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
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
PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

VOL. XXIII.

SIR WILLIAM MONSON'S
NAVAL TRACTS

VOL. II.





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See p 60 note.

THE NAVAL TRACTS
OF
Sir William Monson

IN SIX BOOKS

EDITED
WITH A COMMENTARY DRAWN FROM THE STATE PAPERS
AND OTHER ORIGINAL SOURCES
BY
M. OPPENHEIM

VOL. II.



PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
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CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME



BOOK I. (*continued*)

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Notes to the Cadiz Voyage (<i>continued</i>) | I |
| The Islands Voyage, A.D. 1597 | 21 |
| Notes | 38 |
| The fleet prepared under Lord Thomas Howard, A.D. 1599 | 84 |
| Notes | 87 |
| Voyage of Sir Richard Leveson to the Azores, A.D. 1600 | 112 |
| Notes | 114 |
| Sir Richard Leveson in Ireland, A.D. 1601 | 123 |
| Notes | 125 |
| Voyage of Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson, A.D. 1602 | 151 |
| Notes | 167 |
| Voyage of Sir William Monson, A.D. 1602 | 177 |
| Notes | 183 |
| The fleet prepared under Sir Richard Leveson, A.D. 1603 | 194 |
| Notes | 196 |
| Voyage of the Earl of Cumberland to Puerto Rico, A.D. 1598 | 204 |
| Notes | 215 |
| Places taken during the War, A.D. 1585-1603 | 226 |
| Private Adventurers and their Prizes, A.D. 1585-1603 | 229 |
| The Advantages of keeping a fleet on the Coast of Spain in the Time of War | 232 |
| The names of the ships the Queen left at her Death | 235 |
| To Sir Robert Cecyll about the Reformation of the Navy | 237 |

viii CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Notes | 245 |
| How to get Intelligence on the Coast of Spain and at the Azores | 253 |
| Some Observations about the Queen's ships | 263 |
| The Disasters of some of King Henry VIII.'s ships | 265 |
| The Advice of the Council of War concerning withstanding the Invasion of A.D. 1588 | 267 |
| Exceptions to some points of the Advice | 276 |
| The Queen's Death and the Advantages of the Peace that ensued | 287 |
| A Farewell to the Gentlemen to whom the Author dedicated this Book. | 296 |

APPENDICES

| | |
|--|-----|
| A.—Pedro Estrade's account of the Armada voyage, A.D. 1588 | 299 |
| B.—The Spanish Treasure Fleets of the XVIth century | 309 |
| C.—Papers relating to the St. Valentine | 341 |
| D.—Sir William Monson's Instructions, A.D. 1602 | 372 |
| E.—Sir William Monson's Letters, A.D. 1592-1602 | 376 |

LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME II

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1. BAPTISTA BOAZIO'S CHART OF THE AZORES, A.D. 1597 (<i>Add. MSS.</i> 18109 H.) | <i>To face title</i> |
| 2. CEZIMBRA BAY | <i>To face p. 154</i> |
| 3. SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO | " 220 |
| 4 MAP OF THE WEST INDIES TO ILLUSTRATE BOOK I. OF THE 'TRACTS' | " 334 |

BOOK I.—(*continued.*)

The Cadiz Voyage—(*continued.*)

[7] It is rather strange that Monson did not consider several incidents of the occupation of Cadiz, such as the debate about holding it and his own knighthood, worth mention here, and only refers to the former point in a later book. The first noteworthy circumstance was an exchange of civilities with the Shereef of Morocco. Marbecke says that thirty-eight Moorish slaves escaped from the galleys during, or after, the sea fight of the 21st and swam to the English ships, and that the Generals clothed them and gave them a small vessel in which to go to Morocco. The resolve to send them off in a ship of their own seems to show that the appearance of three Moorish vessels on the 25th was unexpected, but Don Antonio had been trying for years to obtain assistance from the Shereef, and his son, Don Christobal, now with the English fleet, had been for some time at that ruler's court and may have reopened communications. For many years Elizabeth had exchanged courtesies with the Sultan and the minor Mahomedan Powers, and the arrival of the Moorish vessels awoke alarm as to whether it might not portend the working alliance the Spaniards always dreaded. What the Moors actually came for is uncertain. Herrera says in general terms that they came to offer assistance; a modern writer says that it was to offer aid and provisions, and with a request that if the English were not going to hold the city they would hand it over to the Shereef.¹⁰⁶ Dr. de Quesada attributed the Generals' refusal to his own eloquence,¹⁰⁷ but on the 25th it was almost

¹⁰⁶ A. de Castro, *Hist. de Cadiz*, Cadiz, 1845, p. 57. He gives no authority.

¹⁰⁷ 'Here God inspired me with such fire and eloquence that I persuaded the Generals that not only would it diminish their glory to

definitely resolved to hold the city, which is a more adequate explanation, although it seems that on the recommendation of Don Christobal they asked the Moors to furnish supplies if necessary. However, the news spread among the townsfolk and put them in mortal terror; after the English had gone they still feared to return to their homes, saying that they had lost their property, 'and now the Moors will come and carry them off.'

The burning question among the English leaders was, now that Cadiz was possessed, what should be done with it? Was it to be held or evacuated? Essex, having sailed with the intention of holding it, used all his influence in that direction, but 'some of our sea commanders, and especially my colleague, did not only oppose themselves to that design (whose opposition mine Instructions made an absolute bar), but when we came to see how the forces that should be left there might be victualled until succours came, the victuals were for the most part hidden and embezzled, and every ship began at that instant to fear their wants and to talk of going home.'¹⁰⁸ It seems that down to 30th June Essex's ascendancy had been sufficient to silence doubt or opposition, but on that date Sir George Carew wrote that the resolve to hold the city had been altered the previous day on account of a survey of the victuals having shown them to be insufficient to support the garrison until fresh supplies came.¹⁰⁹ Still the question was not finally closed, for some were of opinion that if it was found to be impracticable to keep the city it might be then exchanged for Calais, and on 2nd July another council, attended by all the principal sea and land officers, was held at the Munition House.¹¹⁰ The former decision to garrison the city was, we are told, again debated, and some who had previously supported it had now grown doubtful or had quite changed their views. The colonels, especially, had 'almost all' altered their opinions, but it is remarkable that their chief objection was not so much to the receive aid from others (they having such a powerful fleet), but much more to receive it from the common enemy of both our religions. The earl answered that in the Crusades his ancestors had behaved valorously, and that as a knight he would do no less than they. Both Generals swore to me not to use their aid, to send them back if they came, and if they would not go to fight them; and all the nobles standing round loudly applauded this decision.—Relation of Dr. Francisco de Quesada.

¹⁰⁸ *Omissions of the Cales Voyage.*

¹⁰⁹ *Cecil MSS.* 30th June, Carew to Robert Cecyll.

¹¹⁰ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclix. 50. Some of the previous councils had been held at Essex's quarters. Visitors to Cadiz may be interested in knowing that the house is now No. 230 Calle de la Palma de Hondillo, then belonging to Pedro de Castro. The earl sent his unwilling host a present of plate from England (De Castro, *op. cit.*).

retention of the city as to Essex remaining ; they expressed themselves as quite willing to remain if he would go, but to this he would not agree. Darell, the commissary-general of victuals, called in, reported that two months' provisions for the garrison could not be spared ; other objections were that their Instructions did not authorize an occupation, that the ships left there might be attacked by a superior force, and that to allow part of their force to remain at Cadiz would necessarily prevent them carrying out the further object of the expedition—an attack elsewhere in Spain or a search for the homeward Flota. For these reasons, therefore, the former resolution was to be rescinded and the town and fortifications to be burnt, except the churches and monasteries. The next objective was to be Lagos. Seeing the previous agreement of the colonels to Essex's plan of stopping at Cadiz himself, his reference to the opposition he experienced from the sea commanders, omitting all censure of the soldiers, and the *volte-face* of the latter unless the earl would consent to return himself and leave them, we may infer that the decision to evacuate was come to rather on grounds personal to Essex and his position at court than of military necessity. Vere tells us that the question was 'long disputed,' and that he offered to remain with 4,000 men until the Queen's pleasure was known, but that Essex insisted on staying in person, 'which the rest of the council would not assent unto.' Howard had ever before him the fear of Elizabeth and her anger, however brilliant the success, if her favourite was not returned to her. It was probably quite as much this terror as any desire to thwart the earl that caused him and his flag-officers to put every obstacle in Essex's path, and to their arguments may be attributed the sudden revolution in the minds of the colonels, whose prospects would also be affected by Elizabeth's frowns. It will be observed that they thought that if Essex went the place could be held, but that if he stopped sufficient victuals could not be found, a *non sequitur* which points to the inwardness of their difficulty. The doubt and hesitation existing is indicated by the fact that the Generals did not send off Sir Anthony Ashley with the despatches announcing their success before 1st July, and that even then they left the future open, for the Privy Council wrote to them that they found 'no certainty of your resolution by his report.'¹¹¹ It is not easy to understand why Essex, if he had the retention of Cadiz so much at heart, should have allowed a matter he considered so important to be

¹¹¹ *MS. Council Register*, 7th August. A covering letter from Essex is dated 1st July, but Ashley probably did not leave until later, because in a letter of Raleigh's, dated 7th July, he says that Ashley is its bearer. Ashley did not deliver these despatches until 30th July, little more than a week before the return of the fleet to Plymouth.

affected by his own presence or absence, for there is other evidence besides Monson's to show that there were sufficient provisions.¹¹³ He may have been jealous of giving Vere further opportunity to enhance his reputation, and perhaps his touched susceptibilities now were at the root of his misunderstanding with him in 1597.

Between 21st June and 4th July the Generals made sixty-six knights,¹¹³ most of them, including Monson, obtaining the honour on Sunday, 27th June, before a solemn service held in the cathedral and a sermon preached by Mr. Hopkins, 'a man of good learning and sweet utterance.' Essex was childishly fond of making knights, a prerogative usually accorded to generals exercising any high command. Howard was much more chary of exercising his right, and in 1588 had made only five, two of them being men of the quality of Hawkyns and Frobiser. Here he was carried away by his colleague, and no doubt would have thought it, in the language of the time, 'foul scorn' to himself to have knighted a much smaller number than his fellow general, so they set to work to bestow the *accolade* upon everyone who by any chance of birth, rank, office, or favour could possibly lay claim to it. Knighthood had been considered sufficient reward for Drake, and when conferred on him, in 1581, it was still a high honour; to Essex must be ascribed the discredit of conferring it broadcast, and thus commencing a practice which has degraded it to its present level.¹¹⁴ In Normandy in 1591 he made twenty-two knights, although in his commission he had been particularly ordered to bestow the dignity sparingly; of these Elizabeth remarked that 'my lord had done well to build his almshouse before he made his knights.' The sixty-six heroes now distinguished afforded material for the wits, and it was said of them that

A gentleman of Wales and a knight of Cales
And a laird of the North Countree,
A yeoman of Kent with his yearly rent
Could buy them out all three.

Next year, in the Islands Voyage, Essex restrained himself and made only eight knights, but in Ireland, in 1599, he resumed his former practice and constituted eighty-seven of them. This

¹¹³ For instance, Van Meteren says that the Dutch admirals offered to leave a month's victuals for 2,000 men out of their own squadron alone. See also *post*, p. 9. Slingsby tells us that Essex argued that unless he remained proper supplies would not be sent out, but he could have ensured their despatch with much more certainty by being in England; also that Howard 'did absolutely refuse to return' without him, not a threat that carried much terror.

¹¹³ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclix. 83, 84.

¹¹⁴ However, in fairness, it must be added that Leycester helped by making thirty knights in the Low Countries.

wholesale creation caused much indignation, and Chamberlain gave expression to the general feeling when he wrote to Carleton, 'it is much marvelled that this humour should so possess him that, not content with his first dozens and scores, he should thus fall to huddle them up by half-hundreds; and it is noted as a strange thing that a subject, in the space of seven or eight years (not having been six months together in any one action), should, upon so little service and small desert, make more knights than are in all the realm besides.' His action in this direction was one of the charges brought against him when he returned from Ireland, and did him considerable harm with the Queen, his enemies maintaining that he distributed knighthoods so liberally not to reward merit but to form a following.¹¹⁵ There can be little doubt that if vanity had been the motive in Normandy some such purpose was now in his mind, and the knights made by the Lord Admiral at Cadiz knew that they were indebted rather to his intention to keep level with Essex than to any inclination of his own.

In pursuance of the resolution of the council of war, Cadiz was fired on 4th July, the churches and religious houses being spared as arranged, and the embarkation was commenced. The firing was not very systematically carried out, for of the 1,200 houses in the city only 250 were destroyed and no damage was done to the fortifications, but some of the churches were burnt, no doubt by the spread of the flames.¹¹⁶ During the fortnight that the English had held Cadiz the Duke of Medina Sidonia had been helplessly watching their proceedings in miserable anxiety. Galleons, Flota, and Cadiz had all gone, and the only matter remaining in suspense was where and how the next blow would fall. Anything seemed possible to observers in Spain, and the Venetian ambassador remarked that everyone was expecting to hear of fresh disasters: 'Had the English, immediately after the capture of Cadiz, pushed on to Seville, they would have found no obstacle to the plunder of that most noble and wealthy city, but, in truth, they could not believe that preparations had been so neglected as they were. . . . It is thought the English will not leave these waters until they have seen the end of the India navigation. On this point Francisco Idiaquez, in conversation with me, said that although the English know how to conquer they cannot hold.'¹¹⁷ Medina Sidonia was firmly convinced for

¹¹⁵ Elizabeth cancelled thirty-eight of these creations in one proclamation.

¹¹⁶ Report of Don Cristobal de Rojas to Philip, 27th July. Another statement (*Col. de Doc. Inéd.* xxxvi. p. 410) is that 290 houses were burnt and 685 left undamaged.

¹¹⁷ *State Papers Ven.* 14th, 15th July, 1596. That the English knew better how to win a success than how to profit by it is true

some time that the Generals would go to Lisbon, but Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Tangier were also in his mind, and he was equally unable to assist any of them. Philip was lying ill at Toledo, and on 7th July the duke wrote that he had not received a word of reply to any one of the letters he had written during the preceding seventeen days. He had no money, no supplies, and could collect no men for any effective purpose, for he had not been able to get together 5,000 reliable troops; he could not exaggerate, he said, the little help he had received.¹¹⁸ It was not lack of patriotism. Spain was drained of men, poor in money, empty of provisions and munitions, and without capable government. The duke's disquiet was not lessened when he learnt that on 30th June Essex, with a strong force, had appeared at the bridge of Suazo. What his purpose was, unless it were to try the enemy's strength, is not clear, and it must have been a relief to the small Spanish garrison in the fort there when he retired the next day.

During the whole of the occupation the unwearied Dr. de Quesada had been engaged in getting away the civilian population, and he was still employed in the work when the troops were embarking. He boasted that 8,000 or 9,000 persons had been brought out under his guidance, carrying with them little less than 1,000,000 ducats in money and jewels, and that he did not believe that the English had obtained half a million in plunder of that kind. Vere seems to have had an inkling of the state of affairs, for he one day threatened Quesada with personal violence, saying that the English had been defrauded of 200,000 ducats in ransoms, money, and jewels by those whom the clergyman had got passed out within two days. Quesada had been the medium of communication between the opposing leaders, but on 30th June Howard wrote direct to Medina Sidonia. He began by reminding the duke that he had been his opponent in 1588, not, perhaps, the most tactful way of recalling himself to memory. The purport of his letter was to offer to exchange his prisoners, not being hostages or held to ransom by particular persons, for those Englishmen in the Spanish galleys. After some negotiation the proposal was accepted, and on 5th July, when the fleet was already under sail, a galley, which had fifty-one English-

enough, but the Spanish admission shows a sounder appreciation of the condition of things than that evinced by a predecessor of Idiaquez in 1586, when he wanted to know whether England was not quaking with fear of Spain (*ante*, i. p. 134).

¹¹⁸ *Col. de Doc. Indd.* pp. 324, 375, 378. On 31 July, Philip wrote approving the duke's conduct and thanking him. Other people were not so fortunate. Thirty persons connected with the defence of Cadiz were tried and condemned, including Portocarrero (galleys), Sotomayor (galleons), and Flores (Flota); (Fernandez Duro, *Arm. Española*, iii. p. 128). The city was freed from taxes for ten years (Abreu).

men on board, was seen approaching.¹¹⁹ By some mischance the galley, *La Fama*, was fired upon—only one shot, but it killed one and wounded two men. The mistake being discovered the Lord Admiral ordered a salutation to be sounded with his trumpets, and Essex was furious at the blunder, telling the commander of the galley, Hernando Hurtado, that he would hang the captain of the ship that had fired. He might have found it difficult, but the Spaniards, not to be outdone in courtesy, begged him not to think again about it, the sufferers having been persons of no birth or consequence.

In accordance with the decision of the council of war held on 2nd July, the destination was to be Lagos, and there is no indication in the minutes that action at any other place had been discussed. Seville may have been dismissed as too dangerous,¹²⁰ although it is difficult to see what attraction Lagos can have presented either as a strategical point or in the way of plunder, while, if the leaders were in earnest about looking in at the other Spanish ports and going after the Flota, and if their stores were really diminishing as rapidly as figures showed, it was sheer waste of limited time. They could not have intended to hold Lagos or any other point on St. Vincent, for if they had no victuals to hold Cadiz they had none to stay elsewhere, but there may have been a reminiscence of Drake's operations in that region in 1587. Calms and head-winds had delayed the fleet,¹²¹ which was off Terrubillas, the haven of Faro, on 13th July. Much against Howard's will the troops, chiefly Dutch according to Van Meteren, but the whole army according to Sir George Carew, were landed and marched to the town on the 14th, which was found abandoned. Little booty was obtained, but the place was occupied for two days while the country round was scoured. On the 16th it was burnt and the next day the men were re-embarked. Howard, who had landed with the soldiers, had been obliged to return to his ship, being affected by the heat, but, if he was incapacitated, his flag officers are guilty of neglecting to water the fleet, if Monson's comment on the subject refers to this time. The chief prize from Faro was the library of Jerome Osorio, Bishop of the Algarves, the writer of an 'Epistolary Admonition' to Elizabeth,

¹¹⁹ Marbecke says that only thirty-nine were received, the others being too far off in Spain. Some had been twenty years at the oar, some had belonged to the Drake-Hawkins fleet, but, unfortunately, thirty more men belonging to Drake's expedition did not arrive at Seville until September (*Cecil MSS.* 3rd June, 1597).

¹²⁰ Apparently it had been considered: 'it was by all our seamen thought a capital offence to name the going over the bar at San Lucar' (*Omissions of the Cales Voyage*).

¹²¹ Portocarrero's galleys were dogging the fleet and had taken a flyboat. The *Swiftsure* had been sent home, being leaky.

who now retorted after the manner of sovereigns. This library Essex took for himself and presented to the newly-formed Bodleian.¹²² We may infer from Monson that Howard had opposed the original resolution to proceed to Lagos, and he now succeeded in persuading Essex to relinquish it.

[8] On 20th July the fleet was off Lagos and shortly afterwards rounded Cape St. Vincent, having been followed to that point by Portocarrero with his galleys. The intervening days seem to have been passed in prolonged wrangling, under the guise of councils, as to the ensuing proceedings, for here was the parting of the ways between Essex, who thought enough had not yet been done, and those who were honestly satisfied with the success obtained or wanted to get home with their booty. The failure to take the Flota might be explained by the conditions existing on 21st June, and in any case it had been destroyed and was lost to the Spaniards. The attempt to hold Cadiz was, as has been noticed in the Introduction, a serious undertaking and might fairly evoke diverse opinions; but a cruise for the homeward West Indiamen and the carracks was a normal procedure and the criterion by which to test the earnestness of the principal officers. Essex urged them to stand away from St. Vincent for the Azores, but although seven weeks' victuals were admittedly on board, he urged it in vain. On the 23rd they were in the latitude of Lisbon, and 'there I again pressed the lying for them with a selected fleet.' Essex proposed to send home the troops and sick in any defective or unprovided ships, but Howard and Raleigh, and, by implication, all the other sea officers except Lord Thomas Howard and the Dutch admirals, were in opposition. Essex was supported by Vere, and no doubt other soldiers, but their aid was worth little in an essentially maritime question, to be decided by the seamen. All he could do was to insist that every man should sign his opinion in case their action should be called in question by the Queen. Although the earl and Monson both name Raleigh as a leader of the opposition, it is doubtful whether the former considered him chiefly responsible, or he would scarcely have maintained the improved relations with Raleigh which certainly existed after the return of the expedition. On the other hand, his attitude to Howard became more and more hostile.¹²³ Of course Essex was right in desiring to look for the Flota, which came into San Lucar on 17 September¹²⁴ with silver

¹²² Essex's gift has been long since lost in the mass of the Bodleian, but a few of the books are specifically mentioned in Hearne's *Reliquiae Bodleianae*, London, 1703.

¹²³ However, Raleigh was held to have persuaded Howard (Birch, *Bacon Papers*, ii. p. 122), or the writer, Anthony Bacon, thought so.

¹²⁴ *State Papers Ven.* 30th September. Two carracks arrived at Lisbon on 2nd August (*Cecil MSS.* 12th August)

to the value of 12,000,000 ducats, but whether sufficient provisions could have been got together to enable him to keep out long enough, since the Spaniards could not have been at the Azores until the beginning of September, is a point not now to be resolved. The only piece of evidence bearing on it is a statement made in August by Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Robert Cecyll, that the ships were then turning out at Plymouth 'great stores of all sorts of victuals,' enough, even then, to supply a squadron to go in search of the Flota, and so far as this testimony goes it seems to show that the lack of provisions had been exaggerated all through. Slingsby makes only one casual reference to any scantiness of victuals, but according to him the wind came easterly after doubling St. Vincent, and one of the numerous councils then decided to run for the Azores, subject to any change of wind. It soon changed, and then the squabbles recommenced. It is unfortunate that Raleigh has not left on record his reasons for the course he advised, and his silence may be used as an argument either for or against him. In his case, at least, it can hardly have been a desire to get his plunder home safely, for it is doubtful whether he got anything at Cadiz; he said that he obtained nothing. But besides want of provisions he and others refer to that usual concomitant of Elizabethan voyages, an outbreak of disease in the fleet, which may have been an additional ground for his advice.¹²⁵ He had every motive to make his peace with Essex; observers with the fleet noticed that both at Plymouth and during the voyage he had never lost an opportunity of behaving pleasantly to him, therefore it must be assumed that the open opposition at the close was due either to considerations which appeared to him to be of overwhelming force, or that Essex did not hold him to be in the forefront of the obstruction he experienced.

All that Essex could do was to persuade the seamen to look into Coruña and Ferrol, and that he obtained with difficulty; 'to the Groyne with cart ropes I drew them, for I vowed and protested against their refusal and parted company with them when they offered to hold another course.' Nothing was seen in the two ports because Philip's ships were divided between Lisbon, which the Generals had been particularly ordered not to attempt, and Los Pasages, lying in the eastern corner of the north coast of Spain. Finding nothing to do at Coruña and Ferrol, a final council was held, at which Essex tried to persuade his unruly team to run along the northern coast to visit Santander, San Sebastian, Los Pasages, and all the other likely ports. Howard refused, 'complaining of wants, and objecting our being embayed, and I

¹²⁵ On the other hand, Monson says that it was exceptionally healthy. But see *post*, pp. 10, 12.

know not what. In which opinion Sir W. Raleigh strengthened him, and they were both desirous to take upon them the honour of breaking that design.' Remembering the strong views expressed by Drake's masters and pilots in 1589 on the subject of getting embayed in the bottom of the Bay, we may take it that, in this respect, Howard's fear was a very genuine one. Nothing more could be done to keep the fleet together, and every one seems to have hastened home. Raleigh was first,¹²⁶ on 6th August, with 'a great and dangerous infection on board,' he says; the others arrived on the dates given by Monson. They were home before the last of their few despatches, dated 1st August, and sent off after it had been decided not to risk getting embayed, in which the Generals said that 'the best seamen' thought it too hazardous, but in which appears no trace of Essex's passion.¹²⁷ They were sorry, they wrote, to be at the end of the service, 'but glad to think we shall so soon come to see your fair and sweet eyes.' It may be a question whether Essex felt as keenly at sea the crosses he afterwards thought so perverse when he sat down to write about them, spurred by the attacks and insinuations of open and secret enemies.

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it up, must have inferred that they had relinquished the cruise after the Flota that she had so much at heart. In consequence of this news Robert Cecyll wrote on 6th August to Sir Ferdinando Gorges at Plymouth to prepare to re-victual certain ships to go to sea again to meet the West India fleet. On the day that Cecyll wrote, Raleigh was at Plymouth. On the 7th, the day before Howard returned, the Privy Council drew up a long despatch to the Generals, in which the position was reviewed.¹²⁸ The Queen, they wrote, had heard nothing positive since Ashley's return, and 'hath entered into divers doubts what she might expect from you since your coming from Cadiz, finding no certainty of your resolution upon his report.' She understood from him that they were then debating whether to go after the carracks and Flota, or to stand along the coast of Spain for prizes and destroy the shipping in Coruña, Ferrol, and the northern ports. Since then she had heard from returning vessels that they had taken Faro and marched inland, 'although very hot and inconvenient to make so long a march without any profit arising thereby, as is reported'; and hearing that they are now at the Bayona Islands she thinks it well to give them some advice. Then the Instructions¹²⁹ are recapitulated, and the Generals are reminded that they promised that rich towns should not be plundered by the soldiers, whereas she now finds that they have been plundered apparently without check. She then requires them to remember their pledge to cruise for the Flota, and tells them to send home their superfluous ships and do it; 'we find her Majesty most earnestly bent to have these, her remembrances and advices, to be carefully followed.' If the Generals are home before they receive this despatch, the Privy Council does not know what course to recommend, but suggests that, in that case, they shall fit out a squadron and go to sea again for the Flota, and to that end orders have been sent to Plymouth to prepare victuals. Altogether, both for Essex, who was chiefly responsible for the irregular plunder of Cadiz to private profit, and for Howard, who was answerable for the absence of any attempt on the Flota, it must have been an unpleasant welcome at Plymouth, and have suggested that some disagreeable moments were in store for them. Although his letter is lost, apparently one of Howard's first proceedings after reaching home was to write to Elizabeth for money to pay the seamen's wages, and this was, of course, the one thing required to bring her temper to boiling point. When she wrote to the Generals to congratulate them on the capture of Cadiz she thanked them for making her 'dreadful, famous, and renowned.' Now she could

¹²⁸ *MS. Council Register*, 7th August, 1596. It was probably sent off before it was known that Essex and Howard were back.

¹²⁹ Quoted *ante*, i. p. 366.

only see 'the inconvenience which we suspected would follow this journey, that it would be rather an action of honour and virtue against the enemy, and particular profit by spoil to the army, than any way profitable to ourself.'¹³⁰ The words are noteworthy, read with the other phrase attributed to her, that she would not make war but only arm for defence, as displaying the mental limitations in her comprehension of the objects of warfare. She never understood that the object of war is not to pay expenses or even make a profit, but to crush the enemy, and that to stand on the defensive only is to court defeat.

From the time that the idea of cruising to the Azores was abandoned Essex appears to have taken up another plan, either of his own initiative or suggested by Vere, that of using the troops before they were disbanded for the recovery of Calais. On 28th July he wrote to his secretary, Edward Reynolds, directing him to go to the French and Dutch residents and propose to them to get their masters to bring forward the proposition. The London citizens also were to be moved to offer some aid, but, before all things, Essex's hand was not to be seen, for 'I must, like the watermen, row one way and look another,'¹³¹ meaning that his enemies at court would oppose the scheme in every way if he were known to be the author. The two residents promised their co-operation, the City communicated with Burghley, but Elizabeth was in no mood for fresh adventures, especially one which seemed to be principally for the benefit of Henry IV., and perhaps Essex found on his return that his personal interests required his presence at court to secure his footing. At any rate he seems to have accepted, without further contest, a letter from Robert Cecyll, of 12th August, in which he was told that there were not three ships available, that there was a 'great infection'¹³² in the fleet, that the seamen had deserted and the soldiers were disbanded, 'and so nothing left for you to do.' If anything more was to be done Elizabeth's desire was that it should be a squadron to meet the Flota, but there was no willingness on the part of those who were expected to undertake the duty. Essex was now interested in Calais, Howard and Raleigh wanted to be near the Queen to defend themselves, and the officers and men wanted to get away to spend their prize money. On 8th August Sir Ferdinando Gorges wrote that many excuses were being made, but that the squadron might be got ready, and that the returned fleet was putting ashore large quantities of provisions. He and his colleague

¹³⁰ *Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 363.

¹³¹ Birch, *Bacon Papers*, ii. p. 77.

¹³² So far this supports Raleigh and others, and contradicts Monson; but Cecyll was only repeating what was told him by the Lord Admiral, confirmed, it is true, by Lord Thomas Howard, who had hitherto seconded Essex, and who might expect the command of a new squadron.

at Plymouth, William Stallenge, thought that a score of ships, including ten of the Queen's, with 3,800 men, might be fitted out in three weeks. But on 11th August Stallenge wrote again to the Privy Council that Howard was against going to sea, and that the fleet had gone up Channel, so that he had given up all hope of getting a squadron ready, especially as the victuals were being wasted to make an excuse for those unwilling to sail. On the same day the Council were writing to Howard pressing him again on the subject, 'so desirous we find her Majesty to have some adventure,' but he, saying that there were no ships fit for sea, nor provisions for them, had taken the matter into his own hands and gone up Channel to the Downs.

Elizabeth's preoccupation now was to recover some of the plunder brought home from Cadiz and to get rid of the soldiers and seamen, if possible without paying them. The troops from the Low Countries were to be sent back again, but before they went, and before the others were disbanded or sent to Ireland, they were all to be searched and the value of any booty found was to be deducted from their wages. The Council wrote that the Queen believed that if the ships were searched so much pillage would be found that she 'need not pay wages.'¹³³ The Dutch squadron was not to be put to this test, but the word of the officers taken, and on the 14th August Elizabeth wrote a cordial letter of praise and thanks to the Admiral Duyvenvoord. A month later Essex sent gold chains to Duyvenvoord and Gerbrandtsen, and, to the former, a diamond ring as well. Notwithstanding the efforts of Elizabeth's commissioners not much plunder could be found, and of that found little could be claimed for the Crown, because most of the owners produced licences from the Generals for things of value, and the commissioners therefore could not seize but could only schedule. Ashley, as the Queen's representative on the spot, was held chiefly responsible for neglecting to secure her interests, and as he was also suspected of private speculation on his own account he had a rather unhappy time. On 10th August he wrote to Sir Gely Meyricke, Essex's steward, that what had happened to him was too painful to dwell upon, but as Meyricke was an associate he hoped there would be honour between them: 'I do hope, notwithstanding these storms, you will, in all respects, proceed gentlemanlike with me. I pray conceal all for fear of the worst, nor be it not known I have writ to you.' Within a fortnight Ashley and Meyricke had fallen out, and the former had to admit various things, including a chain sold here for 530*l*. He now took a more manly tone: 'If it be not lawful to take things of

¹³³ *Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 337. She had promised to allow the men a third of all plunder, not being treasure or jewels, *ante*, i. p. 376.

that nature but with caution to restore, I should think it (under correction) scarce warrantable to offend the public enemy.'¹³⁴ The Council had already expressed 'how ill the Queen took it that there was so much spoil and so little reckoning made for her,' but the soldiers could not have made a cleaner sweep or have shown greater skill in concealing their more valuable acquisitions had they been practised in sacking Spanish cities for a generation. Bedsteads, pots, pans, kettles, tusks, sugar, green ginger, scrap iron, bales of paper, linen, and the like were of course noticed, but money and jewels evaded the commissioners. We get a reference to seventy-nine bags of money taken out of a fly-boat by Monson and delivered to Meyricke, but if it puzzled the commissioners at the time to follow the trail we are scarcely likely to be more successful now. An abstract of plunder sent in by the officers of the customs at the port towns is made up of heavy articles of little value, but the commissioners at Plymouth obtained admissions to the amount of 12,800*l.*; Vere owned to 3,628*l.*, Raleigh to 1,769*l.*,¹³⁵ and Conyers Clifford to 3,256*l.* Elizabeth claimed the ransom money for private individuals and for the city, as security for which some forty of the hostages had been brought home, and called Burghley 'a miscreant' because he supported Essex. In March 1597 the hostages were at Ware, complaining of their 'new and harsher treatment,' and saying that they expected the remittances from Spain in a month. The Venetian ambassador says that Philip was so dissatisfied with the defence of Cadiz that he refused to assist in recovering them, and they remained in England until July 1603, when the accession of James I. freed them, the latter part of their sojourn having been passed in the Bridewell prison.¹³⁶

Although more might have been attempted by the Generals,

¹³⁴ *Cecil MSS.* 10th, 23rd August, 14th September. Ashley's last letter was written from the Fleet prison.

¹³⁵ But on 7th July Raleigh wrote to Cecyll, 'I hope her most excellent Majesty will take my labours and endeavours in good part. Other riches than the hope thereof I have none; only I have received a blow,' referring to his wound (*Cott. MSS.* Vesp. C. xiii. f. 290). And in his *Relation*, after saying that he does not know what the other officers got, 'for my own part I have gotten a lame leg and a deformed. For the rest either I spake too late or it was otherwise resolved. . . . I have possession of naught but poverty and pain.'

¹³⁶ Abreu, *Saqueo de Cadix*, p. 45; *Cecil MSS.* 34 March, 1597; *State Papers Ven.* 38 July, 1596. The Cadiz expedition cost Elizabeth 78,000*l.* (*State Papers*, cclvi. 107), nor was that the whole cost, for it did not include the ships sent by the port towns at their own expense. So far as the direct, obvious profit in which she delighted, was concerned, Elizabeth must have considered it a bad speculation. The Dutch squadron cost the States-General 500,000 florins (Meteren).

perhaps further proceedings would not have added materially to their success, which, so far as it went, was complete enough. Less ambitious in intention than the voyage of 1589, the Cadiz journey stood out in striking contrast, in design, execution, and results, to the former ill-considered enterprise. English wealth had not been greatly increased directly, but the weakness, poverty, and incapacity existing in Spain had been advertised to the world, and the prospects and self-reliance of its enemies proportionately strengthened. If we may believe the reports sent home to Essex by one of his spies, the fall of Cadiz almost maddened Spain into revolt; we are told of secret meetings of the *grandees* to debate the advisability of replacing Philip by his son, of proceedings against the two secretaries, Juan de Idiaquez and Christovão de Moura, of insults shouted at Philip in public, and of a shower of lampoons and epigrams, directed at him and those responsible, nightly affixed in the streets and public places. Another correspondent, perhaps more reliable, for Philip was never within measurable distance of losing the affection of his Castilian subjects, simply says that the effect was to induce those surrounding him to urge him to resume more active measures. The King required little urging, for although worn out with work and disease, his one object for the moment was revenge, and he told the Papal Nuncio that he would pawn the very candlesticks on his study table to obtain it. It seemed likely that he would be reduced to some such straits before long, for the tottering edifice of Spanish credit, long supported with difficulty by means of loans, assignations of revenue, forced advances of the silver from the Indies belonging to private owners, and similar expedients had come down with a crash as one effect, and not the least, of the events at Cadiz. The possibility of Philip's eventual defeat had long loomed before the European financiers, but the ease with which the English had conquered, and the inability of the Spaniards to make any effective resistance, was a surprise even to those to whom Spain was no longer a political Behemoth, and one of the first consequences was that Philip found it yet more difficult to raise money. But money was the one essential for his new offensive, and he cut the knot of his embarrassments in November 1596 by a general repudiation of his debts, thus freeing the mortgaged revenues.¹³⁷ Men were

¹³⁷ Repudiation was not found to be the easy remedy it appeared, and in 1597 an arrangement was come to by which creditors sacrificed part of their capital and interest. Besides smaller trickeries Philip had already executed a State bankruptcy in 1575, and made a settlement which Ranke calculates as a dividend of 58 per cent. of the capital involved. After the revolt of the Netherlands, Castile and Sicily were the only provinces of the Empire which produced any

ruined in all the chief commercial cities in Europe, and the armies of the Archduke Albert reduced to impotence, but, for the moment, Philip was at ease and enabled to pay his way.

While Essex was at Cadiz, Brochero de Anaya had proposed a counter raid with ten galleys to the English coast, but Philip had refused permission, saying that he wanted a more complete revenge. The usual preparations for the usual invasion had been leisurely going on in the Spanish ports, and would no doubt have finished with the customary postponement, had not the insult to his coasts stung Philip into action at any cost, and decided him upon Ireland. During the autumn months information pointing to a pending invasion came in from various quarters, and moderate preparations were made afloat and ashore to meet it: the land forces were ordered to be ready for mobilization, the *Hope*, *Vanguard*, *Tramontana*, *Charles*, *Quittance*, and *Moon* were commissioned in October and November, additionally to the weak *Channel Guard*,¹³⁸ and a pinnace under Captain Legatt, Monson's companion in captivity in 1592,¹³⁹ was sent down to watch off the *Burlings*, another off *Finisterre*, and a third at the *Scilly Islands*. The Spanish armada was under the command of Don Martin de Padilla Conde de St. Gadea, Adelantado of Castile, with Diego Brochero de Anaya as his Vice-Admiral, and to the latter is assigned the drafting of the plan of action, which was primarily to seize an Irish port in aid of the rebels in Ireland,¹⁴⁰ or, if forced by stress of weather to the English coast, to occupy Milford Haven, where Philip expected to be helped by sympathisers. After the departure of

surplus of revenue when the expenses of administration had been defrayed. The whole dependence of the Government was upon the treasure from America.

¹³⁸ *Pipe Office Accounts*, 2,234. Only the *Antelope*, *Answer*, *Advantage*, *Adventure* and *Aid* were already in commission.

¹³⁹ Legatt, after his return, was sent out again, and spent Christmas Day off Coruña in very bad weather. He said that he would not repeat his experience for a rich India ship (*Cecil MSS.* 6th January, 1597).

¹⁴⁰ In September 1595 the Earl of Tyrone had written to Philip that the only hope of freeing Ireland from the English yoke lay with him, and that now or never was the time for Spanish help. He asked for 2,000 or 3,000 men, and stores, not later than May 1596, and with them had no doubt of success within a year. In January Philip promised him the aid requested (*Carew MSS.* iii. pp. 122, 131). See also *ante*, i. p. 377. As early as 1593 Philip had sanctioned the despatch of small assistance to the Irish patriots. At the same time, as declared in Parliament that year, he was considering the offer of Scotch ports made by the Catholic malcontents of that country, but being necessarily an ardent believer in a short sea passage, for every mile of distance greatly increased the risks of his fleet, the tender was never considered really seriously. There were political reasons besides for hesitation to act through Scotland.

Essex and Howard the preparations were pressed on, until towards the end of September Padilla had about 100 ships and pinnaces, and 16,500 troops ready.¹⁴¹ But only some twenty of his fleet were men-of-war, and to obtain these the Venetian ambassador tells us that Spain had been ransacked of the last ship and the last gun. Fifty-three of the vessels were Flemish or Easterling merchantmen, used as transports or store ships, and the composition of the fleet is an effective commentary on the impotence of Spain and the policy of uninspired caution which is usually considered a merit in Elizabeth. If, after eight years of preparation for his second invasion, Philip could only get together twenty fighting ships,¹⁴² it is sufficient proof that he should never have been allowed to get a fleet together again at all, and could not have done so had Elizabeth struck hard with her always efficient navy, as those who understood the real conditions continually advised her to do. The want of men was as marked as the want of ships, and nearly every language in Europe was to be heard in the fleet, 'mariners of all nations are constrained to serve; the Dutch assembled and went to the Adelantado demanding pay, but were driven aboard with weapons'; another witness, who had also been present, said, 'no mariner, of what nation soever he be, is suffered to depart, but is constrained to serve.'¹⁴³ The general equipment of this compound armada was very poor in every respect, but such as it was it was ready, and Philip ordered it to sail, notwithstanding the lateness of the season. His admirals understood the risks better than he did, and a council decided to send a memorial protesting against the order, but the protest was made in vain and only evoked an imperative command to sail. After two or three attempts Padilla got to sea from Lisbon on 1st October, and on 17th was off Finisterre, where he was struck by a south-westerly gale which ended the second invasion, and when the weather cleared and the shattered remains of the fleet had recovered shelter, it was found that between thirty and forty ships, including seven men-of-war, with at least 2,000 troops, had been lost. 'The Adelantado's fleet is so ruined,' wrote the Venetian ambassador, 'that out of the 12,000 and upwards who were on board, not more than 2,500 remain. The larger number of the sailors have deserted; if his Majesty intends to use his fleet next year he will have to reconstruct it.'

¹⁴¹ *State Papers Ven.* 2^d November, 1596.

¹⁴² The Venetian ambassador says twenty-four; an English pilot, who was with the fleet, says twenty (*State Papers Eliz.* cclxii. 37). According to Fernandez Duro there were eleven more galleons available (*Arm. Española*, iii. p. 129).

¹⁴³ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclx. 87; Hist. MSS. Com., App. to 15th Rep. pt. vii. (*Somerset MSS.*), p. 22.

What operation Philip had necessary in his mind is not quite plain. If the intent of the fleet was an invasion—that is, to throw troops into Ireland to assist the rebels, the fleet is more escaping and leaving the army in Ireland with the help of the rebels—the movement was a pure expedient one. If the possibility of the combined force being self-sustaining, or dependent on only occasional and chance supplies of stores and reinforcements, had been accurately calculated. But the alternative plan of seizing Milford Haven was to repeat the strategy of 1588 under more unfavourable circumstances. In both cases Philip contemplated a fleet action, but in 1588 it was to be fought in the Channel within striking distance of London, and with Parma's army to follow up a victory; here, it was to be fought in the Bay of Biscay or in St. George's Channel by a much smaller fleet without any supporting army, and with a prize in the confines of the kingdom, the possession of which promised no decisive result, as the prize. Not in the event of a lost victory, was either fleet or army strong enough to continue the invasion without reinforcements, yet Philip had no reserves and could not hope to keep open communications in case of an English land and sea force which would grow larger day by day. The truth was, although few Englishmen or Spaniards appreciated it, that invasion had long been impracticable. England had grown in strength since 1588, while Spain had weakened: invasion was feasible in that year with the force Philip had at command, and under the strategic conditions then obtaining in the Low Countries and in France. Those conditions no longer existed, and to compensate for their absence the King would have to set forth a much larger fleet and army than that of 1588; but as the preparation of the Armada had strained his resources to breaking point, and as Spain was infinitely poorer and weaker in every respect than in the Armada year, the equipment of an expedition on the scale required was impossible to an exhausted nation.

The scheme of an Irish descent may have been Brochero's, but Philip's sequel to its failure must have been his own: in December he wrote to the Cardinal Archduke Albert, suggesting that the latter should collect troops at Calais and invade England forthwith, transporting the army across the Channel in light vessels. Philip can only have hoped for the success of such an attempt on the supposition that, as prudence and forethought had failed to win a prosperous issue, he might now anticipate a miracle. More disastrous to Spain than mere defeat, as a sign of the causes sapping national life, was the spirit of Herrera's comment, written a few years afterwards, on the 1596 failure: 'This, and the other misfortunes which happened to this country during the war with England, did not proceed from want of human foresight, nor from the valour of the enemy,

but from the will of God, who was pleased to permit it for His ends.'¹⁴⁴ In a religious race God's will is the equivalent of the explanation of betrayal offered by a people of another type; both equally imply loss of prestige, power, and self-respect, and degeneration of national fibre.

On 2nd November, a little more than a fortnight, allowing for the difference between the English and Spanish calendars, after one of those fortunate winds which have so often blown for England had destroyed the Spanish fleet,¹⁴⁵ the Queen authorized the calling together of a committee of experts to discuss the best measures to be taken for the national defence. Elizabeth's resolution was rather late, for, if things had gone as the Spaniards hoped, Padilla should have been in Ireland or at Milford Haven before she had made up her mind. The committee consisted of Burghley, as president, Essex, Lords Willoughby, Burgh, North, and Norreys, Raleigh, Sir Conyers Clifford, Sir William Knollys, Sir Francis Vere, and Sir George Carew. The committee could by no means agree as to what might be expected; some thought that a serious invasion was intended, others that only a raid on a southern port in revenge for Cadiz was to be feared. All the Channel ports, the Thames, Holland, and Scotland were dwelt on as in danger; only Lord Willoughby thought of Ireland.¹⁴⁶ Raleigh delivered an opinion which was unimpeachable in its reasoning, and therefore, dealing as it did with such a mediocrity as Philip, wrong in its conclusions. Seeing that it had taken the King three years to prepare for the conquest of Portugal, and three years to prepare the Armada, he could not understand how Philip could have ships or stores or men enough for invasion. In other words, he could not conceive that Philip would send a fleet to sea just strong enough to fight once, but not strong enough to conquer, nor to stand the strain of the continued fighting that might be expected. He did not believe that the Spaniards would dare to seize any southern port before gaining the command of the sea, and thought that there was no need of fortifications anywhere but in the

¹⁴⁴ *Historia General*, iii. p. 645.

¹⁴⁵ 'Fortunate' in the sense that, with the exception of the Dutch, we have always fought worse sailormen than ourselves. Gales have not blown providentially, but the instinctive adaptability of the Englishman to the sea has been most clearly brought out under unfavourable conditions of weather which were therefore more to be desired by, and more fortunate for, us than for our adversaries. The student of naval history will recall the numerous instances in which heavy weather has destroyed the enemy or intensified his difficulties, while the Englishman, equally exposed to it, has skilfully used it to obtain or complete a success. The sum of offensive advantage thus gained has been incalculable.

¹⁴⁶ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclx. 82, 83, 93.

What operation Philip had precisely in his mind is not quite plain ; if the object of the fleet was an evasion raid—that is, to throw troops into Ireland to assist the rebels, the fleet at once escaping and leaving the army to hold its own with the help of the rebels—the movement was a quite legitimate one, if the possibilities of the combined force being self-supporting, or dependent on only occasional and chance supplies of stores and reinforcements, had been accurately calculated. But the alternative plan of seizing Milford Haven was to repeat the strategy of 1588, under more unfavourable circumstances. In both cases Philip contemplated a fleet action, but in 1588 it was to be fought in the Channel within striking distance of London, and with Parma's army to follow up a victory ; here, it was to be fought in the Bay of Biscay or in St. George's Channel by a much smaller fleet without any supporting army, and with a port on the confines of the kingdom, the possession of which promised no decisive result, as the prize. Nor, in the event of a first victory, was either fleet or army strong enough to continue the invasion without reinforcements, yet Philip had no reserves and could not hope to keep open communications in face of an English land and sea force which would grow larger day by day. The truth was, although few Englishmen or Spaniards appreciated it, that invasion had long been impracticable. England had grown in strength since 1588, while Spain had weakened ; invasion was feasible in that year with the force Philip had at command, and under the strategic conditions then obtaining in the Low Countries and in France. Those conditions no longer existed, and to compensate for their absence the King would have to set forth a much larger fleet and army than that of 1588 ; but as the preparation of the Armada had strained his resources to breaking-point, and as Spain was infinitely poorer and weaker in every respect than in the Armada year, the equipment of an expedition on the scale required was impossible to an exhausted nation.

The scheme of an Irish descent may have been Brochero's, but Philip's sequel to its failure must have been his own ; in December he wrote to the Cardinal Archduke Albert, suggesting that the latter should collect troops at Calais and invade England forthwith, transporting the army across the Channel in light vessels. Philip can only have hoped for the success of such an attempt on the supposition that, as prudence and forethought had failed to win a prosperous issue, he might now anticipate a miracle. More disastrous to Spain than mere defeat, as a sign of the causes sapping national life, was the spirit of Herrera's comment, written a few years afterwards, on the 1596 failure : 'This, and the other misfortunes which happened to this country during the war with England, did not proceed from want of human foresight, nor from the valour of the enemy,

but from the will of God, who was pleased to permit it for His ends.¹⁴⁴ In a religious race God's will is the equivalent of the explanation of betrayal offered by a people of another type; both equally imply loss of prestige, power, and self-respect, and degeneration of national fibre.

On 2nd November, a little more than a fortnight, allowing for the difference between the English and Spanish calendars, after one of those fortunate winds which have so often blown for England had destroyed the Spanish fleet,¹⁴⁵ the Queen authorized the calling together of a committee of experts to discuss the best measures to be taken for the national defence. Elizabeth's resolution was rather late, for, if things had gone as the Spaniards hoped, Padilla should have been in Ireland or at Milford Haven before she had made up her mind. The committee consisted of Burghley, as president, Essex, Lords Willoughby, Burgh, North, and Norreys, Raleigh, Sir Conyers Clifford, Sir William Knollys, Sir Francis Vere, and Sir George Carew. The committee could by no means agree as to what might be expected; some thought that a serious invasion was intended, others that only a raid on a southern port in revenge for Cadiz was to be feared. All the Channel ports, the Thames, Holland, and Scotland were dwelt on as in danger; only Lord Willoughby thought of Ireland.¹⁴⁶ Raleigh delivered an opinion which was unimpeachable in its reasoning, and therefore, dealing as it did with such a mediocrity as Philip, wrong in its conclusions. Seeing that it had taken the King three years to prepare for the conquest of Portugal, and three years to prepare the Armada, he could not understand how Philip could have ships or stores or men enough for invasion. In other words, he could not conceive that Philip would send a fleet to sea just strong enough to fight once, but not strong enough to conquer, nor to stand the strain of the continued fighting that might be expected. He did not believe that the Spaniards would dare to seize any southern port before gaining the command of the sea, and thought that there was no need of fortifications anywhere but in the

¹⁴⁴ *Historia General*, iii. p. 645.

¹⁴⁵ 'Fortunate' in the sense that, with the exception of the Dutch, we have always fought worse sailormen than ourselves. Gales have not blown providentially, but the instinctive adaptability of the Englishman to the sea has been most clearly brought out under unfavourable conditions of weather which were therefore more to be desired by, and more fortunate for, us than for our adversaries. The student of naval history will recall the numerous instances in which heavy weather has destroyed the enemy or intensified his difficulties, while the Englishman, equally exposed to it, has skilfully used it to obtain or complete a success. The sum of offensive advantage thus gained has been incalculable.

¹⁴⁶ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclx. 82, 83, 93.

Thames.¹⁴⁷ Raleigh fell into the error of assuming that Philip and the Spanish officers possessed his own clearness of perception and grasp of strategical principles.

If we may judge from the information given by prisoners to the Spaniards, there was a general belief in the Cadiz fleet that the Earl of Cumberland was coming with reinforcements, but in reality there was no such intention. On 21st December, 1595, he was at Portsmouth preparing for sea, and desired that his commission of the previous summer might be continued; this was granted, and on the following 16th January he wrote to Robert Cecyll, from on board his new ship the *Malice Scourge*, that he hoped to be back by the end of March, but was delayed at present by foul weather.¹⁴⁸ In the beginning of February he put to sea, but was forced back with his mainmast sprung, and bad weather kept him in port until March, when he was stayed by the Queen's order.¹⁴⁹ He did not go to sea again himself during 1596, but fitted out the *Ascension* (400 tons, 34 guns), Captain Francis Slingsby, 'chiefly to look for such ships as should come from Lisbon.' Instead of falling in with rich prizes, Slingsby was unlucky enough to come upon a Spanish squadron under Pedro de Zubiaur, and the *Ascension* had a desperate fight with two of the Spaniards, losing twenty-two men, before she escaped.¹⁵⁰ She then returned, having made a profitless voyage.

¹⁴⁷ *Works*, Oxford, 1829, viii. p. 677. Raleigh was a 'pure navy' man, 'either the enemy will give us time to prepare our navy and then it (fortifications) shall not need, or he will give us no time, and then we shall but begin a work of our own perils.' But it is doubtful whether Raleigh meant that he would leave places like Portsmouth and Plymouth open to a raid; he probably had others, such as Falmouth and Milford Haven, in mind, which then offered a secure roadstead but nothing more.

¹⁴⁸ *Cecil MSS.* 21st December, 1595; 16th January, 1596.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 17th March.

¹⁵⁰ Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1149.

A Voyage to the Islands, the Earl of Essex General, A.D. 1597. [I]

| Ships. | Commanders. |
|--|---|
| The Merhonour, after in the Repulse | The Earl of Essex. Captain under him, Sir Robert Man- sell. |
| The Lion | The Lord Thomas Howard. |
| The Warspite | Sir Walter Raleigh. |
| The Garland | The Earl of Southampton. |
| The Defiance | The Lord Mountjoy. |
| The Mary Rose | Sir Francis Vere. |
| The Hope | Sir Richard Leveson. |
| The Matthew | Sir George Carew. |
| The Rainbow | Sir William Monson.* |
| The Bonaventure | Sir William Harvey. |
| The Dreadnought | Sir William Brooke. |
| The Swiftsure | Sir Gely Meyricke. |
| The Antelope | Sir John Gilbert ; he went not. |
| The Nonpareil | Sir Thomas Vavasour. |
| The Andrew | Captain Throckmorton, |

HER MAJESTY having knowledge of the King of Spain's drawing down his fleet and army to Coruña and Ferrol, which intended some action against her ; and that notwithstanding the loss of thirty-six sail of his ships that were cast away upon the North Cape, in their coming thither, he prepared with all possible means to revenge the hurts and disgrace we did him the year last past at Cadiz, her Majesty likewise prepared to defend herself, and fitted out the most part of her ships for the sea. But

* A has 'Sir William Monson was put into the Rainbow because my Lord of Essex resolved to come on board him, and to give the attempt upon the ships in Ferrol with the Rainbow and the rest of the fleet, the Queen's excepted.'

at length, perceiving his drift was more to affright than offend her, though he gave it out otherwise, because she should provide to resist him at home rather than to annoy him abroad, she, perceiving his intention and what expense she was driven into, augmented her charge and converted her preparations upon him. [2]

The project of this voyage was to assault the King of Spain's shipping in the harbour of Ferrol, which the Queen chiefly desired to do for her own security at home, and afterwards to go to the island of Terceira to take it and keep it, and there to expect the coming home of the Indian fleet: but neither of these two designs took that effect which was expected. For in our setting forth, the same day we put to sea * we were taken with a most violent storm and contrary winds, and the General was separated from the fleet, and one ship from another, so that of force one half of the fleet was compelled to return home. And the rest that kept the sea, having reached the coast of Spain, were commanded home, by order of the Lord General.

Thus, after their return, they were to advise upon a new voyage, finding, by their ships unable and victuals spent, that they were unable to perform the former. Whereupon it was thought convenient all the 'army should be discharged for saving of victuals for the rest, except a thousand of the prime soldiers of the Low Countries, who were carried principally to put into her Majesty's ships if they should chance to encounter the Spanish fleet. Thus the second time they departed England, though not without some danger of the ships by reason of the winter approaching, which upon their return they were sure to taste. [3]

* A, B, and R read 'a day or two after we put to sea.'

The first land in Spain we fell in withal was the North Cape, the place whither our directions led us if we happened to lose company. Being there descried from the shore, and not above twelve leagues from Coruña, where the Spanish armada lay, we hoped to have enticed them out of the harbour upon indifferent * terms to have fought with us. But spending some time thereabouts, and finding no such disposition in them, it was thought fit no longer to linger about that coast lest we should lose greater opportunity upon the Indian fleet. Therefore every captain received his directions to stand his course into thirty-six degrees, there to spread ourselves north and south, it being a height that commonly the Spaniards hale † in from the Indies.

At this time the Lord General complained of a leak in his ship, and two days after, towards night, he brought himself upon the lee to stop it. Sir Walter Raleigh, and some other ships, being ahead of the fleet, and it growing dark, they could not discern the Lord General's working, but stood their course as before directed; and through this unadvised working of the master of my Lord's ship, they lost him and his fleet.

The day following, Sir Walter Raleigh was informed, by a pinnace of Plymouth he met, that the great armada, which we supposed to be in Coruña and Ferrol, was gone to the Islands for the guard of the Indian fleet: this pinnace, with this intelligence it gave us, Sir Walter Raleigh immediately sent to look out the General. My Lord had no sooner received this advice but at the very instant he directed his course to the Islands, and despatched some small vessels to Sir Walter Raleigh to inform him of the sudden alteration of his course

* *I.e.* equal, impartial.

† The early form of 'haul' in the sense of direction.

upon the news received from him, commanding him with all expedition to repair to Flores, where he would not fail to be. At our arrival at the Islands we found this intelligence false; for neither the Spanish ships were there, nor were expected there. We met likewise with divers English vessels that came out of the Indies, but they could give us no assurance of the coming home of the fleet; neither could we receive any advertisement from the shore, which made us half in despair of them.

By that time we had watered our ships and refreshed our men at Flores, Sir Walter Raleigh arrived there; who was willed by the Lord General, after he was furnished of such wants as that poor island afforded, to repair to the island of Fayal, which my Lord intended to take. Here grew great questions and heart-burnings against Sir Walter Raleigh. For he coming to Fayal, and missing the Lord General, and yet knowing my Lord's resolution to take the island, he held it more discretion to land with the few forces he had than to expect the coming of my Lord, lest that in delaying of time the island might be better provided: whereupon he landed, and took the town and castle before my Lord's approach. This act was held such an affront and indignity to my Lord, and urged with that vehemence by those that loved not Sir Walter, that I believe he had smarted for it if my Lord had not been a man of mild and flexible nature* and perhaps might fear it would not be well taken in England. [4]

From this island we went to Graciosa, which did willingly relieve our wants with such succour as it could; yet with humble entreaty to forbear landing with our army, especially because they understood

* C, D, and Sl. 1 read 'timorous and flexible nature'; Sl. 2 'kind and timorous'; A, B, and R as in the text.

there was a squadron of Hollanders amongst us, whose condition was to use all manner of cruelty where they overcame. And here it was that we met the Indian fleet, which in manner following unluckily escaped us.

The Lord General having sent some men of good account into the island to see there should be no evil measure offered to the Portuguese, he having passed his word to the contrary, those men advertised him of four sail of ships descried from the shore, and one of them, looming greater than the rest, seemed to be a carrack. My Lord received this news with great joy, and divided his fleet into three squadrons, to be commanded by himself, the Lord Thomas Howard, and Sir Walter Raleigh. The next ship to my Lord, of the Queen's, was the Rainbow, wherein Sir William Monson went, who received direction from my Lord to steer away south that night, and if he should meet with any fleet, to follow them, carrying lights, or shooting off his ordnance, or making any other sign that he could to give warning; and if he met with no ships, to direct his course the next day to the island of St. Michael, but my Lord promised that night to send twelve ships after him. Sir William besought my Lord, by the pinnace that brought him this direction, that above all things he should have a care to despatch a squadron to the road of Angra in the island of Terceira, for it was certain, if they were Spaniards, thither they would resort.

Whilst my Lord was thus contriving his business, and ordering his squadron, a small bark of his fleet happened to come to him, who assured him that those ships discovered from the land were of his own fleet, and that it came in immediately from them. This made my Lord countermand his former direction, only Sir William Monson, who was the

next ship to him and received the first command, could not be recalled back. Within three hours of his departure from my Lord, which might be about twelve of the clock in the night, he fell in company of a fleet of twenty-five sail, which at the first he could not assure himself to be Spaniards because, the day before, that number of ships was missing from our fleet. Here he was in a dilemma and great perplexity with himself. For in making signs, as he was directed, if the ships proved English it were ridiculous, and he might be held a scorn; and to respite it till morning were as dangerous if they were the Indian fleet, for then my Lord might be out of view, or of the hearing of his ordnance; therefore he resolved rather to put his person than his ship in peril. He commanded his master, on his allegiance, to keep the weather-gage of the fleet, whatsoever should become of him; and it blowing little wind he betook himself to his boat and rowed up with this fleet, demanding whence they were. They answered, of Seville in Spain, and asked of whence he was. He told them, of England; and that the ship in sight was a galleon of the Queen of England's, single and alone, alleging the honour they would get by winning her, urging them with daring speeches to chase her. This he did in policy, hoping to entice and draw them into the wake of our fleet if they should follow him, where they would be so entangled as they could not escape. They returned him some shot and ill language, but craftily kept on and would not alter their course to Terceira, whither they were bound, and where they arrived, to our misfortune. Sir William Monson, returning aboard his ship, again made signs with lights, false fires, and report of his ordnance, but all in vain; for my Lord altering his course, as you have heard, stood that night to St.

Michael, and passed by the north side of Terceira, a farther way than if he had gone by the way of Angra, where he had met the Indian fleet.

When day appeared, and Sir William Monson was in hopes to find the twelve ships promised to be sent to him, he might only discern the Spanish fleet two miles and a little more ahead of him, and astern him a galleon, and a Spanish frigate betwixt them; which galleon, putting forth her flags, he knew to be the Earl of Southampton in the Garland. The frigate of the Spanish fleet took the Garland and the Rainbow to be galleons of theirs, but seeing the flag of the Garland, she found her error and sprang her luff,* thinking to escape; but the earl pursued her, with the loss of some time, when he should have followed the fleet, and therefore was desired to desist from that chase by Sir William Monson, who sent his boat to him. By a shot from my lord this frigate was sunk; and while his men were rummaging her, Sir Francis Vere and Sir William Brooke in the Mary Rose and Dreadnought came up in their two ships, who, the Spaniards taken in the frigate, would have made the earl believe were two galleons of theirs. And so much did my lord signify to Sir William Monson, wishing him to forbear his chase and stay their coming up, for that there would be greater hope of those two ships, which there was no doubt but we were able to master, than of the fleet, for which we were too weak.

When Sir William had made the two ships to be the Queen's, which he had ever suspected, he began to pursue the Spanish fleet afresh, but by reason they were so far ahead of him, and had so little way to sail, they recovered the road of Ter-

* Came up to the wind, having been running large.

ceira. But he and the rest of the ships pursued them, and himself led the way into the road, yea, into the very harbour, followed by the rest of our ships, where he found sharp resistance from the castle. One fort at the entrance of the harbour having but three pieces of ordnance shot him through three times, but notwithstanding he so battered the ships that he might see the masts of some shot by the board, and of others the men quit the ships, so that there wanted nothing but a leading gale of wind to enable him to cut the cables in the hawses and to bring some of them off. Wherefore he sent to the other three ships of ours to desire them to man their boats and a small bark that was in company of us that we might attempt the cutting their cables, but Sir Francis Vere, who was inexperienced in sea stratagems, desired Sir William Monson to come off himself that they might consult and take a resolution what to do. Sir William once more sent him word, that if he quitted the harbour the ships would be towed near the castle; and that as the night drew on, the wind would freshen, and come more off the land, which indeed proved so, and we above a league from the road in the morning.

We may say, and that truly, there was never that possibility to have undone the State of Spain as at this time, or to have enriched ourselves by their poverty; for every real of plate we had taken in this fleet, had been two to them, by our converting it by war upon them.

No man can receive blame hereby; all is to be attributed to the want of experience in my Lord, and his flexible nature to be overruled.* For the first hour he anchored at Flores, and called a council,

* Sl. 1 reads 'his flexible easy nature to be misled and overruled.'

Sir William Monson advised him, upon the reasons following :—After his watering to run west, spreading his fleet north and south, so far as the easterly wind that then blew would carry them ; alleging, that if the Indian fleet came home that year, by computation of the last light moon, (from which time their) disemboguing in the Indies (must be reckoned),* they could not be above two hundred leagues short of that island, and whensoever the wind should chop up westerly, he bearing a slack sail, they would in a few days overtake him.

This advice my Lord seemed to embrace ; but was suddenly † diverted by divers gentlemen, who, coming principally for land-service, found themselves tired by the tediousness of the sea so that they courted nothing more than to be on shore. Certain it is, if my Lord had followed his advice, within less than forty hours he had made the Queen owner of that fleet ; for by the pilot's card, which was taken in the frigate, the Spanish fleet was but fifty leagues in traverse with that easterly wind from Flores, when my Lord was there. Which made my Lord wish, the first time Sir William Monson repaired to him after the escape of the fleet, that he had given his right hand so he had been ruled by him.

Being met aboard Sir Francis Vere we consulted what to do, but God knows it was too late. Notwithstanding we resolved to acquaint my Lord with what had happened, desiring his presence with us, to be an eye-witness if there were any possibility to attempt the shipping, or surprise the island, and so to possess the treasure. My Lord received this advertisement just as he was ready with his troops to have landed in St. Michael, but this message

* The passages in brackets are emendations by the Churchill editor, but are necessary to the sense.

† Immediately.

diverted his landing, and made him presently cast about for the island of Terceira, where we lay all this while expecting his coming. In his course from St. Michael it was his hap to take three ships, belonging to Don Juan de Maldanava, Governor of the Havana, that departed thence three days after the fleet, which three ships did almost then countervail the expense of the whole voyage.

After my Lord's arrival at the mouth of the road of Angra, where we lay expecting him, he had a consultation of the sea commanders how the enemy's ships might be fetched off from under the castle, or destroyed as they lay; but all men, with one consent, agreed the impossibility of the one or the other. The attempting the island was propounded; but withstood for these reasons: The difficulty in landing; the strength of the island, which was increased by fourteen or fifteen hundred soldiers in the ships; and our want of victuals, to abide by the siege. [5]

Seeing then we were frustrate of our hopes at Terceira or of the ships lying there, we resolved upon landing in St. Michael, and arrived the day following at Ponta Delgada, the chief city. Here my Lord embarked his small army in boats, with offer to land; and having thereby drawn the enemy's greatest force thither to resist him, suddenly he rowed to Villa Franca, three or four leagues distance from thence, and without mistrust of the inhabitants surprised the town at unawares. The ships had order to abide in the road of Ponta Delgada, for that my Lord made account to march thither by land; but being ashore at Villa Franca, he was informed that the march was impossible, by reason of the high and craggy mountains which diverted his purpose.

Victuals now grew short in many of our ships; *

* A, B, and R read 'in all the ships.'

and my Lord General began discreetly to foresee the danger in abiding towards winter about those Islands, which could not afford him so much as safe harbouring, only open roads that were subject to southerly winds; and upon every such wind he must be forced to put to sea for his safety. He considered, that if this should happen when his troops were ashore, and he not able to reach the land in three weeks or a month, or more, which is a thing ordinary, what a desperate case he should put himself into, especially in so great a want of victuals. He weighed also that he had seen the end of all his hopes by the escape of the fleet, and so embarked himself and army, though with some difficulty and danger, the seas were now so overgrown.

By this time the one-half of the fleet that rid in Ponta Delgada put room for Villa Franca; and those that remained behind rode as a bait to such Spanish ships as should seek that road. And one morning there bore in, without mistrust of us, a ship of Brazil that was thus betrayed, taking us to be the King of Spain's fleet. And after her there followed a carrack, who had been served in the like manner but for the hasty and indiscreet weighing of a Hollander, which made her run ashore under the castle when she was ready to put in amongst us. But, notwithstanding that the castle was a guard unto her, when the wind began to lessen, for at that time it blew very hard, Sir William Monson weighed with the Rainbow, intending to give an attempt upon her, notwithstanding the castle, which she perceiving, as he drew near unto her she set herself on fire and burned down to the very keel. She was a ship of fifteen hundred tons burden, that the year before was not able to double the Cape of Good Hope in her voyage to the East Indies, but put into Brazil, where she was laden with sugars, and afterwards thus destroyed. [6]

The Spaniards, who presumed more upon their advantages than valour, and thought it too equal a condition to follow us to the Islands, and put their fortunes upon a day's service, subtly devised how to intercept us as we came home, weak and weather-beaten, when we had least thought or suspicion of them and their fleet, which was all this while in Coruña and Ferrol, not daring to put forwards while they knew ours to be upon the coast. Against the time we should return, their General, the Adelantado (not so called from his office of admiral as many suppose, but a title of dignity received from his ancestors), came for England, with a resolution to land at Falmouth, and fortify it, and afterwards with their ships to keep the sea, and expect our coming home scattered. And having thus cut off our sea-forces, and possessing the harbour of Falmouth, they thought with a second supply of thirty-seven Levantine ships, which Don Marcos de Aramburu commanded, to have returned and gained a good footing in England.

These designs of theirs were not foreseen by us for we came home scattered, scarce two ships in company, some with the loss of their masts and few but had reason to complain of some disaster or other. We say, and that truly, that God fought for us, for the Spaniards had never so dangerous an enterprise on us. The Adelantado, being within a few leagues of the islands of Scilly, he commanded all his captains on board him to receive his directions for before the common sort was ignorant of the design; but whilst they were thus busy in council, a violent storm took them at east, insomuch that the captains could hardly recover their ships, but in no case were able to save their boats. The storm continued so furious that by morning the whole fleet was scattered, and happy was he who could recover home,

seeing their design thus overthrown by the loss of their boats, whereby the means of landing was taken away. Some who were more willing to obey the directions of the General than the rest kept the seas so long upon our coast, that in the end they were taken; others put themselves into our harbours for refuge and succour; and it is certainly known, that in this voyage the Spaniards lost eighteen ships, the *St. Luke* and the *St. Bartholomew* being two, and in the rank of his best galleons.

We must ascribe this loss of theirs to God only; for certainly the enemies' designs were dangerous, and not diverted by our force, but by His will, who from time to time would not suffer the Spaniards in any one of their attempts to set footing in England, as we did in all quarters of Spain, Portugal, the Islands, and both Indies.* [7]

In this voyage to the Islands, I have set down my Lord's design upon the Spanish fleet lying at Ferrol, wherein his lordship required a captain he most relied on to have his opinion in writing. First, whether he should attempt the ships in harbour, or no? Secondly, whether before or after his being at Terceira? And, lastly, the manner how to assail them? The captain's answer follows, which you may read and judge of:—

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Essex.

IN answer to your lordship's demand, 'Whether to give an enterprise upon the ships in Ferrol, before

* R has 'There went in this journey, counting the Holland squadron, about 170 sail of ships.' In all the MSS. of Book I. the Islands voyage ends here, the succeeding portion having been written, presumably, years later, and is included in various parts of the following books. The Churchill editor, of course, placed it in its right position.

next ship to him and received the first command, could not be recalled back. Within three hours of his departure from my Lord, which might be about twelve of the clock in the night, he fell in company of a fleet of twenty-five sail, which at the first he could not assure himself to be Spaniards because, the day before, that number of ships was missing from our fleet. Here he was in a dilemma and great perplexity with himself. For in making signs, as he was directed, if the ships proved English it were ridiculous, and he might be held a scorn; and to respite it till morning were as dangerous if they were the Indian fleet, for then my Lord might be out of view, or of the hearing of his ordnance; therefore he resolved rather to put his person than his ship in peril. He commanded his master, on his allegiance, to keep the weather-gage of the fleet, whatsoever should become of him; and it blowing little wind he betook himself to his boat and rowed up with this fleet, demanding whence they were. They answered, of Seville in Spain, and asked of whence he was. He told them, of England; and that the ship in sight was a galleon of the Queen of England's, single and alone, alleging the honour they would get by winning her, urging them with daring speeches to chase her. This he did in policy, hoping to entice and draw them into the wake of our fleet if they should follow him, where they would be so entangled as they could not escape. They returned him some shot and ill language, but craftily kept on and would not alter their course to Terceira, whither they were bound, and where they arrived, to our misfortune. Sir William Monson, returning aboard his ship, again made signs with lights, false fires, and report of his ordnance, but all in vain; for my Lord altering his course, as you have heard, stood that night to St.

Michael, and passed by the north side of Terceira, a farther way than if he had gone by the way of Angra, where he had met the Indian fleet.

When day appeared, and Sir William Monson was in hopes to find the twelve ships promised to be sent to him, he might only discern the Spanish fleet two miles and a little more ahead of him, and astern him a galleon, and a Spanish frigate betwixt them; which galleon, putting forth her flags, he knew to be the Earl of Southampton in the *Garland*. The frigate of the Spanish fleet took the *Garland* and the *Rainbow* to be galleons of theirs, but seeing the flag of the *Garland*, she found her error and sprang her luff,* thinking to escape; but the earl pursued her, with the loss of some time, when he should have followed the fleet, and therefore was desired to desist from that chase by Sir William Monson, who sent his boat to him. By a shot from my lord this frigate was sunk; and while his men were rummaging her, Sir Francis Vere and Sir William Brooke in the *Mary Rose* and *Dreadnought* came up in their two ships, who, the Spaniards taken in the frigate, would have made the earl believe were two galleons of theirs. And so much did my lord signify to Sir William Monson, wishing him to forbear his chase and stay their coming up, for that there would be greater hope of those two ships, which there was no doubt but we were able to master, than of the fleet, for which we were too weak.

When Sir William had made the two ships to be the *Queen's*, which he had ever suspected, he began to pursue the Spanish fleet afresh, but by reason they were so far ahead of him, and had so little way to sail, they recovered the road of Ter-

* Came up to the wind, having been running large.

next ship to him and received the first command, could not be recalled back. Within three hours of his departure from my Lord, which might be about twelve of the clock in the night, he fell in company of a fleet of twenty-five sail, which at the first he could not assure himself to be Spaniards because, the day before, that number of ships was missing from our fleet. Here he was in a dilemma and great perplexity with himself. For in making signs, as he was directed, if the ships proved English it were ridiculous, and he might be held a scorn ; and to respite it till morning were as dangerous if they were the Indian fleet, for then my Lord might be out of view, or of the hearing of his ordnance ; therefore he resolved rather to put his person than his ship in peril. He commanded his master, on his allegiance, to keep the weather-gage of the fleet, whatsoever should become of him ; and it blowing little wind he betook himself to his boat and rowed up with this fleet, demanding whence they were. They answered, of Seville in Spain, and asked of whence he was. He told them, of England ; and that the ship in sight was a galleon of the Queen of England's, single and alone, alleging the honour they would get by winning her, urging them with daring speeches to chase her. This he did in policy, hoping to entice and draw them into the wake of our fleet if they should follow him, where they would be so entangled as they could not escape. They returned him some shot and ill language, but craftily kept on and would not alter their course to Terceira, whither they were bound, and where they arrived, to our misfortune. Sir William Monson, returning aboard his ship, again made signs with lights, false fires, and report of his ordnance, but all in vain ; for my Lord altering his course, as you have heard, stood that night to St.

Michael, and passed by the north side of Terceira, a farther way than if he had gone by the way of Angra, where he had met the Indian fleet.

When day appeared, and Sir William Monson was in hopes to find the twelve ships promised to be sent to him, he might only discern the Spanish fleet two miles and a little more ahead of him, and astern him a galleon, and a Spanish frigate betwixt them; which galleon, putting forth her flags, he knew to be the Earl of Southampton in the *Garland*. The frigate of the Spanish fleet took the *Garland* and the *Rainbow* to be galleons of theirs, but seeing the flag of the *Garland*, she found her error and sprang her luff,* thinking to escape; but the earl pursued her, with the loss of some time, when he should have followed the fleet, and therefore was desired to desist from that chase by Sir William Monson, who sent his boat to him. By a shot from my lord this frigate was sunk; and while his men were rummaging her, Sir Francis Vere and Sir William Brooke in the *Mary Rose* and *Dreadnought* came up in their two ships, who, the Spaniards taken in the frigate, would have made the earl believe were two galleons of theirs. And so much did my lord signify to Sir William Monson, wishing him to forbear his chase and stay their coming up, for that there would be greater hope of those two ships, which there was no doubt but we were able to master, than of the fleet, for which we were too weak.

When Sir William had made the two ships to be the *Queen's*, which he had ever suspected, he began to pursue the Spanish fleet afresh, but by reason they were so far ahead of him, and had so little way to sail, they recovered the road of Ter-

* Came up to the wind, having been running large.

ceira. But he and the rest of the ships pursued them, and himself led the way into the road, yea, into the very harbour, followed by the rest of our ships, where he found sharp resistance from the castle. One fort at the entrance of the harbour having but three pieces of ordnance shot him through three times, but notwithstanding he so battered the ships that he might see the masts of some shot by the board, and of others the men quit the ships, so that there wanted nothing but a leading gale of wind to enable him to cut the cables in the hawses and to bring some of them off. Wherefore he sent to the other three ships of ours to desire them to man their boats and a small bark that was in company of us that we might attempt the cutting their cables, but Sir Francis Vere, who was inexperienced in sea stratagems, desired Sir William Monson to come off himself that they might consult and take a resolution what to do. Sir William once more sent him word, that if he quitted the harbour the ships would be towed near the castle; and that as the night drew on, the wind would freshen, and come more off the land, which indeed proved so, and we above a league from the road in the morning.

We may say, and that truly, there was never that possibility to have undone the State of Spain as at this time, or to have enriched ourselves by their poverty; for every real of plate we had taken in this fleet, had been two to them, by our converting it by war upon them.

No man can receive blame hereby; all is to be attributed to the want of experience in my Lord, and his flexible nature to be overruled.* For the first hour he anchored at Flores, and called a council,

* Sl. 1 reads 'his flexible easy nature to be misled and overruled.'

Sir William Monson advised him, upon the reasons following :—After his watering to run west, spreading his fleet north and south, so far as the easterly wind that then blew would carry them ; alleging, that if the Indian fleet came home that year, by computation of the last light moon, (from which time their) disemboguing in the Indies (must be reckoned),* they could not be above two hundred leagues short of that island, and whensoever the wind should chop up westerly, he bearing a slack sail, they would in a few days overtake him.

This advice my Lord seemed to embrace ; but was suddenly † diverted by divers gentlemen, who, coming principally for land-service, found themselves tired by the tediousness of the sea so that they courted nothing more than to be on shore. Certain it is, if my Lord had followed his advice, within less than forty hours he had made the Queen owner of that fleet ; for by the pilot's card, which was taken in the frigate, the Spanish fleet was but fifty leagues in traverse with that easterly wind from Flores, when my Lord was there. Which made my Lord wish, the first time Sir William Monson repaired to him after the escape of the fleet, that he had given his right hand so he had been ruled by him.

Being met aboard Sir Francis Vere we consulted what to do, but God knows it was too late. Notwithstanding we resolved to acquaint my Lord with what had happened, desiring his presence with us, to be an eye-witness if there were any possibility to attempt the shipping, or surprise the island, and so to possess the treasure. My Lord received this advertisement just as he was ready with his troops to have landed in St. Michael, but this message

* The passages in brackets are emendations by the Churchill editor, but are necessary to the sense.

† Immediately.

diverted his landing, and made him presently cast about for the island of Terceira, where we lay all this while expecting his coming. In his course from St. Michael it was his hap to take three ships, belonging to Don Juan de Maldanava, Governor of the Havana, that departed thence three days after the fleet, which three ships did almost then countervail the expense of the whole voyage.

After my Lord's arrival at the mouth of the road of Angra, where we lay expecting him, he had a consultation of the sea commanders how the enemy's ships might be fetched off from under the castle, or destroyed as they lay; but all men, with one consent, agreed the impossibility of the one or the other. The attempting the island was propounded; but withstood for these reasons: The difficulty in landing; the strength of the island, which was increased by fourteen or fifteen hundred soldiers in the ships; and our want of victuals, to abide by the siege. [5]

Seeing then we were frustrate of our hopes at Terceira or of the ships lying there, we resolved upon landing in St. Michael, and arrived the day following at Ponta Delgada, the chief city. Here my Lord embarked his small army in boats, with offer to land; and having thereby drawn the enemy's greatest force thither to resist him, suddenly he rowed to Villa Franca, three or four leagues distance from thence, and without mistrust of the inhabitants surprised the town at unawares. The ships had order to abide in the road of Ponta Delgada, for that my Lord made account to march thither by land; but being ashore at Villa Franca, he was informed that the march was impossible, by reason of the high and craggy mountains which diverted his purpose.

Victuals now grew short in many of our ships; *

* A, B, and R read 'in all the ships.'

and my Lord General began discreetly to foresee the danger in abiding towards winter about those Islands, which could not afford him so much as safe harbouring, only open roads that were subject to southerly winds ; and upon every such wind he must be forced to put to sea for his safety. He considered, that if this should happen when his troops were ashore, and he not able to reach the land in three weeks or a month, or more, which is a thing ordinary, what a desperate case he should put himself into, especially in so great a want of victuals. He weighed also that he had seen the end of all his hopes by the escape of the fleet, and so embarked himself and army, though with some difficulty and danger, the seas were now so overgrown.

By this time the one-half of the fleet that rid in Ponta Delgada put room for Villa Franca ; and those that remained behind rode as a bait to such Spanish ships as should seek that road. And one morning there bore in, without mistrust of us, a ship of Brazil that was thus betrayed, taking us to be the King of Spain's fleet. And after her there followed a carrack, who had been served in the like manner but for the hasty and indiscreet weighing of a Hollander, which made her run ashore under the castle when she was ready to put in amongst us. But, notwithstanding that the castle was a guard unto her, when the wind began to lessen, for at that time it blew very hard, Sir William Monson weighed with the Rainbow, intending to give an attempt upon her, notwithstanding the castle, which she perceiving, as he drew near unto her she set herself on fire and burned down to the very keel. She was a ship of fifteen hundred tons burden, that the year before was not able to double the Cape of Good Hope in her voyage to the East Indies, but put into Brazil, where she was laden with sugars, and afterwards thus destroyed. [6]

The Spaniards, who presumed more upon their advantages than valour, and thought it too equal a condition to follow us to the Islands, and put their fortunes upon a day's service, subtly devised how to intercept us as we came home, weak and weather-beaten, when we had least thought or suspicion of them and their fleet, which was all this while in Coruña and Ferrol, not daring to put forwards while they knew ours to be upon the coast. Against the time we should return, their General, the Adelantado (not so called from his office of admiral as many suppose, but a title of dignity received from his ancestors), came for England, with a resolution to land at Falmouth, and fortify it, and afterwards with their ships to keep the sea, and expect our coming home scattered. And having thus cut off our sea-forces, and possessing the harbour of Falmouth, they thought with a second supply of thirty-seven Levantine ships, which Don Marcos de Aramburu commanded, to have returned and gained a good footing in England.

These designs of theirs were not foreseen by us for we came home scattered, scarce two ships in company, some with the loss of their masts and few but had reason to complain of some disaster or other. We say, and that truly, that God fought for us, for the Spaniards had never so dangerous an enterprise on us. The Adelantado, being within a few leagues of the islands of Scilly, he commanded all his captains on board him to receive his directions for before the common sort was ignorant of the design; but whilst they were thus busy in council, a violent storm took them at east, insomuch that the captains could hardly recover their ships, but in no case were able to save their boats. The storm continued so furious that by morning the whole fleet was scattered, and happy was he who could recover home,

seeing their design thus overthrown by the loss of their boats, whereby the means of landing was taken away. Some who were more willing to obey the directions of the General than the rest kept the seas so long upon our coast, that in the end they were taken; others put themselves into our harbours for refuge and succour; and it is certainly known, that in this voyage the Spaniards lost eighteen ships, the *St. Luke* and the *St. Bartholomew* being two, and in the rank of his best galleons.

We must ascribe this loss of theirs to God only; for certainly the enemies' designs were dangerous, and not diverted by our force, but by His will, who from time to time would not suffer the Spaniards in any one of their attempts to set footing in England, as we did in all quarters of Spain, Portugal, the Islands, and both Indies.* [7]

In this voyage to the Islands, I have set down my Lord's design upon the Spanish fleet lying at Ferrol, wherein his lordship required a captain he most relied on to have his opinion in writing. First, whether he should attempt the ships in harbour, or no? Secondly, whether before or after his being at Terceira? And, lastly, the manner how to assail them? The captain's answer follows, which you may read and judge of:—

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Essex.

IN answer to your lordship's demand, 'Whether to give an enterprize upon the ships in Ferrol, before

* R has 'There went in this journey, counting the Holland squadron, about 170 sail of ships.' In all the MSS. of Book I. the *Islands voyage* ends here, the succeeding portion having been written, presumably, years later, and is included in various parts of the following books. The Churchill editor, of course, placed it in its right position.

the landing your men and the castles gained,' this I say, that before I can give my resolution, I must describe the state of that harbour, and the situation of the forts, with the strength of the ships, before I can frame my reasons.

I conceive at the entrance of the harbour there are three castles, two on the one side, one on the other, all three commanding at one time any ship that shall enter. They are seated low by the water, the cliffs on both sides very high, and the harbour to be chained.

I conceive, if your lordship do land your men in the bay before you take the forts, as there is no other place of landing, you must consider it is an open road, the coast subject to northerly winds, which make so great a siege * on the shore, that you cannot land your soldiers and their furniture with conveniency and safety, especially being sure to find resistance at your landing.

But your lordship may answer, 'That he who attempts great things, must run all hazards, and, as it is wisdom to forecast all doubts and dangers, so were it too great security not to hazard loss upon hope of victory.' And whereas the danger of landing by reason of the siege on the shore is alleged, you may think we are not always sure of a northerly wind, nor of so great a siege, and therefore you must put your attempt in adventure.

But for your lordship's satisfaction in this point, you must know that you cannot seize that coast but with such a wind as makes such a siege as that you can hardly land. Or, suppose that being upon the coast as you were the last year when you came from Cadiz, and that the wind should now do, as then it did, chop up from the south-east to the north-west, your lordship would be embayed, and forced to seek

* Surf.

the harbour of Coruña or Ferrol, and make good those places, which then you might have done. But now you must consider your army is not so great as it was then, and their fortifications and shipping are much stronger than they were. My opinion is, therefore, that there is little possibility of attempting the shipping without gaining the forts; neither do I see any possibility to possess them with your small army.

But your lordship may allege that, though the forts were impregnable, yet they may be passed with a large wind; for every shot that comes from them hits not, or if it does it kills not, but though it should, it sinks not.

I allow it is no great difficulty to pass any fort with a ship under sail, being a movable thing where no certain aim can be had. Yet I think no place more dangerous than Ferrol, because of the hugeness of the hills and the narrowness of the entrance that makes a continual calm, or the little wind, so uncertain that every puff brings sundry shift of wind. Many of the King of Spain's ships have found this and been there lost. And therefore the advantage of a ship in passing a castle is the force and largeness of a wind; as to the contrary, these forts will be able to annoy a ship by reason of a continual calm.

But allow that your lordship's fleet should enter safely; for the greatest difficulty is not to pass in, but to perform the service when they are within. Your fleet being entered, they will be in the state of a prisoner that cannot get out of a hold without leave of his keeper; for the wind that is good and large for them to enter, is as much against their coming forth, and therefore it behoves every commander as well to think of bringing himself off with discretion as with valour to execute danger.

Hitherto I have showed the uncertainty of your lordship's landing, the doubtfulness of your attempt, and the danger in not having the castles. But I will now suppose the forts to be ours, and the whole shipping passed them without any loss; yet will the enemy have as great an advantage as they can require, for the number of men and shipping, and the greatness of their vessels, are known to exceed ours.* And, where there is an equality in shipping on both sides, the victory is not to be obtained on either side whilst there is ammunition and men on the other side, unless it be by a general boarding, or stratagem of firing, in which the Spaniards shall have advantage of us, they being in their own harbour where they may be supplied, and we can have no relief but what we bring with us.

If your lordship shall hold it convenient, as in discretion I think you will not, to send in her Majesty's ships upon this service, then you must consider the rest of your fleet to be far inferior to the enemies' strength. And so you will send them apparently to their own destruction, slaughter, and ruin.

As I am against the attempt of Ferrol before you return from the Islands, so I am also against your lordship's presenting yourself upon that coast, for in thinking to entice forth the fleet, besides that you shall discover your own strength, you shall give them occasion to arm their country. And moreover, it will be in their choice, whether to set upon you, yea or no, for they will be able to value their force by yours after you are descried, and besides such is their discipline, that though they had your lordship upon advantage, yet they dare not attempt

* A has an erased passage, 'exceed ours and your lordship cannot propound any advantage of them in a harbour fight, and where,' &c.

you without a special order from the King ; which your lordship found by experience in the Conde de Fuentes his answer to your lordship's challenge at the walls of Lisbon. And to conclude, since your lordship intends to go from Ferrol to Terceira, it were much better, in my opinion, first to attempt that island, whilst your army is strong and in health. It is a place of much more importance, and more likelihood of prevailing than in your enterprise upon the shipping. That island being possessed, will draw contributions from the rest to maintain it ; your lordship will cut off the relief and succour the Spaniards and Portuguese receive in their navigations from both the Indies, Guinea, and Brazil ; your lordship will provide a place of refuge for our fleet hereafter from whence they may with ease keep the seas, and endanger all the trades aforesaid ; your lordship will unite that island to the Crown of England ; and if there be an agreement of peace betwixt the two nations, you will gain advantageous conditions to the State of England upon a treaty ; your lordship will be in a possibility of drawing the armada of Ferrol to pursue you thither, that island importing them so much to defend ; and then your lordship will have your desire to fight them upon equal terms at sea. If you attempt Ferrol at first, and should happen to be repulsed, your lordship will confess it will be so great a dishonour and loss that you will not be able to resolve upon any other service, and then will your expedition for Terceira be utterly void. Whereas if you would please to make your attempt upon Terceira first, it will not take away your hope of Ferrol afterwards ; for in your return from thence you will find the shipping either in the same state you left them in harbour or shall encounter them at sea upon advantage. Thus have I answered your lordship's expectation to your demands. [8]

W. M.

[1] The fleet was made up as follows :—¹

Earl of Essex's Squadron

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|--------------------------|------------------|---|
| Merhonour . | 865 | (Earl of Essex); Sir Robert Mansell, 1st June–13th August. |
| Garland . | 660 | J. Troughton (Vice-Admiral of squadron), 14th June–17th November. |
| Defiance . | 550 | George Fenner, sen., 14th June–25th December. |
| Mary Rose . | 600 | J. Wynter, 14th June–27th November. |
| Swiftsure . | 400 | Sir Gely Meyricke, 14th June–24th December. |
| Foresight . | 300 | Sir Carew Reynells (Reynolds), 14th June–8th August. Sir Alexander Ratcliffe, 9th August–28th November. |
| Armed Merchantmen : | | |
| Swan . | 350 ² | — |
| Prosperous . | 400 | — |
| Unicorn . | 250 | — |
| Hercules of Rye | 240 | — |
| Katherine . | — | — |
| Black Galley . | — | — |
| Vice-Admiral's Squadron. | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Repulse . | 770 | Lord Thomas Howard, Vice-Admiral, ³ 14th June–17th August. Sir Robert Mansell, 18th August–23rd December. |
| Lion . | 500 | Lord Thomas Howard, 17th August–24th December. |

¹ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2235; *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxiv. 3, 19.

² The tonnage of the merchantmen is taken from the Exchequer warrants, granting the bounty of 5s. a ton on ships of 200 tons and upwards.

³ Wages, 3*l.* a day. When the fleet started for the second time, the *Merhonour* was left at home, and Essex shifted to the *Repulse*, giving Lord Thomas Howard the *Lion*. Howard's pay was then reduced to 2*l.* 15*s.* a day.

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|---------------------------|-------|--|
| Hope . . . | 600 | Sir Richard Leveson (Vice-Admiral of squadron), 14th June–11th November. |
| Nonpareil . . . | 500 | Sir Thomas Vavasour, 14th June–26th November. |
| Rainbow . . . | 500 | Sir William Monson, 14th June–24th December. |
| Dreadnought . . . | 400 | Sir William Brooke, 14th June–24th December. |
| Advice . . . | 50 | William Willis, 14th June–17th November. |
| Armed Merchant-man : | | |
| Sun . . . | 250 | — |
| Rear-Admiral's Squadron. | | |
| Warspite . . . | 648 | Sir Walter Raleigh, 'captain and rear-admiral,' ⁴ 14th June–9th November. |
| St. Matthew . . . | 1,000 | Sir George Carew (Vice-Admiral of squadron), 16th June–17th September. |
| Antelope . . . | 400 | Sir John Gilbert, 14th June–10th August. ⁵ |
| Bonaventure . . . | 600 | Sir William Harvey, 14th June–26th November. |
| St. Andrew . . . | 900 | Marcellus Throckmorton, 14th June–15th October. |
| Adventure . . . | 340 | Sir George Carew, 19th September–21st November. |
| Armed Merchant-men : | | |
| Guiana ⁶ . . . | — | — |
| Consent . . . | 350 | — |

⁴ Wages, 15s. a day. Sir Arthur Gorges, who wrote an account of the voyage, claims to have acted as captain; if so, he did not act officially. His list of ships and officers differs in several respects from the official one.

⁵ The Antelope was detached to strengthen the Channel squadron on the news that reinforcements had arrived at Blavet (*Cecil MSS.* 10th August). In the same letter Essex said that he had also sent the Tramontana, but, according to the pay lists, the latter was one of the Channel division during the whole year.

⁶ The Guiana belonged to Raleigh (*State Papers*, cclxiv. 60), and

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|------------------------|-------|--|
| Dutch Squadron. | | |
| Orange . . . | — | Jan van Duyvenvoord, Admiral. |
| Dolphin . . . | — | Jan Gerbrandtsen, Vice-Admiral. |
| Æolus . . . | — | Cornelius Lensen, Rear-Admiral. ⁷ |
| Neptune . . . | — | — Cales. |
| White Falcon . . . | — | — Bancker. |
| Fox . . . | — | — Walle. |
| Drake . . . | — | — Doune. |
| Neptune . . . | — | — Segarson. |
| Greyhound . . . | — | Elkart Cox. |
| Drake . . . | — | — Whipcall. |

With Essex's squadron there were ten transports carrying troops and stores, with Howard's twelve, with Raleigh's ten, and with Duyvenvoord's fifteen; five or six small vessels with each squadron completed the fleet. Gorges says that there were 120 ships, Monson 170, and as, in a letter of 8th September, Raleigh speaks of being accompanied by 'twenty voluntary barks of the west country that came out with me,' we may take it that, as usual in these expeditions, there were many additional unplaced ships sailing in company on the chance of plunder. In April, and on 9th May, the Privy Council sent out circular letters ordering a levy of 6,000 men; on 30th May the number was reduced to 4,000, of whom half were to be musketeers and half pikemen if so many of the former could be obtained.⁸ On 21st May the Council wrote to Sir Francis Vere that he was to apply to the States for ten men-of-war and fifteen flyboats, which were to be in England by 12th June and bring 1,000 veteran soldiers in them.⁹ The seamen were obtained in the usual way—by impressment—but appear to have been of an exceptionally unsatisfactory quality. On 7th July, just before sailing, Essex, dealing with the Lord Admiral's comments on so many men being dismissed, wrote, 'none are discharged but men utterly unsufficient and unserviceable taken up by the pressmasters, in mariners' clothes but shall not know any one rope in the ship; and yet all the ships are so when the fleet left for the second time, he took another of his ships, the Roebuck, with him (*ibid.*).

⁷ Meteren gives Lensen as Vice-Admiral and Jacob Michielsens as Rear-Admiral. The names in the text are from *State Papers Elis.* cclxiv. 3.

⁸ *MS. Council Register.*

⁹ *Ibid.* The Dutch did not join until 25th June, when they came into the Downs.

ill manned as if at this place and Plymouth we be not better supplied we shall be very much troubled how to sail the Queen's ships, for though we have enough for number yet we have none of our fleet that hath half her complement of good men.' The next day he continued on the same subject, 'We are at our wit's end to find her Majesty's fleet thus weakly and wretchedly manned as it is. We did from Weymouth advertise your lordships, my Lord Admiral, and Mr. Secretary of the monstrous abuse in the pressmasters that sent the men which brought us hither. We were furnished with men of all occupations that never knew any rope many of them, nor ever were at sea. And, as many of our men tell us, all the good men for 20s. apiece let go. When we looked for a supply in the West there of Dorsetshire appeared not a man, but either were underhand discharged by the pressmasters or made a jest of the press.'¹⁰ The method of working the system of impressment must have rendered it always a matter of chance whether fit men were obtained, for the central authorities had no power of selection and remained in the dark until the men appeared, when, as in this case, they could dismiss the unfit if they chose. Press warrants were issued by the Privy Council, on the authority of the Queen's commission, and directed to the vice-admirals, lieutenants, and justices of the peace of the maritime counties; eventually the warrants found their way to the mayors and constables, with whom the power of selection remained and who were frequently amenable to persuasion or bribery, with the results complained of by Essex. The men pressed were given conduct, or travelling, money and told to report themselves at the place named in the press warrant, and not until their arrival did the persons chiefly concerned—the navy authorities—know what sort of crews they were going to be provided with. Nearly a century was to elapse before the captains of men-of-war were also supplied with press warrants that they might pick up men for themselves, and then the two systems worked side by side, but down to the last days of impressment the local authorities were being continually censured for the same faults that Essex taxed them with. Moreover, with the lapse of years the question was additionally complicated by the growth of a feeling of the injustice of the press system, due to the development of ethical sense in even provincial justices and their underlings, which rendered them frequently unwilling to put the warrants into execution or give more than grudging assistance.

If the seamen were of a poor stamp no complaint was made of the soldiers, and distinction was lent to the expedition by the presence of many aristocratic volunteers. Sir Arthur Gorges says that there were 500 of them, including the Earls of Rutland and

¹⁰ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxiv. 11, 12.

Southampton, and Lords Audley, Gray, Rich and Cromwell ; it is rather curious that so many of these volunteers were from the north that some fear was felt for the safety of the English Marches against the Scots.¹¹ The experience of a stiff gale took the courage out of many of them ; one or two actually died of sea-sickness, and when the fleet returned at the end of July from the first unsuccessful attempt to pursue the voyage a number deserted the expedition. 'This storm hath killed the hearts of many voluntary gentlemen, who are returned already from Plymouth,' wrote Rowland Whyte to Sir Robert Sidney. Sir Arthur Gorges says that a number went away secretly, 'forgetting either to bid their friends farewell or to take leave of their General.' We have, however, a letter of one of the Yorkshire volunteers which shows that the terror of the sea was not the only factor, 'many of the gentleman adventurers already gone, some for sea-sickness discouraged by the last storm, some out of a more base disposition, hopeless now to make profit of the voyage, for which end only they undertook the journey. . . . For my own part at the seas I was the sickest of 600 in our ship . . . were not my respect of my reputation more to me than hope of advantage I would long since have left the journey.'¹² Evidently the plunder of Cadiz had drawn many to this voyage with fresh hopes.

The Staff was composed of Charles, Lord Mountjoy, as lieutenant-general and second in command ; Sir Francis Vere, marshal ; Sir George Carew, master of the ordnance ; Sir Ferdinando Gorges, serjeant-major ; Sir Christopher Blount, colonel-general of foot ; Sir Oliver Lambert, quartermaster ; and Sir Hugh Beeston, treasurer.

[2] Although Philip was again helpless after the storm of October, the full extent of his weakness was not at first known in England ; when the information coming in showed that the fleet was ruined, and the men dying by hundreds of sickness, Elizabeth appears to have been persuaded to convert her defence into an attack, or to allow it to be debated. Towards the middle of December the Privy Council applied to the City of London for ten ships, but the citizens were in a bad humour because no part of the 19,000*l.*, their share of the Cadiz expedition had cost them, had been repaid them, contrary to the contract made in the Queen's name, although enough plunder had been brought home, they said, to defray the whole cost of the voyage.

¹¹ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclxiv. 61 ; Robert Cecyll to Essex, 29th July. Chamberlain thought that there were 2,000 of them (*Letters*, Camden Soc. p. 3).

¹² Wm. Slingsby to Fr. Slingsby, 12th, 15th August (Parsons, *Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby . . . family correspondence . . .* p. 250 *et seq.*)

Elizabeth had now to face the consequences of what the citizens regarded as a breach of faith in a refusal, although it was masked under colour of declining trade and heavy debt.¹³ However, the returns of bounties paid on new ships show that building was never brisker than from 1595 to the end of the reign, and the customs receipts were equally flourishing. Moreover, the Lord Mayor and Common Council were troubled with some constitutional questions of their own, for they added that people were asking 'by what authority the said payments are imposed upon them by the governors and other ministers of this city,' which seems to point to accusations of unfair rating. They ended by hoping that the Queen would be content if they gave in proportion to the other cities of the kingdom; but clearly the real difficulty was their feeling of injury at Elizabeth's conduct to them over the Cadiz voyage. Information from Spain and elsewhere seemed to agree that the shattered fleet lying in Ferrol might be destroyed without much difficulty, and, in January 1597, two plans put forward by Cumberland and Essex were under consideration. The first only asked for two Queen's ships, twenty Dutch, and some of his own; the second required ten or twelve of the Queen's, twenty Dutch, twelve London ships, and 5,000 men. Burghley, while thinking that there was 'nothing so needful' as to attack Ferrol, doubted whether so large a force could be prepared soon enough, or whether, large as it appeared to him, it was strong enough for the work.¹⁴ For various reasons the project fell through for the time; all accounts concurred in reporting that Philip was quite powerless for the present, and a winter or spring campaign was not a thing to be undertaken lightly. The treaty consolidating and defining the triple alliance between England, France and the States, signed the previous year, had placed the allies in a strong position, and the defeat of Turnhout in January seemed to mark its importance by doing for the Archduke's army what the storm had done for Philip's fleet. But the brighter the prospects of the alliance the more suspicious his allies became of Henry IV., who was more than suspected of listening to proposals for a separate peace contrary to his engagements. Henry was also believed not to have forgiven Elizabeth the loss of Calais he ascribed to her delay in propounding conditions, and something more was attributed to 'the general inveterate malice and envy of France against the prosperity of England.'¹⁵ The general political conditions, therefore, also

¹³ Cecil MSS. 24th December, 1596.

¹⁴ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxii. 16. It appears that Essex did not volunteer his plan, but was ordered by Elizabeth to draw it up (Birch, ii. p. 266).

¹⁵ Robert Naunton to Essex (Birch, ii. p. 211).

made for delay, but proposals were made to the States in February to provide a sea force, which they readily assented to. Vere, whose opinion as a military adviser carried great weight with the States-General and with Essex, was strongly in favour of recovering Calais, but as he thought the siege would require 20,000 men there was little chance of its being undertaken. Calm observers had never considered the Archduke's possession of Calais a serious danger to England, and, notwithstanding the slackness of the Channel cruisers,¹⁶ it had proved of even less annoyance than had been anticipated, and the Dutch, therefore, were not eager to take it in hand.¹⁷ To the Archduke Calais was of little use as a privateer port, custom and capital having already settled upon Dunkirk in preference; to Philip it was of no use whatever as the advanced base he required, and single ships bound for it must, after running the gauntlet of the English, French and Dutch vessels in the Channel, make it, if of any size, exactly at high tide. The placid consideration of the allies was interrupted by an unexpected event on 1st March—the capture, by the stratagem of a Spanish captain, of Amiens, the second city of northern France, where Henry lost his artillery park and most of his ordnance stores. This occurrence brought Calais to the front again for the moment, for Henry, determined to besiege Amiens, offered Elizabeth the former town as a guarantee for any expenses incurred in giving him the assistance he required. But, in view of the little injury Calais had caused, the Queen was not tempted by the permission to recover it at her own cost for temporary occupation.

The months which followed Essex's return from Cadiz marked the turning point of his career. A soldier by inclination, and by rank and reputation the leader of professional English soldiery, his brilliant capture of the city had established his renown and given him a dangerous popularity. Moreover, his share of the voyage stood out in contrast with the failure of the seamen to take the Flota and their refusal to cruise for the homeward West India fleet; and the expedition as a whole seemed to redound to the glory of the army and to bring into relief the many naval failures that had preceded it. That it would not have been possible at all for the army but for the very moderate successes obtained by the navy in even its worst years was probably an observation that occurred to

¹⁶ Sir Robert Sidney, the governor of Flushing, wrote to Essex that the captains in the Channel neglected their duty in scouting and examining ships, sacrificing everything to the chance of obtaining convoy money. He instanced George Fenner, jun., and William King, of the Advantage and Tramontana, 'they are the scrapingest fellows in the world . . . they will take anything that is given them, and care not how they come by it' (*Cecil MSS.* 12th March, 1597).

¹⁷ *Cecil MSS.* 7th January, 1597.

but few. Essex's nature was to follow the path of least resistance, and he easily slid into the character of popular hero assigned to him, but not without warnings from those most closely, if selfishly, interested in his welfare. On 4th October, 1596, Francis Bacon addressed to him the famous letter of advice urging him to eschew the perilous course of a military career, to be content with the fame he had won at Cadiz, and lay himself out for success at court by skilfully flattering the Queen and endeavouring to obtain high civil office. Above all things, Bacon repeats, he must quit playing the soldier, 'that kind of dependence maketh a suspected greatness.' Others, besides Bacon, saw the danger; when the earl was ordered in January to draw up his plan of attack on Spain his secretary, Reynolds, lamented that 'the drift of some is to draw on his lordship by insinuations to take the charge of chief commander.' Perhaps Essex was to a certain extent impelled into the path he followed by his failure to overthrow the rising influence of Robert Cecyll in the world of statesmanship and the court, and was thus tempted into a sphere where he would meet less opposition. Notwithstanding the earl's arguments and entreaties with the Queen she had made Cecyll Secretary of State during his absence, and he therefore endeavoured to regain his ascendancy by obtaining the nomination to the Earl Marshalship or the Mastership of the Ordnance, the two great military appointments then vacant. Bacon had directly warned him against taking either of these posts, and Cecyll does not seem to have opposed his desire, an acquiescence which hall-marked the wisdom of Bacon's advice. Cecyll made advances to Essex, but apparently without much success,¹⁸ for Raleigh was called in as mediator, and that he should have been able to assume that office shows that the feeling between him and the earl had been improved instead of worsened by the Cadiz voyage. He was not only successful in restoring outwardly amicable relations between the two opponents, but also appeased the remains of Essex's enmity to himself. In appearance everything went to admiration: Essex withdrew his opposition to Raleigh's resuming his duties of captain of the guard, from which he had been suspended from the time that his marriage was discovered, and Raleigh allowed Essex to share some of the advantages of his contract for victualling the land forces. Cecyll cultivated both, and the triumvirate, of which Essex was certainly the most ingenuous member, were inseparable: 'they are grown exceeding great, and often goes the earl to Sir Robert Cecyll's house, where they all meet.'¹⁹ On 10th March Essex obtained his appointment as Master of the Ordnance.

¹⁸ In February (Birch, ii. p. 282).

¹⁹ Events forced Essex and Raleigh into antagonism, but they had much more in common than either had with the shifty Cecyll. Sir

In January the Lord Admiral had been spoken of as to be joined with Essex, but he had no desire to share another command with the earl, and Howard's name soon ceased to be mentioned. It was no doubt a consequence of the renewal of friendship between the three courtiers, and with the consent of Essex, that the next plan was for a small fleet under Lord Thomas Howard and Raleigh. During the winter all the information coming in had agreed in describing the Spanish fleet at Ferrol as a dismantled wreck, without rigging, stores, or crews, and it may be that the apparent ease with which it could be destroyed allured Essex, with the encouragement of Cecyll, to undertake the work himself with a larger force. There was nothing to tempt Essex to occupy a subordinate position on the continent instead of a leading one at sea; the only military events of the summer were Henry's siege of Amiens and the Archduke's attempts to relieve it, operations which engaged all their forces for six months. Calais remained 'a bird in the air; you may have it if you can catch it'; and Elizabeth was not enticed by the prospect of being the fowler.

In his *Apology*²⁰ Essex says that the Howard-Raleigh idea was abandoned because a council decided that such a squadron would be too large for scouting and too weak to effect anything against the Flota or the ports. 'I was resolved,'²¹ he writes, 'that not only Ferrol, where the Adelantado lay, but any port in Spain might be entered and the force of the King that should be found in it beaten and destroyed, or any port or island of the enemy taken and forfeited, besides the commanding of any fleet of war or of treasure that should be met with,' if an additional six ships to the ten he had previously proposed and 5,000 troops were given to him. This was agreed to, and in April a warrant was issued to prepare the fleet and a general embargo laid on foreign bound ships until it should be manned.²² In May the States-General was formally applied to for the Dutch contingent, but there are indications of the usual struggle with Elizabeth before

Arthur Gorges says, 'Though the earl had many doubts and jealousies buzzed into his ears against Sir Walter Raleigh, yet I have often observed that both in his greatest actions of service and in the times of his chiefest recreations he would ever accept of his counsel and company before many others who thought themselves more in his favour' (*Relation of Island Voyage*, Purchas, iv. p. 1938). Whatever may have been the opinions given by Raleigh in the councils of war during the Cadiz voyage, the subsequent events show that they left no bitterness behind in Essex's mind.

²⁰ *State Papers Dom.* cclxix. 71.

²¹ Meaning that he was convinced, a sense in which the Elizabethan writers frequently use 'resolve.'

²² *MS. Council Register*, 21st April.

matters got so far. Rowland Whyte, who had good sources of information, wrote to Sir Robert Sidney there was 'much ado between the Queen and the Lords about the preparation to sea . . . they urge necessity ; she opposes, no danger appearing towards her anywhere, and that she will not make wars, but arm for defence.' He adds that she was very angry with those who were pressing her.²³ Several pinnaces were kept down on the Peninsular coast during April and May, and the information sent or brought home by their captains pointed to the possibility that Philip's fleet was at last resuming shape as an offensive factor. Early in the year Stallenge, who, at Plymouth, was in the way of obtaining the best information, wrote to Cecyll that 'as far as I can understand they are more afraid of us there than we of them here,' and a report in April that the English were at sea caused all the usual terrors in Lisbon and along the coast, which was still practically defenceless. Essex's words show that he at least was not blinded by the old illusions of Spanish strength. Although Vere knew that he would probably be sent with Essex he had not received any official instructions to that effect, but he was in correspondence with the earl during May as to the proposed operations. He expressed his desire to serve under Essex, and repeatedly impressed on him that for any successful attack on Ferrol a powerful fleet, army, and battering train were all equally necessary.²⁴ Vere seems from the beginning never to have regarded very hopefully the prospect of success at Ferrol, preferring Calais, and would have left the chance of a fortunate dash into Ferrol with fire-ships to Raleigh and Lord Thomas Howard, being 'fitter for them to whom the charge was first nominated.' Vere's eagerness for the expedition grew still less when he heard that Lord Mountjoy, who had yet to make a military reputation, was to be put over his head as lieutenant-general, and he seems almost to have hesitated about coming over. As late as 7th June the Privy Council wrote in a way evidently intended to soothe his feelings that, although he appeared to be still in doubt whether he was to come, he might have understood from their previous letters that his assistance would be required, as 'her Majesty hath too good an experience of your service to draw thence so good a part of her forces and leave you behind.'²⁵ When Vere met Essex he told the latter that he knew his influence with the Queen was too great to have had Mountjoy forced upon him without his consent, and that he would never serve under him again. It is, however, quite possible

²³ Collins, *Sidney Papers*, ii. p. 52.

²⁴ *Cecil MSS.* 25th, 30th May, 5th June. 'You must land, beat, or make an army retire, before you can destroy their shipping.'

²⁵ *MS. Council Register.*

that Essex's influence in the matter was not so great as Vere imagined, and that Mountjoy, another of Elizabeth's favourites, was forced upon him. But not only was Essex determined not to quarrel with Vere, but at Weymouth he made him and Raleigh shake hands, thus temporarily terminating the feud that had broken out between them at Plymouth the previous year.

On 1st June Essex went to Chatham to superintend the equipment of the fleet, on 23rd June he was at Sandwich, and on 8th July was at Plymouth. Not the least onerous portion of his duty, on his way round the coast, was the composition and despatch of adoring letters to Elizabeth, in which the student is irritated at finding the smallest amount of information concealed in the largest number of words,²⁶ but they served his purpose of keeping her in a good temper. A council held at Portland on the 6th discussed Elizabeth's fears that they might miss the Spanish fleet if it sailed for Blavet, and Essex assured her that information daily brought in agreed that it was in no condition to put to sea, and that there were so many English privateers on the coast that if it did come out he was sure to have ample warning; to make certain, however, he would send some pinnaces to the Breton coast with instructions to join him before he left the Channel. The council also decided to send Fulke Greville to beg another month's supply of victuals in view of the short supply, and 'the distance of place where the intended services are to be performed.' In his farewell letter of 10th July Essex grovels in gratitude: 'for your Majesty's blessed, wise, and magnanimous resolution to increase our store with a month's victual we have praised God; first on our knees for inspiring your royal heart with it, and next given that acknowledgment and that glory which is due to yourself.'²⁷ It must have been arduous work to achieve anything for a sovereign whose servants had to believe that her resolution to supply her forces with a month's necessary provisions was so marvellous as to be due to the direct intervention of Providence. The victuallers were to come out under the convoy of Sir Robert Crosse in the *Lion*, but he had not started when Essex was driven

²⁶ Elizabeth's familiar epistolary style was a ghastly premonition of Mr. George Meredith:—'How irksome long toil much danger and hearts care may seem to the feeler's part when they that only hears reports of what might be full of evil chance or danger's stroke are so filled with doubts of unfortunate sequel,' &c. (Queen to Essex, 24th July): 'when I see the admirable work of the eastern wind, so long to last beyond the custom of nature, I see, as in a crystal, the right figure of my folly that ventured supernatural haps upon the point of frenatical imputation' (*ibid.* undated).

²⁷ *State Papers Dom.* cclxiv. 11; *Cecil MSS.* 6th July, 1597; *Devereux, Lives of the Devereux*, i. p. 426.

back to England, and the Lion was then taken into the fleet in the place of the Merhonour.

[3] We have the Instructions in full and, in some respects, they merit particular attention.²⁸ The expedition was being sent because Philip was preparing a force to assist the Irish rebels, to invade England, 'and likewise to endanger our isles of Jersey and Guernsey,' and by taking Brest to conquer Brittany. Obviously one Spanish fleet could not do all these things, and the vagueness of the sweep shows how ignorant Elizabeth's advisers were of the Spanish plans; the reference to the Channel Islands is a new fear, and, I believe, a solitary instance, but the Scilly Islands, on which Philip's generals had had an eye for more than twenty years, are not considered, apparently, as a possible object of attack. Essex is repeatedly told that, although he is in command, it is 'with the advice of special persons appointed'²⁹ . . . by whose advice we require you to direct all your actions and enterprises.' This is strict and definite enough, but, as usual with Elizabeth, it is immediately qualified by permission to follow his own opinion in case of disagreement if he has the consent of any four of the council, 'or at least three.' All resolutions are to be reduced to writing and signed, and the opinions of all the principal land and sea captains are to be called for, although decisions are to be taken by Essex and the council. In particular George Fenner is to join the council in any matter relating to sea affairs, but without a vote. Fenner was one of the men of the Frobiser-Drake-Hawkins school still in active service, and it is possible to see in the recommendation some distrust of the practical seamanship of the new men in the absence of the moderating circumspection of the Lord Admiral, to whose influence the recommendation was no doubt due. Essex is to attack the Spanish fleet and army in Ferrol, or wherever it may be, 'but we will that none of our ships be appointed to enter into any havens to the manifest danger of our said ships'; in fact omelettes were to be made without injury to any eggs. If the Spaniards had put to sea before his arrival, the earl was to follow them with all or part of his force, as his council might deem advisable. The destruction of the Spanish force is 'one of the special purposes' of the expedition, and that done he was to turn his attention to intercepting the Flota and the carracks, and if they were found in any port of the Azores 'you shall do your best with the advice of your assistants in council to assail the said places and roads by sea or by land.' If Terceira was taken the earl was to use his discretion with the advice of his council—a somewhat difficult combination—about leaving a

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²⁹ Lord Thomas Howard, Raleigh, Mountjoy, Vere, Sir George Carew, and Sir Ferdinando Gorges.

garrison to hold it, but he was to have especial regard as to whether it could be self-supporting in the matter of provisions, as the troops could not rely on supplies from England, and also whether it could be made strong enough to resist Spanish attempts to reconquer it. Then Elizabeth added a warning which deserves precise quotation :—

Of all things we would have you consider whether we shall not hereby be driven to make an army every year to relieve that place, which if we should, then would your labour or success whatsoever before, be altogether absurd and inutile ; for where hereby you pretend that it will be a way to direct the war from us, whereby we may spare these daily and intolerable charges at home continually augmented by these voyages, you should be an author unto us of such a growing charge, such a continual peril of our subjects' lives and our honour, and, shortly, of such a confusion as we should repent to have given you the charge, power, or trust, we committed to you. Thus do you see that we do yield hereunto not as persuaded yet that it can be safe for us, but as a prince that would not be thought wanting to ourself if occasion be offered.

It would be of supreme interest to know whether Elizabeth was here expressing her own intuitions or reasoned reflections, or voicing the opinions of others. Certainly it marks a decided advance in the apprehension of the principles of naval warfare from Drake's ill-considered proposals of 1585 to hold Cartagena and the Havana, of which she was either ignorant or had passively allowed to pass without comment. She now understood that trans-oceanic possessions are retained not by forts and garrisons but by fleets, and although the Azores are little more than a fourth of the distance to the West Indies, would be occupied among a comparatively friendly population, would be held by a garrison partly self-supporting, and although England was now enormously stronger—stronger than she ever realized—than in 1585, she still doubted, and perhaps rightly, whether the country could stand the strain in money, men, and shipping the occupation would involve in face of an enemy not yet beaten off the seas by successful fleet actions. Assuredly if she was not prepared to enlarge her fleet and expend her ships it was impossible, for the retention of the Azores was a matter of life and death for Spain, and only by being at sea in overwhelming superiority of strength could she hope to win those victories which decide the mastery of the ocean. That secret of the necessity for superior force in sea fights she never learned, and she could not always expect the gales of 1588 and 1596 to do the work of her battleships. As neither antagonist would, or perhaps could, have sent large fleets to sea, an English garrison in Angra would, if it had held out, have involved a series of indecisive sea battles until one of the Powers was exhausted. One great sea battle might have been sufficient in 1591 to have

gained the command of the Azores, but Spain had been allowed some years in which to recover and could not, in 1597, be crushed at sea with such ease. To have torn the Azores from Spain was possible in 1597, but not for a navy as weak as Elizabeth's; it would have required to have been at least doubled in strength, and whether the national wealth, and the political conditions under which Elizabeth retained the popularity which was the source of her power, would have permitted this is doubtful.

The fleet sailed on Sunday, 10th July, and on Monday it blew a gale from the north-east; Raleigh and most of his squadron parted company that night, which he attributed to his having to stand by the St. Matthew and St. Andrew, both sluggish sailers. The weather moderated but remained stormy, and on the 12th Essex was off Ushant; by the evening of that day it was blowing a hard gale from the south-west which continued for the remainder of the week. After being battered about for days, Raleigh and Essex both gave in and ran back for England, Raleigh making Plymouth on the 18th, and Essex Falmouth on the 19th. Both Admirals at once proceeded to write impressionist letters of the terrors of the gale and the appalling risks they had run.³⁰ Lord Thomas Howard was more fortunate and either experienced less severe weather or thought less of it; he parted company with Raleigh on the evening of the 12th, but did not run into the bad weather until the night of the 13th, and then described it as only 'a stiff gale.'³¹ On 19th July, on the coast of Spain, when Essex was putting into Falmouth, he wrote to Cecyll that 'our purpose is to go for the Groyne, where we hope to meet our General,' and had sent the Tramontana back to England with the information of his whereabouts.³² Within a few days of his return Essex sent out the

³⁰ Raleigh wrote that in the Warspite 'it hath shaken all her beams, knees, and stanchions well nigh asunder . . . our ship so open everywhere, all her bulkheads rent, her very cook-room of bricks shaken down into powder.' Essex, in the Merhonour, said that he sprung his fore and main masts, 'her seams opened, her decks and upper works gave way, and her very timbers and main beams, with her labouring, did tear like laths.' If all this is to be taken literally, they must have been wonderful ships to have remained afloat. It may be worth notice that, in the Mary Rose, a sprung mainmast was fished with anchor stocks. Vere says that the captain and master both wanted to cut it away but that he would not consent. On 20th July Raleigh wrote that most of the ships in Plymouth had 'cracked' their masts. Vice-Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge is of opinion that the great housing in of the sides of these ships, which prevented the shrouds having sufficient spread to support the masts, was the cause that so many were sprung.

³¹ *State Papers Eliz.* cclxiv. 64.

³² *Ibid.* 36. Probably he picked up the Tramontana during the gale.

Moon and Advice to collect stragglers and to take orders to Howard not to show himself on the coast of Spain, but to lie twenty leagues off Finisterre or in the mouth of the Channel until he was rejoined. But on the 25th Howard was close inshore off Coruña and cruised off the port, boasting that he gave the Spaniards 'a fair sight of us.' For some unexplained reason Howard understood the orders brought by the Advice, which fell in with him on the 28th, as a recall and bore up for Plymouth, where he arrived on Sunday, 31st July.³³

As soon as he landed Essex wrote to the Queen and to Cecyll, 'in haste, in passion . . . the childbirth of our success is with show of danger and more than ordinary panic,' and declaring his intention of losing no time in repairing damages and getting to sea again. On 23rd July he expressed his wonder at not having heard a word from the court, but on that date Burghley and his son were writing to him on behalf of the Queen that she had 'fallen into many considerations, the time being so far advanced, whether in any good time you could unite such an army together, being once separated in so many places and many of the ships being reported to be so much impaired by the rage of storm and tempest. All which as her Majesty taketh as an act of God and therefore repineth not at it, so is it far from her Majesty's nature to throw any imputation upon you.' The Queen learns from Sir Thomas Gates that he is eager to continue the voyage and she will not decide for him, but submits certain points for consultation: 'her Majesty had diverse ends in this action, principally the diversion of the Spanish forces from her own kingdoms and especially of Ireland by disarming him of his ships, and afterwards to lie for some matter of profit. For the first we know that you are not ignorant how long this matter hath been expected in Spain, and therefore in general you may think that they have prepared to make the place defensible.'³⁴ Now, as he is short of provisions, boats lost, and the fleet in bad condition, he and his council are to consider seriously all this. Essex and his council answered this on or before 26th July,³⁵ saying that it had been considered several times and that they expected to sail the next day with seven Queen's ships, three Dutch, ten armed merchantmen, and four or five transports with troops, to join Howard, to whom orders had already been sent.

³³ *State Papers Eliz.* cclxiv. 64.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 50.

³⁵ *Ibid.* cclxiv. 60. The editor of the *Calendar of State Papers* assigns the reply to 29th July, but in a private letter to Burghley of the 26th the earl refers to it as already despatched. On the 24th July Elizabeth herself wrote to the earl doubting the truth of a report that the Spaniards were in the Tagus. If, however, it should prove to be the case, he was strictly forbidden to attack the city; if he and his council thought that the shipping could be assailed without danger she would not interdict it (*State Papers*, cclxiv. 54).

They assured the Privy Council that if the Spaniards came out and fought there would be no doubt of the result: 'if they keep in and stand upon the defensive, we will think how by landing and turning along the coast we may draw them forth to fight if we cannot destroy them in harbour . . . and if we either can give them a blow or know them not to be in a state to put to sea we will get us into such a height and place as we may hope to meet with the carracks and West India ships.' The earl did not share Elizabeth's misgivings, and in his *Apology*, written in 1598, dwells insistently on his purpose to attack Ferrol—'when I went forth my first design was upon Ferrol both by her Majesty's command and my own choice, that when I had defeated that force I might go forward whither I list and almost do what I list, I mean in any places upon the coast.' And again, 'my first, chiefest, and main design being to sail to the Adelantado at Ferrol, Ferrol was the rendezvous I gave.' It will be observed that Essex thoroughly understood the importance of striking at the enemy's military force before proceeding to subsidiary, if more profitable, operations, and disposes of the accusation brought against him³⁶ that in leaving the Spanish fleet untouched in Ferrol and the sea open behind him, he acted in ignorance of the first principles of war. He even returns to it again, dwelling on the results of the destruction of the Adelantado's fleet; that it would have put an end to invasion, left the Flotas defenceless, rendered the capture of the Azores easy, and thus made Elizabeth 'absolute Queen of the ocean.' The man who, in 1597, could so clear-sightedly measure the strategical advantages to be expected from a shattering blow directed at the enemy's means of offence was not likely to err from ignorance, and his reasons, good or bad, for leaving Ferrol untouched and unmasked will be seen shortly.³⁷

The weak point of Essex's character was that common to many men of more than average intellect who can see that there are more than two sides to every question, but who have not that tenacity and confidence in themselves associated with mental power of the highest kind. Although he saw so clearly the principles that should direct his action, he permitted himself to dally with a plan of another sort, which was apparently Raleigh's,³⁸ and an absolute contradiction of the leading truths he had grasped. The wind remained steadily adverse and their store of victuals was lessening daily; in these circumstances the question arose whether most of the troops should not be disbanded, the Ferrol attempt abandoned, and in its place substituted a more

³⁶ By the late Admiral Colomb, for instance.

³⁷ Monson's note (*ante*, p. 21) shows that he believed that the earl was in earnest about going to Ferrol.

³⁸ *Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 377.

attractive run to the West Indies. Vere tells us that everyone was in favour of it but himself,³⁹ and perhaps his influence still held it in suspense when the return of Lord Thomas Howard on 31st July with the news that the Spaniards would not venture out decided Essex's doubts.⁴⁰ The next day Essex and Raleigh rode for the court with the intention of persuading the Queen to allow them to keep 1,000 soldiers and half the fleet and start 'for such a place as I and the council of war had chosen.'⁴¹ From Raleigh's letter, much of it destroyed by fire, it seems that he dwelt on the lateness of the season and the dangers and difficulties of the Ferrol enterprise, proposing to venture to the West Indies instead because there would be no suspicion of such an intention and the treasure fleets of 1596 and 1597 would both be captured.⁴² He expected that they would be away for five or six months and thought it the most favourable opportunity that had yet offered. Elizabeth rightly rejected the proposition without much consideration, and Vere remarks that, after the earl's return, 'no more speech was had of the Indian voyage.' At the first glance it seems extraordinary that a man of Raleigh's penetrating insight should have even considered a scheme which involved leaving the country unprotected in face of an enemy's fleet known to be preparing for sea, even if a smaller English force had, for the moment, challenged it ineffectually to come out. What remains of his paper is not free from obscurity, but a closer examination suggests that he was not proposing an immediate departure for the West Indies but one to be deferred until the probability of Spanish invasion was past for the year: 'The Spanish fleet now at Ferrol is not in any estate to come out, and by that time in which we shall be ready to depart it will be no time of the year to make invasions or incursions by sea. We shall only be wanting in the dead of winter and be able to return in the spring sufficient timely to answer any attempt from Spain.' This reads as though the departure were to be deferred until the late autumn or the beginning of the winter, and although the experience of 1596 showed that the Spaniards were not slaves to the season, and in no case could it have been good strategy to sail leaving the Ferrol fleet intact within striking distance of home, the design was not so outrageously bad as to leave immediately would have been. No doubt, also, Raleigh would have said that the naval force left in

³⁹ *Commentaries*.

⁴⁰ On the 31st the Adelantado was booming Ferrol harbour, and throwing up earthworks, in mortal terror of an attack (*State Papers*, cclxvi. 69).

⁴¹ Essex's *Apology*.

⁴² It is strange that Raleigh should have been under the impression that the 1596 silver had not been brought to Spain.

English waters was sufficiently strong to guard against any Spanish enterprise, and, if properly handled, this was true enough.

Essex was back at Plymouth on 8th or 9th August ; the wind was still contrary, the troops were beginning to develop serious sickness, and the victuals were rapidly diminishing. On the 11th the council sent up Sir Anthony Sherley, who had succeeded Sir Ferdinando Gorges as serjeant-major,⁴³ to report on the state of things, and on the same day Lord Thomas Howard wrote to Robert Cecyll that he hoped they would not be thought vacillating, but there was so much sickness among the soldiers that if they were taken to sea they would die in heaps ; he trusted, however, that they would not be disbanded altogether.⁴⁴ The earl now offered to go into Ferrol if the Queen would leave him the 1,000 men brought over by Vere, and permit him to enter the harbour with the St. Matthew, St. Andrew, and fire-ships, leaving the remainder of the fleet outside.⁴⁵ On the 13th the Privy Council replied that the Queen allowed the disbandment of the troops, and approved the attempt on Ferrol with the ships named, but Essex was forbidden to risk himself in the venture ; he was reminded that he had promised to do nothing but with the consent of his council, and she was of opinion that the council would not permit the design to be put into execution.⁴⁶ On the same day Raleigh, who was then at Sherborne, received a letter from Cecyll saying that eighty sail of Spaniards were in the Channel ;⁴⁷ the report was of course absurd, but it was in continuation of a smaller alarm of the reinforcement of Blavet by some galleys and troops under Pedro de Zubiaur which had forced Essex, on 10th August, to detach the Tramontana and the Antelope by the Queen's orders to strengthen the Channel squadron. As a matter of fact Blavet was, at this time, even less

⁴³ Gorges, Sir Carew Reignalls (Reynolds), Sir Hugh Beeston, and Lord Rich had left the fleet. Essex wrote of Rich and Reynolds, 'if I had carried them to sea they would have been dead in a week.'

⁴⁴ *Cecil MSS.* The alliance between Cecyll, Essex, and Raleigh continued apparently unclouded. The first wrote many effusively friendly letters to both the others, containing innocent remarks intended to instil suspicion between them. But if Essex was deceived it was not for lack of warning (Birch, ii. p. 351).

⁴⁵ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* xlv. p. 126 ; *Apology*. In the State Paper letter Essex again took the opportunity to inculcate that 'if you would be commandress of the sea you must always be ready and your magazines well stored . . . the main points are two : you must keep him from strengthening himself at sea, and bringing home his Indian fleet.'

⁴⁶ *Cecil MSS.* 13th August. However, Essex seems to have disbanded the troops before receiving this letter of the 13th (*ibid.* 14th August). Raleigh was to take the fire-ships into Ferrol (Vere ; Gorges).

⁴⁷ *State Papers Dom.* cclxiv. 81.

a threat than usual: in June the troops in Brittany had mutinied, not being able to endure any longer, they said, the hard treatment of their commander, Don Juan de Aguila. They wrote to Philip protesting their loyalty, although they had been fighting seven years without pay, but said that they would sooner be cut to pieces than have any more of Aguila.⁴⁸ At the same time the garrison of Calais was also threatening to deliver the town to the enemy.

On 14th August there was a momentary change of wind, and part of the fleet got out, only to be forced back again immediately. This last disappointment was not an unmixed misfortune, as it gave time for the victualling ships to join, and as four-fifths of the troops had been discharged the fleet was now much better furnished. But it was exasperating to those who had been so long waiting in Plymouth, and the general impression seems to have been that if an instant departure was not made Essex would be recalled, and part of the fleet sent out under Lord Thomas Howard and Raleigh.⁴⁹ The same writer says that 'we languish with desire to repair our losses, but with small hope,' and when the fleet did at last get away, on 17th August, Cecyll appears to have been of much the same opinion; he hoped for nothing more than the maintenance of English reputation by keeping the sea in defiance of the Adelantado, and a cruise for the Flota, 'but the fleet at Ferrol will not be burnt, the carracks are come home, the Islands cannot be taken, so that their weak watery hopes do but faintly nourish that noble earl's comfort,'⁵⁰ and here, assuredly, the wish was father to the thought. Essex asserted that he sailed with the intention of attacking Ferrol, and Vere supports his statement,⁵¹ but Gorges says that 'our General and the wisest of his council of war did well enough know that the Groyne or Ferrol were then no morsels fit for our mouths';⁵² Raleigh is silent on the point unless the opinion of Gorges, who was in his confidence, may be held to reflect his sentiments, but it is significant that he took a pessimist view from the time of his return to Plymouth. On the 18th July he wrote to the Privy Council that the fleet was much battered, victuals spoilt, and many sick, and adds, suggestively, that he understood that the Spaniards were strong in Ferrol, ending with 'you, my good lords, can judge how we shall be able to beat it up

⁴⁸ Fernandez Duro, *Armada Española*.

⁴⁹ *Slingsby Correspondence*, ubi sup.

⁵⁰ *Cecil MSS.* 21st August; Sir Robert Cecyll to the Lord Deputy of Ireland (Thomas, Lord Burgh of Gainsborough).

⁵¹ *Apology; Commentaries*.

⁵² *Relation* (Purchas, iv. p. 1941). His words imply that there was some division of opinion in the council. If Essex remembered his own arguments of the previous year (*ante*, i. pp. 372, 373) he must have known that it was not advisable to attempt Ferrol under the limitations now imposed.

with these weighty ships. I dare not advise.' On 26th July he says: 'we only attend the wind . . . but we shall not be in any great courage for winter weather and long nights in these ships.' It was not a cheerful frame of mind in which to head a desperate rush with fire-ships into Ferrol.

[4] On the 25th August the fleet made the land east of Cape Ortegal⁵³ and beat about for two days in bad weather, in which the St. Matthew lost her foremast and had to run back across the Bay,⁵⁴ and the St. Andrew and other ships parted company for some days. Essex, probably much against his will, was standing close inshore, 'which was reputed no great policy or discretion in us,' says Gorges, and the Spaniards were lighting beacon fires along the coast. Then the Repulse sprang a bad leak, and failing to stop it by ramming down pieces of beef and clothes 'wrung together,' had to lie to in order to get at it. This was on the 27th, and on the same day the Warspite broke her main yard; Raleigh was ordered to stand in for Finisterre, the first rendezvous, but in the maimed condition of his ship could only run before the wind, and by the next day his and twenty other ships were missing.⁵⁵ Thus when Essex made Finisterre on the 28th, Raleigh, with an important portion of the fleet was separated, the St. Matthew gone for good, and, for the moment, the fleet had ceased to be capable of the offensive. Evil tongues were not wanting to tell Essex that Raleigh had ordered this strong force to keep with him for his own purposes, which Gorges characterizes as 'a monstrous untruth.'

⁵³ Cecil MSS. 28th August. Gorges says the 23rd.

⁵⁴ Essex called the St. Matthew and St. Andrew 'two great carts.' Carew, in the St. Matthew, made La Rochelle, where the great ship, although in all likelihood well under 1,000 tons, was regarded as a wonder. He says that 4,000 people came on board to see her, and that she was looked upon as so huge shows the reduced state of the French marine. Among the 4,000 were thirty ladies of rank who 'for three long hours talked of the Queen's beauty, wisdom and government,' says Carew, who must have been proud of his endurance. He got the ship back to Portsmouth during the first week of September, and immediately took the Adventure and set out to find Essex, trying all the rendezvous in succession. Hearing from a privateer that the fleet was at the Azores he stood across, but when 100 leagues from the Islands had news of its return. Off Ushant, on his way back, he fell in with the Spanish fleet, but as it was at night and in a gale managed to get clear. When he got back to the Downs only fifteen men out of his crew of 140 were able to work (Cecil MSS. 13th September, 3rd November).

⁵⁵ In his despatch of 28th August Essex says that twenty, and in his Official Relation written afterwards, thirty, sail went with Raleigh (Harl. MSS. 36, f. 419). Raleigh, himself, says twenty, 'voluntary barks,' the Dreadnought, three transports with soldiers, and three victuallers (Cecil MSS. 8th September).

Essex appears to have taken the same view, ascribing the absence of many ships to their following Raleigh's light at night according to custom.⁵⁶ The mischance was of the less importance because the wind blew persistently from the east, thus rendering any attack on Ferrol practically impossible, and Essex was told by some Spanish prisoners that the Adelantado was not going to sea during the year, so that there appeared to be plenty of time for further consideration if necessary. A council was held on the 28th, at which the Ferrol enterprise was formally abandoned on account of the want of ships and the adverse wind, and it was then no doubt that the decision to lie north and south for the Flota, still keeping touch with the coast and with Ferrol, was taken, although Monson sadly confuses the sequence of events. There can be little question that it was fortunate that circumstances prevented the Ferrol enterprise, as modified and permitted by Elizabeth, from being put into execution. It is true that there were not more than twenty men-of-war in Ferrol, but to enter one of the most difficult ports in Europe with two especially clumsy vessels and half-a-dozen fire-ships, without even the possibility of a surprise, and with the knowledge that there was no support to be expected from the fleet left outside, was a forlorn hope, and according to all probability could only have resulted in the capture or destruction of the whole detachment.⁵⁷ Raleigh's silence on the whole subject seems to indicate that he was not eager to lead them in; Essex, besides knowing that the second plan was bad, was never hot for anything where he was not to command in person, and perhaps had no great desire to give Raleigh an opportunity to distinguish himself by a possible success.⁵⁸

Until the 31st August Essex was between Finisterre and Cape Roca, and although the Ferrol venture was formally relinquished he was still within touch of the port and able to watch it, when he took a step which altered the character of the cruise. In the meanwhile Raleigh, with his squadron, had brought to off Cape Roca, the second rendezvous, where he appears to have intended to wait for Essex or orders, but his attitude of expectation was

⁵⁶ *Harl. MSS.* 36.

⁵⁷ As early as April the Spaniards anticipated the use of fire-ships at Ferrol; they also feared that vessels filled with stone would be sunk at the entrance to block the fairway (*State Papers Ven.* 19th April).

⁵⁸ An English prisoner, called an interpreter, taken at St. Michael, told the governor that Essex sent a challenge to the Adelantado to come and do battle at the Azores. If so it must have been about this time. The other statements made by this prisoner that can be checked are, on the whole, fairly accurate, and that Essex should challenge some one was very probable (*Vaz Coutinho, Hist. do Successo que na Ilha de S. Miguel . . . Lisboa, 1630*).

disturbed by news that the Adelantado had sailed for the Azores to meet and convoy the Flota. This information he sent off at once to his chief, with a message that he would lie twenty leagues off the Burlings until he received an answer. The earl received the intelligence late on the 30th, and early the next morning a council was held at which it was decided, on account of the positive nature of the information,⁵⁹ to leave at once for the Azores; orders were despatched to Raleigh to follow immediately.⁶⁰ In considering whether Essex is to be condemned for so readily acting on this communication, the point to be examined is not that we now know that the news was false, but whether the earl was justified in believing it to be true. As described by Gorges, and by Essex himself, it does not sound convincing, being merely that a Southampton privateer spoke Raleigh and gave him the information;⁶¹ the story was second-hand when it reached the General, for Raleigh had no power to send on the captain of the privateer for examination. Raleigh did his duty in forwarding the tale; he was not called upon to decide and, so far as we know, took no responsibility; but it is odd that in his next letter home, of 8th September, he makes no allusion to an occurrence which sent them on a wild-goose chase to the Azores in which he was a leading, if innocent, actor. Seeing, however, the number of enemies he had in the fleet, we may take it that he would have been charged with negligence at least had the accusation been possible. Raleigh must have written some kind of despatch to the earl, and that, taken with the answers of the Captain Cobbett who brought it, may have led the impulsive commander-in-chief to fly to the conclusion that the Spaniards had gone, but it is important to remember that the full council, composed of cooler heads, seem also to have been convinced. No doubt at the time Essex dismissed the statements of his prisoners that the Adelantado was not going to stir that year—a *prima facie* improbability—as a deliberate attempt at deception. More knowledge of the details would be desirable,⁶² but we

⁵⁹ 'The direct and confident delivery of the advertisement.'

⁶⁰ *Cecil MSS.* 31st August; Essex to Privy Council. The fleet council, which was attended by all the principal masters of the ships, appears to have been unanimous (*Lives of the Devereux*, i. p. 453; Essex to Queen). Raleigh is extraordinarily silent about the incident, whether he was innocent or blameworthy. The authorities do not support Monson's statement that the privateer was sent on to find Essex, nor was the message brought by its captain.

⁶¹ *Harl. MSS.* 36. Gorges (*Purchas*, iv. p. 1947).

⁶² The Scotch ambassador in London gives another version, received, he says, by letters from the fleet of 31st August; letters, that is to say, that had come with Essex's despatch of that date (*Cecil MSS.* vii. p. 390). This was to the effect that Raleigh had taken an

cannot lightly assume that Essex's decision was unjustifiable in face of the support given to it by his naval and military advisers, and the fact that it led to no later recriminations, being looked upon as an unfortunate mistake for which no one was to blame.⁶³ It may be said that before leaving the coast Essex should have reconnoitred Ferrol, but it happens to be an extremely difficult place for such an operation. It is so situated as to be entirely invisible from the sea, and the entrance from the outer bay is by a tortuous channel nearly two miles long with forts on each side, and with a fairway so narrow in some places that it gives passage to only one ship at a time. To see the Spanish fleet in the harbour any scout vessel would have had to run up this entrance during daylight, and unless favoured with marvellous good luck would assuredly never have come back. But if Essex could not look into Ferrol he could and should have left some light vessels off the port with instructions where to find him. The Adelantado came out on 9th September, but did not finally leave Coruña until 8th October, so that the earl might easily have reached the coast again before the later date.

The General sailed direct for Terceira,⁶⁴ and, as Monson tells

aviso, sent on from the Flota with messages desiring the Adelantado to come out to the Azores to convoy them. Douglas should have been in a position to obtain authoritative information, but this does not fit in with anything we are told by the principals. If the privateer had taken an *aviso* it would surely have been mentioned, nor were the convoys arranged by messages from the Flotas.

⁶³ On 28th October the Queen reproached Essex that 'by your late leaving of the coast of Spain, upon probability that no army would come forth of Ferrol till March, the enemy,' &c. (*State Papers Dom.* cclxiv. 153). This referred to a letter of the earl's of 16th September, by which time he had returned to his former opinion that Padilla would not come out, but she says nothing of Essex's first reason for leaving the coast.

⁶⁴ Boazio's map. I regret that I have been unable to ascertain anything about this man, but he must have been one of Essex's dependants for some time, as he drew a plan of the action at Cadiz for the earl. Rear-Admiral Sir William Wharton, K.C.B., has been kind enough to examine the map, and to write the following note upon it:—

'This chart is, considering its date, a wonderfully good representation of the group of the Azores. The scale of latitude is, curiously enough, exactly the same as that of the present Admiralty Chart, which facilitates comparison.

'In its detail, in the general correctness of the shapes of the several islands, and in their relative positions, it is far ahead of any of the charts in Lucas Wagenaar's *Mariners Mirrour* of the same period, which are for the most part very wild and crude representations of the coasts they depict.

us, was not long in finding out that the Adelantado was not there and was not expected to come ; worse still, from their point of view, they learnt from a prize that the Flota was not expected to sail that year, or if it did would take a course to the south and avoid the islands.⁶⁵ Strategically the proper plan for Essex to follow was to rush back to Portugal and take up a position which would enable him at once to watch for the Flota and close with the Ferrol fleet if it came out, and to keep that station until one of the events happened or until he was forced back to his base for supplies. By this time, however, the earl had persuaded himself again that the Spaniards were not coming out ;⁶⁶ to wait patiently within striking distance of Ferrol, for theoretically that was of higher importance than the Flota, was a procedure which suited neither his disposition, the hopes of his officers, nor Elizabeth's

'It may, I presume, be taken for granted that it could not have been drawn from observations made by the ships of Essex's squadron alone, as to arrive at the fair approximation of their several shapes and sizes would have required a separate circumnavigation of each island.

'Wherever the material came from, the principal part of it must have been gathered from ships passing—not from a land survey.

'The distances would be measured from the run of the ships as estimated, checked by latitudes measured by cross staff or astrolabe. Probably a good many latitudes were observed on shore, as it is remarkable that the errors are nearly all in one direction, viz. they are too great. Latitudes observed on board ship would vary in either direction, but with a careful observer on land instrumental errors would show. Some of the Spanish pilots of the period obtained latitudes marvelously correct when they observed from land or from a ship at anchor in quiet water. I am, therefore, inclined to think that this part of it was the work of one man, probably a Portuguese pilot belonging to the Islands.

'The mean error of latitude for the north points of the Islands is + 18', and for the south sides or points it is + 12', a very close approximation on the whole, assuming that instrumental error accounts for a considerable part of the discrepancy.

'The distances are all too great, a very common error in all rough draughts of an unknown land, especially islands, even in these days.

'Thus, the total distance from the eastern end of San Miguel to Flores by Boazio's map is 360 geographical miles, when it should be 300 miles, or a proportion of 6 to 5 ; while each island is magnified in dimensions in a mean ratio of 8 to 5, and every bay and indentation is exaggerated. The latter errors are also probably due to the tendency which always exists on the part of untrained persons to map individual parts too large.

'The numerous names must have come from Portuguese sources, from people who knew the Islands well.'

⁶⁵ Meteren. But more probably to the north.

⁶⁶ *Cecil MSS.* 16th September ; Essex to Robert Cecyll.

anticipations, who was looking for news of both the capture of the West Indian fleet and the defeat of the Adelantado. In naval affairs Elizabeth was never capable of judging the means required, and the voyage is another illustration of the inadequacy of the fleets she commissioned for the work asked of them. The fleet was more than strong enough to deal with the Flota, but not any too strong to fight the Adelantado ; it had been prepared on the supposition that the events were to happen, as Elizabeth wished, consecutively ; now they were falling simultaneously, and one or the other had to be given up. Even if Essex had gone back to the coast of Portugal he would probably have found himself compelled to renounce one of his aims, and Elizabeth would hardly have understood a campaign of which the results, if the Spaniards remained in port and the treasure ships came home unmolested, could only be negative in preventing invasion. No doubt another reason determining Essex was the impression held by Monson, which could not have been exclusively his, that the presence of the English at the Azores would bring the Adelantado there, if he put to sea at all, to protect them and the Indian trade.

From Angra the fleet stood on to Flores to take in water, and here Raleigh rejoined on 15th September, but the force was weakened by the dismissal of a Dutch admiral in his flagship on account of illness. Essex welcomed his Rear-Admiral cordially, 'saying that he never believed that he would leave him, although divers persuaded him to the contrary,'⁶⁷ showing that when Raleigh parted company his enemies had tried to persuade the General that it was with the intention of going cruising on his own account. His look into Angra had satisfied Essex that he was too weak in troops and heavy guns, of which the latter had gone home in the *St. Matthew*, to attack that port, and a council held before Raleigh's arrival had decided, in view of the information obtained from the captured Spaniard while they were at Flores that the Flota was not coming this year, to attempt the other islands, keeping scouts out, however, north and south, in case the Indian fleet should appear.⁶⁸ The fleet was to be divided into separate commands for the work : Essex and Raleigh were to attack Fayal ; Lord Thomas Howard and Vere, *Graciosa* ; Mountjoy and Blount, *St. Michael* ; and the Dutch, *Pico*. Time was to be given to Raleigh to revictual and water, but at midnight of the 16th September he received a message from the earl, that he was to weigh and make sail for Fayal instantly and supply his

⁶⁷ Gorges. Raleigh seems to have delayed two or three days off Villa Franca (*St. Michael*), attempting to wood and water. The governor of the island thought that his firm attitude frightened him away. No doubt Raleigh was wisely chary of undertaking independent action.

⁶⁸ *Harl. MSS.* 36.

ships there, the rest of the fleet having departed six or eight hours previously. Raleigh reached Fayal the next morning, but to his surprise Essex was not there, and, in the delicate position he was in towards his chief, was uncertain what to do. Two Portuguese, who, like most of the islanders, hated their Spanish masters, swam off to the fleet and gave information that led Raleigh to call a council to consider the advisability of a landing, as the inhabitants of Horta were removing their property, and the men were discontented at the delay and the prospective loss of plunder. The decision was to wait for the commander-in-chief, and two more days elapsed in perplexity, when another council was held on the 19th, at which Essex's adherents were still opposed to taking action, while others supported Raleigh's wish to land. On the 20th there was still no sign of the main body, and Raleigh took advantage of a change of wind to shift to a better anchorage four miles from the town; his squadron was now in great want of water, and this may have been the determining cause of his resolution to land, but, according to his own account, he had not intended to do more than obtain water if the presence of the Spaniards had not taunted him into attacking them. The landing, which he undertook on the 21st with the men of his own squadron alone, was opposed by 500 Spaniards,⁶⁹ who broke and ran when the English came to close quarters with them. The first party ashore consisted of 260 men, and the boats were sent back for 200 of the Low Country soldiers who, in the advance inland upon Horta, did not distinguish themselves, which Gorges excuses by explaining that they belonged to the garrisons of the cautionary towns⁷⁰ and had no experience of war. Horta lies at the foot of a semicircular sweep of hills forming the background of the bay, and when the hills were crossed the town was easily occupied, an entrenched position above the town, however, still holding out. This was to be assaulted the next day, but before the assault was delivered Essex at last appeared, having been searching for the Adelantado 'and other adventures,' says Gorges, but a Dutch historian ascribes the delay to the earl having received information about the Flota and gone looking for it. No doubt Boazio was with Essex in the Repulse, but as he only draws a straight course from Flores to Fayal we get no knowledge from him of the movements of the fleet. It was a golden opportunity for Raleigh's enemies, and Meyricke, Blount, Sherley and Vere⁷¹ aggravated the case against him, persuading the earl that it had

⁶⁹ The Spaniards said that the garrison was only 150 men.

⁷⁰ Flushing, Rammekens, and The Brill, held by Elizabeth as 'caution,' or security, for the money advanced by her to the States.

⁷¹ Vere says: 'for my part no man showed less spleen against him than myself,' but his animus is evident.

been deliberately done, 'to steal honour and reputation from him,' and urged that he should be brought before a court-martial and be beheaded. Raleigh, either expecting or fearing nothing, had set out to visit the *Repulse* as soon as she anchored, 'not suspecting that anything had been ill taken in that matter but rather looking for great thanks.'⁷² Essex gave him 'a faint welcome,' and then charged him with breaking the article which forbade the landing of troops except in the General's presence or by his order. This may have been custom,⁷³ but Raleigh pointed out that it was overridden by the specific orders composed by the council of war for the voyage, which prohibited the landing of troops unless by order of the General 'or of some other principal commander,' and he was himself a principal commander; he continued that he waited four days until 'I heard mine own company even at my back murmur and say that I durst not adventure it,' and that it seemed probable that he was judged strong enough to perform the task alone, and that the fleet had gone to the other islands. He might have added that it was Essex's duty when, whatever the cause, he found himself delayed to send instructions to his subordinate if he did not consider him to be in independent command. To court-martial and degrade Raleigh, much more to behead him, might, as Monson hints, have led to unpleasant questions at home, especially as there was always the third person of the alliance, Robert Cecyll, to be remembered, as he might find it to his interest to show intense sympathy and indignation on behalf of the victim who, after all, had won the first success of the voyage. At first Essex was inclined to admit the validity of the defence, but Sir Christopher Blount is said to have fanned his anger again, and for the moment the situation appeared serious, for if it came to the worst Raleigh 'had meant to have put himself into his own squadron and so to have defended himself or to have left my lord.' Fortunately Lord Thomas Howard, whose words carried weight by reason of his birth, character, and reputation, mediated between the other two Admirals and persuaded the one to give and the other to receive an apology, the earl saying that 'the rest would think him a very tame and weak commander if he should receive no manner of satisfaction.' Raleigh went on board the *Repulse* the next morning to make his apology, and a few days

⁷² Gorges. His want of suspicion may be doubted; the long hesitation about landing shows that he knew the risk he was running with his commander.

⁷³ 'The Book of Orders for the War,' drawn up by order of Henry VIII., and earlier than 1532 (*Harl. MSS.* 309, f. 10), directs that an admiral shall not enter a harbour, or land men, without the counsel of his captains. Certainly the converse must have held. It was this traditional custom that Borough had in mind when he protested against Drake's conduct in 1587.

later Essex and the other principal officers dined with him in the Warspite, and the earl restored the officers who had landed with Raleigh, cashiered by him in his first outburst of anger. In the Official Relation of the voyage⁷⁴ no reference whatever is made to this episode; many years later, when he wrote the *History of the World*, Raleigh referred without bitterness to it, saying that 'there were indeed some that were in that voyage who advised me not to undertake it, and I hearkened unto them somewhat longer than was requisite, especially while they desired me to reserve the title of such an exploit (though it was not great) for a greater person.'⁷⁵ It would be doing an injustice to Essex to say that his attitude was that of one 'willing to wound yet afraid to strike,' for that would be to forget his weak but generous character. It was an illustration rather of what Bodley calls 'his perilous, feeble, and uncertain advice, as well in his own as in all the causes of his friends,' a remark in striking agreement with the comment made by Monson. Essex was peculiarly amenable to personal influences, and it is conceivable that had the third flag officer been any other than Lord Thomas Howard, Raleigh might have been driven to the armed defence he professed to be ready to adopt. But Lord Thomas was a general favourite, and his persuasions therefore had more weight with Essex than they would have had with a man of colder temper. Even Elizabeth felt the attraction of Howard's character and gave a curious proof of it later in the year. In December he was lying so ill that his death was expected hourly, and his only son being a minor could not, if the father died, be given a peerage. Elizabeth, when she knew his condition, ordered a warrant creating him Lord Howard of Walden to be drawn up 'instantly' and brought to her for signature;⁷⁶ the new peer recovered to enjoy his dignity for many years, and on 21st July, 1603, was created Earl of Suffolk. His probable influence on Monson's career has been shown in the General Introduction.

[5] During the night the Spaniards deserted the entrenchments above the town, which were occupied by Vere the next morning, when the bodies of a murdered Englishman and a Dutchman were found there. In revenge the country was laid waste before the troops were re-embarked on the 24th, and the whole fleet stood over to Graciosa, where it arrived on 26th September. From Monson's phrase the Dutch seem to have rejoined from Pico, where, Gorges says, they behaved with great cruelty, 'yet I must say truly for them that the Spaniards again

⁷⁴ *Harl. MSS.* 36. Signed by Essex, Lord Thomas Howard, Raleigh, Mountjoy, Vere, Ant. Sherley, and Christ. Blount.

⁷⁵ Book V. cap. i. sect. vi.

⁷⁶ *Egerton Papers*, p. 268 (Camden Soc.).

have used such tyranny and outrage in their jurisdictions over that industrious people as hath well merited their irreconcilable malice.' It must always be remembered in reading anything that Monson says about the Dutch that he was writing after his quarrels with them when he commanded in the Channel, and after his Spanish pension for which abuse of them was part payment. Essex intended to get supplies at Graciosa, but, Gorges tells us, was persuaded by Thomas Grove, the master of the *Repulse* and one of the six principal masters of the navy, to stand over to St. Michael as affording safer anchorage, 'a dull, unlucky fellow,' Gorges calls him. The sequence of the events following is not quite clear, Monson, Vere, and the Official Relation all differing somewhat in details, but the pith is the same, and Monson, as a seaman and as the chief actor in the affair, is perhaps the most likely to be accurate. Essex, indeed, in the Official Relation makes the business appear still worse for himself, for he says that it was only by reason of his orders being misunderstood that the *Rainbow* and the other ships were left west of Angra at all. In discussing the Earl of Cumberland's voyage in 1589, it was pointed out that to intercept the Flota it was absolutely essential that the cruising ground west of the Island of Terceira should be clung to. Cumberland may have had some excuse for deserting it in his empty water-casks, but no such apology can be made for Essex, whose conduct in sailing for St. Michael because he thought that the first information brought to him was false, or because his Graciosa anchorage was a bad one, is quite indefensible. As a theoretical strategist Essex holds a high position; as a commander at sea he showed the deficiencies to be expected from one thrust at once into place of command, without having undergone the apprenticeship of service.⁷⁷ Monson, taught by experience, had given him excellent advice, but Monson was not always at his side, and the soldiers, eager for distraction on land, always had more influence than sailors with him.

The Flota, which included six galleons laden with silver, was under the command of Juan Gutierrez de Garibay, Baskerville's antagonist off Cape St. Antonio, and was made up of forty-three ships, with treasure to the value of 10,000,000 of pesos.⁷⁸ On board one of them was Sir Richard Hawkyns, coming to Spain as a prisoner, and it may be imagined with what anxiety and disappointment he watched the unsuccessful attempts to close with the Spaniards; he afterwards wrote to Essex that there would

⁷⁷ On 27th September he wrote to Elizabeth that he intended spending some part of October in the latitude of St. Michael, and would then come home (*Cecil MSS.* 16th October), thus displaying an unaccountable blindness to the right course, although there was nothing novel in the situation.

⁷⁸ Herrera, *Hist. Gen.*; Fernandez Duro, *Arm. Española*.

have been no doubt of the result had the English been able to get among them. When Monson's message reached the earl he was off St. Michael and immediately put back, but took two or three days beating up to Angra. On his arrival he sent in a pinnace with four or five captains and masters to judge whether it was practicable to take in the fleet, and, when they reported that it was impossible, went in himself, only to find that the Spaniards were lying in the wind's eye and that the place was strongly fortified.⁷⁹ These steps were no doubt what Monson calls the consultation of the sea commanders. Gorges adds that a full council was held to debate the advisability of a landing and storm of the town, that the soldiers were at first eager for it when the seamen thought it impracticable, but that when Lord Thomas Howard and Raleigh said that the navy would provide 3,000 men if the soldiers were in earnest, the latter became much less ardent. Gutierrez had landed guns and trenched the approaches to the town, and the garrison was increased by the soldiers of the Flota,⁸⁰ so that an assault from the land side would have been no easy task; moreover, the want of water in the English fleet was now so great that men were falling sick for lack of it, so that everything forced an abandonment of the attempt. Still the conditions were favourable from a naval point of view, for the fleet was in undisputed command of the waters around the Azores, and was strong enough to deal with any Spanish force that might appear, thereby covering the land operations. If the inhabitants could obtain water, the invaders could surely do the same somewhere; the real question was whether the military force was adequate to a siege, or could be made so without dangerously depleting the ships' crews. The passage of years did not lead to any alteration in Raleigh's opinion, for, although he despised forts in general as a check to the passage of ships, he made an especial exception of Angra: 'Yet this is true that where a fort is so set, as that of Angra in Terceira, that there is no passage along beside it, or that the ships are driven to turn upon a bowline towards it, wanting all help of wind and tide, there, and in such places, it is of great use and fearful; otherwise not.'⁸¹

⁷⁹ Official Relation (*Harl. MSS.* 36).

⁸⁰ Fernandez Duro.

⁸¹ *Hist. of the World*, Book V. cap. i. sect. ix. As a theorist Raleigh was the first strategist of his day. It is unfortunate that he never commanded in chief so that his qualities might have been fully tested, and that he was powerful enough politically to make enemies, but not powerful enough to have followers, so that we get no full or fair account of his actions and influence. It is possible that in supreme command he might have failed like Essex, and for the same reason, the lack of apprenticeship. On the other hand, he possessed a touch of genius while the other man only had talent, but there was certainly

[6] We possess a very full account of the events at St. Michael from the pen of Senhor Gonçalo Vaz Coutinho, the governor of the island, who, although he appreciated his own ability to the uttermost, acted with more skill and energy than was customary with Portuguese or Spanish officers.⁸² Essex was first sighted from Terceira on 7th September, and an advice boat was sent to St. Michael with the news, but the vessel took eleven days accomplishing the thirty league voyage, having to dodge Essex's stragglers and Raleigh's arriving squadron, and therefore brought but a belated warning when she did get in. Ponta Delgada, the capital of the island, is only an open town which possessed a fort dignified by the name of castle, but when Raleigh disappeared the governor prepared for a return by provisioning town and castle, and warned the local levies for service. Thus, when, on 28th September, a caravel sailed in with the information that it was only just ahead of the English fleet, he was in readiness in most respects, having 3,500 men available and having used the spade in trench work to some purpose; but he was weak in that ammunition was scanty for his 2,000 arquebusiers, and there were only two or three hundred regular Spanish troops in his command. On the 29th Essex appeared and, after sending in light vessels to sound, anchored in Rosto de Cão bay, out of range of the castle, which is close to the sea on the western side of the town, but Vaz Coutinho remarks that, on shore, they saw them take up such a dangerous anchorage with amazement. Here, the fleet commenced a furious cannonade of the trenches, in the midst of which Essex sent off a boat bearing a flag of truce which the governor ordered to be fired upon, notwithstanding some protests from his own officers in order that his men should not be dispirited by even the appearance of hesitation. From a prisoner on board the *Repulse*, he afterwards heard that 'the General was extremely angry, saying that this was one discourtesy upon another,⁸³ but that the last was that of a desperate man; but when his passion had cooled he said that there was a good head on shore, though but a small force.' The cannonade, which appears to have been quite harmless, was continued at close range until dark; the governor expected an immediate landing that afternoon or during the night, and the women and children were sent away from the town, the streets barricaded, and everything prepared for a desperate resistance, to end with a retreat into the castle at the worst. It

a want of practical capacity shown in his two Guiana voyages, and this would, probably, have been still more marked in command of a great fleet.

⁸² *Hist. do Successo que na Ilha de S. Miguel ovoo com Armada Ingresa* . . . Lisboa, 1630.

⁸³ The governor had not acknowledged the single shot fired in salute of the flag of St. Sebastian, the patron saint of the city, in-passing it.

was already decided to abandon Villa Franca as incapable of defence, which could be better undertaken on the five leagues of bad and difficult road which separated it from the capital. The night was passed under arms, Vaz Coutinho ordering fresh trenches to be dug on the shore of Rosto de Cão bay and arranging the plan of action to be followed by his subordinates if he, with the 600 men, all that it would hold, should be forced into the castle. At daylight, the next morning, the bombardment commenced again, and continued until a ship was observed to come in and speak the flagship, bearing, as we know, the message from Monson, whereupon Essex made sail in the direction of Terceira. But, contrary to what has hitherto been understood, he did not take his whole force with him, for we are told that twenty-three ships were left off the city, and thirteen moved eastward, first to Ponta da Galera, and then to within the island, forming part of the anchorage of Villa Franca. In face of such a comparatively small force Villa Franca was hastily reoccupied, when a message came ashore from the flagship of the squadron, the *St. Andrew*, presumably from Throckmorton, demanding water and provisions under penalty of the destruction of the town in case of refusal.⁸⁴ The officer in command demanded twenty-four hours to communicate with the governor, and the answer sent, with reinforcements, was that if the English desired these things they must come ashore and take them.

Throckmorton, if it was he, remained sullenly before Villa Franca; Vaz Coutinho, who felt certain that the main body of the fleet would return, kept his men in the trenches, feeding them well and cheering their spirits. What became of the twenty-three ships left off Ponta Delgada we are not told, but as no further mention is made of them, and as Essex, when he reappeared on 4th October, is said to have been accompanied by 130 or 160 sail, they may be supposed to have followed the earl shortly after his departure. On his return Essex took up his old anchorage in Rosto de Cão bay, where he was at once rejoined by the squadron from Villa Franca; under cover of a cannonade the boats were filled with men and pulled for the shore. Vaz Coutinho says that when within musket shot of the beach they stopped and then went back, which he attributes to a well-aimed shot from a field piece which struck what appeared to be the principal boat, but which was more probably due to the heavy surf making a landing very perilous; or, according to Monson, it was never intended as anything but a feint. Before nightfall a pinnace was observed to stand close in reconnoitring,⁸⁵ and by daylight of the 5th it was

⁸⁴ As Villa Franca had been destroyed by earthquake as recently as 1591, the threat can hardly have caused much dismay.

⁸⁵ Collating Gorges' *Relation*, Essex and Raleigh were in this pinnace.

found that sixty ships had disappeared, and the governor soon received information that they had come inside the island off Villa Franca at dawn, and effected a landing without opposition, the bulk of the fleet under Raleigh remaining before the trenches at Rosto de Cão and renewing the bombardment.⁸⁶ The examinations of five English prisoners tallied in saying that 3,000 men⁸⁷ had landed, the intention being that Raleigh should attack from the sea when the other force reached the town. The governor concentrated his troops but still occupied the roads leading from Villa Franca, some of which, he says, were so difficult that the invaders would have required scaling ladders to pass them. A fresh prisoner brought in told the governor that Essex had reconnoitred the roads himself and had given up hope of marching on the capital; his troops were endeavouring to forage round Villa Franca, but so unsuccessfully, says Vaz Coutinho, that they 'hardly dared move from the town, for when they did they were at once captured and killed.' It was not a dignified position for a force numbering 2,000 or 3,000 men, but the defenders had the advantage of knowledge of an extremely difficult country, and at last grew so bold that they harassed with impunity the main body in Villa Franca itself. In these circumstances a council was called, at which it was determined, in view of the difficulty of the roads and the apparent strength of the garrison, to relinquish the march on the capital and order the rest of the fleet round to Villa Franca to water.

In the meanwhile Raleigh was keeping up a harmless bombardment of the trenches⁸⁸ at Rosto de Cão, 'but they did not kill or wound a single man, and the soldiers grew so fearless that when the guns were fired they ran to pick up the balls, the governor paying a silver rei for each.' On the 6th occurred the incident of the carrack related by Monson, but the governor says nothing about the Dutch rashness, but that she was warned by a boy who swam off to her at his request.⁸⁹ When aground she

⁸⁶ The English version is somewhat different, being that a landing was intended to the eastward, and under the shelter of Ponta da Galera, but that the strong westerly wind carried them down to Villa Franca. Vere says that the landing was not effected until the evening, but he was writing from memory.

⁸⁷ Vere and Gorges say 2,000.

⁸⁸ The fleet used 28 lasts 17 cwt. of powder out of the 53 lasts 6 cwt. supplied (*Cecil MSS.* viii. p. 34).

⁸⁹ Meteren, however, tells Monson's story circumstantially, and adds that Raleigh confiscated the Brazil prize which had been taken by the Dutch as a punishment. According to Vaz Coutinho the carrack was chased in by eight English ships, although she took those lying in the roadstead for Spaniards, and Gorges notices that the mistake was easily made because Spanish fleets were composed of so

was attempted by the English boats, but the governor sent down musketeers and covered her by the fire of field pieces so that they were driven off, but, on board her, 'all was in such confusion that they never even thought of their artillery.' She was not set on fire until the ammunition and the more valuable portion of the cargo had been landed; she burnt until the 8th, and in the meantime Essex had come round, leaving Vere in command at Villa Franca,⁹⁰ and on the same day he took the remainder of the fleet back with him to that place. The governor believed that the earl intended to force the passes with his whole strength, professing to have been informed afterwards that such had been his purpose,⁹¹ and he moved down to Alagoa, a town midway between Ponta Delgada and Villa Franca, with a strong force, purposing to attack the English in Villa Franca. Whatever fears may have been felt at first, the ill-success of the invaders had restored confidence, and Vaz Coutinho tells us that his men were all volunteers eager to prove their valour. During the night of the 9-10th an attack was made by two companies of foot, but the governor says that little resistance was met with, having only to fight a rearguard which was chased down to the beach on the morning of the 10th, the embarkation having been carried out the day before; he claims to have captured seven guns, four horses, seventy boats, and many full water-casks ready to be transported to the fleet, and that nearly 200 men were drowned in the last rush for the boats. The English accounts are quite irreconcilable with all this. Vere describes a successful rearguard action fought by a small detachment, and an orderly retreat and embarkation conducted without loss. According to the Official Relation, the departure was decided upon in consequence of the protests of the masters of the ships, who warned Essex that if the fleet was forced to sea by one of the gales, that might now be daily looked for, the troops might expect to be left on shore the whole winter.⁹²

Spanish prisoners, left behind at Villa Franca, told the governor that the fleet sailed 'full of discontent,' and Gorges uses nearly the same words; ⁹³ he cannot refrain from a sneer at the

many nationalities. The Indiaman was the São Francisco, captain Vasco da Fonseca.

⁹⁰ *Commentaries*.

⁹¹ All the English writers say that it was only to water Raleigh's division.

⁹² If their opinion is repeated correctly they were guilty of exaggeration or ignorance. The sailing directions for the North Atlantic give 'ten days or more' as the time limit in winter during which ships may expect to be unable to recover the island.

⁹³ 'With grief and discontent,' the town (he must mean the troops in Villa Franca) firing salvoes of derision.

soldiers who wanted to attack Angra but were now unable to take an open town. Essex signalized his departure by making knights, but, affected perhaps by the hardly triumphant nature of the occasion, confined himself to a much smaller number than usual.⁹⁴ Vaz Coutinho, who indulges in a justifiable pæan over his meritorious defence, criticizes Essex's generalship unfavourably, but does justice to his chivalry and generosity. On the question of generalship we have not, at this distance of time, a sufficiently intimate knowledge of the local conditions and the equipment of the army for the offensive to pronounce a definite judgment; moreover, the defending force was stronger and better led than has hitherto been supposed. Vere's narrative is so colourless that the reader cannot tell whether he was satisfied or dissatisfied with the proceedings at St. Michael; but, as he defended the earl to the Queen, after their return, because he was discontented with him, we may infer that if he disapproved the course followed he would not say so. When the inhabitants returned to Villa Franca they were agreeably surprised to find the churches uninjured and the pictures in them untouched, 'which filled us with amazement,' says the governor, who, as he was unable to comprehend any sort of intellectual tolerance, immediately leaped to the conclusion that Essex must be well affected to the Catholic faith. On occupying the town, five women, lagging behind their companions, were taken and brought before the earl, who, seeing that some of them were good-looking, put them in a house alone under guard, threatening dire punishment to anyone who insulted them, and sent them food from his own table, 'as if they had been women of a different rank.' And 'It may well be that if we invaded England we might not show the same restraint,' remarks Vaz Coutinho wonderingly.

[7] As soon as the fleet put to sea all discipline was lost and each made the best of his way home, 'the fleet kept no order at all, but every ship made the best haste they could.'⁹⁵ For the first few days the wind was fair, but then came north-easterly gales, which completed the separation of the fleet and strained the battered ships badly. The Warspite and Mary Rose both sprang leaks, and no doubt many others were in the same plight; water was short, and on board the Warspite 'we were fain to begin to set our great stills on work.'⁹⁶ The navigation was hesitating and Raleigh followed the Repulse from duty, 'although our

⁹⁴ One authority (*Add. MSS.* 5482, f. 16) says eight; another (*Metcalf, Book of Knights*), four. Vere names four and 'the young noblemen.'

⁹⁵ Vere.

⁹⁶ Gorges. Sir R. Hawkyns had an 'invention' on board the Dainty, in 1594, for the distillation of salt water (*Observations*, Hak. Soc. p. 164).

master was very unwilling thereunto, assuring himself that our General's master was mistaken and beside his course by too much crediting the persuasions and art of one J. Davis, a great navigator reputed, who at that time failed much of his pilotage and conjecture for the Sleeve.⁹⁷ In a few days they were in Soundings, 'though indeed by that sounding I saw few wiser or more assured of the coast. For it was the back of Scilly, but none could say so, nor then so judge it but only the master of our ship, whose name was Broadbent, a careful man and a right good mariner.' Many ships, either from bad navigation or force of weather, were driven into Irish ports; the Warspite, being leaky, made for St. Ives, where, to their astonishment, they found some Spanish transports and pinnaces, belonging to the Adelantado's fleet, scattered and driven to shelter by the same storms that had so troubled themselves.

On 16th October Elizabeth prepared a despatch to be sent to Essex, saying that she could not reproach him, but that when she remembered the great promises made she was sorry to see the fruitless conclusion. Not knowing what had happened since Essex's despatch of 27th September, to which this was intended to be a reply, she recommended him, before he left the Azores, to detach a small squadron to look for the Flota, and to beware of the Adelantado who intended to watch for his return to cut off stragglers, 'though haply they dare not encounter with the gross.'⁹⁸ Therefore on this date the Queen had no expectation of invasion, and did not think that the Adelantado would venture to fight Essex, although he had actually sailed with both intentions eight days before the date of this despatch.

After Don Martin de Padilla had been beaten back by the winds in October 1596, Philip had undauntedly bent his efforts to refitting his armada for another attempt. The task was not easy, for the military and commercial exhaustion of his kingdom was now accentuated by the State bankruptcy of that year, and progress was very slow. Every man and every necessary that

⁹⁷ These words seem to imply that John Davis, the celebrated explorer, was with the fleet. Sir Clements Markham says, 'it is certain that Davis served under Essex in one or both of these expeditions (Cadiz and the Azores), for in a letter to the earl, written after his return from India, he says that he ordered his men "after that excellent method which we have seen in your lordship's most honourable actions"' (*Life of John Davis*, p. 178). Sir C. Markham thinks that he may have sailed as pilot of the *Repulse*, but it seems probable that if he held any appointment it would have been that of master, for that officer was now undertaking the navigating duties formerly performed by the pilot. Davis was not master of any man-of-war in the Cadiz voyage, and Grove was master of the *Repulse* in this one.

⁹⁸ *Cecil MSS.* 16th October, 1597; a draft.

could be obtained was sent to Ferrol, but after six months of preparation the Venetian ambassador said of his fleet that it was 'such that it is better suited for transport purposes than for an attack on England, where he would find a fleet far superior to his own.'⁹⁹ Philip's faith was still in soldiers rather than seamen, or perhaps it was because he could still get soldiers of a sort while his seamen were dead, that towards the end of August 4,000 Italian troops left Cadiz for the north, and if Raleigh had remained on his station a few days longer, he might have fought his first fleet action. We have seen that the Adelantado was so far from being ready when Essex was off Ferrol that, instead of thinking of coming out, he was fortifying the harbour, but the departure of the English to the Azores seemed to be the Spanish opportunity. Don Martin protested in vain that he was not strong enough, insufficiently victualled, and that his ships' stores were bad and inadequate; if he, like his men, thought it dangerously late in the year, such an argument had no force against Philip's passion for revenge. He was urged to go at all costs, and was promised that reinforcements should be sent on under Don Marcos de Aramburu. He left Ferrol on $\frac{1}{8}$ September for Coruña, which he did not make until the $\frac{13th}{23rd}$, experiencing a foretaste of the weather which bore so hardly on Spanish seamanship.¹⁰⁰ A galleon was wrecked going into Coruña, but the fleet consisted of from 130 to 140 ships, manned by 4,000 seamen and upwards of 8,000 troops; of the ships, however, only a small proportion—about twenty—¹⁰¹ were men-of-war, the rest being made up as usual of Levantines, Easterlings, 'and all other nations.'¹⁰² Although the expedition was poorly enough supplied on the naval side, great care had been used in providing everything likely to be necessary after landing; it was characteristic of Philip now to believe that all depended on the army, and to neglect the naval victory that must precede invasion. All sorts of material for fortification were carried; carts, horses, and oxen for transport; mills, ploughs, and twenty large boats capable of holding 200 men apiece, especially built to land the troops quickly. The fleet was divided into four squadrons, wearing the green, yellow, red, and white flags, under the Adelantado, Diego Brochero, Martin de Bertendona, and Pedro de Zubiaur respectively; the last named had the windward, or vanguard, station, Bertendona the leeward, or rearguard.

⁹⁹ *State Papers Ven.* 12th June, 1597.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 8th November; *Cecil MSS.* vii. p. 457.

¹⁰¹ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxv. 26; cclxvi. 69; *Cecil MSS.* 28th November, 1597. But the Venetian ambassador says that there were forty-four royal ships.

¹⁰² 'Their mariners very few and those whom they durst not trust, being compounded of all nations.'

Marcos de Aramburu was to follow with the reserve of thirty ships, carrying some 5,000 men. The instructions were to seize and fortify Falmouth,¹⁰³ and, leaving a garrison there, then to take up a station off Scilly and await Essex's return; having defeated Essex the Adelantado was to return to Falmouth, land all the men available, and capture Plymouth, and all else that he could. What chance Philip had of success can best be estimated by anticipating a little and considering the result of the Irish expedition of 1601. There, Philip III. undertook the perfectly warrantable operation of throwing an auxiliary force into a country whose natives were allied in faith and friendship, and had long been looking for help; and where a patriot army was already in the field and almost holding its own, and the country, as a whole, seething with revolt. Yet when Leveson went into Castlehaven, and finished with Zubiaur as a terrier finishes with a rat, and when Mountjoy smashed Tyrone, advancing to join hands with Aguila, all the apparent advantages of the situation vanished and the expedition crumbled up as a house of cards, leaving Aguila only an honourable capitulation. That was because after Tyrone's defeat and with the English in command of the sea he could not wait for a native rally, hope for reinforcements from Spain, or escape. Assuming that the Adelantado had captured or destroyed some of Essex's fleet, for as it was returning scattered and making for different ports he could not expect to do more, he would still have had to deal with the remainder when it had united with the bulk of the navy as yet uncommissioned, and forming, with the merchantmen available, a far stronger fighting force than his own.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, although Philip ignored them, the Dutch were now to be reckoned with as a naval power, and a powerful contingent from Holland would not have been long in joining the English flag. In less than two years, though he did not live to see it, a Dutch fleet was to insult his coasts and plunder his colonies, but he was so far from recognizing the presence of a new maritime factor, that for all notice in his combinations it might well not have existed. In 1588 a single victorious sea action might have given the command of the Channel for a time sufficient

¹⁰³ The town of Falmouth was not yet in existence. What the Spaniards intended to hold was the peninsula—nearly an island—on which Pendennis Castle stands and commands the entrance of the harbour. The castle had fallen into a weak state, but the immediate result of Elizabeth's alarm was its reparation and enlargement on an important scale. By February 1598 there were 400 men at work upon it (*State Papers*, cclxvi. 75).

¹⁰⁴ From the superior skill of English seamen and the greater handiness of English ships, it is improbable that he would have been able to bring to action any that did not blunder into the midst of his fleet in ignorance.

to enable Parma to cross, which, rightly or wrongly, was all that he asked ; but here it was not the command of the Channel that was wanted, but the command of the sea, and to obtain that would have required more than one victory, while the Adelantado had neither ships nor necessities to replace the losses of battle, nor had the King any reserve of ships or seamen. Granting the Adelantado's first victory, and his return to Falmouth, we may ask that if Aguila, with nearly as strong a force, landing in a friendly country with an ally marching to meet him, could not maintain himself, what prospect was there for Padilla, friendless amid enemies, and with all the military strength of England directed into Cornwall, while the English and Dutch fleets were cutting his communications outside? Nor was Falmouth a good choice for the invader ; to render the haven secure from attack from the sea he must hold St. Mawes Castle, opposite Pendennis, and a much less defensible situation, while the greater portion of his fleet would be within heavy gun range from any point on the shores of the harbour. It is to be regretted that the Spaniards did not reach Falmouth for they would have ' seized ' the harbour in the sense that a fox seizes its earth with the dogs outside and with the prospect of the spade, in the shape of cannon fire from the shores around, to follow. The order to take Plymouth afterwards showed an entire ignorance of the local conditions ; Pendennis and St. Mawes might have been held for a longer or shorter period, but the Spanish general had not enough men properly to defend them and the necessary ground around, much less to treat the port as a fortified base from which an advance might be made. He could expect no help from the Archduke, for the situation on the Continent was very different from that existing in 1588 ; in any case not a man could come over until the English and Dutch navies were destroyed, and with the Adelantado's resources that was an idle dream. The whole scheme was hopelessly bad. Whether Philip intended a formal invasion or to hold Falmouth as an advanced base for future operations, the command of the sea was equally necessary to enable him to pour in supplies and troops, but that was the one point that he set aside. In 1588 he had admitted at least one crushing fleet action as a part of the campaign ; but it would seem as though failing physical and mental powers had led him now to persuade himself that he might ignore that English fleet he could not master, that was ever in the path of the soldiers whom he could not land.

Don Martin de Padilla remained in Coruña from $\frac{1}{2}$ September until $\frac{1}{8}$ October, delayed, it is said, by contrary winds, and employed the interval in drilling his men and exercising them at the heavy guns. On the $\frac{1}{8}$ th, two days before Essex left Villa Franca, and eight days before Elizabeth wrote to him that the Spaniards

might come out to pick up stragglers, they sailed.¹⁰⁵ Thirty leagues at sea, orders were sent round the fleet that the destination was Falmouth, and so, for the first time, the objective was really known. On the ^{19th}~~22nd~~, in Soundings, the fleet was hove to, while a messenger was sent into Blavet to call out the troops to join from there, and in the meantime a council of war was held, but by four o'clock in the afternoon it had begun to blow from the north-east, and with the rising wind went Philip's last attempt at invasion. As the storm grew worse the fleet separated, the ships labouring badly and losing sails and spars, but the Adelantado, with those vessels he could keep with him, clung to his station for three days before he gave up the hope of at least making Ireland or Brittany, and ran back for Spain with the three galleons and twenty-four transports, which were all that remained with him.¹⁰⁶ Some vessels stood on for Falmouth, and their presence on the coast gave the first alarm; others made Irish ports, or were driven into the Bristol Channel, but most succeeded in getting back to Spain. The material loss was not large,¹⁰⁷ but the continual failure to get even into contact with the enemy was destructive of national prestige and demoralizing to officers and men. To the mob, English or Spanish, the fleets persistently baffled and destroyed by gales exemplified the working of Providence for favouritism or punishment, according to the race or religion of the observer. We may see rather the working of the penalty that attends on inferior seamanship and unscientific shipbuilding.¹⁰⁸

It was not until after the Adelantado was back in Spain that the English Government heard that Spanish ships were on the coast.¹⁰⁹ Naturally the alarm was great, and the proper defensive measures in the mobilization of the land forces and the navy were hastily ordered. It is to be observed that if Essex is to be condemned for permitting himself to be deceived into the belief that the Spaniards were not going to sea, the Queen and her ministers are, on the same line of reasoning, even more deserving of censure, because they had better and uninterrupted sources of information. The news was known in London about the 25th or

¹⁰⁵ 'Everyone unwilling as knowing the lateness of the season and the unpreparedness of the fleet.' Letter of the Adelantado's confessor obtained by the Venetian ambassador (*State Papers Ven.* 8th November).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ It is doubtful whether it was as large as supposed by Monson; in any case not more than three men-of-war appear to have been lost.

¹⁰⁸ 'Never did I behold so sudden a defeat with mine eyes as one storm hath given to an army so long in preparing' (*State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxiv. 148).

¹⁰⁹ He was off Coruña again on 30 October.

26th October; on the 25th Lord Mountjoy came into Plymouth with four of the Queen's ships, and, probably, some of the merchantmen, and the next day Essex appeared,¹¹⁰ neither he nor Mountjoy having seen anything of the enemy. The earl threw himself into the task of preparing for sea again with characteristic energy, 'though we eat ropes' ends and drink nothing but rain water we will out,' and, within a couple of days, impatiently set out for the court to impress his ideas on the Queen, and obtain fresh authority. However, before he reached her his Instructions had already been made out,¹¹¹ giving him full powers, but strictly forbidding him to leave the English coast. Only vague intelligence was coming in, brought by the lagging English ships daily making Plymouth, who passed detached groups of the Spaniards, but Lord Thomas Howard was preparing to get to sea with such vessels as were ready, and Raleigh, who had ridden over from St. Ives, was attending to the Cornish levies, while Mountjoy was to remain in charge of Plymouth. Two English captains reported having been in action with Spanish ships; a third, Bowden, having only twenty-eight men and boys for his crew, took a transport by boarding, although she had forty soldiers as well as her seamen.¹¹² The Dutch squadron went to sea, intending to beat to the westward, but being driven to leeward went home, 'and since, I perceive, there was some little discontentment among them,' wrote Vere. The 'discontentment' was due to the seizure of the Brazil prize by Raleigh,¹¹³ and on his return Duyvenvoord laid a formal complaint before the States-General.¹¹⁴ There must have been more small successes than are recorded in the official papers, because by 6th November there were 560 Spanish prisoners at Plymouth. All fear was now over, even at court, as was shown by the issue of a warrant on 31st October for 492*l.* for the paying off of the Ark Royal, Triumph, and Truelove recently ordered for commission, but now to be discharged. In fact the pay lists show that not a single extra Queen's ship went to sea in consequence of the alarm; the Channel Guard, under the command of Sir Henry Palmer as Admiral and Sir John Gilbert as Vice-Admiral, all or most of which was ordered westward to strengthen Essex, consisted, at the end of October, of the Van-

¹¹⁰ *Cecil MSS.* The storm struck the English fleet on the 18th (Mountjoy to Cecyll, 25th October). Rumours may have reached London earlier, but the danger does not seem to have been positively known until 26th October, when Cecyll wrote to Sir Thos. Edmondes that 'this very day advertisement is come.'

¹¹¹ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclxiv. 153; a draft.

¹¹² Bowden's ship was probably a privateer and not one of Essex's fleet, as he made his capture not far from Finisterre.

¹¹³ *Ante*, p. 70, note 89.

¹¹⁴ *Cecil MSS.* 13th November.

guard, Antelope, Advantage, Answer, Quittance, Crane, Tramontana, Charles, Moon, and Spy,¹¹⁵ and reference to the tonnage lists will show that most of these were of but moderate, or less than moderate, size.

[8] We must assume that this letter was written in 1597, although it is extremely strange that Monson should have omitted it when he wrote his first and most important book about 1624, or at least have omitted it in all the early MSS. known to us. From the allusions to landing the troops to take the forts, it was clearly anterior to the second departure, and probably the opinion was asked and given before Essex sailed for the first time. The view that the forts must be taken before the fleet could be attacked was sound but not novel, and the reader will observe that Monson would sail confidently to the Azores leaving the sea open behind him for the Adelantado to make a counter-attack on England, a possibility not even mentioned, and he commits himself to the definite opinion that the possession of Angra was of more importance than the destruction of the Spanish fleet. It is obvious that he did not realize that territorial conquest must follow instead of precede the overthrow of the enemy, and must depend for maintenance on the preservation of supremacy at sea. It was the same heresy into which Drake fell when he meditated holding Cartagena in 1586, and during his whole life Monson does not appear to have grasped the principle involved. He saw clearly enough that England could be defended, and Spain conquered, at sea, but inverted the necessary sequence of events.¹¹⁶ So far as the Adelantado's movements were concerned, he apparently thought that an English movement to the Azores would compel the Spaniard to follow,¹¹⁷ but, for all the indications he gives, the possibility that Philip would use for another purpose the opportunity afforded never crossed his mind. It was not contempt, for no Elizabethan seaman held Spain in so much respect, even when its power had become but a memory. For Spain the decisive strategical point was always the English fleet as preliminary to a landing, because Spain could not win without invasion; for England it varied according to whether a Spanish armada was ready for sea, or whether the Flota only had to be considered because England could win by naval operations alone.

¹¹⁵ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2235.

¹¹⁶ 'Our only security must be to cut off Spain's forces by sea, seeing their means of invasion and strength of defence depends upon their shipping' (*Project how to make war upon Spain . . . written in the Queen's time*, Book V.)

¹¹⁷ Compare 'and for four years together he employed his ships to the Islands for the guard of his merchants, which made him have no leisure to think of England' (*ibid.*).

In 1597 the main objective was abandoned by England in favour of a secondary operation, and, as against a strong and unspent enemy, the country should have repented the mistake bitterly. Theoretically, therefore, Philip's strategy was good, for he struck swiftly, unexpectedly, and made the port subsidiary to the defeat of Essex; practically it was bad because the means were utterly incommensurate with the end in view. It ignored the leading principle of maritime war that no decisive success can be gained without great superiority of force—a principle recognized, so far as they were able, by Philip, Parma, and Santa Cruz in 1588, although consistently disregarded by Elizabeth, if she ever understood it, throughout the war.¹¹⁸ In 1597 no superiority of force was possible for Spain, because England had become by far the stronger power, therefore Monson was so far justified in expecting that the Adelantado would follow to the Azores, for in sending him to England Philip was risking the substance for the shadow—risking the treasure, never so nearly captured, for the sake of a scheme in the success of which, however good theoretically as a consequence of the absence of Essex, not even his own admirals believed.

Monson rather minimized than exaggerated the difficulty of the Ferrol enterprise, and it is questionable whether the undertaking was not hopeless from the first, as a set attack, with the force that Essex had at command and under the limitations of his Instructions. Whether the modified plan of an attempt with fire-ships was feasible is one of those questions that are only decided by the event, and are condemned as rash folly or praised as masterly in conformity with the result. But as quickness and secrecy were essentials of fire-ship work, and as Ferrol can be entered neither quickly nor secretly,¹¹⁹ the presumption is that it was not feasible. After the excitement of the alarm in October had passed away, Essex fell into disgrace for the unsatisfactory outcome of the expedition, the Queen, 'seeming greatly incensed against my Lord of Essex, laying the whole blame of the evil success of the journey on his lordship, both for the not burning of the fleet at Ferrol and missing the Indian fleet.'¹²⁰ His good

¹¹⁸ The fact is not usually sufficiently emphasized that the Spanish ruin of 1588 was not due to the English, but to the gales. The defeat off Gravelines put an end to the invasion for the time, but no great material loss had been inflicted, nor could be inflicted, by Howard who was only able to 'pluck their feathers by little and little' in his own words. That process, continued, is as exhausting for the victors as for the vanquished.

¹¹⁹ Even by steamers.

¹²⁰ Vere (*Commentaries*). He defended the earl's proceedings, being, he says, the more desirous of doing so on account of the coldness between them. He succeeded, he thought, in changing Elizabeth's opinions so far that she began praising Essex.

friends Robert Cecyll and the Lord Admiral had taken the opportunity of his absence to obtain promotion for themselves, the first the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the second the Earldom of Nottingham, in reward, the patent said, for his services at Cadiz, which were thus considered more meritorious than those of Essex, who protested against the implied disparagement, and demanded either a commission of enquiry into the facts, or licence to fight Nottingham or one of his sons.¹²¹ His waning influence was not strong enough at the moment to obtain any satisfaction, and he retired sulkily to his house at Wanstead, where he was staying when Vere had his interview with the Queen. The subsequent reconciliation with Elizabeth either did not restore him in her judgment as a sea commander, or he himself may have come to the conclusion that his true *métier* was the army, for he considered himself essentially a soldier, and it was as true then as before or since that only a man who has grown up among them can successfully lead sailors. The earl never lost an opportunity of proclaiming his love for soldiers; he was significantly silent about seamen, and it is probable that there was personal distaste, as well as perhaps Elizabeth's want of confidence, to explain why this was his last sea service. Essex maintained that he had certainly intended to carry out the attack on Ferrol as first planned had not the storm driven him back, and the subsequent delay at Plymouth compelled him to discharge most of his troops;¹²² that the second scheme was nullified by the absence of the St. Andrew and the St. Matthew, and by Raleigh parting company; that the Flota was missed because he did not meet it before it got into Angra, and that it was the will of God that he and the Adelantado should not encounter each other.¹²³ If he had been on his proper station west of Angra, instead of north of it, there was every reason to suppose that he would not have missed the Flota, and if he had left scout vessels off Ferrol, the will of God would probably have not manifested itself in his ignorance of the Adelantado's movements. So far, therefore, he is open to criticism; but in considering the first object of his voyage, the destruction of the Ferrol fleet, it must be remembered that he was set a task more difficult than that of any of his predecessors. Never before, when an English admiral sailed, had any Spanish fleet been almost ready for sea, except in 1588, when, if Howard had got down to the Spanish coast in July, a somewhat similar

¹²¹ Nottingham was sixty-one years of age.

¹²² 'Ferrol was the rendezvous I gave, to Ferrol I directly shaped my course, and at Ferrol I had mastered the fleet that lay a whole year threatening my country, or driven their army into the hills, or else sacrificed myself.' *Apology*. See also *ante*, p. 53.

¹²³ *Apology*.

situation would have been produced ; in 1587 Drake had been forbidden to enter the Tagus ; in 1585, 1589, and 1595 he had no Spanish fleet to consider. Here, Essex was at first directly ordered, and afterwards permitted, to assail, without risking his ships, a fortified port, into which they could only drift one at the time, which was also defended by a fleet and army. To force a comparatively undefended harbour like Cadiz in 1587 and 1596, or the dash up the Tagus asked of Drake in 1589, was child's play to such a piece of work, even if the earl had been given a free hand ; but that he should have undertaken it under the restrictions of his Instructions shows that when he sailed the second time he can hardly have appreciated the hazard of the venture, and perhaps explains some of his hesitation when at length he did realize it.

Although the successes of the fleet had not been very obvious, they had been considerable enough indirectly.¹²⁴ Raleigh could point to the evident results, 'her Majesty's kingdoms defended, the enemy dishonoured and made a great loser, and the war made upon our enemy's charge,' though more than this had been expected. But the States' Deputies saw further, and attributed Henry's recapture of Amiens in September, and the surrender of several towns to Prince Maurice, to the necessity forced upon Philip of directing troops and supplies to Portugal and Ferrol, instead of to the Low Countries, and the consequent lack of men and money at the theatre of the war.¹²⁵ Naturally, Elizabeth would have liked to possess the treasure actually, but Henry was satisfied to admit the influence of the fleet in delaying its arrival, and so helping him ; and one of Philip's envoys owned that the postponement, and the cost of protecting and fitting out extra fleets to bring it from the Azores, was one of the worst injuries

¹²⁴ There must also have been more plunder than would be supposed from the official papers. On 30th October Lord Thomas Howard wrote familiarly to Cecyll that he would gladly confide in him as to their gains, but that he (Cecyll), being a member of the Privy Council, could not be safely told, 'and we are loth to make restitution of goods so hardly gotten. But the Rear-Admiral hath taken a sure course, for he hath sold the sugar prize at Bristol, and paid himself with his officers and company, and could, with the Queen's honour, proportion to himself no less than forty shillings a day. If it be allowed he is beforehand ; if not, he sweareth desperately you shall never get a groat back again from him' (*Cecil MSS.*). See also Monson, *ante*, p. 30.

¹²⁵ *Cecil MSS.* 16th March, 1598. Olden-Barneveld and Justin of Nassau were at this date on their way to see Henry IV., to persuade him to a continuance of the war. The words of a contemporary diarist show the importance attached to the recovery of Amiens : 'All Europe was anxiously watching the result of this siege, for upon it depended the freedom or subjection of France' (Pierre de L'Étoile, *Journal du Regne de Henri IV.*, ii. p. 370).

that could be done to his master.¹²⁶ It was yet another illustration of the far-reaching influence of naval operations, even when unattended by those brilliant successes which catch the attention of the million.

The Queen, we see, held Essex responsible for the whole blame of what she considered failure, but it will not escape the reader's notice that Essex and Howard in 1596, and Essex in 1597, were rather presidents of councils of war than commanders-in-chief in the strict sense, for their councils might, on occasion, refuse to entertain any proposals they brought forward. Howard, indeed, fully understood and accepted the arrangement, for, before he sailed in 1596, he wrote to Burghley that he would not act upon his own judgment but would always listen, and yield, to argument.¹²⁷ It was an essentially wrong frame of mind if he and Essex were alone responsible for success or failure, but it was judicious enough if he believed that they were expected to do nothing without the assent of a majority of their council. In this expedition Essex is definitely ordered 'to direct all his actions' by the advice of his council, although the clause is immediately modified in such a way that he could be held to blame whether he ignored it or followed it. Probably this authority given to a council is an indication of Elizabeth's doubt of her Generals, or, in 1596, her fear that Howard alone would not be able to restrain Essex from any unadvised proceedings.

¹²⁶ Birch, *Bacon Papers*, ii. p. 373.

¹²⁷ *Lansd. MSS.* 115, f. 22.

The Lord Thomas Howard, Admiral in the
Downs, whence he returned in a Month.
A.D. 1599. [I]

| Ships. | | | Commanders. | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|
| The Elizabeth Jonas . . . | . | . | The Lord Thomas Howard. | . | . |
| The Ark Royal | . | . | Sir Walter Raleigh. | . | . |
| The Triumph | . | . | Sir Fulke Greville. | . | . |
| The Merhonour | . | . | Sir Henry Palmer. | . | . |
| The Repulse | . | . | Sir Thomas Vavasour. | . | . |
| The Garland | . | . | Sir William Harvey. | . | . |
| The Defiance | . | . | Sir William Monson. | . | . |
| The Nonpareil | . | . | Sir Robert Crosse. | . | . |
| The Lion | . | . | Sir Richard Leveson. | . | . |
| The Rainbow | . | . | Sir Alexander Clifford. | . | . |
| The Hope. | . | . | Sir John Gilbert. | . | . |
| The Foresight | . | . | Sir Thomas Sherley. | . | . |
| The Mary Rose | . | . | Mr. Fortescue. | . | . |
| The Bonaventure | . | . | Captain Troughton. | . | . |
| The Crane | . | . | Captain Jonas. | . | . |
| The Swiftsure | . | . | Captain Bradgate. | . | . |
| The Tramontana | . | . | Captain Slingsby. | . | . |
| The Advantage | . | . | Captain White. | . | . |
| The Quittance | . | . | Captain Reynolds. | . | . |

I CANNOT write of anything done in this year of 1599, for there was never greater expectation of war with less performance. Whether it was a mistrust the one nation had of the other, or a policy held on both sides to make peace with sword in hand, a treaty being entertained by consent of each prince, I am not to examine; but sure I am the preparation was on both sides very great, as if the one expected an invasion from the other. And yet

it was generally conceived, not to be intended by either ; but that ours had only relation to my Lord of Essex, who was then in Ireland, and had a design to try his friends in England to be revenged of the wrongs done him by his enemies, as he pretended, and as it proved afterwards by his fall. Howsoever it was, the charge was not great yet necessary, for it was commonly known that the Adelantado had drawn both his ships and galleys to Coruña, which was not usually done, but for some action intended upon England or Ireland, though he converted them afterwards to another use. For the galleys were sent into the Low Countries, and passed the Narrow Seas whilst our ships lay there ; and with the fleet the Adelantado pursued the Hollanders to the Islands, whither he suspected they were gone. This fleet of Hollanders, which consisted of seventy-three sail, were the first ships that ever displayed their colours in warlike sort against the Spaniards in any action of their own ; for how cruel soever the war seemed to be in Holland, by using all terror of death when they took one another in ships of war at sea, yet they desired and accomplished a peaceable traffic with Spain and abused us in the highest degree. This first action of the Hollanders at sea did not succeed for the best with them, for after the spoil of a town in the Canaries, and some hurt done at the island of St. Thomé, they kept the sea for seven or eight months, in which time their General and most of their men sickened and died, and the rest returned with loss and shame. The second benefit which we received by this preparation was, that our men were now taught suddenly to arm, every man knowing his command and how to be commanded, which before they were ignorant of ; and who knows not, that sudden and false alarms in an army are

sometimes necessary ? The expedition in drawing together so great an army by land, and rigging her royal navy to sea, in so little a space of time was so admired * in other countries that they received a terror by it ; and many that came from beyond sea said, 'The Queen was never more dreaded for anything she ever did.'

Frenchmen that came aboard our ships did wonder (as at a thing incredible) that her Majesty had rigged, victualled, and furnished her royal ships to sea in twelve days' time.† And Spain, as an enemy, had reason to fear and grieve, first, to see this sudden preparation, secondly, when they saw how the hearts of her Majesty's subjects joined with their hands, for with one consent they were ready to spend their dearest blood for her and her service. Holland might likewise see that if they became insolent we could be as soon provided for them as they for themselves ; nor did they expect to find such celerity in any nation but themselves.

It is probable, too, that the King of Spain and the Archduke were hereby drawn to entertain thoughts of peace, for as soon as our fleet was at sea a gentleman was sent from Brussels with some overtures, though for that time they succeeded not. However, whether it was that the intended invasion from Spain was diverted, or that her Majesty was fully satisfied of my Lord of Essex, I know not ; but it is very likely that she stood in no jealousy‡ of either the one or the other by the sudden return of her ships from sea after they had lain three weeks or a month in the Downs. [2]

* *I.e.* Caused such wonder.

† SL 1 has an interlineation here :—'who I remember said that England was happy in her strength with the use for defence, and his unhappy for that the strength, meaning the towns, was the only cause of often war.'

‡ Fear.

[1] The following is the list of Howard's fleet.¹ Four of his vessels, the Rainbow, Hope, Repulse, and Lion, were only four of the Channel Guard transferred to his command :—

| Ships. | Tons. | Men.* | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-----------------|-------|-------|--|
| Queen's Ships : | | | |
| Elizabeth Jonas | 900 | 4,550 | Lord Thomas Howard, 'captain and admiral,' ³ 11th August–10th September. |
| Ark Royal | 800 | | Sir Walter Raleigh, 'captain and vice-admiral,' ⁴ 11th August–11th September. |
| Triumph. | 1,100 | | Sir Fulke Greville, 'captain and rear-admiral,' ⁵ 11th August–10th September. |
| Merhonour | 865 | | Sir Henry Palmer, ⁶ 20th August–10th September. |
| Garland | 660 | | Sir Wm. Harvey, 11th August–11th September. |
| Mary Rose | 600 | | Wm. Fortescue, 14th August–12th September. |
| Hope | 600 | | Sir John Gilbert, 11th August–11th September. |
| Bonaventure | 600 | | J. Troughton, 10th August–17th September. |
| Nonpareil | 500 | | Jeremy Turner, 4th–21st August. |
| Defiance | 550 | | Sir Robert Crosse, 22nd August–12th September. |
| Foresight | 300 | | Sir Wm. Monson, 11th August–11th September. |
| Repulse | 770 | | Sir Thos. Sherley, 20th August–2nd September. |
| Rainbow | 500 | | Sir Thos. Vavasour, 20th August–11th September. |
| Lion | 500 | | Sir Alex. Clifford, 10th August–10th September. |
| Mercury | 80 | | Sir Rich. Leveson, 26th August–4th September. |
| Merlin | 50 | | Thos. Flemyng, 11th August–13th September. |
| | | | Gawen Harvey, 28th August–22nd September. |

¹ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2237.

² *State Papers Dom.* cclxxii. 5.

³ At 3*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* a day.

⁵ At 16*s.* 8*d.* a day.

⁴ At 1*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* a day.

⁶ All the captains 2*s.* 6*d.* a day.

| Ships. | Tons. | Men. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------------|-------|------|------------------------------------|
| Hired Merchant-men : | | | |
| Triumph . . | 255 | | Rich. Duncombe. |
| Flying Dragon . | 290 | | Jas. Cresye. |
| Swallow . . | 250 | | John Atkinson. |
| Rebecca . . | 310 | | Edmond Doggett. |
| Rose Lion . . | 200 | | Robert Meade. |

Added to this fleet was a squadron of twelve ships provided by the City of London, but concerning which we have no details.⁷ This, the 'Grand Fleet,' to use a descriptive term of a century later, was by no means the complete reckoning of the naval preparations of 1599. The squadron on the Irish station consisted of :—

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|---------------------|-------|---|
| Antelope . . | 400 | Sir Robert Mansell, 'captain and admiral,' ⁸ 16th February–29th October. |
| Adventure. | 340 | Geo. Somers, 'captain and vice-admiral,' ⁹ 16th February–29th October. |
| Charles . . | 70 | Sackville Trevor, 1st January–28th October. |
| Moon . . | 60 | Christopher Crofts, 1st January–1st December. |
| Popinjay . . | — | Geo. Thornton, 1st March–7th November. |
| And two hired ships | | |

The Dreadnought, Swiftsure, and Advice, under Geo. Fenner, Matthew Bradgate, and Wm. Willis¹⁰ respectively, were kept cruising between Scilly and Ushant, from April to the end of

⁷ Chamberlain to Carleton, 1st, 23rd August, 1599; *Slingsby Correspondence*, p. 255; *State Papers*, cclxxii. 86. The captains were to be appointed by Lord Thomas Howard (Hist. MSS. Com. *Foljambe MSS.* p. 95).

⁸ At 1*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* a day.

⁹ At 1*os.* a day.

¹⁰ Fenner, as Admiral, 1*l.* and Bradgate as Vice-Admiral 6*s.* 8*d.* a day; Willis the usual 2*s.* 6*d.*

September, with an especial eye on Brest in case the expected Spanish armada put in there. The Channel Guard was made up of:—

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------|-------|--|
| Rainbow . . | 500 | Sir Rich. Leveson, 'captain and admiral,' ¹¹ 1st January–6th July. |
| Hope . . | 600 | Sir Rich. Leveson, 'captain and admiral,' 7th July–8th August. |
| Lion . . | 500 | Sir Rich. Leveson, 'captain and admiral,' 9th–25th August, 5th September–3rd October. |
| Crane . . | 250 | Sir Rich. Leveson, 'captain and admiral,' 4th October–31st December. |
| Crane . . | — | Sir Alex. Clifford, 'captain and vice-admiral,' ¹² 1st January–28th July, 11th September–31st December. ¹³ |
| Crane . . | — | Jonas Bradbury, 8th August–23rd September. |
| Quittance . . | 270 | Humphrey Reynolds, 1st January–31st December. |
| Answer . . | 275 | Walter Gore, 1st January–8th October. |
| Advantage . . | 215 | Thos. Coverte, 1st September–31st December. |
| Tramontana . . | 150 | Guilford Slingsby, 27th July–13th September. |
| Spy . . | 50 | John White, 7th April–27th September. |

The Thames and Medway Guard of the Channel Squadron was a separate division:—

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-------------|-------|---|
| Lion . . | 500 | Sir Henry Palmer, 'captain and admiral,' ¹⁴ 11th May–4th August, 12th October–13th December. |
| Repulse . . | 775 | Sir Henry Palmer, 'captain and admiral,' 5th–19th August, 16th September–11th October. |

¹¹ At 17. a day.

¹³ *Sic.* Compare Leveson's dates.

¹² At 10s. a day.

¹⁴ At 17. a day.

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-----------------|-------|---|
| Foresight . . . | 300 | John Troughton, 'captain and vice-admiral,' ¹⁵ 14th September–12th December. |
| Advantage. . . | 215 | Thos. Coverte, 1st January–31st August. |
| Achates . . . | 100 | Thos. Norreys, 1st January–19th August. |
| Sun . . . | 40 | Rich. Bourne, 14th March–31st December. |

There were also attached to the River Guard five ships hired by the Queen, and a number of small hoys and barges provided by the City of London. The navy and victualling payments for this year of simply passive defence amounted to 99,000*l.*, being at least a fifth of the revenue of the Crown, which is supposed, including subsidies, tenths, and fifteenths, to have been about 500,000*l.* a year at the end of the century, probably a liberal estimate. But this was for the navy alone; a large amount must have been expended on the levy, support, and concentration of the troops brought together.

[2] Monson passes over the year 1598 without notice, as no royal fleet was sent southwards, although the Earl of Cumberland went to the West Indies, an expedition he discusses at the end of the royal voyages. It was, however, an important year politically, since it was signalized by the Peace of Vervins, which withdrew France from the war. Henry's formal declaration of war against Spain in 1595 was a step that had no doubt been taken with a view to negotiating a durable peace, and his allies had regarded him with unconcealed suspicion from the time when his public act seemed to set the seal upon his straightforwardness. They were right in so far that he had been secretly negotiating ever since through the agency of the Pope. The loss of Amiens had set back the business for the moment, but the recovery of the city in September placed him again in an advantageous position, and his own defence that his people were yearning for a peace, and that a continuance of the war for any time longer than was necessary might cost him his throne, was evidently true enough. On his side Philip had no prospect now of either obtaining the crown of France for himself or one of his family, or of reducing it to impotence by dividing the provinces among the great nobles; the next best thing was to make peace with it, as being the Power to which he would have to surrender least, and so reduce the legacy

¹⁵ At 10*s.* a day.

of war he was about to bequeath to his son. In November 1597, Henry sent M. de Maisse, as a special envoy, ostensibly to acquaint Elizabeth with the progress of the negotiations and to invite her to join in them; it appears that he also asked for the aid of ships to reduce Blavet, the siege of which Henry was then considering, and the French king subsequently made Elizabeth's refusal an additional justification of his course of action.¹⁶ If Elizabeth had consented it would have made no difference, but Henry was desirous of obtaining something more from his ally or of having further excuse. For Elizabeth the position was difficult; she longed for peace, and she had that amount of love for the Dutch that a despotic monarch was likely to feel for insurgent burghers, but she saw that it was impossible to desert them and that Philip would not accede to any terms that they or she could accept. In a moment of confidence she told the States' envoy that it was as easy for her to make black white as to make peace with Spain. Yet she may have had doubts whether she was not nursing into strength a more formidable antagonist than Spain had ever been. The wealth and the extraordinary commercial progress made by the United Netherlands had long been a cause of jealousy and dislike, and was becoming one for fear. Of their success elsewhere she could not openly complain, but she fixed on the trade with Spain as a breach of faith, and Burghley threatened that the English cruisers should seize as enemies Dutch vessels bound for Spanish ports. Chamberlain gives expression to the popular desire for peace not for liking of Spain, but for dislike of the Dutch, 'in that we for their sake and defence entering into the war, and being barred from all commerce and intercourse of merchandize, they, in the meantime, thrust us out of all traffic to our utter undoing.' Moreover, neither Queen nor people were free from an instinctive fear of France as a military and commercial competitor, at peace, regaining prosperity, and cultivating trade and shipping.¹⁷

In Spain, during the winter, they had been in constant fear that Elizabeth would send another fleet to the Azores to capture the 1597 treasure still lying at Angra. They need have had no misgivings, for Elizabeth was occupied in diplomacy and in no mood for winter cruises. It was brought safely to Spain on ½ February, 1598, and the day previously Robert Cecyll and two other envoys had left for France on a mission to persuade Henry to refrain from a separate treaty. Before he departed Cecyll had taken measures to secure his position at court, knowing from his own

¹⁶ Birch, *Bacon Papers*, ii. p. 375.

¹⁷ The French 'grow great more than is convenient for England, with which country France will never have true friendship' (John Petit to Thomas Phelippes, *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* 30th April, 1600).

successes how easily the absent are overthrown. Essex had been persuaded from his seclusion at Wanstead, and his hurt pride mended by being created Earl Marshal of England, a dignity which gave him precedence again over the newly made Earl of Nottingham, who had been given the office of Lord Steward. It seems that what the protestations of Nottingham himself, and the advice of his friends, had failed to do, had been obtained through the mediation of Raleigh, who then, and during the remainder of the year, continued to be on friendly terms with Essex, and from this we may conclude that the incident at Fayal had left no rankling irritation.¹⁸ But before Robert Cecyll would quit England he insisted on a promise from the earl that nothing should be done in his absence injurious to his interests; on his side he obtained a present of 7,000*l.* from the sale of cochineal for Essex, and a contract for much more at nearly half the market price. Essex, indeed, as a vigorous supporter of the war policy, was not likely to throw any obstacle in the way of a mission in accordance with his views, even although the chief envoy was known to be but lukewarm for the policy he was sent to assert. Cecyll's indefinite arguments, carefully worded not to commit Elizabeth to any engagement, were hardly likely to convince Henry, who, although he personally repudiated the sentiment, probably thought with his subjects that 'your drift is only to amuse me, to leave me in the war ever, and to account that your safety.'¹⁹ The Dutch offered substantial inducements to keep the King in the alliance, not merely in troops, but in offering to assist in a siege of Calais; yet they could offer nothing but what Henry was able to obtain without fighting, and only at the expense of broken faith. Elizabeth felt that France and the States were growing in power and wealth while she bore the weight of the struggle without obvious profit. Henry's Council was strongly in favour of peace, and he feared more revolt if he did not accept it on the favourable terms offered. The treaty of Vervins was signed on ^{2nd April}_{and May}, 1598, and, so far as we are concerned here, the most important clause was that by which Philip restored all his conquests in France, so that his footholds at Blavet and Calais were no longer nightmares to Elizabeth. Calais could never have been of any use to Philip as a harbour for his fleet; the inutility of Blavet should have proved to him that the command of the sea must precede any serviceable acquisition of a base within the area contested, if not

¹⁸ 'None but Cecyll and Raleigh enjoy the Earl of Essex; they carry him away as they list' (Collins, *Sidney Papers*, ii. p. 79, January, 1597-8).

¹⁹ For these negotiations see *Cecil MSS.* vol. viii., and Birch's *Historical View of the Negotiations between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels*, London, 1749.

dominated, by an unbeaten enemy.²⁰ Thus, as in 1585, the English and Dutch were again left face to face with Spain, but the conditions were now very different. In 1585 England was untried, and Spain was a great military power, though its prestige was far greater than its real strength; now England was a great European State, with memories of victory and the new-found knowledge of unmeasured resources in its increasing wealth and the energy and tenacity of its people, while Spain, broken in reputation, stood bankrupt and exhausted before the world. The contrast between the States of 1585, on the brink of destruction, humbly beseeching Elizabeth's help, and the firmly knit Republic now negotiating on equal terms with England and France, was still more striking. From France the Dutch envoys came to England, and, after much haggling, a new treaty was signed on 1st August, by which the States agreed to pay off the expenses incurred by the Queen in their defence by yearly instalments, and pledged themselves to provide a naval contingent of thirty ships and 5,500 troops if England was attacked; for any offensive expedition they would furnish as many ships as the Queen set out.²¹

The year 1598 passed in comparative peace. Elizabeth was glad not to be compelled to undertake offensive operations, and Philip, occupied with political cares, did not even threaten them. Essex, oscillating between favour and disgrace,²² had ceased to have any potent influence in politics, and recommendations to him to carry the war into the enemy's country fell on barren ground, however much he agreed with them.²³ Yet since 1589 no year had been more favourable for a great blow, for Spain, exhausted and discouraged, was waiting passively on the dying King, from whose failing powers no initiative was now to be expected. That keen observer, Sir Richard Hawkyns, paints a vivid picture of the condition of the enemy, which should have given fresh courage to the weak hearts in England to whom Spain was still the pictured Colossus of their youth. A prisoner at

²⁰ In February Philip succeeded in throwing fresh troops into Calais. They may have proved useful to the Archduke, but so far as regarded any injury they could inflict on England, they might as well have remained in Spain.

²¹ Birch, *Historical View*, p. 175.

²² In May he was again out of Elizabeth's good graces on account of assisting in the marriage of the Earl of Southampton, which occurred without her knowledge.

²³ 'So long as Portugal shall remain subject to Spain, so long will it be a hotbed of wars and treasons . . . the curbing of the Spaniard which in no wise can more easily, safely, usefully and gloriously be accomplished than by means of Portugal.' Juan de Castro to Essex (*Cecil MSS.* 19th May, 1598).

Seville, he wrote to the Queen ²⁴ that the country was feeble in every way, dependent even for provisions on importation, and the Ferrol fleet only 'a scarecrow for England.' The Spaniards acknowledged English naval superiority to him, 'if Spain make a navy (*i.e.* a fleet), three years' time is needful to join shipping, and those to be bought, embargoed, or hired, . . . for Spain is utterly without shipping of regard. Of men there is no kingdom that this day is so poor.' Of themselves, he said, they could hardly man a dozen ships, 'of mariners and gunners there is not a ship which is not partly furnished with Flemish and English; and for any journey of importance they must of force help themselves with Walloon, Almain, and Italian soldiers, and all that will offer service.' Their cities and people are ruined; of the yearly revenue of 14,000,000 ducats, ²⁵ the King has not 200,000 at command, the rest being mortgaged; and although six or eight million pesos ²⁶ are received yearly from the Indies, the cost of carriage and defence absorbs most of it, and, 'within a few days that it is unladen it vanisheth without show or appearance.' He concludes, 'that the war with Spain hath been profitable no man can with reason gainsay; and how many millions we have taken from the Spaniard is a thing notorious; . . . from us I think Dunkirk hath taken more than all Spain.' About the time of this letter, information from Spain showed that the Spaniards fully expected a royal fleet after the Earl of Cumberland had left the coast, and that they were not only unprepared, but unable, to take any steps to meet it. But Philip was left in peace; Elizabeth may have hoped that the new reign, now evidently so near, would inaugurate a new policy, and, true to her maxim of 'arming only for defence,' would do nothing that to her mind would make the situation more difficult. The coast of Portugal was blockaded by Cumberland and by privateers, but Philip had ceased to trouble himself about such details, and, after bringing the negotiations at Vervins to a successful termination, busied himself about the marriage of his daughter with the Archduke Albert, and the cession of the Netherlands, obedient and disobedient, to them in sovereignty. ²⁷ The transfer took place in May, ²⁸ and Philip's increasing weakness reduced the processes of government to those of routine character only, so that for two months

²⁴ Cecil MSS. 12th June, 1598. Compare also Forneron (*Hist. de Philippe II.*) and Hume (*Spain: its Greatness and Decay*) for the ruined state of the country at the death of Philip II.

²⁵ Which he reckons at 5s. 6d. each.

²⁶ At 4s. 6d. each. The gold peso was worth at least ten shillings.

²⁷ It was understood that there would be no offspring of the marriage, so that the separation from the Crown of Spain would be only temporary.

²⁸ But was formally accomplished at Brussels on 11 August.

before his death, which occurred on $\frac{3}{13}$ September, no business of any importance was transacted.

If Elizabeth had had any hope that the accession of Philip III. would lead to a prospect of peace she was destined to disappointment. As often happens, the new sovereign and the new men only condemned their predecessors for their methods, not for their doctrines, and, in intention, the Spanish statesmen proposed prosecuting the war more energetically than ever. One of their first steps was to gratify the English merchants by putting an end to the trade which the Dutch had carried on with the obedient provinces and with Spain and Portugal, or any Spanish possession, to the bitter discontent of Elizabeth and her ministers;²⁹ in future Dutch ships and goods found in any of King Philip's ports would be confiscated and their crews handed over to the Inquisition. The result was that the Dutch, unable henceforth to obtain Indian products at Lisbon, went themselves to the East Indies, and Spain brought a new enemy into a field that she had hitherto been able to keep free from interlopers. Moreover, as the United Provinces had now nothing to fear from more active maritime measures, and as it was necessary to find employment for some of the men thus deprived of their usual avocation,³⁰ the direct consequence was the expedition of 1599, the first time that the Dutch made a formal naval war on their own account. Besides this negative attempt to injure Dutch commerce, Philip's counsellors were talking of the usual armament against England, but in reporting it, the Venetian ambassador added, 'considering how unfortunate previous attempts have proved it is difficult to understand the grounds upon which they base their hopes for success,' and he thought that in discussing it the Council of State was inspired principally by a desire to mark its disapproval of the previous administration.³¹ Certainly the conditions were not very favourable, for it was related that matters were in an incredible state of confusion and disorganization at the death of Philip II.; there was no money in the treasury, for the Flota had been held back on account of Cumberland's presence in the West Indies, and the secret sale of the royal jewels was under discussion. In November there was a rumour that a combined English and Dutch fleet was coming, and the whole coast was in a ferment while the ministers sat in perplexity,³² and the corresponding English expectation of Spanish enterprises does not make its appearance until December, the year having been unusually free

²⁹ See *ante*, i. p. 272, ii. p. 91.

³⁰ Reckoned at 30,000 men. Le Caron to States-General, 24th September, 1597.

³¹ *State Papers Ven.* 17 September, 1598.

³² *Ibid.* 30th Oct., 'here they deliberate what to do, but settle little.'
9th Nov.

from such alarms. The only ships in commission during 1598 were those of the Channel Guard and on the Irish station. The Channel Squadron was :—³³

| Ships. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-------------------|---|
| Vanguard . . . | Sir Robert Crosse, 'captain and admiral,' 1st January–20th March. Sir Henry Palmer, 'captain and admiral,' 9th May–2nd July. |
| Rainbow . . . | Sir Richard Leveson, 'captain and vice-admiral,' 3rd March–28th May, 7th November–31st December. ³⁴ |
| Lion . . . | Sir Richard Leveson, 'captain and vice-admiral,' 29th May–6th November. Jeremy Turner, 9–28th May. |
| Rainbow . . . | Jeremy Turner, 29th May–2nd July. |
| Adventure . . . | Sir Alexander Clifford, 'captain and vice-admiral,' 1st March–7th October. |
| Crane . . . | Sir Alexander Clifford, 'captain and vice-admiral,' 8th November–31st December. Jonas Bradbury, 1st January–27th April. |
| Antelope . . . | Guilford Slingsby, 9th May–2nd July. |
| Warspite . . . | Thomas Grove, 1st May–3rd July. |
| Tramontana . . . | William King, 1st January–31st December. |
| Charles . . . | Sackville Trevor, 1st January–31st December. |
| Answer . . . | Walter Gore, 1st January–31st December. |
| Quittance . . . | Humph. Reynolds, 1st January–31st December. |
| Moon . . . | William Wyllies (Willis), 1st January–26th June. John White, 8th November–31st December. |
| Cygnet . . . | Nich. Starkey, 19th February–9th May. |
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| Gilliflower . . . | William Newton, 7th March–6th October. |

This fleet, although respectable in point of number, is but of small offensive power, the five ships of strength, Vanguard, Rainbow, Lion, Warspite, and Antelope, being only in commission for comparatively short periods. Although Ireland was in

³³ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2236.

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revolt, the quiescence of Spain rendered it less imperative to strengthen the Irish station, which was very weak :—

| Ships. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------|---|
| Popinjay . . . | George Thornton, 'captain and vice-admiral,' ³⁵ 26th July–12th December. |
| Spy . . . | Henry Moyle, 'captain and vice-admiral,' 11th June–8th November. |
| Merlin . . . | Thomas Flemyng, 11th June–8th November. |
| Primrose . . . | William Woodroffe, 4th March–31st December. |

The year 1599 opened without any marked change, except that the Irish revolt had been daily gathering strength since a crushing English defeat experienced in the preceding August. After much hesitation, and after others had refused the dangerous honour, the Earl of Essex accepted the post of Lord-Lieutenant,³⁶ and left in March to take up the office which was to lead directly to his disgrace and death. For Monson's statement, twice repeated, that the mobilization of this year was connected with doubts of Essex's loyalty there is no real evidence, and no corroboration beyond the fact that Elizabeth was known to be excessively displeased with his government, and that he was reported to be highly discontented and in the habit of using speech which laid him open to dangerous imputations.³⁷ On the other hand, the story evidently impressed Monson, and we may take it that, if unfounded, it expressed general gossip and belief that he thought had good reason. Camden says explicitly that he intended it, but was dissuaded by the Earl of Southampton and Sir Christopher Blount,³⁸ and Monson may only be copying Camden. But the latter describes the army alone as levied to meet the possible attempt, and does not mention the mobilization of the fleet, from which, if there be any truth in the tale, we may assume that there were two separate causes—fear of Essex and fear of the Spaniard—at work.³⁹ Seeing how strongly Essex was expressing himself

³⁵ Both Thornton and Moyle received 5s. a day.

³⁶ Strictly 'Lieutenant-General and Governor-General.'

³⁷ Collins, *Sidney Papers*, 12th September, 1599. Also a passage in a letter from a London merchant to his Italian correspondent : 'It is muttered at court that he and the Queen have each threatened the other's head' (*State Papers*, cclxxi. 33, 30th June).

³⁸ This is confirmed by Blount's confession at the trial.

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about his enemies round the Queen, and remembering what happened subsequently, we cannot dismiss the story as absolutely inconceivable.

On 6th January, for some reason, certainly not fear of a Spanish attack, an estimate was prepared of the cost of ten ships to be commissioned for four months; on 10th January this time was reduced to two months, and a reference on 16th January indicates that they were then being brought forward.⁴⁰ It seems possible that a squadron of this strength was intended not for defence but for a dash for the Flota, which actually arrived in Spain about 1st March, but the idea, if it existed, was not carried out. The Privy Council may have thought that it was then too late, and this would have been the case, for the Flota must have been at the Azores about the end of January. We see that in February the Irish station was reinforced by two Queen's ships of moderate strength, and two hired ships, but Essex would have wished a much more powerful squadron, pointing out that only by the ships could the introduction of munitions of war be prevented, and that without foreign aid the revolt would be easily strangled. Essex's advice was emphasized by reliable information from Spain that heavy guns and supplies had been sent to Tyrone in February.⁴¹ Not only was there no sign of Spanish preparation for a serious offensive, but Elizabeth felt further safety in the Dutch promise both to keep a fleet on the coast of the Peninsula, 'all this year,' and to undertake the destruction of the Spanish fleet, if, at least, we may accept as exact her version of their engagement.⁴² Although the reports from Spain were sometimes conflicting, the general sense was to leave the English ministers at ease as to the probability of an attack. In April the Venetian ambassador wrote to the Seignory that the country was defenceless, privateers working their will along the coast, and, 'let them do as they like here it is impossible to prevent the English this year.' All that the Spanish Government proposed doing was to send a fleet to Puerto Rico, under Francisco Coloma, to repair the damage done by Cumberland the previous year and bring back the following Flota, and this sailed in January; a further effort to equip a squadron under Zubiaur to clear the coast and reassure the Portuguese, who were in terror of an English descent, was less successful.⁴³

⁴⁰ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* 6th, 10th, 16th January, 14th June, 1599.

⁴¹ *Spanish Correspondence*, 1st April. They sailed under the French flag. Elizabeth had agreed to waive the right of search as regarded French ships, and the incident led to much diplomatic argument.

⁴² Queen to Vere, 25th July (Hist. MSS. Com. *Foljambe MSS.* p. 69). She considered the departure of the Dutch from the coast of Spain a breach of the agreement.

⁴³ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*.

The condition of national impoverishment would alone have prevented any armament on a large scale, and, in one sense, the joy at the announcement of the arrival of the treasure in March which led the King to give the Marquis of Denia, better known afterwards as Duke of Lerma, 50,000 ducats merely for bringing him the good news, can be understood. Besides bankruptcy, Spain and Portugal were scourged during 1598 and 1599 by an epidemic of true bubonic plague, which almost depopulated whole cities and disorganized all preparations.⁴⁴

In the middle of May the Dutch expedition sailed for Spain. As Monson discusses its proceedings later⁴⁵ it need only be mentioned here as appearing to afford further security to Elizabeth, but after looking into Coruña it stood away down the coast, during the first week in June, for the Canaries. The Dutch had not yet attained a maritime reputation inspiring the despair with which an English fleet was now regarded, and the insult aroused all the remaining vigour of the Spanish Government. All available men and ships were ordered to concentrate at Ferrol, and such was the haste and such the deficiency of *matériel* that seventy guns for the Adelantado's fleet were taken out of the castle of St. Julian, thus leaving Lisbon nearly defenceless.⁴⁶ All sorts of rumours were flying about as to his destination; some held that he was going to Ireland or England, but others, better able to judge, knew that, as was the case, he would be ordered to follow the Dutch or go to the Azores to meet the Flota due in September. Reports reached England that the Dutch had sacked Lisbon and Cadiz, and when these were found to be untrue, and the Spaniards known to be pressing forward their armament, the feeling of assurance gave way to uneasiness, especially as there was an agreement of intelligence that the enemy intended putting into Brest, information which must have aroused doubts of Henry's good faith. Those best able to form an opinion felt no alarm, assuring the Government that the Spaniards were in more fear of the English than the English were of them,⁴⁷ but during the third week in July there was a unanimity of terrifying intelligence, and uneasiness suddenly gave place to something approaching panic. From two sources, both apparently especially authoritative, the Government heard that the Spaniards had applied to the Governor of Brest for permission to come in, and the date of the Adelantado's expected

⁴⁴ *Epidemiología Española*. The favourite remedy was a decoction of viper-grass internally and a chicken, just hatched, applied to the inflamed glands. But the chief controversy was about what it should be called, 'while the doctors are disputing it destroys cities and spreads over kingdoms.'

⁴⁵ Book V.

⁴⁶ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*, 17 July.

⁴⁷ E.g. letter of Thos. Philippes (*State Papers*, cclxxi. 80).

arrival—25th July—was circumstantially given.⁴⁸ Bradgate, who had been down to Finisterre, came into Plymouth with news that 100 ships and seventy galleys under Philip himself were coming to Brest on their way to seize the Isle of Wight ;⁴⁹ as a makeweight he threw in the information that the Archduke and his wife had already quarrelled and separated. But there was another and earlier communication to the same effect, and the result was that the Queen and Council, perhaps remembering the surprise of 1597, were violently dismayed and ordered ships and troops to be got ready on a scale more appropriate to 1588 than to 1599. It is true that Cecyll had been troubled in the spring at the Spanish preparations which he considered were larger than could be explained by expectation of the Dutch fleet, and on 1st May, wrote to Sir Henry Neville, the ambassador at Paris, that they were 'great and suspicious' and more than opposition to the Dutch would account for.⁵⁰ All the information sent by Neville was reassuring, but on 14th July Cecyll wrote to him,⁵¹ 'You shall understand that the Flemish fleet is quite gone past all the coast of Spain and passed to the islands of the Madeiras. It was little expected that those who published so brave a purpose to interrupt all supplies for Spain, and to keep that coast blocked up from trade, would now thus fondly and mechanically⁵² put all upon a journey to the islands for wines and sugars ; and now that Spain is clear and secure of them, and hath in readiness forces to have defended, he may in all probability convert some of those hitherwards . . . we are also credibly informed he hath sent two Spaniards to Brest to Monsieur Sourdeac for leave to anchor with his fleet in Brest.' If it is true, Sourdeac being at the court, Neville is to put the matter very strongly to the King, for 'considering our being unprovided of a fleet at sea, and so many of our best men absent, it may be a design that may disorder us . . . though in the conclusion we shall turn their audacities back in their own throats.' This, we see, is dated 14th July, and all the information previously referred to, appearing in the *State Papers*, is of dates between the 14th and 21st, so that the news, of which there is now no documentary evidence but which deeply impressed those responsible, had been received before 14th July,⁵³ and for the next week all the intelligence coming in confirmed it.

⁴⁸ *State Papers*, cclxxi. 94, 96.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 90.

⁵⁰ Winwood, *Memorials*, i. p. 19. It is interesting to observe the immediate fear felt that the restoration of peace would enable Henry to create a navy : 'I cannot yet learn by any means of any design in this King to erect a navy royal' (*ibid.* p. 25 ; Neville to Cecyll, 15th May, 1599).

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 70.

⁵² Foolishly and basely.

⁵³ The informant was Simon Killigrew, who was desired by Mme. de Sourdeac to tell the Queen.

It was in the highest degree unlikely that Henry would afford the hospitality of his ports to a Spanish military fleet, for not only were the relations between the two Crowns already strained,⁵⁴ but it was not to the interest of France either that there should be peace between England and Spain, or that one of the two Powers should obtain a decisive advantage.⁵⁵ On 28th July Neville was able to write to Cecyll that he had brought the matter before Henry, who 'willed me to assure the Queen that there should not be any such thing permitted in any place of his kingdom, and seemed to wonder that the Spaniards should presume so much upon him, saying there was no such good intelligence between them.' Henry afterwards wrote personally to Elizabeth to the same effect.⁵⁶ Five weeks later Cecyll explained that the alarmist reports came in 'with a whirlwind,' and that, so far as he was concerned, 'I did choose rather to run with the stream of providence than of too much confidence upon my own intelligences, which I must confess did assure me of preparations all the year for defence against the States' fleet.' He had not expressed any doubts during the stress of the panic.

Monson's boast that the fleet was prepared in twelve days has been frequently quoted allusively, enthusiastically, or incredulously, but all depends on what he means by 'rigged, victualled and furnished,' and the employment of the word 'mobilization' as equivalent is, although tempting, perhaps an illustration of the danger of describing ancient processes in modern terms without qualification. Unfortunately the Council Register for 1599, which might have given the exact order and date, is missing. Eliminating three out of the four vessels of the Channel Guard, which were transferred direct to Howard,⁵⁷ there remain thirteen ships which went into commission at dates varying between 4-28th August, only one being ready on the 4th, two on the 10th, and seven on the 11th August. From the urgent nature of his com-

⁵⁴ By reason of the French claim to the Marquisate of Saluzzo, and because all the French merchantmen in Spanish ports had been seized for the Adelantado's fleet.

⁵⁵ On the question of the Marquisate, Neville wrote: 'I make no question, whatsoever they (the French) pretend, that they are unwilling this peace should proceed, at least till the matter of the Marquisate be determined.' He thought that they might be drawn to offer very advantageous terms on the questions in dispute between England and France merely to ensure the continuance of the war (Winwood, i. p. 47).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 92. Rowland Whyte must have been referring to this letter when he wrote to Sir Robert Sidney, on 5th August, that the French ambassador had given assurances to the Queen (Collins, *Sidney Papers*).

⁵⁷ The Rainbow had gone out of commission on 6th July.

munication we may take it that Cecyll wrote to Neville without the loss of an hour when Elizabeth received Mme. de Sourdeac's message, and the presumption is that the Queen and Council, now thoroughly alive to the supposed peril, gave their instructions to the Navy Officers at the same time. The earliest reference to the fleet is in a letter of 21st July from an Italian merchant in London to his correspondent in Venice,⁵⁸ in which he says that the Council had ordered, 'lately,' eighteen ships to be prepared, and would accept no excuses on the score of many of the ships being unfit for sea without extensive repairs. Notwithstanding this urgency the Council does not seem to have taken any steps to obtain the men until 27th July; on that date a circular letter was written to the Lords-Lieutenants of Suffolk, Norfolk, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, instructing them that, 'whereas certain of her Majesty's ships royal are to be set to the seas with all expedition, and there shall be occasion to use a good number of mariners to serve in them,' they were to press all seamen between sixteen and sixty years of age and give them conduct money to Chatham. At the same time all foreign-bound shipping was embargoed.⁵⁹ Of course this does not necessarily imply that no previous orders had been issued applying to the river and the home counties, but as the Council did not write to the Lord Mayor calling upon the City of London to provide twelve or sixteen ships until 23rd July,⁶⁰ it would appear that, instead of expecting the Queen's ships to be prepared unusually quickly, they expected unusual delay, and thought that even if the dock-yards had a long start, they and the London ships would only be ready together. The probability is that the order of 27th July, with possibly another of the same or near date relating to the river, was the first connected with the men, because there is a memorandum of 23rd July on the subject of the number of seamen, guns, &c., required for the fleet, which suggests that these needs were then still only under consideration. On 1st August the Queen's ships were still 'making ready,'⁶¹ Howard's commission was not signed until the 10th, and only on the 14th August does Rowland Whyte write 'our fleet is ready and will be at sea this week.'⁶² It seems certain, therefore, that if Monson's phrase is understood to mean mobilization in the present sense, a complete readiness of *personnel* and *matériel*, he is altogether

⁵⁸ *State Papers*, cclxxi. 106.

⁵⁹ Hist. MSS. Com. *Foljambe MSS.* p. 69 (Minute of Privy Council).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* On 28th July they wrote to the Lord Mayor to furnish sixteen ships (*ibid.* p. 71), but only twelve were sent (*State Papers*, cclxxii. 86).

⁶¹ Chamberlain to Carleton.

⁶² *Sidney Papers.* Raleigh did not join until the 18th August (*ibid.*).

wrong, but no doubt he would have been the first to repudiate such an interpretation. As illustrating the capacity or incapacity of Elizabethan naval administration, any such statement is of importance if correct; if incorrect in implying a complete preparation, or to be understood with the limitations present in Monson's mind, it is of very little consequence to inquire what he really meant, although various surmises about his meaning might be offered.⁶³

The measures taken for the land defence were on as large a scale as the naval. Upwards of 25,000 horse and foot were ordered to appear at certain points at dates between the 10th and 16th August, to be under the command of the Lord Admiral, Nottingham, with Lord Mountjoy as lieutenant-general, and Sir Francis Vere, who had hastily been ordered back to England with 2,000 troops, as the marshal. More than 10,000 men were to be concentrated in Kent, and, besides its naval contribution, the City of London was called upon to raise 6,000 men. London and the river were placed under the especial command of the Earl of Cumberland, whose Puerto Rico laurels were still fresh, with Sir George Carew, the Lieutenant of the Ordnance, to second him; on 1st August he received his authorization from the Privy Council and was directed to confer with the Lord Mayor 'for all other things that may be thought requisite for defence of the river and the city.' Cumberland threw himself with zest into the spirit of the thing, and, with the assent of the Council and inspired by recollections of Parma's famous bridge at Antwerp in 1585, set about bridling the Thames with a similar defence; on 6th August the Council recommended him to avail himself of the assistance of Gianibelli, the famous engineer whose ability nearly proved superior to Parma's combinations in 1585, on account of his great skill in such matters.⁶⁴ All these frenzied preparations to fight in the last ditch made sober citizens, who could see no sign of an enemy in the distance, much less at the door, stare in amazement. One of them writes:—⁶⁵

⁶³ Phineas Pett tells us in his *Autobiography* that in November 1602 he obtained the favour of Sir Fulke Greville, the Treasurer of the Navy, by promising to prepare a fleet for sea in six weeks and keeping his word. This can only refer to the fleet 'intended foreign' at the date of Elizabeth's death the following year, which consisted of six capital ships and two smaller ones. If Pett thought six weeks for eight ships something to be proud of, it is evidence against the accuracy of Monson. Personally, I should be inclined to believe that the complete mobilization of 1599 occupied from four to five weeks, and yet was a remarkably quick and creditable performance.

⁶⁴ *Foljambe MSS.* (Hist. MSS. Com.), pp. 73, 74, 90.

⁶⁵ Chamberlain to Carleton.

more news from Brest that six galleys had put into Conquet, and that the Adelantado, with a huge fleet, was entering the Channel. Orders were given, therefore, to recall the men on their way home, but the falsity of the intelligence was discovered within twenty-four hours and the dismissal of the troops resumed.⁷¹ Information which the Government appears to have considered conclusive had come in that the Adelantado had sailed after the Dutch, and that there was no further reason for alarm, even from Brest; the natural consequence was a mandate on 1st September that the fleet was to be paid off.⁷² As a matter of fact, the Adelantado had left Coruña on $\frac{1}{2}$ August⁷³ with a fleet which included upwards of thirty fighting ships and 8,000 troops, in search of the enemy. Orders had been sent to the West Indies to keep back the homeward Flota, but it was uncertain whether the orders had been received in time, and while that uncertainty continued bankrupt Spain could not afford offensive operations in the Channel at the expense of the Flota. Earlier in the year there had been talk of an expedition against England, and no doubt under a new king, and if her possessions and commerce had not been threatened, something would have been undertaken if only to assist the Irish rebels, but it was known generally in Spain in July that the Adelantado had then been ordered to the Azores to meet the West Indian fleet.⁷⁴ One cause of the panic in England was the defectiveness of the English intelligence service, which had degenerated greatly after Walsyngham's death, and now lacked the substitute organized by Essex at his own expense. Ministers were dependent on tavern gossip brought in by merchant seamen, or information coming through Paris or Italy, and on such news as could be picked up by privateers on the coast of the Peninsula. The events of the summer appear to have caused Cecyll to feel this deficiency forcibly, and towards the end of August he wrote to the ambassador at Paris instructing him to use the utmost caution in procuring a passport for

⁷¹ This report had more foundation than most of those from Brest. A fleet, magnified into 200 sail, had really been seen, but it was a portion of the Dutch fleet returning from the Canaries. Chamberlain says, 'it gave us a very hot alarm' in London that Saturday.

⁷² Collins, *Sidney Papers*. Altogether, with merchantmen and a few Dutch vessels, Howard had some sixty ships (Winwood, i. p. 96), but this number must have included fourteen armed hoys furnished by the City of London.

⁷³ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*.

⁷⁴ The Venetian ambassador's information is usually very accurate, but is sometimes belated. He gives the Seignory the information about the Spanish request to harbour in Brest in a despatch of $\frac{1}{2}$ August; we know that it was made not later than the second week of July, and probably earlier.

Spain for an agent who was to reach that country through France.⁷⁵

The Londoners had backed the Government loyally, but were beginning to show that shortness of temper which follows waste of energy and money. The scare of 25th August must have caused the Privy Council to ask the Lord Mayor to arrange again for the fortification of the river and a further supply of a month's provisions, for, on the 28th, he answered that he anticipated that the request, if brought before the Common Council, would be refused, the expenses already incurred having been so heavy, and that it was to be hoped that what had been done would be sufficient.⁷⁶ From those who only looked to results the whole business naturally evoked much caustic comment: 'There is much talk here of the groundless alarm taken in England about six galleys. Men wonder that so wise a Council was not more provident than to put the Queen and realm to excessive charge in time of peace upon a false alarm, drawing ships together and assembling men in great numbers.'⁷⁷ In another letter, a year later, it was remarked, referring to Essex, 'as to his errors in Ireland it is marvelled that she makes them so heinous, and puts up with the shameful error that caused such excessive charges and trouble last summer.' Cecyll, who accepted the responsibility for the mobilization, adopted an apologetic tone and affected afterwards to think that there had never been any real danger, although his letters show that he had been suspicious when others felt secure, and was one of the first to believe in the reality of the invasion.⁷⁸ In a letter to the Earl of Shrewsbury in 1602, he recurred by implication to the subject, and lamented his hard case in having to yield to the *vox populi* rather 'than dissuade preparations, the interruption whereof, if disaster followed, would serve for a razor to cut my throat.' It cannot, however, be maintained that the English Government was wrong in taking measures for defence when it was known, without doubt, that permission for an armada to put into Brest had been applied for, or that they should have been deferred until its appearance in the Channel. The

⁷⁵ Winwood, *Memorials*, i. p. 97 (28th August). On 18th August he had 'exceedingly' desired Neville to find a Frenchman who would undertake to live in Spain for a year and send intelligence, but apparently he was now too impatient to await the result of Neville's inquiries.

⁷⁶ *State Papers*, cclxxii. 86.

⁷⁷ *Flanders Correspondence*, 15 October. Letter from Brussels. By 'time of peace' the writer must have meant 'time of helplessness,' most of the Spanish garrisons being in their usual state of mutiny for want of pay.

⁷⁸ Compare letters to Sir H. Neville (Winwood, *Memorials*, pp. 70-90); *Rutland MSS.* i. p. 356.

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events of 1597 had shown that it was not absolutely certain that a Spanish fleet would follow to protect a threatened Flota, although there is little doubt that the procedure of that year was due to the personal equation of Philip's thirst for revenge rather than to a settled policy, and was not likely to be adopted again. But the extent of the preparations ordered was out of all proportion to the danger, and it would seem that the weaker Spain grew the more respect was paid to its dying efforts, for the mobilization of 1599 was, relatively to the menace, far larger than that of 1588; Elizabeth had forgotten, or feared to rely on, the perfectly accurate description of the remaining resources of Spain sent to her by Sir Richard Hawkyns in 1598. However, the great fault of the English Government, implicitly admitted by Cecyll in the measures he at once took to remedy the imperfection, was the want of a reliable intelligence service in Spain. The lack of that left the ministers a prey to every diverse rumour heard or invented by men belonging to the class peculiarly prone to prop insufficient fact with imagination. Responsible spies in Spain would have told them that by the middle of July, before the mobilization was ordered, the Adelantado's destination, whatever it may have been originally, was then southward and not northward; and instead of shuddering at the sensational reports of his presence at Brest, or in the Channel, they would have known that he was not even at sea.

It will occur to many readers that the fleet, having been collected for a purpose which proved to be unnecessary, might at least have been used on the offensive. It was not, however, so simple a matter to send it away on an ocean voyage. It had only been provisioned for a month, and in view of the slow and cumbersome methods of sixteenth century victualling departments, October would have been far advanced before it would have been ready to sail,⁷⁹ and neither Queen nor admirals were fond of winter cruises. There were also political reasons to induce Elizabeth to hold her hand. The interminable peace negotiations were, if languishing, still languidly continuing, and in August, in the midst of the alarm, two commissioners had arrived from the Archduke Andrew (who was acting in the absence of his brother the Archduke Albert) with instructions that Philip III. had commissioned Albert to treat with the Queen.⁸⁰ The Archduke

⁷⁹ There were some surplus stores left and they were got rid of in the usual manner. An order of 21st September directed the officers of the customs not to clear outward bound ships unless certificates were produced that a certain proportion of the remaining navy victuals had been purchased.

⁸⁰ Monson is a little wrong in his date. They must have been sent before the fleet was at sea, because Cecyll notes their arrival as 22nd or 23rd August (Winwood, i. p. 96). The instructions from Philip to the Archduke were, of course, long anterior.

Albert returned to the Low Countries towards the end of August, and wrote to Elizabeth assuring her of his and his wife's desire for peace and renewal of the ancient treaties and relations that had existed between Burgundy and England. On 29th September the commissioners were again in London, and though all this was to mean nothing, for Elizabeth could not desert the States and Spain would have no peace unless she would, it was an encouragement of the tentative waiting policy that was her chief reliance. Now, as heretofore, she would arm only for defence, and would do as little as possible to infuriate her enemies.⁸¹

It will have been noticed that when the Adelantado was last reported at Brest, six galleys were also said to have put into Conquet. That portion of the information was correct and was a new departure in Spanish policy, akin to the privateering expeditions on a large scale Elizabeth permitted and patronized. The Spaniards had never taken very kindly to privateering,⁸² and the dash for the Archduke's ports made by these six galleys was the outcome of Italian enterprise. In January 1599, Cabrera de Cordoba notices that Frederick Spinola had offered to undertake a galley contract but had been referred to the Archduke Albert. Spinola was a member of the great Genoese banking family of that name, and emulating his fellow townsmen the D'Orias, who were in hereditary command of the squadron of Genoese galleys hired by the Kings of Spain, could think of no better method of rivalling them than that of attacking English and Dutch commerce in its own waters with what would be virtually a new arm. The episode was but a minor phase of the war, and the conception was marred by ignorance of the northern climatic conditions and the dangerous physical configuration of the Channel coasts, which would render galleys useless for three-fourths of the year, and exposed to greater than Mediterranean risks at sea during the remainder; but Spinola had youth, energy, and wealth, and the Spanish Government had no objection to his employing them in

⁸¹ In October the negotiations were so promising that the Privy Council refused the new association of East India merchants a warrant for their proposed voyage, for the reason that it might interfere with the peace. The committee having the matter in hand reported to the stockholders that it would be well to defer the voyage for a year (Stevens, *Dawn of Trade to the East Indies*, Lond. 1886, p. 10).

⁸² Permission to set out privateers seems to have been both given and withdrawn. It was given in 1586 (*State Papers Ven.* 6th August); again in 1590 (*ibid.* 23rd June); and then in 1599 (*ibid.* 3rd January). On the last occasion the Venetian ambassador writes: 'this step is very popular.' The previous permissions must have been rescinded, probably as interfering with the manning of the royal fleets, or it would not have been necessary to renew them.

its service. When he was referred to the Archduke, the latter was in Spain after his marriage with the Infanta Isabel, and the consequent negotiations must have been satisfactory, for in March Spinola was at Dunkirk superintending improvements intended to make the harbour fit to receive galleys, and sending a spy to England to report on the southern ports. Spinola, however, had been trained under Parma, and was himself a man of capacity; he did not deceive himself into the belief that anything more than surprise raiding, or interference with the weakest kind of coasting commerce and the fisheries, was possible with his galleys.⁸³ Spinola's agent had been arrested in England, but the details obtained from him do not appear to have much troubled the Government, and little curiosity was shown about the Italian's movements until the end of August, when he was reported at Conquet; even then Cecyll only referred to him as one 'who takes upon him(self) great wonders.' Spinola left Madrid for Santander, where his six galleys were awaiting him, in the second week of July, and he was supposed to have undertaken to build another twelve at Dunkirk, to be prepared to spend 400,000 ducats if necessary, and to require no pay for two years.⁸⁴ He arrived at Conquet about 21st August, and left again on the 23rd. He was delayed by weather that the galleys could not face, or he would probably have been able to reach his destination without trouble and before any steps had been taken to intercept him. As it was, although the English and Dutch under Fenner, Leveson, and Justin of Nassau were looking out for him, he managed by a combination of skill and luck to run unharmed up Channel and into Sluys.⁸⁵ Many opprobrious criticisms were made, rather unjustly, on the navy for the failure to stop Spinola, but it was forgotten that, although it was now accepted that the sailing ship was superior to the galley in fight, the former had no more chance of catching the latter on an open sea than the tortoise has of catching the hare unless the galley could be pinned under adverse conditions of weather or situation. The six galleys occupied the same relation to the sailing ships that as many torpedo craft would hold nowadays under similar circumstances,⁸⁶ and, long before the lumbering men-of-war could reach the spot where they were last seen, they were leagues away, or, if seen, there was a hopeless stern chase until darkness enabled the pursued to alter their course. Moreover, the bulk of the English and Dutch forces was to the eastward, and the western Channel is a wide area in

⁸³ Bentivoglio, *Wars of Flanders*, p. 407.

⁸⁴ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*.

⁸⁵ He had an English pilot with him. See *post*, p. 262.

⁸⁶ With the limitation that muscle endurance is a smaller quantity than coal endurance.

which a few cruisers were to pick up half-a-dozen microscopic points. The one place which offered a good chance of catching them was the Straits of Dover; Justin of Nassau was in Calais Roads, but Leveson, for good or bad reasons, had put back to the Downs. Justin chased, but of course uselessly, and Sluys had been left open and unguarded for Spinola's entrance; there, if anywhere, was the principal fault, for Leveson, like Justin, would have chased in vain unless the galleys had been turned outside Sluys.

On this occasion everything fell out well for Spinola; but when, in 1602, he tried the same game again and the turn of luck was against him, he was forced to realize that, even if there had been no other difficulties, the conformation of the English and Dutch coast within the narrow limits in which he was compelled to work was fatal to his designs. Of course Elizabeth, who always judged the navy by results, was very angry at the failure to close with him.⁸⁷ The good citizens of Paris, easy masters of the strategy of the sea, were equally critical: 'here is much speech to our disgrace that the galleys were suffered to pass so quietly to Sluys . . . those which affect us are very sorry, and those which love us not laugh us to scorn.'⁸⁸ Cecyll accepted the Italian's escape philosophically, and thought the Dutch would be the chief sufferers; he remarked jestingly to Neville, 'if you have any land in Sussex, where any of my lady's, my cousin's, milch kine and fat wethers go, Spinola will have some of them next spring.' Experience showed that Lady Neville's cattle could graze in safety. Although Spinola was able to do some little mischief, it was within an extremely small radius, and the galleys dared hardly show themselves except to attack some stray merchantman and scuttle back to their lair. On the rare occasions when they tried their fortune with Dutch men-of-war the results were not of a nature to encourage further ventures of that kind.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Collins, *Sidney Papers*, 8th September.

⁸⁸ Sir H. Neville to Cecyll.

⁸⁹ The Dutch soon took the measure of the galleys. On 16th October they attacked a Zealand ship 'which received them so hotly with its cannon and musketry that they were compelled to leave it. Three days later there was a similar combat in which they came off as badly, and from that time they caused no more fear but only some expense to the Zealanders for guarding the coasts' (Le Clerc, *Hist. des Provinces Unies*, i. p. 202).

Sir Richard Leveson to the Islands.

A.D. 1600. [1]

| Ships. | | | Commanders. | | |
|--------------|---|---|-------------|----------------------|--|
| The Repulse | . | . | . | Sir Richard Leveson. | |
| The Warspite | . | . | . | Captain Troughton. | |
| The Vanguard | . | . | . | Captain Somers. | |

THE last year, as you have heard, put all men in expectation of war, which yet came to nothing. This summer gave us great hope of peace, but with the like effect; for by consent of the Queen, the King of Spain, and the Archduke, their commissioners met at Boulogne in Picardy to treat of peace, a place chosen indifferently, the French King being in league and friendship with them all. Whether this meeting was a show, as being out of hope to effect the peace, or that their severing after they met was upon advice and true grounds I cannot judge, but methinks the occasion was very slender that parted them after their meeting, for there grew a difference about precedency betwixt the Crowns of Spain and England, which all the world knows was ever due to England. And so upon this light occasion this happy and hopeful business was made frustrate, which, once more I say, had it been really intended might easily have been accommodated. [2]

The Queen suspected the event hereof before their meeting; and the rather, because the Spaniards entertained her with the like treaty in 1588, when

at the same instant their navy appeared upon her coast to invade her. Therefore, lest she should be blamed or condemned by other princes of too great security, in relying upon the success of so doubtful a peace, she furnished the three ships before named under pretence to guard the western coast, which at that time was infested by the Dunkirkers.*

And, because there should be the less notice taken, part of the victuals was provided at Plymouth, and Sir Richard Leveson, who was then Admiral of the Narrow Seas, was appointed General. By the secret carrying on of the business it could not be conjectured, either by their victualling or by the mean condition of the captains,† or by the going of the Admiral of the Narrow Seas, that it was a service from home. As they were in a readiness at Plymouth, expecting orders, the Queen being fully satisfied that the treaty of Boulogne would break off without effect, she commanded Sir Richard Leveson to hasten to the Islands, there to expect the carracks and Mexico fleet. The Spaniards, on the other side, being as circumspect to prevent a mischief as we were subtle to contrive it, and mistrusting (as we did) that the treaty of peace would prove a vain hopeless show of what was never meant, furnished eighteen tall ships to the Islands, as they had usually done since the year 1591. The general of this fleet was Don Diego Brochero, a well qualified gentleman of good experience.

Our ships coming to the Islands, they and the Spaniards had intelligence of one another, but not the sight; for that Sir Richard Leveson hauled sixty leagues westward, not only to avoid them, but in hopes to meet with the carracks and Mexico fleet

* B and R add 'and Biscayners.'

† *I.e.* captains of no particular reputation or social position such as would be chosen for an important expedition.

before they could join them. But the carracks being formerly warned by the taking of one of them and burning of another in 1592, either by direction or their own providence had ever since that year shunned the sight of the Islands, and by consequence the fleet that lay there to waft them. So that our fleet being now prevented, as they had often before been (whereby the uncertainty of sea actions may be discerned where ships are to meet one another casually), they returned home, having consumed time and victuals to no purpose, and seen not so much as one sail from the time they quitted the coast of England till their return, two ships of Holland excepted, that came from the East Indies (for then began their trade thither), which ships Sir Richard Leveson relieved, finding them in great distress and want. [3]

[1] The pay lists give only the *Repulse* and the *Warspite* as equipped for a voyage 'southwards,'¹ but the *Vanguard*, already in commission as one of the Channel Guard, was added :—

| Ships. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-----------------------|---|
| <i>Repulse</i> . . . | Sir Richard Leveson, 'captain and admiral,' ² 4th June—11th October. |
| <i>Warspite</i> . . . | J. Troughton, 'captain and vice-admiral,' ³ 4th June—13th October. |
| <i>Vanguard</i> . . . | George Somers, 4th June—14th October. |

The peaceful tendency of the year is indicated by the number and force of the other vessels commissioned for service in the Channel :—

¹ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2238, 9. The *Lion's Whelp*, belonging to the Lord Admiral, appears to have accompanied them (*Cecil MSS.* quoted by Corbett, *Successors of Drake*). She had served as a hired ship in the Channel, and in 1601 was bought into the navy.

² At 1*l.* 10*s.* a day.

³ At 15*s.* a day.

SIR RICHARD LEVESON, 1600 115

| Ships. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|--------------------|---|
| Rainbow . . . | Sir Richard Leveson, Admiral, ⁴ 1st January–2nd February. |
| Vanguard . . . | Sir Richard Leveson, Admiral, 3rd February–3rd June. |
| Crane . . . | Sir Alexander Clifford, Vice-Admiral, ⁵ 1st January–2nd February. |
| Adventure . . . | Sir Alexander Clifford, Vice-Admiral, 22nd February–9th August. |
| Rainbow . . . | Sir Alexander Clifford, Vice-Admiral, 14th August–9th December. |
| Advantage . . . | Thomas Covert, 1st January–21st February. George Fenner, 15th May–18th November. |
| Tramontana . . . | Sackville Trevor, 22nd December, 1599–31st December, 1600. |
| Answer . . . | Walter Gore, 10th February–9th December. ⁶ |
| Quittance . . . | Humphrey Reynolds, 1st January–31st December. |
| Advice . . . | John White, 14th May–8th July. |
| Spy . . . | John White, 9th July–20th December. |
| Lion's Whelp . . . | William Willis, 8th February–17th June. |

In November the Crane (Thomas Covert), and in December the Vanguard (Leveson) and Lion's Claw (qy. Whelp) (W. Morgan), were added to assist in dealing with the Dunkirkers as noticed in note 3 (p. 122), below.

[2] In the autumn of 1599, Elizabeth met the Archduke Albert's approaches with the reply that she was perfectly willing to treat for peace, but must first consult her good allies the Dutch whether they would join in the negotiations. As the States proved impracticable,⁷ Elizabeth, towards the end of December, decided to send Sir Thomas Edmondes to discuss preliminaries with the Archduke. Informal conversations had already been carried on both in London and Paris, but she must have felt the prospects hopeless, for she could neither leave the Dutch unaided to face Spain nor see them throw themselves under the subjection of France in return for succour, although at this moment French

⁴ At 1*l.* a day.

⁵ At 10*s.* a day.

⁶ As Vice-Admiral from 4th June.

⁷ 'The States . . . absolutely refused to treat.'—Cecyll to Sir Henry Neville, 28th December, 1599 (Winwood, *Memorials*).

statesmen saw so little attraction in the Provinces that many, including the ambassador at the Hague, advised Henry to refuse their submission if circumstances should compel them to offer it. The first question started by Edmondes related to the place where the negotiations should be conducted, and as Elizabeth, being a queen, considered the Archduke an inferior and demanded that commissioners should be sent to England, the business nearly broke down at the outset, until the Queen so far receded as to accept Boulogne as a neutral situation. It was the end of February 1600 before this point was settled, and when the Archduke's commissioner, Louis Verreyken, actually appeared in London, popular opinion was much divided as to whether peace was really intended by either side.⁸ Some who believed the attempt sincere were still more puzzled at the Queen's eagerness, 'being the more marvelled at considering the state the enemy presently⁹ stands in, and that forbearing but a while longer we should see all grow to that pass as nothing would be demanded which would not be granted.'¹⁰ The Spaniards, however, did not regard their position from the same point of view, and their demands were as haughty as though the delivery of the final blow only depended on their will. They required that Elizabeth should deliver up the cautionary towns, break off all trade with the revolted Provinces, and of course recall her troops and prevent Englishmen serving the States.

To the Dutch envoy, Noel Le Caron, Elizabeth professed extreme indignation at these proposals, but she hardly regarded them as meant seriously,¹¹ and, in any case, as Cecyll wrote to the ambassador at Paris, 'the opinion of a peace toward keeps up the Queen's reputation.' Another reason impelling Elizabeth to continue the negotiations as long as possible was the hope that the fear of peace might induce Henry IV. to yield some of the points still in debate between the two Crowns, and perhaps, even, to consent to an alliance guaranteeing mutual aid in case of invasion. Behind these causes there was no doubt the lurking hope that some line of agreement might be found, for Elizabeth, a despot in everything but money matters, felt the financial strain of the war although her subjects were as far as possible relieved from it, and Ireland, now in flame, was a terrible drain on the Exchequer.

The commissioners¹² met at Boulogne on $\frac{1}{2}$ May, and

⁸ Chamberlain to Carleton (*Letters*, p. 68; Camd. Soc.).

⁹ Now.

¹⁰ Collins, *Sidney Papers*, 21st February.

¹¹ Winwood, i. p. 157.

¹² For England—Sir Henry Neville, the ambassador at Paris; Robert Beale, secretary for the north parts; John Herbert, second secretary; and Thomas Edmondes, secretary for the French tongue. For Spain—Don Baltazar de Zuñiga y Fonseca, Philip's ambassador

difficulties at once arose about the Spanish credentials. These were smoothed over, and then came those belonging to the question of precedence, what Cecyll called 'the first prologue to that comedy,' a phrase used before the meeting came about which seems to sum up his expectation of results. There was not merely the precedence between the two Crowns to argue, but a subsidiary dispute as to how they should meet to discuss it, and the Englishmen could not see their way to assent to an accidental encounter on the sands at five o'clock in the morning for the purpose. Both sides had recourse to history for support; the Spaniards could not get farther back than the Goths, but the English brought up Julius Cæsar. Henry had urged Neville to stand firm, and no doubt did the same good office for the Spaniards. Elizabeth so far receded as to propose equality, leaving the critical question in abeyance, and the commissioners, on their own responsibility, suggested that all communications should be by written documents. But the Spaniards were peremptory, and on ^{28th July} abruptly broke up the conference. As the end came in ^{7th Aug.} sight Elizabeth had appeared more desirous of coming to terms, but the Archduke had opened unofficial negotiations directly with the Dutch, and the opinion of the English Privy Council was that the Spaniards would prefer peace with the United Netherlands to peace with England,¹³ although how, as yet, it was to be obtained from Spain on the basis of independence, the only one possible for the Dutch, is not apparent. The Queen's own opinion, if she told Le Caron what she really thought, was that these transactions at Boulogne were preliminary to a real peace to be brought about the following year.¹⁴ Another explanation of the Spanish attitude may be found in the barren results of Count Maurice's campaign for the reduction of Nieuport. On ^{22nd June} ^{2nd July} he had gained a great victory, but one which only extricated him from a ruinous situation and secured his retreat. 'The expedition was an absolute failure,' says Motley, 'but the stadtholder had gained a great victory'; the Archduke could for the time afford to suffer defeats if his enemies' expedi-

at Brussels, and Don Ferdinand Carillo, a member of the Council of State. For the Archduke—Jehan Richardot, President of the Council, and Louis Verreyken.

¹³ Winwood, i. p. 223.

¹⁴ *Sidney Papers*, 3rd April. Elizabeth's mind was not so pre-occupied with the proceedings at Boulogne but that she could display a touch of feminine nature unusual in her. In one of his letters to Neville, Cecyll told him that the Queen had ordered 'merrily' that he was always to give half a sheet in his despatches to Paris gossip. Subsequently Neville did so, at first apologizing in a shamefaced way for the trifling news.

tions came to naught. As for Elizabeth, it may be said of her that during 1598, 1599, and 1600 she could not make peace and would not make war.

[3] The uncompromising position taken up by the Spaniards was based rather on ignorance of ruin than consciousness of strength, for their prospects, not of success, but of merely holding their own, grew less year by year. The Adelantado's cruise after the Dutch in 1599 had ended in the usual disaster to which the Spanish Government and people were accustomed; he returned to Cadiz on $\frac{1}{2}$ 7 October with the remains of his fleet, having done nothing against the Dutch, but having lost a score of vessels in a gale that it was supposed would have sunk the whole fleet if it had lasted two hours longer.¹⁵ Don Martin told the Venetian ambassador that during the whole voyage he only sighted one vessel, friend or foe, and that he was afflicted by continual storms, but, although he was unlucky in his weather, the real fault, there is no doubt, lay with Spanish seamanship and shipbuilding rather than with the elements. A marine is not consistently unfortunate year after year in dealing with the ordinary risks of the sea unless such a fate is brought about by ignorance and incapacity. Spanish shipbuilders never learnt to adapt sailing craft of the Mediterranean type to the more varying necessities of the ocean, and Spaniards at sea never have been, before or since, anything more than soldiers on board ship; when man comes into conflict with, or attempts to use, the forces of nature and displays a lack of adaptability to environment they exact their toll in penalty.

In Spain peace was ardently desired by the nation and was expected during the year, a hope that must have been intensified by the national and individual poverty affecting nearly all classes. Under such circumstances the arrival of the Plate fleet was looked for even more eagerly than ever, for it was the one and only support yet remaining to uphold Spanish pretensions and efforts. That expected in the autumn of 1599 was long overdue, and the absence of news concerning it had aroused the keenest anxiety: 'such a thing has never been known as that in eight months no caravel of advice has passed.'¹⁶ However, it arrived towards the end of February, bringing treasure to the amount of 11,000,000 ducats, of which two and a half millions were for the King. 'This good news has given universal delight,' writes Cabrera, and Lerma received another present of 100,000 ducats for bringing the

¹⁵ *State Papers Ven.* 31st October, 7th December, 1599; Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*. Major Martin Hume (*Spain: its Greatness and Decay*, p. 202) calls Martin de Padilla 'a romantic and quixotic bigot.' That he may have been, but the principal fault was that, like all his colleagues, he was a soldier and not a sailor.

¹⁶ Cabrera de Cordoba.

announcement to Philip III., a suggestive indication of the King's political capacity. The liberality was the less justified because if the Crown debts were paid there would be nothing left for the treasury, 'as the money raised beforehand on the cargo of the fleet amounts to three millions, the remaining half million continues as a debt. And his Majesty is already spending money raised on the security of the fleet of 1603, the fleets of 1601 and 1602 being already mortgaged.'¹⁷ The 'delight,' also, felt by those who expected that their debts would be paid was shortlived, for it was soon ordered that half the Crown debts secured on this Flota were to be carried over, and it may be doubted whether the other half was paid. In May more Plate ships came in, and coincidentally with this arrival the Venetian ambassador wrote, 'Your Excellencies will be surprised to hear that auction has been held under feigned names of the jewels and furniture of the King to meet current outgoings.' The same authority estimated that, by November, 20,000,000 ducats in treasure had been brought from America during the year, and yet that the ministers were always racking their brains for ways to raise money because everything was previously mortgaged; as far as possible expense was avoided by delegating the duties of the Government to private enterprise,¹⁸ but the expenditure of the court was more thriftless and lavish than it had ever been under Philip II. or Charles V. Yet the pompous pretence of carrying on effective war was sedulously maintained, and attention was again seriously turned to the possibilities offered by Ireland. The balance of expert Spanish opinion had been, quite rightly, unfavourable to operations in Ireland while there was any prospect of striking at the heart by a successful attack on England itself, and the implicit admission of hopelessness in changing the field of action was as significant as the descent from the formal fleet invasion of 1588 to the evasion raids of later years. As a base for a regular invasion Ireland was thought to suffer under the disadvantage of not being able to support an army, supplies for the English troops having to be sent from home; moreover, the Irish character was distrusted, and it was disputed whether its conquest would not be rather a relief than a blow to England. There was also the question of communications which, in the event of invasion on a large scale, could not be maintained only by occasional ships slipping past the Queen's cruisers. After the failure of 1596 Philip II. had directed that the expectations of the Irish chiefs were to be answered with generalities, and had confined himself to that cheap encouragement. Still, in consequence

¹⁷ *State Papers Ven.* 8th March, 1600.

¹⁸ In August the Government entered into a contract with the Casa de Contratacion at Seville, to continue for seven years, that that body should keep a squadron of twelve galleons permanently equipped to sail to and fro with the Flota.

of the desire of the new King and his ministers to show their superiority to their predecessors, their obvious inability to renew attempts on England itself, and Tyrone's success, the Irish scheme now reached the stage of resolve and discussion which in the Spanish councils always long preceded action. In May the Council of State reported to Philip that the Irish rebels should be assisted in force, and that in the meantime assistance in money and necessities of war should be sent to them;¹⁹ the second recommendation was carried out at once, and formed a subject of complaint by the English commissioners at Boulogne. But the principal decision was, as ever, too late, for 1598 had been the year of Irish victory, in which even moderate assistance in the shape of disciplined troops and experienced leaders might have had great results; now, Lord Mountjoy had replaced Essex, and although his position was still difficult enough, the first force of the revolt had spent itself and a policy of concession and bribery, supplementing arms, was loosening the rebel cohesion.

In July the Council of State moved a step forward, and recommended that the Irish enterprise should be undertaken this year on the ground that, if it did not enable good terms of peace to be made, it would at least bridle England and enable Spain to interfere in the succession, and, with this advice, the project dropped for a year, for Philip had not a man or a ducat wherewith to equip another fleet. But the news of the scheme no doubt reached Elizabeth, and may have determined her to give the Spaniards some other object of attention by sending Leveson to the Azores. The objective was not the Flota, of which the silver ships had come in by the end of February, and the less valuable merchantmen by May, but the East Indian carracks, which escaped Leveson and reached Lisbon in August.²⁰ Monson's statement that Elizabeth decided to send the expedition because she saw that the Boulogne meeting would be fruitless must be wrong, as Leveson sailed on 26th June,²¹ therefore the decision must have been come to not later than the beginning of that month, and the commissioners did not meet until 16th May. No doubt the combination of known Spanish weakness and a new form of surprise attack, not yet tried, proved too tempting in agreement and is sufficient explanation.²² Within a few days of his sailing, the Spanish peace

¹⁹ *Simancas Papers*, 4th May.

²⁰ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*. The Venetian ambassador says that three treasure fleets came to Spain during 1600. There was really only one, divided between February and May, and the carracks; all had treasure on board, but the great mass was brought by that of February.

²¹ Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, p. 297.

²² There had been some talk of another Dutch fleet to the coast of Spain (Winwood, i. p. 163); if so, its failure to sail may have induced Elizabeth to act for herself.

commissioners made Leveson's departure a subject of complaint, to which the Englishmen could answer nothing; in Spain they did their best to provide for eventualities by sending Don Diego Brochero de Paz de Anaya with fifteen ships to the Azores, for which he sailed at the end of July.²³ Brochero remained at the Azores until November, but met neither Leveson nor the carracks. Of Leveson's proceedings we have only Monson's account, but it is to be observed that as six carracks were expected, and as five actually came in together, his squadron was, as usual, too weak for the work set it, for, although he might with luck have taken one or two carracks, he would not have been justified in fighting Brochero at such unequal odds. Since, if Leveson was really searching for the carracks, his cruising ground was comparatively small, the suspicion arises that Brochero was not eager to meet him and spent most of his time in Angra.

Leveson returned some time before 30th September,²⁴ and during his absence an incident had happened that could not have added to the peace of mind of the Spanish ministers when it became known in Madrid. Stow notices that on 8th August, ambassadors had arrived from Barbary, their especial object in coming being to ask the 'continuance of her Majesty's special favour towards their king with like entreaty of her naval aid.' Concerted maritime action between England and the Mahomedan Powers of the Mediterranean had always been particularly dreaded in Spain, and was still more to be feared now when the Spanish marine had practically ceased to exist. It is to be presumed that now, as in former years, Elizabeth, for theological or political reasons, did not see her way clear to any avowed agreement with these States.²⁵

Neither Power had done much in the way of artistic naval warfare during the year, and such honours as were scored were won not by Government fleets, but by the savage energy of Van der Waacken, a famous Dunkirk privateersman, who played havoc with the Dutch fishery and coasting commerce. As might have been expected, Spinola's galleys had done little harm to the Dutch and less to the English, but at various times through the year there were rumours that more galleys were coming from Spain to strengthen his force. In view of the failure of sailing craft in 1599 to catch him, both Governments had decided, under the

²³ Cabrera de Cordoba. An English prisoner said that Brochero's fleet was so badly manned that three Queen's ships and eight merchantmen could easily fight it (*State Papers*, cclxxv. 62).

²⁴ Lodge, *Illustrations of British History*, ii. p. 544.

²⁵ Chamberlain writes about it being 'a matter odious and scandalous to the world to be too friendly or familiar with infidels,' and he must have been interpreting the general opinion.

influence of the alarm of the moment, to prepare a galley division to cope with the Italian or his reinforcements. In England a whole dozen had been called for, but eventually the number fell to four ; two were built by the navy authorities and launched in June and August 1601 ; two more, presented by the City of London, were not ready until 1602. In the mean time Van der Waecken had got to sea out of Dunkirk, and there was continual fresh news of troops coming through the Channel to join the Archduke. Apparently the Government believed the rumours to a certain extent in December, and strengthened the Channel Guard with three vessels, but more probably as a measure of precaution than from any real expectation, seeing the weakness of the reinforcement commissioned. Van der Waecken was driven out of the Channel and the North Sea, and his squadron scattered or destroyed during the autumn, but there are indications that other Dunkirkers were busy during the winter on the coasts of Devonshire and Cornwall, and they no doubt furnished another reason for the additional ships.

Sir Richard Leveson into Ireland,
A.D. 1601. [1]

| Ships. | Commanders. |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| The Warspite | Sir Richard Leveson. |
| The Garland | Sir Amyas Preston. |
| The Defiance | Captain Gore. |
| The Swiftsure | Captain Somers. |
| The Crane | Captain Manwaring. |

IN the year 1600, and part of the year 1601, there was a kind of cessation from arms, though not by agreement, for this year gave a hope of peace, which failing, the former course of annoying each other was revived; we in relieving the Low Countries, the Spaniards in assisting the rebels in Ireland. This was the summer that the Archduke besieged Ostend, which was resolutely undertaken and as bravely defended, but principally by the supplies out of England. And towards winter, when the Spaniards thought we least looked for war, as they might well think by our preparations, Don Diego Brochero being Admiral by sea and Don Juan de Aguila General by land, with forty-eight sail of ships and four thousand soldiers, were sent to invade Ireland. [2]

In his way thither he lost the company of his Vice-Admiral Zubiaur, who returned to Coruña, which, when the King heard, he was much distasted with Zubiaur, and commanded him, upon his allegiance, to hasten with all speed for Ireland as he was formerly directed. Don Diego's landing was known in England when it was too late to prevent it; yet,

lest he should be supplied with further forces out of Spain, this fleet was sent to impeach and prevent any such design, but before they could recover the Irish coast Don Pedro de Zubiaur was arrived in the harbour of Castlehaven, where immediately he unshipped his men and ordnance and fortified the landing against our men and ships. But Sir Richard Leveson, considering how much it imported the service and his own reputation to defeat the enemies' forces, valiantly entered the harbour, drew near the enemy, and ceased not fighting the space of a whole day, his ship being often shot through and eight men slain. God so blessed him that he prevailed in his enterprise, destroyed their whole shipping, and made Zubiaur fly by land into another harbour, where he obscurely embarked himself in a French vessel for Spain. All this while the main army, which landed with their general Don Juan de Aguila, was at Kinsale, expecting the aid of Tyrone, who promised every day to be with them. Our army, whereof Lord Mountjoy was General, being likewise Lord Deputy of Ireland, besieged the town so that he prevented their meeting, though daily many skirmishes passed betwixt the English and the Spanish.

The siege continued with great miseries to both the armies, and not without cause, considering the season of the year and the condition of the country that afforded little relief to either. Some few days before Christmas Tyrone appeared with his forces, which was some little heartening to the enemy in hopes to be freed of their imprisonment, for so may I call it, they were so strictly beleaguered. The day of agreement betwixt the Spaniards and Tyrone to give battle was Christmas-eve, on which day there happened an earthquake in England; and as many times such signs prove *aut bonum, aut malum*

omen, this proved fortunate to us, the victory being obtained with so little loss as is almost incredible.

This was the day of trial, whether Ireland should continue a parcel of our crown, yea or no ; for if the enemy had prevailed in the battle, and if mediation had not afterwards obtained more than force, it was to be feared Ireland would hardly have been ever recovered. The Spaniards in Ireland seeing the success of Tyrone and the impossibility for him to reinforce his army, being hopeless of supplies out of Spain, and their poverty daily increasing, they made offers of a parley which was granted, and a peace ensued the conditions whereof are extant in print. The Spaniards were by agreement with us furnished with ships and secured of their passage into Spain, where arriving in English vessels the ships returned back for England. [3]

[1] Before Leveson's fleet was commissioned there were two men-of-war and some hired merchantmen on the Irish station :—¹

| Queen's Ships. | | Captains and Period of Commission. | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Tramontana. | . | Chas. Plessington, 'captain and admiral,' ² | 3rd April—31st December. |
| Moon | . | Thos. Button, 'captain and admiral,' ³ | 21st April—31st December. |
| Merchantmen : | | | |
| Amity, of Ipswich | . | Thos. Flemyng, ⁴ | 1st January—28th July. |
| Triumph, of London | . | Gawen Harvey, ⁵ | 13th May—17th October. |
| Garland, of Harwich | . | Giles Thornton, | 1st January—8th June. |
| Samaritan, of London ⁶ . | . | John Thornborough, | 16th August, 1600—26th September, 1601. |

¹ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2239.

² On north-west coast, at 5s. a day.

³ On west coast, at the same rate of pay.

⁴ With two crompters under him ; same rate of pay. Crompters seem to have been vessels of the collier type. Raleigh speaks of them as synonymous, 'crompters or hoys of Newcastle' (*Discourse of Ships*), carrying usually six demi-culverins and four sakers. They were probably vessels of large beam and stowage capacity, and shallow draught.

⁵ With three ships under him ; same rate of pay.

⁶ As a transport to Lough Foyle, 'the said carvel also continued there as a storehouse for the victuals.'

As the other vessels under the orders of Flemyng and Harvey do not appear in the Navy Treasurer's accounts, they were, if not Irish ships, probably hired and paid by the Irish Government. Leveson's fleet consisted of :—

| Queen's Ships. | Men. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------|--------------------|---|
| Warspite . | 1,732 ⁹ | Sir Richard Leveson, Admiral, ⁷ 27th October–31st December. |
| Garland . | | Sir Amyas Preston, Vice-Admiral, ⁸ 27th October–31st December. |
| Defiance . | | Walter Gore, 27th October–31st December. |
| Nonpareil . | | Humphrey Reynolds, 27th October–31st December. |
| Swiftsure . | | Geo. Somers, 27th October–31st December. |
| Crane . | | Edmond Manwaring, 27th October–31st December. |
| Merlin . | | Thos. Flemyng, 27th October–31st December. |

Merchantmen :

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Marigold, of London . | Wm. Willis, 22nd October–31st December. |
| Reuben, of Lee . . . | Joseph May, 22nd October–31st December. |
| Desire, of London . . | Wm. Laurence, 22nd October–31st December. |
| Arcana, of London . . | Thos. Coverte, 22nd October–31st December. |
| Mayflower, of Gillingham | Thos. Salkeld, 27th October–31st December. |
| Garland, crompter . . | Raymond Hurlock, 21st October–31st December. |

[2] It was known that Elizabeth was still as desirous of peace as she had been twenty years earlier, when she saw herself drifting towards a war she recoiled from against the greatest Power in the civilized world. On all theory of probability Spain should have been equally eager to put an end to the war which had ended its attempt at European domination, and was now dark with the presage of irretrievable disaster to the empire itself. But such reasoning took no account of the character of Philip III., born to be the tool of favourites, or of the men who handled him, prepared to govern with all the presumptuous confidence of ignorance and

⁷ At 1*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* a day.

⁸ At 13*s.* 4*d.* a day.

⁹ *MS. Council Register*, 28th December, 1601.

with no thought of the morrow. The last Cortes called by Philip II. had replied to the demand for money by saying that 'no one has either money or credit, and the country is utterly ruined. Any money that is made is hidden away. . . . In the principal cities most of the houses are closed and deserted.' Nevertheless the pretensions of Spain to interfere in the affairs of Europe were still maintained, and the extravagance of the court and administration increased to an extent that Charles V. and Philip II. had never permitted in their most prosperous days.¹⁰ Therefore the expectations of those who looked for renewed efforts towards peace in 1601 were disappointed, and it was not until May or June that negotiations were recommenced, and then only in a half-hearted way by letters between Edmondes and Beale on the one side and Richardot on the other. In the Low Countries matters had remained quiescent since the Nieuport campaign and both Powers were preparing for the renewal of the struggle, but there, if the *odium theologicum* still existed, there was less of the racial hatred that explained the savagery of previous days when Dutch burghers and Spanish peasants faced each other. The war was no longer one of conscience but of business, and was fought on both sides chiefly by mercenaries who did not want to kill but to take prisoners for ransom. A contemporary writer remarked of this period that 'A fourth hindrance to the Spaniards' success herein is because the Spanish commanders fight only in such a manner that they may still have occasion to fight again, and not that they may get the victory, by this means making, as it were, a trade of war, . . . and the very same is the practice of the commanders on the other side also.'¹¹ This criticism hardly applied to the battle of Nieuport, but it was true enough of minor movements and operations, and the fact was the consequence of the circumstance that emotions cannot be maintained at boiling point for a generation, and that while the Dutch were now wealthy enough to hire their soldiers, Spain, exhausted of men, could only put Italian and German mercenaries in the field, who not only had no patriotic hatred to gratify, but being usually unpaid had to rely upon taking prisoners in place of wages.

In December 1600 Sir Henry Neville wrote to Winwood, referring to Ireland, that 'the heart of that rebellion is broken,' and anticipated that another year would see the country pacified. From Paris, during the early months of 1601, came several intimations that the Spaniards were again collecting troops and

¹⁰ Philip and Lerma proposed at one time to coin all the gold and silver plate in the possession of the Church and of private individuals, but had to withdraw their first tentative step towards it.

¹¹ Campanella, *De Monarchia Hispanica*.

supplies, and warnings that the destination might be England, but the news seems to have caused little uneasiness, and the English Government may have known that the real objects in view at the time were to reinforce the Archduke and to attack Algiers. The strength of the Channel Guard throughout the year does not indicate any great nervousness, although during the summer events led the Government to take preparatory steps to commission a sea-going squadron in July; but it never got to sea, though the advanced state in which it remained proved very advantageous when Leveson was urgently ordered to sea on the news of the Spanish arrival at Kinsale, and several of his ships had formed part of it. The force serving in the Narrow Seas was :—¹²

| Ships. | | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-------------|-------|--|
| Vanguard | . . . | Sir Rich. Leveson, Admiral, ¹³ 10th December, 1600—28th August, 1601. |
| Rainbow | . . . | Sir Rich. Leveson, Admiral, 29th August—27th September. |
| Rainbow | . . . | Sir Alex. Clifford, Vice-Admiral, ¹⁴ 1st January—11th February. |
| Adventure | . . . | Sir Amyas Preston, Vice-Admiral, 3rd February—29th August. |
| Dreadnought | . . . | Sir Amyas Preston, Vice-Admiral, 2nd September—23rd October. |
| Advantage | . . . | Sackville Trevor, 17th April—15th December. |
| Crane | . . . | Walter Gore, 13th January—31st August. ¹⁵ |
| Quittance | . . . | Humph. Reynolds, 1st January—11th September. |
| Charles | . . . | John White, 7th January—31st December. |
| Hope | . . . | Sir Robert Mansell, ¹⁶ 17th June—26th October. |
| Antelope | . . . | Jeremy Turner, Vice-Admiral, ¹⁷ 10th August—31st December. |
| Lion's Claw | . . . | Wm. Morgan, 16th December, 1600—4th May, 1601. |

¹² *Pipe Office Accounts*, 2239.

¹³ At 1*l.* a day. Leveson was in command in the eastern, Mansell in the western Channel (see *infra*). It was beginning to be customary to separate the two commands.

¹⁴ At 10*s.* a day.

¹⁵ From 17th June until 31st August Gore was Vice-Admiral of the western division under Mansell.

¹⁶ 'Admiral to the Westward'; 1*l.* a day.

¹⁷ Ten shillings a day.

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 129

The Thames and Medway Division.

| | | | |
|------------------|---|---|--|
| Dreadnought | . | . | Sir Hen. Palmer, Admiral, 9th April-6th May. |
| Lion | . | . | Sir Hen. Palmer, Admiral, ¹⁸ 7th May-4th September. |
| Dreadnought | . | . | John Cason, Vice-Admiral, ¹⁹ 19th June-1st September. |
| Answer | . | . | Thos. Coverte, 13th January-1st September. |
| Advice. | . | . | Rich. Bourne, 9th April-1st September. |
| Merchantman : | | | |
| Lion, of Ipswich | . | . | Bryan Browne, 1st January-31st December. |

On the whole this is a stronger fleet than had been in commission in some preceding years when there seemed to be more obvious necessity for precaution. Although Leveson's cruise of 1600 had proved fruitless, Elizabeth seems to have been still thinking of some further attempts against the Flotas, and towards the end of that year the Earl of Cumberland appears to have submitted some plans to intercept them or the carracks, and it is noticeable that for the latter he boldly suggested going down to St. Helena, 'which as yet hath never been put into practice.'²⁰ He proposed to equip twenty-five ships, but as Elizabeth refused to provide 20,000*l.*, half the estimated cost, he subsequently suggested an attempt on a smaller scale, but impressed on her that an immediate decision must be come to as the Flota was expected earlier in 1601. The scheme would have failed as far as the Flota was concerned, for one arrived about the end of December 1600, or beginning of January 1601, and there was no other until September, the one due earlier having been delayed by a Norther in the Gulf of Mexico, which wrecked fourteen ships.²¹ And even if Elizabeth had been tempted to agree

¹⁸ In the Thames Palmer was paid 13*s.* 4*d.* a day. From 7th July he was at sea with Leveson or Mansell, and then received 1*l.* a day.

¹⁹ At 6*s.* 8*d.* a day.

²⁰ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxix. 46, 47. These two papers are calendared with a query under 1601, and assigned to March, and that month is certainly a wrong one. Mrs. Everett Green cannot now be applied to, but I see no evidence of the date in the contents beyond the fact that No. 46 is later than 1598.

²¹ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*. The six galleons which came in January brought silver of the value of 8,000,000 ducats, of which 2,000,000 belonged to the Crown. The second Flota made its Spanish landfall on 28th August (N.S.) in 42°, having gone up as far

the unexpected domestic events which supervened would no doubt have caused her to delay any foreign enterprise. On 30th July, 1599, Elizabeth had written to Essex imperatively forbidding him to leave Ireland on any pretext without especial permission. On 28th September he unexpectedly presented himself to her at Nonsuch, having added to his guilt by concluding a truce with Tyrone, another thing that Elizabeth had forbidden, and of whom she said that 'to trust this traitor upon oath is to trust a devil upon his religion.' Essex was put into a gentle confinement at first at York House, and then in his own house, and in June 1600 was brought before a specially constituted tribunal on several charges, three of which related to his making so many knights, his leaving Ireland, and his truce with Tyrone. The Court adjudged him to be suspended from all his offices and to be confined to his house during the Queen's pleasure.²² In August his liberty was restored, but he was prohibited approaching the court, and during the greater part of the remainder of the year he was writing humble letters to Elizabeth and imploring permission to kiss 'that fair correcting hand.' In the mean time, however, he was carrying on some complicated intrigues with James of Scotland, which it is unnecessary to attempt to unravel here, but in which Mountjoy and Southampton were involved, intended to force a reconciliation on the Queen and that went dangerously close to high treason. At the last moment his hand is said to have been forced by anonymous information that further measures were intended against him, and then spurred on by the encouragement of his friends, his own unquenchable optimism, and the belief in his personal influence, he attempted, on 8th February, to raise the City. How he miscalculated the temper of the London citizens is well known, and on the same day he surrendered to the Lord Admiral, Nottingham, who can scarcely have avoided some reflections on the turn of fortune which set him to arrest his erstwhile brilliant and all-powerful colleague, now a ruined traitor marked for death. On the 19th February he was tried, and on the 25th beheaded on Tower Hill. Some premonition of the danger which came to a head in February, if not full information, reached the Government, and may be one reason why no decision was come to in the scheme formulated by Cumberland, who was one of the nobles with Nottingham on 8th February prepared to lead on the

north as the banks of Newfoundland, and not having sighted the Azores.—*Viage de Pedro Teixeira* . . . pointed out to me by the late Mr. W. F. Sinclair, who edited it for the Hakluyt Society.

²² On 7th June Rowland Whyte wrote to Sir Robert Sidney, 'I hear it was a most pitiful and lamentable sight to see him that was the *mignon* of Fortune now unworthy of the least honour . . . many that were present burst out into tears at his fall to such misery.'

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 131

stormers who were to carry Essex House if the earl had not surrendered.

In September 1600 Cecyll wrote to Sir George Carew that he was not out of hope of a treaty with Spain on account of the imminence of a rupture between that Power and France, and repeatedly expressed an opinion that there was no likelihood of Spanish aid being sent into Ireland, 'they are all fools that expect it.'²³ In December he wrote still more hopefully of the prospects of a peace, but in April 1601 the current impression in Paris was that he had become lukewarm in the matter by reason of Essex's accusation against him of trafficking with Spain, an imputation, we now know, by no means so devoid of probability as it appeared to his contemporaries.²⁴ Information from various sources reached the English Government during the spring of Spanish preparations, which was all true enough, although the levies were not then intended for England. It was the effort to reinforce the Archduke after the campaign of Nieuport and the mutinies among his troops which followed it, and an expedition under D'Oria against Algiers in which 10,000 men from Italy and Spain were employed. The army returned ignominiously, having failed to face successfully the usual storm which was always sufficient to baffle Spanish maritime enterprises. It was after the return of this force, which had suffered little material loss, that the Irish invasion seems to have been definitely decided upon. In June Cecyll wrote to Carew that the preparations at Lisbon 'may well proportion such an action. . . . I cannot deny but make great presumption that you shall have them in Ireland'; and expressed his belief that they would land in Munster for reasons which show that he was hardly an authority on military subjects. In July, Cabrera de Cordoba writes that the army was still preparing in Lisbon, but that many prophesied dismally about it, and a month later the Venetian ambassador expressed himself in the same sense: 'there is little certainty of success; every certainty of failure and of the destruction of these poor fellows.' What is called the *morale* of an army depends essentially on the soldier possessing the feeling of superiority, and the belief that when he goes into action it will be to conquer under generals he is firmly convinced are better than those of his enemy. Nothing in the sixteen years of war could have given the Spanish soldier

²³ *Letters of Sir Robert Cecil* (Camd. Soc.); Cecyll to Carew, 8th November, 1600.

²⁴ Winwood, *Memorials*, i. p. 315. Major Martin Hume is of opinion that this accusation is 'demonstrably untrue' (*Treason and Plot*, p. 365), but as elsewhere this author expresses his belief (p. 398) that Cecyll was a blasphemous liar, if not perjurer, in relation to another question, it must be difficult to prove his innocence in anything.

any feeling of confidence in himself or his leaders, and if two observers, one being a Spaniard, so significantly forebode the futility of the attempt, we may be certain that among the troops, especially the officers, discouragement was still more marked.

Cecyll's sudden change of front in the matter of his conviction about an Irish invasion did not at the moment lead to any resolution to strengthen the fleet in commission, although, as the Dutch were occupied in keeping open communications with Ostend, of which the Archduke had commenced the siege on ^{25th June} ~~25th July~~, no reliance could be placed for the time on any assistance from them.²⁵ Scout vessels were sent out during June and July, and the officials at the western ports became very nervous, those at Plymouth alarming the Government by news of the appearance of a fleet which they took to be Spanish, but which turned out to be the wine ships returning from Bordeaux. It was not until the end of July and beginning of August that any steps were taken to increase the naval force available. On 2nd August the Privy Council ordered a levy of all seamen between sixteen and sixty years of age belonging to eight ports between Chichester and Bristol,²⁶ and no doubt this was done in connexion with the intention to form an additional squadron for active service.²⁷ On 4th August Leveson and Mansell replied to the questions addressed to them by Cecyll, Nottingham, and Buckhurst, the Lord Treasurer, as to the course they considered it advisable to adopt.²⁸ They said they could not decide until the strength and destination of the enemy were known, but proposed to keep 'our poor force' concentrated until joined by Palmer, who, presumably, was superintending the preparation of the new squadron. In action they intended to get the weather-gage and fight at long range, keeping up a running fight until the Spaniards arrived at the spot where they intended to land,

²⁵ There were 5,000 English troops in Ostend (Cecyll to Carew, 12th August). On 10th July Sir Amyas Preston was sent over to Holland by Leveson and Mansell to see if any help was to be obtained from the Dutch, but they received his news phlegmatically, showing 'a cold and unbelieving apprehension.' On 4th August the two Admirals reported that there was not a single Dutch man-of-war west of Ostend.

²⁶ *MS. Council Register*.

²⁷ Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, p. 320, quoting *Cecil MSS.* Mr. Corbett gives the Warspite, Garland, Defiance, Hope, Rainbow, Dreadnought, and Lion's Whelp as the intended squadron. The first three afterwards formed part of Leveson's fleet, but were now brought forward for service; the Hope and Dreadnought were already in commission, so that as the Channel Guard was to be weakened by withdrawing them (*ante*, pp. 128, 129), the added strength was not great.

²⁸ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclxxxi. 41.

and then to use fireships ; in all which design is a distinct reminiscence of 1588. The Admirals did not touch upon the question of going down to meet the Spaniards before they left their own waters, perhaps because they knew they were too weak. The Government were equally silent, possibly on account of Elizabeth's dislike to lose sight of her fleet, or possibly because it was thought that by the time the reinforcements were ready it would be too late ; as, indeed, it would have been had the Spanish preparations been as far advanced as was supposed. On 8th August Cecyll wrote to the Admirals that the Queen approved their intentions, and, for himself, added, 'I am loth to be backward in times of suspicion, and have therefore joined with my Lord to further the setting forth of more ships . . . but surely when I consider the noise of preparation is too great for Ireland, and do likewise consider it were easy for the Queen, with the help of the Low Countries, in all their warning they have given us, to keep them from landing either at Dunkirk or Sluys (for to expect them on the main of England I cannot do it), surely I do hope you shall not be put this year to the question.'²⁹ Cecyll had altered his conclusions considerably since he wrote to Carew in June, and apparently some information, not now traceable, but of a positive nature, must have come in shortly after the 8th August, for on the 12th he wrote hastily to Carew assuming that the Spaniards had landed in Munster, 'the great storm which I presume is fallen upon Munster drowns all my petty cares and wounds my soul for care of you.' That particular alarm could have lasted but a very short time, for on the 13th he writes again, a long letter, but makes no reference to the all-important subject.³⁰ Leveson's opinion now was that if the Spaniards did not come shortly they would not come at all, and on the 20th August he reported that there were six Dutch men-of-war at Dover under Duyvenvoord, who said that the States desired to join with the Queen in sending a fleet down to the Spanish coast and so keep the Spaniards employed there.³¹ It was good enough advice, but the English preparations were, so far as we can tell, lagging unaccountably ; there was no sign of the appearance of the reinforcing ships, and as they never joined as first intended, we may presume that either they were intentionally kept back, which is unlikely, or that the dockyard people were to blame. If the latter is the explanation, it is, so far as it goes, evidence against Monson's accuracy about the twelve days in 1599, although it is true that the degeneration of the administrative departments of the navy was proceeding in a geometrical progression towards the

²⁹ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclxxxi. 50 i. ; a draft.

³⁰ *Letters of Sir Robert Cecil*, Camd. Soc. pp. 88-91.

³¹ *State Papers Dom. Elis.* cclxxxi. 56, 59.

end of the reign. As time elapsed apprehension grew less, and on 5th September, Cecyll, writing to Carew, confessed himself at fault: 'What is become of the Spanish preparations I protest to you I was never more to seek for; there is no doubt but a navy and an army he hath for Ireland, for so much from the place itself I know,' so that he had altered his opinion again since 8th August. Nottingham thought that the Spanish armada was designed to aid the Archduke to invade England, which shows how little he understood the possibilities remaining to Spain, and the limitations to the Archduke's freedom of movement. To us, with the archives laid open for our inspection, Cecyll's mystification with the sources of information he had at command is difficult to understand; but if he was mystified the only explanation is that, the weakness of Spain not being fully appreciated, it was not realized that the only possible sphere of action left for that Power was Ireland. There is, however, always and in everything the doubt of Cecyll's honesty; whether he had not some obscure personal or political motive for his apparent mental indecision and disinclination for any decisive course of action. England was in no danger whatever Spain might attempt now, but, without being a traitor in the legal sense, he was quite capable of risking the safety of his country for his own immediate ends.³² In the third week of September there was an agreement of information, brought in almost simultaneously by captains making the Channel ports, which left no doubt that the Spaniards were at last at sea, but it is suggestive of the slowness that had characterized the preparations during the whole summer to find that on 6th October the Privy Council wrote to Lord Mountjoy that all haste was being made and that by the 14th the fleet would be ready to sail.³³

For thirty years hopes of Spanish help had been dangled before the Irish patriots, but as an invasion in force exacted the same command of the sea necessary for an invasion of England, and did not, even if successful, promise the same instant and decisive results, it had never commended itself to Spanish statesmen while a direct attack on England seemed possible. Philip II. had played in Ireland, although on a smaller scale, the same game as Elizabeth in the Netherlands; he gave occasional help in the way of money, arms, and other necessities of war, and allowed

³² On 15th October Henry IV. said to Winwood that 'he marvelled much that her Majesty having been so fully forewarned by him of this design of Spain she would not provide to prevent it' (*Memorials*, i. p. 353).

³³ *MS. Council Register*. The document calendared under *State Papers Dom.* (cclxxxi. 95), as Leveson's Instructions of 23rd September, 1601, really belongs to one of the first three months of 1603.

volunteers to go over, but he hardly seems to have regarded it as a serious field for hostilities, nor were the reports he received from returning Spaniards of a nature to alter his views. In 1596 he took up the project, but with an eye also to Milford; in 1597 he reverted to an English port; but 1596 was two years too soon, as 1601 was three years too late.³⁴ The expeditionary force, composed of the *álbrís* of the troops that had been collected for Algiers and to reinforce the Archduke, contained some 6,000 men, with guns, money, additional stores and arms for the natives, and even swords of honour for their chiefs. However, only some 4,000 men sailed in thirty-five ships, the fleet being under the command of Brochero de Anaya, with Pedro de Zubiaur as his second, and the army under Juan de Aguila, formerly the Spanish general in Brittany, who was released from the imprisonment he was undergoing for the commonplace misdemeanour of embezzling the King's moneys there, to take the command. For an invasion, to stand by its own strength, the force was too small, and as there was no intention of meeting and trying conclusions with the English fleet it would be impossible to strengthen it except by what could be carried by odd ships that might escape the English cruisers. As an auxiliary force that might enable Tyrone to hold his own the scheme was nullified by the initial blunder that landed the Spaniards in the south of Ireland while Tyrone occupied the north, thus exposing the allies to be beaten in detail while endeavouring to effect a junction. Tyrone alone could never carry on any but a guerilla warfare; he had no artillery, and no means or disciplined troops wherewith to take towns or fight pitched battles. The presence of the Spaniards and of the guns and stores they brought would have remedied this weakness, and the mistake was seen at once in France, and later—too late—in Spain. The Venetian ambassador at Paris wrote that in French opinion the Spanish troops were thrown away, as they would be unable to join Tyrone.³⁵ In December the Adelantado of Castile, Don Martin de Padilla, drew up a paper for Philip III. which exposed the weak points of the plan of campaign. He pointed out that the only way to repair the mischief was to send strong reinforcements, 'little reinforcements will only cause the loss to be greater. . . . If the Irish do not see the Spaniards the stronger party even for a week they will not declare themselves against the Queen, and unless they do declare themselves we

³⁴ See *ante*, p. 16. Also Raleigh to Cecyll, 'Sure I am if these Spaniards had come in the beginning of the wars (*i.e.* of the Irish revolt) the kingdom had been (at) once lost.'

³⁵ *State Papers Venetian*, 11 November, 1601. Also Henry IV. told Winwood that he held them 'to be lost if they were not seconded, and that speedily' (*Memorials*, 15th October).

shall not be able to finish our task with so small a force. The landing of the men where they were landed was a great drawback.³⁶ He added that if Tyrone and Aguila were able to meet all might be well, but that otherwise the smallness of the succour would only have served to trap the natives, and that if the war lasted until next year the Spanish fleet 'will have to be very powerful and able to give battle to the enemy.' In the last sentence Don Martin propounded the key to the problem, although he took an optimistic view in assuming that matters would not come to a crisis for another six or nine months. In reality the Spanish landing in the south was conditioned by their inability to meet their enemy at sea and the consequent necessity for the shortest possible passage.³⁷ The original intention was to occupy Cork, and it is said that there were many women in the fleet, the purpose being to make a settlement as a preparation for diplomatic action on the death of Elizabeth, an event considered now to be within the prevision of politics. Brochero sailed during the last days of August or beginning of September, and was seen sufficiently often and sufficiently early to have made his arrival unscathed in Ireland problematical had there been any fleet ready strong enough to engage him. When nearly off Cork the wind shifted, so that, anxious to make a port, the Spaniards turned into Kinsale, which they took without resistance on 23rd September; but during the voyage Zubiaur with eight or nine ships and 600 or 700 men had been driven back to Coruña by bad weather, and some other vessels, with 700 men on board, put into Baltimore to the westward, some forty miles, of Kinsale. Altogether, Aguila had not 3,000 effectives with him; he found the place weak to hold, the neighbouring natives showed little sympathy, and, naturally, he had difficulty in getting into communication with Tyrone. Brochero had been ordered to return to Spain as soon as possible, and carried out his orders with little consideration for Aguila's position, who did not make the best of matters in issuing a manifesto in which he deliberately scorned the spirit of national independence and called upon the people to rise in the name of the Pope. There were several causes at work—a weak force, a wrong point of landing, insufficient supplies, and lack of racial and personal sympathy—but the net result, in the words of the Spanish narration, was that, though 'Don Juan doth procure to draw from the country people by love and reward all that he can, yet with all this findeth no assurance from them.'

³⁶ *Simancas Papers*, 10th December, 1601.

³⁷ Philip was told long before that 4,000 or 5,000 men sent to Ulster would be sufficient aid, but 'if the King did purpose to send an army into Munster, then he should send strongly because neither Tyrone nor O'Donnell could come to help them' (*Pacata Hibernia*, p. 456).

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 137

In England the Government were making such speed as their sluggish methods allowed, and on 4th October Cecyll wrote to Winwood that 6,000 troops were being raised to reinforce the 18,000 already in Ireland.³⁸ But these figures were intended to impress Henry IV. and did not allow for false musters and men in buckram; the real effective total was much smaller. Cecyll's—or Elizabeth's—weakness as a politician is shown by the choice of this moment to authorize the secret proposal of terms to Tyrone because 'her Majesty is so weary of this Irish war, and so is all England.' Certainly the rebel earl could have received no greater encouragement, and no more striking proof of the value of Spanish aid, than this immediate result of Aguila's appearance, which was more likely to inspire him to stand out than to come to any arrangement.

[3] Properly to describe the conditions existing in Ireland in 1601 would involve writing a history of that country, therefore the briefest sketch must suffice of the circumstances that brought Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, into prominence as the representative of Irish independence. During the reign of Henry VIII. the Geraldines were the leaders of Irish revolt, and among their allies were the O'Neills of Ulster,³⁹ whose then head, Con O'Neill, made his submission to the English Government and accepted the earldom of Tyrone in 1542, when the Geraldine faction was crushed. Of the two policies submitted to Henry VIII., that of conciliation, or of extermination of the natives to be followed by English plantations, he adopted the former, stained by the brutality and severity of the time, but relatively just and merciful in intention. His policy was continued on the whole during the reigns of Edward VI. and Mary, and a feverish peace was maintained, although the religious troubles of the latter reign were lighting up afresh the dying embers of racial strife. The accession of Elizabeth and her troubled relations with France and Spain made Irish politics a matter of continental as well as domestic concern, and very early in her reign the possibility that Ireland might be made a basis for invasion was present in her mind, and continually impressed upon her by her advisers. In 1559 she seems to have already resolved that the country should be reduced by force to complete obedience, and that the policy of English plantations should be adopted,⁴⁰ and there is no doubt that she

³⁸ 'You shall all be cared for so as you shall say we be no drones' (Cecyll to Carew, 6th October).

³⁹ It is interesting to observe that as early as 1523 the Earl of Desmond was negotiating with Francis I. for French assistance, and that in 1539 the then O'Neill endeavoured to arrange for combined action with Francis and the Emperor.

⁴⁰ Instructions to the Earl of Sussex (*Carew MSS.* i. p. 284).

did not then at all realize the magnitude of the undertaking. Subject to larger methods in the future, the design of the Lord Deputy, Sussex, was to Anglicize as far as possible the native legal and social customs, and the application of this principle brought about the first great revolt from her rule, led by an O'Neill. The Earl of Tyrone of 1542 died in 1559, leaving two sons, Matthew and Shane, of whom the elder, although recognized by the Government, was reputed illegitimate.⁴¹ He was soon killed by Shane in fair or unfair fight, but left a son on whom his title devolved, while Shane was elected according to Irish custom as The O'Neill. Here, then, native uses and English law were confronted, for while the patent of the Tyrone earldom regranted Con O'Neill his estates on his surrender of them to be held by knight service, Shane maintained that having only an estate for life Con had no power to surrender, nor could he do so without the consent of the inferior chiefs of whom he was only the leader but whose independence and lands he thus bartered away and assumed to himself. It strikes one that it should not have been beyond the resources of statecraft to come to an arrangement with Shane, but after some delay, during which he was occupied in consolidating his position in Ulster, war broke out in 1561, and in July Sussex was badly defeated. Worse still, Elizabeth submitted to the defeat, and a peace was patched up in October; in accordance with an article in this treaty O'Neill was granted a safe conduct to come to London, where in 1562 an agreement was arrived at which, although refusing him legal recognition, left him in practical supremacy in Ulster with the prestige of having successfully defied the Queen. Not unnaturally he and Sussex were soon at war again, which was concluded by another peace in 1563, which gave him still more favourable terms, and, arms having failed to subdue him, recourse was had for the second time,⁴² but equally unsuccessfully, to an attempt at assassination. O'Neill was now practically the independent ruler of Ulster, and seems to have administered his principality more successfully than the English did the rest of Ireland. But he mistakenly attempted to subdue the tribal chiefs instead of associating them with himself in union against English rule, and when he proceeded to extend his conquests into Connaught Sir Henry Sidney was sent over in 1565 with orders to subdue him at any cost. Sidney was an antagonist of different calibre to Sussex, and, in 1567, O'Neill during his flight after defeat was murdered by some of his enemies.

The Act for the attainder of Shane and the suppression of the

⁴¹ Con O'Neill 'being a gentleman never denied any child that was sworn to him.'

⁴² The first occasion, in 1561, was with Elizabeth's knowledge.

name of O'Neill dwelt on his attempts to obtain foreign aid, and this was probably the chief cause of the fear he inspired and the resolve to crush him, for otherwise the expenditure on Ireland must have staggered Elizabeth, and tempted her to condone everything possible.⁴³ For a short time matters were more peaceful, and, as a method of closer supervision, lords presidents, to each of whom much individual authority was left, were nominated for each of the provinces. In 1569 Elizabeth's excommunication reawoke the fears of the English, and then Ireland seemed to become a peculiarly suitable soil for the cultivation of militant Catholicism. In 1573 Walter Devereux, Earl of Essex, father of the Earl Robert so often mentioned in these pages, volunteered to do the Queen service in Ireland, but he only succeeded in lighting Ulster into flame again, and we perceive Turlough O'Neill then standing forward as representative of his race and family. The situation in international politics was now bringing the element of foreign help into more prominence, and we find the promises of Spanish or other support, which so often and so long duped the Irish, an important factor. The Desmond rising of 1579 was essentially religious, and especially based on assurances of Spanish and Papal help; in this instance 800 Papal mercenaries did reach Smerwick, but too late to be of any service, and too few to act on their own account. These events were followed by the confiscation of nearly 600,000 acres in Munster, and a so-called plantation, but which, only partially carried out, introduced English landlords instead of English settlers, and irritated the natives without overawing them.

In Ulster, Turlough O'Neill, too weak to be anything else, was apparently a loyal subject, and English supremacy seemed to be safeguarded by the system which encouraged the lesser chiefs to disclaim any subjection to The O'Neill. The most powerful of these lesser chiefs was Hugh O'Donnell, of Tyrconnel, who had been flattered when his assistance was necessary against Shane O'Neill, but whose growing power now aroused the suspicions of the officials at Dublin. His sons were kidnapped, and he and other chiefs had to endure numerous injustices and spoliations at the hands of the Government, until their sense of injury became so great as to override their traditional jealousies and enable them to unite against English rule.⁴⁴ Hugh O'Neill, who was to give

⁴³ Between 1558 and 1574 the Irish administration had cost 490,000*l.*, of which 370,000*l.* had been sent from England (*Carew MSS.* i. p. 484).

⁴⁴ What the common people suffered during the years which followed the pacification of Ulster and Munster may be to a certain extent surmised from the relations of robbery, outrage, and murder recorded in the *Carew MSS.* iii. pp. 154-6, 176, 260. Probably much

Elizabeth so many anxious hours, was the second son of Matthew,⁴⁵ the titular second Earl of Tyrone. It will be remembered that Matthew was killed by Shane O'Neill, and the English Government having no use at the moment for his sons, Hugh was sent to London, introduced at court, eventually given a troop of horse, and became to all appearance English in sympathy and mode of thought. In Ireland he served in the English army, being especially encouraged to make things unpleasant for Turlough, and, in 1584, was put into possession of the south-eastern portion of the Tyrone district, Turlough being allotted the north-western. In 1587 he was created Earl of Tyrone, and for some years appeared to be more English in his ardour to introduce English laws and manners than was the Lord Deputy himself. With Turlough O'Neill he carried on a continual warfare, which was equally pleasing to the Government whichever side won, when, in June 1593, the situation was suddenly changed by Turlough's surrender of all his lands and authority to him in consideration of a certain life income. Whether or no he had been playing a double game all through, his enthusiasm for English customs was now checked, and the Government was faced with a serious problem, for the conditions which had cost so much in lives and money as against Shane O'Neill were reproduced with the added circumstances that the new leader was a skilled soldier, a politician, a man of great ability, and with knowledge of English strength and weakness. Notwithstanding mutual suspicion no very serious complaints could be brought against him at first, and in 1594 he suddenly appeared in Dublin to answer such as could be made. The Council there accepted his explanations and allowed him to leave, much to Elizabeth's anger,⁴⁶ and he never gave such an opportunity again. Wiser than his predecessor, Shane, he did not attempt to enforce any supremacy over the other chiefs, but preferred to make himself the head of a confederacy, and thus the hitherto rival house of O'Donnell became his chief supporters. He was supposed to be able to put 6,000 or 7,000 foot and 1,000 horse into the field, and his probable rebellion was regarded as the most dangerous trial the Queen's Government had yet to undergo in Ireland, both from the character of the man and the impression that he had ensured help from abroad.⁴⁷ When war broke out in 1595 the English garrison was, nominally, about 4,000 foot and 650 horse, although actually only a far smaller

of the Irish difficulty was due to the fact that the soldiers were unpaid and the necessary consequences.

⁴⁵ The elder son was killed by Turlough O'Neill.

⁴⁶ 'This was as foul an oversight as ever was committed in that kingdom.' Elizabeth to the Council.

⁴⁷ *Carew MSS.* iii. p. 127.

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 141

force was available for service, but Tyrone confined himself to a harassing outpost warfare, and declined to give Sir John Norreys and Sir William Russell, the Lord Deputy, any opportunity to come to action; moreover, during 1595 and 1596 he was in constant expectation of Spanish help, and disinclined to commit himself too deeply until it came. A very short experience of this rendered Elizabeth eager to come to terms, and she knew that Tyrone was in communication with Spain and had been promised aid. In January 1596 she wrote to the Council that as the whole kingdom was in revolt she authorized the grant of a free pardon upon the submission of the rebels: 'for the speedy conclusion of a general quiet you may ratify whatever may soonest effect the same.' An armistice followed but the negotiations had no decisive result. Tyrone did not want to move until either some English operation forced him into activity or succour came from Spain, and Elizabeth hoped to come to terms without largely increasing the Irish army, and by slowly garrisoning the disaffected districts. There was occasional fighting and much letter writing until August 1598, when Sir H. Bagenal, marching north, was utterly routed at the Blackwater with a loss of 1,500 or 2,000 men. It was the worst defeat ever experienced in Ireland, and, in the eyes of his countrymen, converted Tyrone from a commonplace rebel into a national hero, at whose hands the long sought deliverance from foreign thralldom seemed likely to be obtained.

The immediate consequence of this victory was that Munster rose, and Elizabeth turned savagely upon the president of that province, Sir Thomas Norreys, for his presumed negligence, although the fault was really her own for the parsimonious neglect with which she treated the revolt for years, and for offering a rebel in arms terms that no sense of justice would have wrung from her during peace. If the government of Ireland is the test of English statesmanship in domestic affairs in each generation, Elizabeth fails lamentably as a politician when tried by that standard. In April 1599 Essex was sent to Ireland with an army estimated at 17,000 men, although he maintained that it never amounted to nearly that number, and at that date the insurgents were supposed to be some 21,000 strong, but many of them quite undisciplined, lacking arms, and scattered over the country. In accordance with the advice of the Irish Council, but contrary to his instructions, the earl marched into Leinster and Munster, leaving Tyrone alone, and one of his divisions under Sir Henry Harrington suffered a severe defeat near Wicklow. It was not until August that, in obedience to the Queen's reiterated orders, Essex marched into Ulster, having arranged to act in conjunction with Sir Conyers Clifford, president of Connaught, who was to advance from that province and take Tyrone in flank. Clifford was attacked in the Curlew mountains, his men routed, and himself killed. This

caused delay, and Essex did not move towards O'Neill's country until September, and then, when opposite Tyrone, concluded a truce with him and immediately returned to England. Lord Mountjoy was appointed Lord Deputy in February 1600, and in his plans partly reverted to the system of small flying columns by which Lord Leonard Grey had succeeded (1535-42), and partly took up the intention Essex had not carried out. Clifford's movement, which had ended in his defeat and death, had been directed on Lough Foyle, which he was to occupy while Sir Thos. Norreys held Ballyshannon, the two posts commanding Tyrone's territory and that of his chief supporter, O'Donnell.⁴⁸ In May 1600 Sir Henry Docwra went round to Lough Foyle by sea and settled himself there, but the coincident movement to Ballyshannon was not undertaken until 1601, and did not succeed at the time although Donegal was taken in its place. Mountjoy and Sir George Carew, who was now president of Munster, scored a series of small successes during 1600 and 1601, by means of the flying columns and the erection and occupation of forts in positions calculated to bridle the insurgent movements. These measures were supplemented by the usual courses of bribery, pretended toleration, persuasion, forged letters, and other methods intended to sow dissension among the natives, and their powers of resistance were slowly reduced. Cecyll was continually giving off small notes of triumph to his various correspondents, and it was clear that without Spanish aid the rebellion would be surely subdued, while it was a question whether, coming now, it was not too late. Tyrone was cooped up in the north, Aguila at Kinsale; if they joined hands success was not certain, for their real base was Spain for munitions of war, and their communications were cut by Leveson; if they did not meet their ruin was undoubted. When Essex left Ireland Tyrone was able to march down to the walls of Cork without meeting any opposition; now, English power was so far restored that there was little active rebellion outside Ulster.

After operations during the summer on the border of Ulster, Mountjoy and Sir George Carew were at Kilkenny when a messenger arrived from Sir Charles Wilmot, the governor of Cork, announcing the advent of the Spaniards. Steps were immediately

⁴⁸ 'There is a meaning that Sir Conyers Clifford should go to Lough Foyle with 3,000 men and Sir Thos. Norreys with as many to Ballyshannon, and so to hedge in Tyrone on all sides.' Chamberlain to Carleton, 1st August, 1599. The flank attack by Lough Foyle was a repetition of that which Sir Henry Sidney had successfully executed in 1566 against Shane O'Neill. For a valuable study of the strategic aspects of the land war see Mr. Corbett's *Successors of Drake*, chap. xiii.

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 143

taken to concentrate troops for service in Munster, and reinforcements from England asked for. By the 2nd October, Mountjoy, Carew, and other superior officers were before Kinsale reconnoitring the position, but troops came in slowly, and it was not until the 16th that the investment may be said to have commenced, but still incomplete in the absence of the fleet. Aguila had been welcomed in the town, and issued a proclamation promising to treat the inhabitants as friends and brothers, and giving permission to those who desired to leave to do so with their property. He occupied and strengthened the forts of Rincorran and Castle-ne-Parke which defended the entrance of the harbour, and prepared to welcome and arm the native recruits who were to flock in with horses and supplies. But they did not come; rebellion in Munster was dead, or at the most was now only disaffection, and the Spaniards were not long in making up their minds that 'Christ had never died for such a people.' In England troops were being levied and the fleet prepared, but notwithstanding the expectation of the Privy Council that Leveson would sail on 14th October, his commission was not signed until the 20th,⁴⁹ and delay still followed on delay, due partly to adverse winds, so that he did not appear at Kinsale until 14th November, when he brought 2,000 land soldiers with him, besides more guns and stores. In the interval Mountjoy had done what he could, and with some success. He had only two small ships available, but in the absence of a Spanish fleet they were sufficient to blockade the port, and their presence enabled him to throw up a battery in front of Rincorran and to prevent Aguila relieving that post, so that on 1st November it surrendered. Aguila could then play only a passive part and await deliverance from Tyrone or from the Spanish squadron expected under Zubiaur.

For some reason, probably the difficulty of concentrating undisciplined troops, the northern leaders were perilously slow in their movements. O'Donnell was besieging Donegal when he received the news of the Spanish landing, and, leaving the town, marched into Connaught, where he halted at Ballymote to gather his forces, but did not set out for his journey south until 2nd November, with 2,000 or 3,000 men.⁵⁰ Tyrone advanced south with between 3,000 and 4,000 men, having arranged to unite with O'Donnell at Holycross in Tipperary, about sixty miles

⁴⁹ *Egerton Papers* (Camd. Soc.), p. 332. He was instructed to consider himself under the orders of the Lord Deputy, or, in his absence, of Carew.

⁵⁰ The *Pacata Hibernia* says that he outnumbered Carew by three to one, which would give him 6,000 or 8,000 men. The Irish authorities are to be preferred, as if he had been so strong it would have been to his advantage to fight Carew instead of evading him.

from Kinsale. On 7th November it was known to the English leaders that O'Donnell was coming up and that Tyrone was behind to the eastward, and Mountjoy detached Carew with 2,000 or 3,000 troops to check or intercept O'Donnell. Carew reached Cashel when O'Donnell arrived at Holycross, and the two forces were in touch with each other; for some reason the Irishman would not fight, and making a forced night march almost due west reached Croom, nine miles south of Limerick, the next day. Carew attempted to keep up with O'Donnell on the interior line as he turned south again, but the Irishmen were the better marchers and reached Castlehaven, while Carew returned to Kinsale. A chance of Irish victory had been lost by the rendezvous having been fixed so far south and by Tyrone's unreadiness. It may be presumed that O'Donnell would not fight because he felt himself too weak, and that he could not fall back on Tyrone because the earl was too far behind; in fact, as the earl did not appear before Kinsale until 19th December he could hardly have commenced his advance. A retreat would have had a disastrous effect both on his own troops and on the hesitating chiefs, and he may have thought that hard marching would enable him to outpace Carew and join Juan de Aguila if the Spaniard helped him with a sally.

As soon as Leveson came some of his ships were used to assist the attack on the other fort, Castle-ne-Parke, which surrendered on 19th November. The siege of Kinsale progressed in due form, with all the proper skirmishes and sallies, until 3rd December, when news was brought in that Pedro de Zubiaur had put into Castlehaven, a little east of Baltimore, with a squadron carrying troops, provisions, clothes, and arms. He had left Coruña with ten ships and 800 or 1,000 soldiers, but one vessel was wrecked going out of the harbour and three others had parted company during the voyage.⁵¹ One of the three sailed innocently into the haven of Kinsale, and the other two never appeared. There was no time wasted in needless consultations; Mountjoy had upwards of 10,000 men in his lines,⁵² and could well spare Leveson, who warped out from Kinsale on Saturday, 5th December,⁵³ and made Castlehaven the next day, with the

⁵¹ Duro, *Armada Española*, iii. p. 219; Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*, p. 128; *Simancas Papers*, 29th January, 1602.

⁵² On 4th December 9,650 foot and 675 horse out of a total of 19,489 men supposed to be in the country (*State Papers, Ireland*, ccix. pt. 2). On 18th November the Earl of Thomond joined with 1,100 loyal Irish; a very large proportion of the army consisted of more or less loyal Irish.

⁵³ So Preston in his despatch to Nottingham (*State Papers, Ireland*, ccix. pt. 2), but the *Pacata Hibernia* says the 4th December, which is more likely, although he may have failed to get clear on the first day.

Warspite, Defiance, Swiftsure, Crane, Merlin, and two merchantmen. Zubiaur had not had time to land his stores, but, expecting an attack, had erected an eight-gun battery at the entrance of the harbour and put 600 soldiers ashore in support: of his squadron only two were fighting ships, and he was therefore overmatched and reduced to the defensive, but the Spaniards were evidently half beaten morally before Leveson went in. It was the 'little reinforcement' that the Adelantado had warned Philip would be useless and only make the loss greater. Zubiaur's force was too feeble to do anything but evade, and he had not evaded and could not expect to if he came within reach of Kinsale, while Spain could not raise any strength sufficient to open up communications in face of opposition. It was the tender point of all such expeditions which were neither evasions nor invasions proper, but combined the weaknesses of both. Leveson sent in a pinnace to sound, the Spaniards disdaining to fire upon it or ignorant of its purpose, and followed on, the enemy's fire being concentrated upon his flagship, mainly, we may suppose, because the transports were unarmed. After five hours' fight five ships were sunk or driven ashore, but Sir Richard could not bring off those aground nor fire them for fear of injuring his own vessels. He had done his work, and done it well, in one day, but the wind was dead on shore and he could not move for two days longer, during which time sporadic hostilities continued with the battery and the troops. As soon as possible he warped out, having no soldiers to land, and 'I thought it no wisdom to continue there to fight against rocks.' On the 9th December⁵⁴ he was back at Kinsale, having lost twelve killed and forty wounded in his own ship, which was 'shot through' a hundred times,⁵⁵ but with little loss in the rest of his squadron, and too exhausted to write his own despatch of victory, a duty he remitted to Preston. Zubiaur's stores were all lost, and he sent most of his men to join O'Donnell, remaining himself at Castlehaven to save what wreckage he might and fortify the fort to receive another fleet. However there was no other fleet to come; when the news was received in Spain of what had happened in Castlehaven the Council of State recognized that the game was lost, and reported that small expeditions were of no use, and that there were no troops available.⁵⁶ But the English Government

⁵⁴ *Pacata Hibernia* says the evening of the 8th. The other authorities for this action are Sir Amyas Preston's despatch *ubi sup.*; Leveson's own (*State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxiii. 19), written on 13th December; and Cecyll to Winwood of 2nd January, 1601 (*Memorials*, i. p. 369).

⁵⁵ The Warspite could not have been very much injured, as she was not sent into dock, but continued in commission in 1602.

⁵⁶ *Simancas Papers*, 18 January, 1602.

could not know the decision of that of Spain, and their immediate anxiety was how to deal with the army of 5,000 men supposed to be preparing at Lisbon. Wisely enough, but much to Mountjoy's disgust, it was resolved to withdraw Leveson from Irish waters and send him down to the coast of Portugal to meet the danger at its source. On 24th December a despatch was written to Preston informing him that Leveson was recalled, and directing him to remain on the station in command of the *Swiftsure*, *Tramontana*, *Moon*, *Merlin*, and two merchantmen.⁵⁷ On the same date the Privy Council wrote to Mountjoy⁵⁸ that if *Aguila* was not crushed before reinforcements came the war would become so serious as to be an intolerable burden. It was natural that they should suppose that Philip would not be content with one attempt, and they told the Lord Deputy that they were going to send him 4,000 men, and that a fleet, of which Leveson was to take the command, would be immediately sent down to the coast of Spain to fight any Spanish fleet leaving port. Both Mountjoy and Carew desired to have the fleet always in sight, and were apparently unable to understand that Leveson would be aiding them off Lisbon far more effectually than by lying in Kinsale harbour. Their remonstrances drew a notable answer from Cecyll in January 1602, in which the purpose of a fleet could not be more sharply and lucidly stated :—

For answer to all things I must refer you to our despatch general whereby I hope you see motions are regarded. For the fleet to continue, sir, we cannot allow it, neither do we hold it to be the way to restrain Spanish succours to keep Irish harbours, whereof there be more than the Queen hath ships. To Spain, therefore, we send, and for the rest you must take your chance.

There is a certain note of impatience in the style which suggests many previous expostulations from Mountjoy and Carew, and a very settled conviction on the part of the writer.⁵⁹ Although it does not show in the passage quoted, the real intention was to keep a fleet on the Spanish coast throughout the year, or at least as late as October, and, comparing Cecyll's indifference during the summer with his curt firmness now, it seems that he had learnt somewhat from observation.

Tyrone joined O'Donnell at Bandon, about ten miles from

⁵⁷ *MS. Council Register*. Preston remained in command until 17th April, 1602.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Carew remained somewhat obtuse as to the effect of fleet action at a distance. In August 1602, when the Spaniards were only preoccupied in considering how their own coasts were to be defended against Leveson and Monson, he wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury 'it is very likely they will come and that within a few days.'

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 147

Kinsale, after fighting his way through Westmeath, and on 21st December disposed his force to cut Mountjoy's land communications. The insurgent army did not number more than 6,000 or 7,000 men, and the earl was inclined to trust to the privations of the siege and desertion to wear down his enemy, with the added advantage of the possibility of the expected army from Spain appearing. O'Donnell was for attack and Aguila was of the same mind, offering to support Tyrone's assault by a sally from the town. Tyrone permitted himself to be persuaded, and Christmas Eve was chosen as the fitting moment, but the intention was betrayed, it is said, to Mountjoy the day before by an Irish chief, either for a price unknown or in sheer stupid impulsiveness.⁶⁰ Thus when the Irish advanced to the attack they, instead of surprising, were surprised by the English cavalry, and very soon the whole army broke and ran, leaving 1,200 dead upon the field and of course all their arms and baggage. The small body of Spaniards sent by Zubiaur from Castlehaven fought well, losing 300 or 400 men, the survivors, about 100 in number, being taken prisoners,⁶¹ but the extraordinary thing is that Aguila made no sign during the battle, an inactivity difficult to explain if the attack was delivered by arrangement with him. Mountjoy is said to have lost only a dozen men in the fight, but the hardships of the siege told a different tale, and the total loss from privation and disease was afterwards put at nearly 6,000 men. As Aguila could not face an assault, and could not hope for relief, there was nothing left for him but to come to terms, which he did on 2nd January, 1602, surrendering Kinsale, Baltimore, Berehaven, and Castlehaven, Mountjoy engaging to send all the Spanish troops back to Spain in English ships with arms, cannon, and baggage. He was impelled to grant these easy conditions by the sad state of the Queen's troops, the fear of the phantom army at Lisbon, and the misgiving that the forcible reduction of the other places held by the Spaniards might cost him more men and time than he could afford.⁶² On 9th January Mountjoy and the Spanish general rode

⁶⁰ The received story is that Brian McHugh Oge McMahon sent to Mountjoy begging for a bottle of whiskey, and in gratitude at receiving it warned him to be on his guard the following night; another version is that it was because his son had been with Carew as his page. But Cecyll says 'of which secret purpose [the attack] the president, by his espial in the country, being able to advertise the Deputy, his lordship resolved,' &c., which implies that Tyrone was bought and sold in the ordinary manner. ⁶¹ Cecyll to Winwood.

⁶² An Irish chief, O'Sullivan, whose patrimony included Berehaven, seized it from the Spaniards. Don Juan, who professed to consider his honour touched, offered to recover it for Mountjoy, who was too anxious to get the Spaniards out of Ireland to accept the offer. The castle of Berehaven was not taken until June 1602.

for Cork, but the latter, with his troops, did not leave for Spain until 16th March. In his own country the stipulations he made were, the Venetian ambassador says, considered a master stroke, 'and greatly adds to his reputation ; many think he has achieved it by gold as he is very rich.' Don C. Fernandez Duro, however, says that he was disgraced.⁶³

So far as Spain was concerned it was the end of the war, and nothing was left that Power now but to submit passively to such English blows as might fall. As Raleigh wrote in October 'this is the last of all [their] hopes,' and it had failed as their former hopes had failed, and for the same reasons, lack of material force and a misapprehension of the possibilities open to them. Their unfitness for anything but what could be brought about by sheer force is most plainly shown in the fact that by the time they left Ireland they and the Irish loathed each other more than either did the English ; it was the same story as had been rehearsed in every region of the old and new worlds where they had come as masters or allies. The Anglo-Irish conquerors celebrated their triumph in a way that must be almost unique among victorious armies by subscribing 1,800*l.* from their arrears of pay to buy books for the library of Trinity College, Dublin ; and when Dr. Luke Chaloner and Dr. James Ussher, afterwards Archbishop of Armagh, were in London in 1603 for that purpose they received much assistance from Sir Thomas Bodley, then buying for his own library at Oxford. O'Donnell fled to Spain, with Zubiaur, from Castlehaven, and pleaded with the Spanish Government for another attempt ; he died at Simancas 10th September, 1602.⁶⁴ Tyrone retreated into Ulster, where he held out against the pitiless war made by Mountjoy until March 1603, when he made his submission, but the fear he still inspired was shown in the favourable terms granted, which left him in nearly the same position he occupied before his rebellion.

Monson remained at home this year and entered the House of Commons, probably as the nominee of Lord Thomas Howard.⁶⁵ Parliaments were outgrowing the stage of docile registration of the sovereign's will, and the temper of this one was not sweetened at the outset by a blunder which shut them out from hearing the Queen's speech delivered by the Lord Keeper. The first debate was on this subject, and then Cecyll proceeded to ask for money.

⁶³ Probably none of the combatants at Kinsale in 1601 knew that it was the second defeat the Spaniards had experienced there. In June 1380 the English western fleet chased a Biscayan squadron into the harbour, retaking twenty-one prizes and capturing or destroying nearly all the Spanish ships.

⁶⁴ See Appendix of Monson Letters, No. 8.

⁶⁵ See General Introduction, *ante*, i. p. xviii.

INVASION OF IRELAND, 1601 149

He of course dwelt on the dangers from Spain, and asked for 300,000*l.*, saying that the Queen had spent that amount in Ireland since Essex went there.⁶⁶ Raleigh, like a good courtier, backed him up, urging the necessity of giving liberally in view of the national requirements and the Queen's sacrifices, 'sparing ever out of her own purse and apparel for our sakes,' a rather unfortunate illustration. The House, however, passed to the subject of monopolies, which produced some stormy debates,⁶⁷ and it was not until after 25th November, when Elizabeth ordered the House to be informed that all monopolies should be revoked, that the money bills came up again. In December four subsidies and eight fifteenths and tenths were given, followed shortly afterwards by four subsidies, of four shillings in the pound, from the clergy;⁶⁸ and although these were more than any previous grants, Elizabeth seems to have been dissatisfied, saying in her speech at the end of the session that the amount was not proportionable to her needs. Although the grant was the largest ever given, some members seemed to think with her that the House had not been too liberal, Fulke Greville saying in the course of debate 'we have no reason to think it [the country] poor; our sumptuousness in apparel, in plate, and in all things argueth our riches.' Monson is not known to have spoken in Parliament, but another subject that engaged the attention of members would have interested him more than money or monopolies. In past centuries the depredations of pirates or privateers had been a subject on which the Commons had frequently petitioned the Crown, and it now reappeared in their deliberations. Formerly a privateer was commonly but an ordinary merchantman prepared to combine a normal trading voyage with any chance of making prize that

⁶⁶ A more exact and truthful official statement gives 192,400*l.* expended in Ireland between 1593 and 1602 (*State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxvii. 59). In November 1602 Cecyll wrote to Sir George Carew that Ireland had cost 300,000*l.* a year for the last four years.

⁶⁷ Cecyll: 'I have been a member of this House in six or seven Parliaments, yet never did I see the House in such confusion.'

⁶⁸ In 1601 a lay subsidy was equal to 80,000*l.*, and a clerical subsidy to 20,000*l.* Fifteenths and tenths were taxes on personal estate, the former being raised on the counties, the latter on the towns; one fifteenth and tenth was reckoned at about 30,000*l.* (Dowell, *History of Taxes*, i. pp. 87, 145, 157). Of course these grants of 1601 were not intended to be levied at once in a lump sum. With regard to Mr. Dowell's estimates it may be noticed that in one speech Cecyll said that the last grants had only produced 160,000*l.* These were three lay and three clerical subsidies, together with six fifteenths and tenths, given in 1597. Taken by itself, anything Cecyll might say in debate would not necessarily be unequivocal truth, but in this case if a subsidy was really worth 80,000*l.*, the Government got more than was asked.

might offer, but the evolution of naval war was leading to differentiation of type, and the existence of a class of vessels built in the ports of Flanders which the regular merchantman could not fight and from which she could not run. It was small consolation to the plundered owner to be told that a *guerre de course* might co-exist with triumphant maritime supremacy and could have no serious effect on the results. Under the Plantagenets the southern ports had been chiefly affected by French privateering, and working with vessels of a similar type—that is to say, the trading ship—had retaliated by similar methods. But the Flanders ports were now turning out fast sailing vessels which infested the eastern Channel and the east coast, doing great havoc among the coast trade and the smaller merchantmen. The members for the port towns appear to have determined to press the Government for protection, and Mr. Dannett (Yarmouth) drew attention to the subject, complaining of the Dunkirkers and Nieuporters; Dunkirk, he said, began with two and now had twenty privateers at work. He was supported by the member for Sandwich, but Cecyll repudiated all responsibility, wanting to know ‘if they would have a continual charge unto her Majesty by having ships to lie between us and Dunkirk.’ The repudiation was impudent—supernally impudent—for if there was one thing quite certain in the English Constitution it was that for more than two centuries tunnage and poundage had been granted to the sovereign for the specific purpose of policing the Narrow Seas. Events in the next reign showed that popular opinion was becoming too strong for such evasions, and would force the Government to some attempt to the performance of its duty, but, for the moment, Cecyll succeeded, and the protesting members accepted his suggestion of a committee of inquiry. The committee met, without much result, except to make it clear to the coast towns that they would have to pay for themselves for any protection they required, and the matter dropped until taken up again in 1603, just before Elizabeth’s death.

Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William
Monson to the coast of Spain, A.D. 1602.[I]

| Ships. | Commanders. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| The Repulse . . . | Sir Richard Leveson, Admiral. |
| The Garland . . . | Sir William Monson, Vice-Admiral. |
| The Defiance . . . | Captain Gore. |
| The Mary Rose . . . | Captain Slingsby. |
| The Warspite . . . | Captain Somers. |
| The Nonpareil . . . | Captain Reynolds. |
| The Dreadnought . . . | Captain Manwaring. |
| The Adventure . . . | Captain Trevor. |
| The English carvel . . . | Captain Salkeld. |

THE last attempt of the Spaniards in Ireland awakened the Queen, who, it seems, for two or three years together, entertained the hopes of peace, and therefore was sparing in setting forth her fleets as she was wont to be. But now perceiving the enemy had found the way into Ireland, and that it behoved her to be more vigilant than ever, she resolved, as the course most safe for her and her kingdom, to infest the Spanish coasts with a continual fleet, and this year furnished the ships aforesaid, having promise from the States of Holland to join to them twelve sail of theirs. And, because this important service required great speed, there was not leisure to furnish them with men and other provisions altogether so well as they were usually wont to be,* so desirous was the Queen to see her ships at sea.

Sir Richard Leveson set sail with five of them the 19th of March, and left Sir William Monson

* The Churchill text adds here, 'but was content with what could be got in so short a warning, so desirous,' &c.

behind with the other four, to attend the coming of the Hollanders; though within two or three days after Sir William received command from the Queen to hasten with all speed to Sir Richard, for that she was advertised, that the silver ships were arrived at the Terceiras. Sir William Monson here-upon neglected no time, making no stay either to see himself better manned or his ships better furnished, but put to sea the 26th of March.

This intelligence of the Queen's was true; for the plate fleet had been at the Terceiras, and departing thence, in their course for Spain, Sir Richard Leveson, with his few ships, met them and fought with them, but to no purpose, wanting the rest of his fleet and the help of the twelve Hollanders. We may very well account this not the least error or negligence that has been committed in our voyages; for if the Hollanders had kept touch, according to promise,* and the Queen's ships had been fitted out with care, we had made her Majesty mistress of more treasure than any of her progenitors ever enjoyed. [2]

Sir Richard Leveson's fortune against the Indian fleet, notwithstanding his renowned valour, being thus and by the Hollanders' slackness only crossed, he plied towards the Rock† to meet Sir William Monson, as the place resolved on between them. But Sir William having spent fourteen days thereabouts, and in all that time hearing no tidings of him, went room to the southward Cape, where he was likewise frustrated of a most notable and worthy hope, for, meeting with certain Frenchmen and

* B runs 'promise, which was in our wisdom to have seen assured, and the,' &c. Wisdom seems to be used here in the sense of prudence (Minsheu, *Guide to Tongues*), i.e. 'which we might have had the prudence to have seen carried out.'

† Cape Roca.

Scots, at the same instant he descried three ships of ours sent by Sir Richard to look for him. These French and Scotch ships came from San Lucar, and made report of five galleons ready the next tide to set sail for the Indies; they likewise told him of two others that departed three days before, wherein went Don Pedro de Valdes to be governor of the Havana, that sometime had been prisoner in England in 1588. These two latter ships were met one night by the Warspite, whereof Captain Somers was captain, but whether it was by the darkness of the night, or by what other casualty (for the sea is subject to many) I know not; but they escaped.


This news of the five galleons, and the three ships of the Queen's so happily meeting together, made Sir William direct his course into the height the Spaniards were most likely to haul in; and coming to it he had sight of five ships, which, in respect of their number and course, he made reckoning to be the five galleons, and did think that that day there should be a full determination and trial of strength betwixt the English and Spanish ships, their number and greatness being equal. But his joy was soon quelled, for coming up with them, he found them to be English ships from the Straits, and bound home. This was no discouragement unto him, for he thought that the Spaniards might be met withal; and the next day he gave chase to one ship alone that came out of the Indies, which he took, though he had been better without her, for she brought him so far to leeward that that night the galleons passed to windward not above eight or ten leagues off us, by report of an English pinnace that met them, who came into our company the day following. These misfortunes lighting first upon Sir Richard, and

after upon Sir William, might have been sufficient reasons to dismay and discourage them ; but they knowing the accidents of the sea and that fortune could as well laugh as weep, having good ships under foot, their men sound and in health, and plenty of victuals, they did not doubt but that some of the wealth which the two Indies sent forth into Spain would fall to their shares. [3]

Upon Tuesday, the 1st of June, to begin our new fortune with a new month, Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson, who some few nights before had met accidentally in the sea, were close on board the Rock, where they took two ships of the east country bound for Lisbon ; and while they were rummaging these ships they descried a carvel from Cape Espichel * bearing with them, which, by signs she made, they perceived had a desire to speak with them. Sir Richard immediately chased her, and left Sir William with the two Easterlings to abide about the Rock till his return. The carvel, being fetched up, made relation of a carrack and eleven galleys to be in Cezimbra road, and that she was sent by two ships of ours, the Nonpareil and the Dreadnought, which lay thereabouts, to look out the Admiral or Vice-Admiral.† With what joy this news was apprehended may be easily imagined. Sir Richard made signs to Sir William to stand with him, and, lest the signs should not be discerned, he caused the carvel to ply up with him, wishing him to repair to him. But before they could approach the Cape it was the middle of the night, and nothing chanced at that time but the exchanging of some shot that passed betwixt the Admiral and the galleys.

* Espichel is always Pitcher in the MSS.

† 'Or Vice-Admiral' occurs in B and R, and probably marks a later addition.



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Upon Wednesday, the 2nd day of June, every man looked early in the morning what ships of her Majesty's were in sight, which were five in number : the Warspite, wherein Sir Richard was, for the Repulse he had sent for England some few days before by reason of a leak ; the Garland, the Nonpareil, the Dreadnought, and the Adventure, besides the two Easterlings taken the day before. All the captains resorted on board the Admiral to council, which took up the most part of the day. And whereas there was an opposition by some who alleged the danger and impossibility of taking the carrack, being defended by the castle and eleven galleys, Sir William Monson prevailed so far as that all consented to go upon her the next day, [4] and concluded upon this direction following :—that he and Sir Richard should anchor as near the carrack as they could, the rest to ply up and down and not anchor. Sir William was glad of this occasion to be revenged of the galleys, hoping to requite the slavery they put him to when he was prisoner in them, and singled himself from the rest of the fleet a league that the galleys might see it was in defiance of them. And so the Marquis of Santa Cruz and Frederick Spinola, the one General of the Portuguese, the other of the Spanish galleys, [5] apprehended it, and came forth with an intent to fight him ; but being within shot, were diverted by one John Bedford, an Englishman, who undertook to know the force of the ship, and Sir William that commanded her.

Before I go farther I will a little digress, and acquaint you with the situation of the town and the manner of placing the galleys against us. The town of Cezimbra lies in the bottom of a road, which is a good succour for ships with a northerly wind. It is built with freestone, and near the sea is erected a

strong and spacious fort, well replenished with ordnance. Above the town, upon the top of a hill, is seated an ancient strong friary, whose situation makes it impregnable and able to command the town, castle, and road; close to the shore lay the carrack, like a bulwark to the west side of the castle, so as she defended both herself and the east part of the town. The eleven galleys had flanked and fortified themselves with the small neck of a rock on the west side of the road, with their prows right forward, to play upon us, every one carrying a cannon in her *cruzia*,* besides other pieces in their prows; and they were no way to be endangered by us, till our ships came so nigh the town that all these forces might play upon us in one instant. [6]

The galleys being placed to this great advantage, they made account (as a captain of one of them we took confessed) to have sunk our ships of themselves, without any farther help. We saw their tents pitched, and great troops of soldiers drawn together, which was no less than the whole country in arms against us. The boats passed betwixt the shore and the carrack all the day long, which we supposed was to unlade her, but we found afterwards it was rather to strengthen her with men and ammunition. Here appeared many difficulties very dangerous, and little hope of taking, but rather of sinking or burning her, as most men conjectured. One was the danger from the galleys, they being flanked with the point of a rock at our entrance, as you have heard, it being likewise calm and they shooting low; another danger was that of the wind,

* Spanish *Cruzia*, *Crujia*, or *Cruscia*; French *Coursie*: a gangway, about two feet wide and two feet above the level of the oarsmen's seats, running from stem to stern of a galley. The heaviest gun of the galley was carried where the *coursie* widened out at the bow, and the gun itself was called the *coursier*. See also *ante*, i. p. 386.

for if it had come from the sea, the road being open and the bay deep, it would have frustrated our attempt. And notwithstanding these dangers, and many more apparently seen, and that there was no man but imagined that most of the carrack's lading was conveyed ashore, and that they would haul her on ground under the castle where no ship of ours should be able to fleet to her,* all which objections, with many more, were alleged, yet they little prevailed. Procrastination was perilous, and therefore with all expedition we thought convenient to charge the town, the fort, the galleys, and carrack, all at one instant ; and had determined, if the carrack had been on ground, or so nigh the shore that the Queen's ships could not fleet to her, that the two Easterlings, the day before taken, should board and burn her.

Thursday, the 3rd day of June, early in the morning, every man commending and committing himself to God's tuition and protection, expected when to begin according to the agreement the day before. A gale of wind happening about ten of the clock, the Admiral weighed anchor, shot off a warning-piece, and put forth his flag in the main-top. The Vice-Admiral did the like in his fore-top, according to the custom of the sea. Every captain encouraged his men, which did so much embolden and animate them, that, though they were grown weak and feeble before, they now revived and bestirred themselves as if a new spirit had been infused into them. The Admiral was the first that gave the charge ; after him followed the rest of the ships, with no less resolution in the commanders, showing great valour and gaining great honour. The last of all was the Vice-Admiral, who, entering into the fight, still strove to luff up as near the shore as he could, where at

* To float to her, to come at her. The Churchill editor gives this latter rendering.

length he came to an anchor in such a place that he was continually fighting with the town, the fort, the galleys, and carrack, all at one instant; for he brought himself betwixt them all that he might play both his broadsides upon them. There might be seen the oars of the galleys swimming on the one side and the slaves forsaking them on the other with offer to swim to us, everything being in a confusion amongst them, and thus they fought till five of the clock in the afternoon.

The Vice-Admiral was anchored in such a place that the galleys rowed from one side to another, seeking to shun him, which Sir Richard Leveson observing, came on board him, and openly, in the view and hearing of his whole company, embraced him and told him he had won his heart for ever.

The rest of the ships, as they were directed, plied up and down, except the Admiral, who by the negligence of his master, or some other impediment without his privity, when he should have anchored fell so far to leeward that the wind and tide carried him forth of the road, so that it was the next day before he could fetch in again. Whereat the Admiral was much enraged, and put himself into the Dreadnought and brought her to an anchor close to the Vice-Admiral about two of the clock in the afternoon. There was no opportunity let pass for our advantage, for where the Admiral or Vice-Admiral saw defect in any other ship they supplied it with their own persons. And one of the Easterlings, who were appointed to board the carrack, beginning to faint and fail of observing the directions given her, the Vice-Admiral perceiving it, went on board her himself, vowing, that if they seemed backward in putting in execution the design of firing the carrack, they should have as little hope of life as to be killed by the enemy. [7] Whilst the Vice-Admiral was thus

ordering things aboard the *Easterling*, Sir Richard Leveson came to him, and would in no case suffer him to board the carrack himself, but carried him into the *Dreadnought*, where they consulted how to preserve the carrack and enjoy her.

The resolution of this conference was to offer her parley, which they presently put in practice, and commanded all the ships to leave shooting till the return of the messenger. The man employed was one Captain Sewell, who had been four years prisoner in those galleys and had escaped and swam to us, as did many others, both Turks and Christians. The design of this parley was to persuade them to yield, promising honourable conditions ; and he was to intimate, as from himself, that the galleys, whose strength they presumed upon, were beaten, some burnt, the rest fled.[8] That we had the possession of the road, the castle not being able to abide our ordnance, much less the carrack, and if they refused this offer of mercy they were to expect all the cruelty and rigour that a conqueror could show his enemy. After some conference to this effect, the captain of the carrack told him he would send some gentlemen of sort,* with commission to treat, and desired that some of like quality from us might repair to him to the same purpose.

These gentlemen came aboard the *Dreadnought*, where the Admiral and Vice-Admiral were, attending the return and success of Captain Sewell. After the delivery of their message they found a necessity to hasten on board the carrack again, for that, as it seemed by these two gentlemen, there was an uproar and a division in her, some being of opinion to entertain a parley, others to save themselves and set her on fire ; which Sir William Monson hearing, without further delay or conference with Sir Richard

* Of rank.

what was to be done, he leaped suddenly into his boat and rowed to the carrack. When he drew near to her he was known by divers gentlemen on board her as having once been a prisoner among them ; they seemed to be very glad of this meeting, with divers embracements and other demonstrations of affection in memory of their old acquaintance. The captain was Don Diego Lobo, a gallant young gentleman of a noble house ; he came down upon the bend of the ship and commanded his men to stand aside ; Sir William did the like to his company in the boat. The captain demanded of him if he had the Portuguese language. He told him he had enough to treat of that business, acquainted him of the place he commanded in the fleet, intimated the affection and respect he bore to the Portuguese nation, and that the treaty which was offered proceeded out of his motion, and wished the captain to proceed to his propositions, which were as follows. The first demand he made was that they should be safely set ashore with their arms. The second, that it should be done the same night. The third, that they should enjoy their ship and ordnance, as appertaining to the King, but we the wealth. The fourth, that the flag and ancient should not be taken down, but worn while the carrack was unlading. His speech being ended, Sir William told him that his demands gave suspicion that, under pretence of parley, they meant treachery, or that their hopes were greater than there was cause or he could conceive ; and but that he knew it was the use of some men to demand great things, when less would serve them, he would not lose his advantage to entertain a parley. For a conclusion he desired that what they intended might be quickly determined, for night growing on might advantage them, and for his resolution they should quickly understand

it in few words, viz., to the first demand, he was willing to yield, that they should be put ashore with their arms. To the second, that he was content they should be set ashore that night, except eight or ten of the principal gentlemen, whom he would detain three days. To the third, he held it idle and frivolous to imagine he would consent to separate ship and goods, and looked upon it as a jest. To the fourth, he would not consent, being resolved never to permit a Spanish flag to be worn in the presence of the Queen's ships, unless it were disgracefully, over the poop. There was long expostulation upon these points, and Sir William Monson, seeing the obstinacy of the captain, offered in a great rage to leap into his boat, resolving to leave off the treaty, which the rest of the gentlemen perceiving, and that he had propounded nothing but what might very well stand with their reputation, they entreated him once more to ascend into the carrack and they would enter into new capitulations; the effect whereof, as it was agreed upon, were these that follow :—

That a messenger should be sent to the Admiral, to have his confirmation of the points concluded on, and that in the meantime the flag and ancient should be taken down; and if the Admiral should not consent to the agreement they to have leisure to put forth their flag and ancient before the fight should begin. That the company should be presently set on shore; but the captain, with eight others of the principal gentlemen, three days after. That the ship, with her goods, should be surrendered, without any practice or treason. That they should use their endeavours that the castle should forbear shooting whilst we rid in the road. And this was the effect * of the conditions agreed upon.

* Substance.

You must understand that this carrack wintered in Mozambique, in her return from the Indies, a place of great infection and sickness as appeared by the mortality among them; for of six hundred and odd people twenty lived not to return home. After a great deal of calamity and mortality she arrived at this port of Cezimbra, as you have heard, which the Viceroy of Portugal, being then at Lisbon, hearing of, sent eleven galleys to her rescue, and four hundred Moços da Camera, which is a title of gentlemen that serve the King upon any honourable occasion. [9] And, being commanded on board the carrack for her better strength, that she was brought to this pass and forced to yield on these conditions, Sir Robert Cecyll, when he was living, was wont to impute the success thereof to the gentlemen's former acquaintance with Sir William Monson. Though three days were limited for setting the captain on shore, yet it was held discretion not to detain them longer than till the carrack was brought off safely to our ships, and therefore Sir William Monson carried the captain and the rest of the gentlemen aboard his own ship, where they supped and spent the night in music and other sports with great pleasure and delight. The morning following he accompanied them ashore himself, whither the Conde de Vidigueira, whose ancestor was the discoverer of the East Indies, had drawn down all the force of the whole country amounting to the number of twenty thousand men.*

I must not omit to describe the behaviour of the galleys in the fight, that every man may have that honour that is due to him. Those of Portugal, being of the squadron of the Marquis of Santa Cruz, betook themselves, with their General, to flight in the middle of the fight; but Frederick Spinola, who

* A, C, D, and Sl. 1 say 10,000 men.

was brother to the famous Marquis Spinola and was to convey his galleys out of Spain into the Low Countries, followed not the example of the marquis but made good the road. Which the other seeing, with shame returned, but to both their costs, for before they departed they found the climate so hot that they were forced to fly, their galleys being so miserably beaten, and their slaves so pitifully slain, that there wanted nothing but boats to possess them all, as well as the two we took and burnt, which is a precedent has been seldom seen or heard of, for ships to be the destroyers of galleys. The number of men slain in the town, the castle, the carrack, and galleys, is unknown, though they could not choose but be many. The wealth of the carrack could then as ill be estimated, though after found to be great. The value of the two galleys burnt, with their loading of powder, is hard to judge, though known to have been a service of great import. For our loss, it was not much, only one man killed in the fly-boat, five slain and as many hurt in the Garland, and one hurt in the Adventure. Sir William Monson had the left wing of his doublet shot off with a splinter, but received no harm. [10]

The names of the carrack and eleven galleys.

| | |
|---|---|
| The St. Valentine, a carrack of one thousand seven hundred tons. | The Trinidad, vice-admiral to Frederick Spinola, burnt. |
| The Christopher, the admiral of Portugal, wherein the Marquis de Santa Cruz went. | The Leva, in which Sir William Monson was prisoner, 1591. |
| The St. Lewis, wherein Frederick Spinola went General of the galleys of Spain. | The Occasion, burnt, and the captain taken prisoner. |
| The Forteleza, vice-admiral to the marquis. | The St. John Baptist. |
| | The Lucera. |
| | The Padilla. |
| | The St. Philip. |
| | The St. John. |

The day following, with a favourable wind, we stood our course for England, which brought us into forty-seven degrees. And there we met a pinnace, sent with a packet from her Majesty, signifying the departure of a second fleet to supply us, and the setting out of the Hollanders which were so long looked for; which fleet of Holland was in view of the pinnace that night, but passed by us unseen. [II] This unlooked-for accident made the Admiral and Vice-Admiral consider what to do, and concluded they could not both appear at home and leave a fleet of so great importance upon the enemy's coast without a guide or head; and therefore they held it fit the Vice-Admiral should put himself into the *Nonpareil*, as the ablest ship of the fleet, and make his return once more to the coast of Spain. But he having taken his leave and standing his course for the coast, a most violent storm with a contrary wind took him, which continued ten days, and discovered the weakness of his ship which had like to have foundered in the deep. The carpenters and company, seeing the apparent danger if he bore not up before the wind, besought him, most importunately, to have regard to their lives, for by keeping the seas they should all perish. Thus was he forced out of extremity to bear room * for England, and, coming for Plymouth, he found the carrack safely arrived, and the fleet he went back to take charge of not to have quitted the coast of England.

Though it be somewhat impertinent to this voyage to treat of more than the success thereof, yet I will a little digress and relate the hard mishap of that worthy young gentleman Don Diego Lobo, captain of the carrack; and because his worth will the more appear by his answer to Sir William Monson's offer to him when he was his

* B and R, 'to go room.'

prisoner. Thus it was : Sir William Monson told him it could not choose but that by the loss of the carrack he had lost his best means, for that he supposed what he had gained in the Indies was laden in her, and therefore offered that what he would challenge upon his reputation to be his own he should have freedom to carry along with him. The gentleman did acknowledge the favour to be extraordinary, but replied that what he had he had gained by his sword, and that his sword, he doubted not, would repair his fortunes again, utterly refusing to accept any courtesy in that kind. But, poor gentleman, ill fortune thus left him not ; for the Viceroy, Dom Christovão de Moura, holding it for a great indignity to have the carrack taken out of the port that was defended by a castle, and guarded with eleven galleys, and especially in his own hearing of the ordnance at Lisbon and in the view of thousands of people who beheld it, some of them feeling it, too, by the loss of their goods that were in her, others grieving for the death of their friends that were slain, but every man finding himself touched in reputation.

And the Viceroy not knowing how to clear himself so well as by laying it upon the gentlemen he put on board her, the same night they returned to their lodging he caused the most part of them, with their captain, to be apprehended, imputing the loss of the carrack to their cowardice and fear, if not treason and connivance with the enemy.* After some time of imprisonment, by mediation of friends all the gentlemen were released but the captain, who received secret advice that the Viceroy intended his

* See, however, the deposition of an English prisoner (*post*, p. 370), where the arrest of the captain and the other Portuguese is said to have been on suspicion of stealing jewels and precious stones out of the carrack.

death and that he should seek by escape to prevent it. Don Diego, being thus perplexed, practised with his sister, who, finding means for his escape out of a window, he fled into Italy, where he lived in exile from 1602, when this happened, till 1615. His government of Malacca, in the Indies, for which he had a patent in reversion, was confiscate, and he left hopeless ever to return into his native country, much less to be restored to his command—an ill welcome after so long and painful a navigation. Having thus spent thirteen years * in exile, at the last he advised with friends, whose counsel he followed, to repair into England there to inquire after some commanders that had been at the taking of the carrack, by whose certificate he might be cleared of blame or treason in the loss of her, which would be a good motive to restore him to his government again. In the year 1615 he arrived in London, in the company of the Conde de Gondomar, and after some inquiry found out Sir William Monson to whom he complained of his hard mishap, craving the assistance of him and some others whom Sir William knew to be at the taking of the carrack, and desired him to testify the manner of surprising her, which, he alleged, was no more than one gentleman was bound to afford another in such a case.

Sir William wondered to see him, and especially upon such an occasion. For the present he entertained him with all courtesy, and the longer his stay was in England the courtesies were the greater which Sir William did him, who procured him a true and effectual certificate from himself, Sir Francis

* Some of the MSS say 1614 and twelve years of exile. However, B and R read 'in the company of the earl (Conde) de Gondomar,' as added in this text a few lines below. But Gondomar came to England as ambassador in 1613.

LEVESON AND MONSON, 1602 167

Howard, Captain Barlow, and some others who were witnesses of that service ; and to give it the more reputation he caused it to be enrolled in the office of the Admiralty.* The gentleman, being well satisfied with his entertainment, and having what he desired, returned to Flanders where he presented his certificate to the Archduke and the Infanta, and he found that favour from them that they did not only purchase the King's good liking for him, but restitution to his government of Malacca. The poor gentleman, having been thus tossed by the waves of calamity from one country to another and never finding rest, Death, that masters all men, now cut him off short in the midst of his hopes as he was preparing his journey for Spain. And this was the end of an unfortunate gallant young gentleman whose deserts were far more worthy of a better reward, if God had pleased to afford it him.

* Enrolled 14th August, 1613 (*Ad. Ct. Misc. Bks.* 997, No. 171), but the certificate itself has not been found.

[I] The fleet list was :—¹

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|--------------|-------|--|
| Repulse . . | 777 | Sir Richard Leveson, Admiral, ² 7th March—22nd May. George Somers, 23rd May—19th July. |
| Warspite . . | 648 | George Somers, 8th March—22nd May. Sir Richard Leveson, Admiral, 23rd May—16th September. |

¹ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2240. There is no very definite line of separation in the pay lists between this and the second fleet of the year, commanded by Monson.

² At 1*l.* 10*s.* a day. He was paid as Admiral of the Irish station to 6th March, but Sir Amyas Preston is also paid as Admiral from 12th January. No doubt Leveson did not return to Ireland after his recall in December 1601 (*ante*, p. 146).

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------------------|-------|--|
| Garland . . | 660 | Sir Amyas Preston, Vice-Admiral, 1st-11th January. George Somers, 12th January-6th March. Sir William Monson, Vice-Admiral, ³ 7th March-26th August. |
| Defiance . . | 550 | Walter Gore, 1st January-12th August. |
| Nonpareil . . | 500 | Humphrey Reynolds, 1st January- 19th August. |
| Mary Rose . . | 600 | Guilford Slingsby, 4th March-3rd August. |
| Dreadnought . . | 400 | Edmond Manwaring, 7th March- 26th July. |
| Adventure . . | 340 | Sackville Trevor, 30th December, 1601-3rd August. |
| Mayflower ⁴ . . | 240 | Thomas Salkeld, 1st February-10th August. |
| Merhonour . . | 865 | Bryan Browne, ⁵ 4th-29th June. |

The following merchantmen composed, with the Merhonour, the squadron of which Browne was in charge, and that Monson notices as having sailed when he and Leveson were on their way home; if they sailed they could hardly have got out of the Channel, as he found them in Plymouth when he returned :—

| | | |
|------------------------------|-----|---|
| Mistress, of Lee | 420 | Thomas Salmon, 25th May-11th September. |
| Marigold, of London | 300 | John Bourne, 25th May-17th Au- gust. |
| Golden Lion, of Ipswich | 250 | Bartholomew Fuller, 25th May- 22nd August. |
| Peter, of Lon- don | 248 | William Bradwell, 25th May-20th August. |
| Truelove, of Ald- borough | 242 | Thomas Bence, 25th May-11th September. |
| Elizabeth, of London | 402 | William Bowes, 25th May-16th September. |
| Lion, of Ipswich | 250 | Thomas Cletcher, 24th May-10th September. |

³ Preston at 13s. 4d., and Monson at 15s. a day.

⁴ The English carvel of Monson's list.

⁵ As Admiral of eleven ships carrying supplies to Leveson's fleet, 13s. 4d. a day.

LEVESON AND MONSON, 1602 169

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|---------------------|-------|---------------------------------------|
| James, of Ipswich | 263 | John Binder, 25th May–11th September. |
| Desire, of London | 300 | Richard Harris, 25th May–31st July. |
| Primrose, of London | 116 | John Reekes, 29th May–3rd September. |

On the Irish station this year were :—

| | | |
|-----------------|-----|---|
| Queen's Ships : | | |
| Swiftsure . . | 400 | George Somers, 1st–11th January. Sir Amyas Preston, Admiral, ⁶ 12th January–17th April. |
| Tramontana . . | 150 | Charles Plessington, Admiral on the north coast, ⁷ 1st–9th January, 7th May–4th December. |
| Crane . . . | 250 | Edmond Manwaring, 1st January–6th March. |
| Moon . . . | 60 | Thomas Button, 1st January–15th April. |
| Merlin . . . | 50 | Thomas Flemyng, Admiral on west coast, ⁸ 1st January–31st December. |
| Merchantmen : | | |
| Reuben . . . | 250 | Joseph May, 1st–23rd January. |
| Arcana . . . | 320 | Thomas Coverte, 1st–9th January. |
| Marigold . . | 300 | William Willis, 1st–21st January. |

There were four others hired at various times for a few weeks, and, comparing this list with that of 1600, it will be seen that Ireland was guarded by the remains of Leveson's fleet until all danger of a Spanish return was supposed to have passed away.

The Channel Guard consisted of :—

| | | |
|-----------------|-----|---|
| Queen's Ships : | | |
| Rainbow . . | 500 | Sir Robert Mansell, Admiral, ⁹ 1st January–10th February. |
| Hope . . . | 600 | Sir Robert Mansell, Admiral, 1st March–5th October. |
| Vanguard . . | 500 | Sir Robert Mansell, Admiral, 6th October–31st December. Thomas Button, 7th June–15th August. |

⁶ At 1*l*. a day.

⁸ Five shillings a day.

⁷ Five shillings a day.

⁹ At 1*l*. a day.

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------------------|-------|--|
| Antelope . . | 400 | Jeremy Turner, Vice-Admiral, ¹⁰ 1st January–24th February, 25th March–13th December. |
| Advantage . . | 215 | William Jones, 1st March–29th September. Thomas Mansell, 30th September–31st December. |
| Charles . . | 70 | John White, 1st January–23rd October. |
| Answer . . | 275 | Matthew Bradgate, 11th July–19th October. |
| Crane . . | 250 | Thomas Mansell, 24th–29th September. William Jones, 30th September–27th November. J. White, 28th November–31st December. |
| Lion's Whelp . | 40 | Thomas Norreys, 21st September, 1601–27th July. |
| Merchantmen : Ounce . . | 212 | William Wynter, 8th June–2nd September. |
| Richard, of Plymouth | — | John Whiskynges, 25th March–31st July. |
| Anne, of Weymouth | 100 | David Eyer, 7th–28th May. |
| Elizabeth, of Plymouth | — | William Willis, 15th March–3rd June. |
| Katherine, of Topsham | 53 | Peter Weaver, 10th May–27th July. |
| Robert, of Topsham | 35 | John Mitchell, 13th June–27th July. |

[2] The year 1602 saw a renewal of the long-drawn-out peace negotiations, although in England they do not seem to have been regarded as of any importance. Yet Philip and the Archdukes went further than they had yet gone, and President Richardot, writing in February from Brussels to his agent in England, suggested that as a complete peace was possible with the Queen the difficulty of treating with the States might be evaded by a long truce.¹¹ Furthermore, an appeal was made to Elizabeth's purse by a promise that she should have satisfaction for the

¹⁰ Ten shillings a day.

¹¹ Birch, *Historical View*, p. 202.

cautionary towns. The English answer was rather recriminatory in tone than placable, and Cecyll, writing to Winwood on 14th March, only casually refers to Richardot's communication, dismissing it lightly. It is not unlikely that the Spanish inclination to negotiate was stimulated not only by the fiasco in Ireland, but by the knowledge that an English fleet was in preparation for the Peninsula, and that *pourparlers* were proceeding between the Courts of London and Paris with a view to an even larger undertaking. The relations between France and Spain were very strained, and Elizabeth attempted to use the fleet as a means to obtain some of the money Henry still owed her, for which she was always pressing him, pretending to be doubtful whether it would sail unless she received a remittance from him. On 20th January Cecyll told Winwood that it was 'already very forward,' but he was to pretend that the Queen's resolution might change unless it was reanimated the right way, although 'in very truth we are far on with our preparations.'¹² In appearance Henry was ready to go farther than Elizabeth, and talked about something great, such as landing a large army to act with his troops and driving the Spaniards out of Flanders. How far Henry was really serious is uncertain; he did not wish to see any peace made between England and Spain, and an idea was now taking shape that the Spanish provinces might be, if not annexed to France, formed into a dependent state under a prince to be selected by Henry and Elizabeth, designed by the former to be his son the Duc de Vendôme. Winwood sensibly asked why should Elizabeth commit herself to the land war on a large scale she had hitherto avoided, 'since the sea did circumscribe as well the bounds of her ambition as the limits of her dominions,' but Cecyll discussed it solemnly, or pretended to, in the hope of obtaining some money from the King. The correspondence on the subject languished, and seems to have been closed in March by Winwood's not too respectful remark to Henry that it were to be wished either that overtures for joint action should not be made, or that, if made, they should be followed up, as otherwise 'they leave behind them an impression either of distrust or neglect.'

The advances made from Paris and Madrid did not interfere with the preparation of the fleet, which Cecyll, we see, anticipated on 20th January would be ready within three weeks from that date. Leveson's commission was signed on 16th February, and it appears that his Vice-Admiral was not selected when it was drawn up, as a blank is left for the name where he was referred to in the usual way as having to succeed the Admiral in case of death.

¹² Winwood, *Memorials*, i. p. 376. 'Only this I can assure you, that our fleet will be ready within these twenty days to set sail whether he do anything or no' (*ibid.* 20th January, p. 378).

Probably the post was being kept open for Preston, and Monson was not appointed until the last moment. Leveson's Instructions were made out on the same day.¹³ He was directed that his chief object should be to intercept any Spanish fleet making for Ireland, but if he met with none at sea he was to examine the ports between Finisterre and Lisbon. He was to seize all neutrals with contraband of war, but as Henry IV. had given his word that nothing should come from France no examination was to be made of French ships. The exercise of the right of search had already caused some bitter controversy between the two sovereigns, and Elizabeth's acceptance of Henry's worthless promise was a tactful retreat from a difficult position. To prevent invasion was to be the 'main point' of his expedition; subject to that the Queen would like a profit, and he was to have an eye to the Flotas and the East Indian carracks. It was left to his discretion whether, if a Spanish fleet was preparing in the Tagus, he should leave his station for the sake of the Flotas or the carracks, and it was suggested that his course of action must depend upon the readiness for sea of any force at Lisbon; it might be possible to send the Dutch, with some of his own ships, after the homeward Flota. As one was due in September, and he had only five months' provisions, further supplies would be sent to him, and, finally, if he could destroy any Spanish shipping in their harbours, 'not putting your own ships in danger,' he might do so. Altogether these Instructions showed an immense progress in grasp and insight on the equivocal and contradictory orders, designed to keep the recipients in leading strings, given to the earlier admirals. This time the fleet was not sent to sea for weeks but for months, so that if Philip desired to send an expedition anywhere, or even to protect his coasts, he would have to fight. The directions are few and simple, devoid of embarrassing qualifications, and rightly throw the choice and the responsibility as to the manner of action on the spot on the commander-in-chief. Drake and Essex were given responsibility without choice. The old spirit showed in the caution not to hazard the ships by going into a port, but that was likely to be of little importance.

Notwithstanding Cecyll's anticipations the ships were not got ready for sea as quickly as was expected, and there was no sign of the Dutch Admiral with the squadron promised. The English difficulty was chiefly that of manning the ships, and no doubt was a consequence of increasing trade and demand for seamen, and the greater attraction offered by privateers. On 8th March Leveson wrote from Plymouth that Somers had sailed on the 4th with such ships as were ready, but had been obliged by adverse winds to bring up in the Sound; he still wanted men, and was on thorns

¹³ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxiii. A, 28.

LEVESON AND MONSON, 1602 173

to get away, as he understood four carracks were on the point of leaving Lisbon.¹⁴ Leveson sailed on the 19th, leaving Monson a rendezvous at Cape Roca,¹⁵ but while the text of the 'Tracts' says that four ships were left behind, Monson's letter to Cecyll, which must be the better authority, says that only the Garland and Defiance were left for him to bring on. The intelligence received by the Government concerning the Flota was, as usual, belated, for it arrived in Spain on 7th April,¹⁶ and, unless like that of 1601 it had come far north, Monson could not possibly have joined in time. It consisted of 42 ships carrying 11,000,000 ducats of silver,¹⁷ and to make matters worse Leveson had detached Somers in the Warspite, with two other vessels, on 31st March to go down to Cape St. Vincent.¹⁸ In the absence of knowledge of Leveson's reasons no definite opinion can be formed about his action, but it may be noticed that he divided his already weak squadron before he can possibly have had any information about the condition of things in the Spanish ports, and that if he thought the Flota was to be met off St. Vincent he must have known that three ships could do nothing with it. It is obvious that Monson's remark, that if the Queen's ships had been fitted out with more care greater success might have been obtained, is an ineffective one seeing that the real want was more force; his other reason, the absence of the Dutch, was a better one, but we do not know how far they had really pledged themselves to join so early, and that brings us back to the old point of the weakness of the cruising fleets. Moreover, although for convenience Flota is commonly used to include the fleets from both Tierra-firme and New Spain, strictly it describes only the latter, and Leveson had fallen in with a Tierra-firme fleet which, as bringing the silver, was always much more strongly armed and convoyed than a Flota proper. That he should have attacked at all and taken one prize for a short time says much for his audacity; that the Spaniards should have turned upon him and retaken it says much for their consciousness of superior strength.

[3] The five galleons of the text were really seven with four pinnaces, under Don Luis de Cordoba, going out as an escort for the Flota due home in the autumn.¹⁹ Monson wrote to Cecyll on 8th May,²⁰ but gives no details as to the proceedings of the fleet. The Admirals, however, seem to have come to the conclusion that no Spanish fleets were preparing for sea, and the Vice-Admiral

¹⁴ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxiii. A, 52.

¹⁵ See Appendix of Letters, No. 2.

¹⁶ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Meteren, p. 509; *Pipe Office Accounts*, 2240.

¹⁹ Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*.

²⁰ Appendix of Letters, No. 3.

seizes the opportunity to impress some sound strategical advice on the Secretary of State. Cabrera de Cordoba writes under the date 15th June that news had come lately (to Madrid) that seven English ships on the coast had landed 600 men near Coimbra, and after sacking some small places had been repulsed. This statement is corroborated by the report of the Venetian ambassador, who names Figueira and Buarcos, which are in the district of Coimbra at the mouth of the Mondego. It must have happened after Monson's letter of 8th May, and was perhaps an attempt to obtain water and plunder at one stroke.

[4] Camden's phrase is 'Yet was Sir Richard Leveson resolved, with the joint consent of all the seamen, to set upon them.' The St. Valentine was sighted by the Recompense of Weymouth, which brought on the news.²¹

[5] Spinola was not General of either of the divisions known, respectively, as the galleys of Portugal and the galleys of Spain. He was taking up eight galleys on the way to his second and less fortunate run through the Channel, which will be noticed in the next section relating Monson's own voyage of this year. The Marquis of Santa Cruz, son of the first marquis who had been intended to command the Armada in 1588, was General of the galleys of Portugal.

[6] In Book III., section *The Galleys*, Monson gives some further details of the position here.

[7] Meteren's short account of the action further explains this. The Easterling, a Lübeck ship, was one of the neutrals seized on 1st June, and was now sent in with twenty men on board to cut the St. Valentine's cables, or, as Monson says, to set her on fire. While anchoring close in she was hit so seriously betwixt wind and water that her crew thought she was sinking and cut their cable.

[8] In his added remarks in Book III. (*The Galleys*) Monson says that this was the greatest mistake the Spaniards made, for had the galleys been placed more skilfully they would not have had to run and would have prevented any communication between the English and the carrack.

[9] Moços de Camera were gentlemen attached to the royal household, and supposed to be appointed in acknowledgment of services rendered by themselves or their ancestors. Huyghen van Linschoten says that they received 'a yearly stipend, although not much, towards their charges of finding provision for their horses, though they can hardly save a pair of shoes and yet never come on horseback all their lifetime; but it is only a token of the King's favour and goodwill wherein the Portugales do more glory and vaunt themselves than anything in the world.'²²

²¹ See Appendix C (Papers relating to the St. Valentine).

²² *Discourse of Voyages*, ed. 1598, bk. iv. p. 458.

[10] Monson's account of the capture is of course the chief authority, but there are a few other references. One, from the Venetian ambassador, is printed in the Appendix of Papers relating to the St. Valentine. Cabrera de Cordoba writes, on 20th July,²³ 'Last month a Portuguese galleon from India arrived in the port of Cezimbra, four leagues from Lisbon, having been fifteen months at sea and having lost more than 400 persons during the voyage, which came loaded very richly with spices and other things estimated to be worth more than a million and a half.'²⁴ It was attacked by seven galleons and three pinnaces of the English, and assisted by eleven galleys, of which eight were of those Spinola was taking to Flanders and the others belonging to the division of the Marquis of Santa Cruz. It resisted for three days, but the English took it and carried it off, to the great grief of all, many being pecuniarily interested in it besides his Majesty. And they say that it might have been unloaded in that port but that the revenue officials would not permit it on account of the customs.' The prize proved worth much less than was expected, and from the depositions of rescued English prisoners²⁵ and other evidence there is no doubt that not only everything portable in the way of gold and jewels was removed or stolen, but that much of the heavy cargo was unladen. Chamberlain writes to Carleton about the capture: 'If our people had not played the men every way she had escaped their fingers by reason she was got so far within the river among flats and shallows, and had received a supply of 300 or 400 fresh men, besides a guard of ten galleys to tow her up and defend her; but our ships so plied the galleys that I think they will have no list to encounter them any more. Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson have gotten great commendation both for courage and advice.'²⁶ What her value may be we cannot yet guess, but sure she was a rich ship. Marry, there goes a report, all the short ends were conveyed away before our men could come at her, but most men think that but a colour for them that have, and mean to make, their market. Here is order taken that no goldsmiths or jewellers shall go into the west country; and Fulke Greville is gone down post to Plymouth, and so to the sea, to meet her and keep her from coming into that pilfering town (as they term it), but to bring her along to Portsmouth. . . . If she come to Portsmouth it is thought greater personages will go to see and dive into her.' Cecyll, writing to Carew,²⁷ dwelt rather on the destruction wrought upon the galleys, which he thought were rendered harmless for the summer, 'so as I assure you though our carrack prove not so much as

²³ *Relaciones*, p. 147.

²⁵ Appendix C (*post*, p. 369).

²⁷ *Letters to Sir Geo. Carew* (Camd. Soc.), 7th August, 1602.

²⁴ Of ducats.

²⁶ Judgment, sagacity.

worth as we expected, having been much pillaged and many of the goods taken wet, yet hath the gentleman deserved an extraordinary reputation.' The 'gentleman' was Leveson, and it is noticeable that Cecyll gives him all the credit for both galleys and carrack. Chamberlain's expectation that the prize would be brought to Portsmouth was not fulfilled, as she never went farther than Plymouth. An imposing number of commissioners was nominated to take charge²⁸ before it was understood that she was not nearly so rich as the San Felipe or the Madre de Dios, and the chief commissioner, Sir Fulke Greville, soon found the inconvenience: 'The number of commissioners used in this business of the carrack, and the many associates added to them, make it a question with me whether the multiplicity of books and inventories of all particulars will not give the buyers more eyes to see withal than were convenient.'²⁹ The St. Valentine did not remain afloat long, and her end is told by an entry in the Plymouth Corporation MSS.:³⁰ 'This year Sir Richard Leveson went out of harbour the 8th of March with six of her Majesty's ships, and two others made ready to follow, which did so, and on the 23rd June, 1602, he arrived here with a carrack which he had taken which came out of the East Indies laden with commodities of that country, and in March following was sunk between the Islands and the Main.' This last expression occurs frequently in navy papers of the late seventeenth century relating to Plymouth yard, and then means between St. Nicholas Island and the shore.

[II] Opdam left Holland on 17th April and brought over 200 Dutch seamen with him for Elizabeth,³¹ the scarcity of men being more acute than ever. For some reason he was delayed a long time in English waters and had only now cleared the Channel, but it is not clear what Monson means by saying at the end of the paragraph that when he arrived at Plymouth he found 'the fleet he went back to take charge of not to have quitted the coast of England.' Unless the Dutch put back for a time, of which we have no knowledge, it must refer to the squadron carrying supplies.

²⁸ By Letters Patent of 28th June: Leveson, Greville, Sir Thos. Gorges, Alderman J. Moore, Thos. Middleton (surveyor of the customs of the outports), Rich. Carmarden (surveyor of the London customs), and Rich. Wright (registrar). Wm. Halse, customs officer at Plymouth, was added on 14th July. Greville even had a deputy in the person of John Coke, who managed to get 66*l.* for his services, while his chief took 47*l.* See also *post* (Appendix C) for gifts made out of the cargo.

²⁹ Greville to Cecyll, 9th September (*Cecil MSS.*).

³⁰ Hist. MSS. Com., App. to 9th Report, part i.

³¹ Meteren. The agreement about the division of prize money is dated 28th April (*State Papers*, cclxxxiii. A, 87).

Sir William Monson to the Coast of Spain,
A.D. 1602. [I]

| Ships. | Commanders. |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| The Swiftsure | Sir William Monson. |
| The Mary Rose | Captain Trevor. |
| The Dreadnought | Captain Caulfield. |
| The Adventure | Captain Norreys. |
| The Answer | Captain Bradgate. |
| The Quittance | Captain Browne. |
| The Lion's Whelp | Captain May. |
| The Paragon, a merchant . . | Captain Cason. |
| A small carvel | Captain Hooper. |

THE fleet of Sir Richard Leveson being happily returned, with the fortune of a carrack, as you have heard, and the Queen having now no ships upon the Spanish coast to impeach the enemy's preparations, she feared the fleet which was ready at Coruña would give a second assault upon Ireland. Whereupon Sir William Monson, who by this time was arrived at Plymouth, was sent for in great haste by her Majesty to advise about, and take on him the charge, of the second fleet then at Plymouth. After a long conference with Sir William Monson, in the presence of her Majesty, the Lord Admiral, Treasurer, and Secretary, it was resolved that Sir William should repair to Plymouth, and with all speed get forth those ships and others that were there making ready. His directions were to present himself before the harbour of Coruña, being the place where the Spaniards made their rendezvous, and, if he found any likelihood of a design upon Ireland, not to quit that coast till he fully saw the issue and event thereof. But if he found Ireland secure, and

the enemy's preparations to be intended only for defence of their own coasts, then his instructions led him thence to the place where the Holland fleet had order to attend and expect him, and upon their meeting to obey him: and afterwards the whole carriage of the action was referred to his discretion, but with this caution, that above all covetous respects of other profit or advantage he should attend the affair of Ireland. The wind this part of the summer hung contrary, and it was six weeks before he could clear the coast, the time which gave greatest hope of profit by the return of the carracks and India fleet which happened one month before his arrival on that coast. He set sail from Plymouth the last of August, with a scant wind which continued with foul weather till he recovered Coruña, choosing rather to keep the sea than hazard the overthrow of the voyage by his return. [2].

He attended before Coruña till he was thoroughly advertised that the fleet, which was there suspected to be prepared for Ireland was gone to Lisbon to join with Don Diego Brochero, who all that summer durst not put out of harbour for fear of our fleet that made good the coast thereabouts. Sir William, in his way to the Rock, commanded his carvel to repair to the islands of Bayona, as the likeliest place to procure intelligence of the state of those parts. As the carvel drew near the islands she discerned the Spanish fleet, consisting of twenty-four sail, whose design was, as she understood by a boat she took, to look out the English fleet, whose coming they daily expected upon the coast, and meeting Sir William with this news he held it a good service to be thus warned of those ships and their intentions. Here he took two goodly ships of France, bound for Lisbon, which harbour he put them from, and took pledges that

they should directly return into France without touching in any harbour of Spain; for that he understood the Spanish fleet was ill provided of men, and many other things, which these ships could supply. Sir William and the Dreadnought were carried with a chase into the road of Cezimbra, where the carrack was taken not long before, and after some fight with the castle, who defended the carvel chased, they came to a friendly treaty and presents passed between them.

That night, while the Admiral rid in the road, a carvel coming in, not mistrusting him, was taken but dismissed in a friendly manner, by whom he understood the affairs of Lisbon, but could get no notice of the Holland fleet which was appointed to attend at the Rock, whither once more he repaired.

Coming thither the 26th of September, a light was spied in the night which the Admiral chased, thinking it had been the fleet of St. Thomé, or Brazil, bound for Lisbon, where they were expected; but drawing so near them that he might hail them, he found them, by the hugeness of their vessels, and the number, which answered the relation the carvel made, to be the armada of Spain. Whereupon he sought means how to quit himself, being engaged amongst them, and made a Spaniard that served him call to them, counterfeiting to be of their company, and in the meantime tacked from them in so secret a manner they could not discern it. The Adventure only and the Whelp were left with him, the rest losing company four nights before in a storm, who perceiving his light and thinking it had been their Admiral that had command of some fleet of Flemings* stood in among them, but the Adventure being discovered to be an enemy the alarm was soon taken, and they shot at her and slew and

* *I.e.* that had brought them to.

hurt some of her men. As soon as the day appeared the Spaniards beheld the three English ships ahead of them, which they chased ; and three of them, being of better sail than the rest, fetched upon us and drew near the Whelp, who was of small force to resist them. But the Admiral resolving, though it was to his own evident peril, not to see a pinnacle of her Majesty's so lost, if he could rescue her with the hazard of his life, though it was much against the will of his master and company, he struck his top-sails for the Whelp, and commanded her to stand her course while he stayed for the three Spanish ships, with hope to make them have little list to pursue us. The General of the Spaniards perceiving how little he cared for his three ships, in that he lingered for their coming up, being now little more than shot * from him, he tacked in with the shore and shot off a warning-piece for his three ships and the rest of his fleet to follow him. It may appear by this, as by several other expeditions of ours, how much the swift sailing of ships does avail, being the principal advantage in sea-service, and indeed the only thing we could presume upon in our war against the Spaniards. Sir William having thus escaped the enemy, in his traverse at sea there happened, as there does upon all coasts where there is plenty of trade, divers occasions of chases, and one day Sir William following one ship, and the Adventure another, they lost company for the whole voyage. [3]

Sir William was advertised by a ship he took, being a Frenchman who came from San Lucar, that the San Domingo fleet was looked for daily, which intelligence made him bear up for the South Cape, as well in hopes to meet with them as to have news of his fleet.

He was no sooner come to the Cape but he was

* Just out of range.

informed by some English ships of war that the San Domingo fleet was passed by two days before. Here he met with ships of several nations: some he rescued from pirates, and to others that were in league with her Majesty he gave his safe-conduct for their free passage on the sea. He kept that coast till the 21st of October, on which morning he gave chase to a galleon of the King of Spain, who recovered the castle of Cape St. Vincent before he could fetch her up; but notwithstanding he knew the strength of the castle, and knew her to be a galleon of the King's, and in sight of a squadron that made in where she lay,* yet he attempted, and had carried her, had it not been for the fear and cowardice of him at the helm, who bore up when he was ready to board her. The fight was not long, but sharp and dangerous, for there never past shot between them till they were within a ship's length one of another. The castle played its part, and rent the Swiftsure so terribly that a team of oxen might have crept through her under the half-deck, and one shot killed seven men.† Between the castle and the galleon they slew in the Admiral ten men, and hurt many more, in the view of Zubiaur and his squadron to the westward, and of divers English ships of war to the eastward, who durst not put themselves upon the rescue of Sir William for

* C, D, Sl. 1, and Sl. 2 read . . . 'castle, and knew the shore, yet,' &c.

† R has here a marginal note, 'and by an unlucky shot from the castle the gunner (whereof was one Garland, an Englishman, who had been in former times gunner of the royal Admiral galley in the battle of Lepanto) and seven of our men as they were standing abreast were killed, having their breasts and hearts quite shot away.' This man, Garland, had been master gunner of the Victory in 1589, and practically saved Monson from captivity or death (see *ante*, i. p. 230, and *post*, Book V. section *Stratagems at Sea*).

fear of the castle, which they saw did greatly endanger him. Sir William being now left alone, and seeing what headland soever he came to he was to encounter a Spanish squadron, stood his course that night to sea, thinking to try if the Islands of Terceira would afford him any better fortune, but coming within forty or fifty leagues of the island of St. Michael, he was taken with a westerly wind and once more bore up for the Rock. But at length finding his victuals grew short, his mast perished, and the dangers he was exposed to by keeping that coast, he directed his course for England, and came to Plymouth the 24th of November, where he found the *Mary Rose* and *Dreadnought*, most part of their men being dead or sick.

The *Adventure* arrived within an hour after him, who in her way homewards fell amongst the *Brazil* fleet, and, encountering with them, lost divers men but could seize upon none of them. The *Paragon* was at home long before, with a prize of sugar. The *Quittance* in her return met two ships of *Dunkirk*, and in fight with them her captain was slain; but she acquitted herself very well, without further harm. This fleet, as you have heard, was to keep the enemy busied at home, that he might be diverted from the thoughts of Ireland. What hazard it endured by the enemy, the fury of the sea, and foul weather does appear; and no marvel, for it was the latest fleet in winter that ever kept upon the Spanish coast, as it was likewise the last fleet her Majesty employed, for in March after she died, and by her death all war ceased. As Sir William Monson was General of this last fleet, so he was a soldier, and a youth, at the beginning of the wars,* and was at the taking of the first Spanish

* R has a marginal note here : 'Sir William Monson went out upon the same commission that Sir Richard Leveson had

prize that ever saw the English coast, which yet was purchased with the loss of twenty-five of our men, besides fifty hurt. This prize was afterwards a man-of-war, and served against the Spaniards, and was in those days reckoned the best ship of war we had ; * she was called the Commander, and belonged to Sir George Carey, then governor of the Isle of Wight. [4].

when he took the carrack, and Sir Richard Leveson assigned over his commission to him, which assignment he hath got to show.'

* D, 'the best man we had'; A, 'the best man-of-war that went to the sea.'

[1] The fleet consisted of:—¹

| Queen's Ships. | Tons. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|-------------------------------------|-------|--|
| Swiftsure . . | 400 | Sir Wm. Monson, Admiral, ² 27th August—2nd December ; J. Marbury, captain, 5th—31st December. |
| Mary Rose . . | 600 | Sir Wm. Monson, Admiral, 3rd—31st December ; Sackville Trevor, captain, 4th—26th August ; Sackville Trevor, Vice-Admiral, ³ 27th August—2nd December. |
| Dreadnought . . | 400 | Rich. Caulfield, 27th July—23rd November ; Sackville Trevor, Vice-Admiral, 3rd—31st December. |
| Adventure . . | 340 | Thos. Norreys, 4th August—31st December. |
| Quittance . . | 270 | Bryan Browne, 30th June—22nd September ; Peter Beeston, 23rd September—4th October. |
| Lion's Whelp . . | 40 | Joseph May, 28th July—31st December. |
| Merchantmen : Paragon, of London | 350 | John Cason, 30th June—2nd November. |
| Fly, carvel . . | 20 | Rich. Hooper, 8th August—4th December. |

¹ *Pipe Office Accounts*, 2240.

² At 1*l.* 10*s.* a day.

³ At 15*s.* a day.

The Answer, included in Monson's list, is not given in the pay lists as belonging to his fleet, but is there placed in the Channel Guard.⁴ As she is named in his Instructions as one of the vessels he is to take with him she was no doubt temporarily transferred to his command, but was kept back at the last moment as unfit for sea. William Stallenge, agent at Plymouth, hired a merchantman, the Indian, Captain Jas. Willes, to take her place.⁵

[2] The extract quoted from the Plymouth Corporation Records says that Leveson made Plymouth on 23rd June.⁶ The date cannot be correct, because on the 22nd Greville wrote that whatever was decided about another voyage, the diseased crews must be discharged, and that it might be better to send the ships to Portsmouth as there was no possibility of obtaining fresh crews at Plymouth. Therefore the fleet must have been already in port on the 22nd June.⁷ No doubt the occurrence was too common for Monson to mention it, unless as marked as in the Mary Rose and Dreadnought when he came back in November, but there must have been much sickness in the fleet in the first voyage of the year for, besides Greville's allusion to it, we know that Monson transferred forty-nine men dangerously ill to a privateer to be taken home, from the Garland alone. In the text of the 'Tracts' our Admiral implies that he was especially sent for as the one man capable of giving good advice, but this is not the exact truth. On 28th June the Privy Council wrote jointly to Greville, Leveson, and Monson⁸ that the Queen desired a fleet on the Spanish coast in case the Spaniards might be tempted again to try their fortune in Ireland, and knowing that Leveson would be loth to leave the carrack, wished that Monson should be sent up, and that they have therefore written to him to come unless Leveson has given him such duties that he cannot be spared. This is quite different from his insinuation that he was the indispensable man the Government felt bound to consult. However, the Privy Council had already decided on the next proceedings before Monson could appear, because they sent orders, dated 29th June,⁹ to Captain Browne, of the Quittance, to sail at once with his own ship and the Paragon in search of the Dutch fleet, and finding it, to assure Opdam that the English fleet would soon follow. He was to ask the Admiral to keep communicating

⁴ *Ante*, p. 170.

⁵ See Appendix of Letters, No. 5, and *Cecil MSS.* 21st September, 1602.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 176. The date of Leveson's sailing given as 8th March, should in all probability be the 18th, when he may have hauled out, leaving the next day.

⁷ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxiv. 40.

⁸ *Ibid.* 49.

⁹ *Ibid.* 51.

ships a few leagues off Cape Roca, encourage him to remain on the station, and promise that the Queen would send supplies for both fleets; finally he was to remain with the Dutch.¹⁰ Ministers were undoubtedly nervous about the possibility of another Spanish raid into Ireland, for Berehaven did not fall until June, and Cecyll had been displaying his usual vacillation of opinion on the subject throughout the year. The attitude he ultimately settled into mentally is exhibited in a letter of August to Sir George Carew. After noticing the various rumours and reports, he says: 'but if you do compare them, one with another, how they cross, you shall first perceive that of all the great army whereof they speak no man ever saw 4,000 together; but he that is at one port speaks what he hears is at another, and in those things . . . I have ever observed that every bruit is multiplied.'¹¹ He thought it quite possible that before the end of September an attempt might be made to throw a small force into Ireland, but 'the other bruits and rumours of men mustering in Spain proceeds from this occasion that hitherto they have apprehended an invasion at Lisbon . . . they have only been for defence against such attempts as they did ignorantly suspect from the Queen and the Low Countries.' On 30th August he dilates again on the subject, explaining that 'in cases of peril it is better to do too much than too little, especially for me to whom the knowledge and judgment of foreign things most properly belongeth,' but that if great preparations were made without real need Philip could use no better weapon to exhaust England. He repeats that an Irish raid was possible, 'for prevention whereof it is still resolved to keep some ships still upon the coast until the winter months come further on, which we are the rather forced to do because the Holland fleet is now come home as soon as they had gotten a good booty.'

Cecyll was harassed by fears of doing too little or too much, but we know in reality that in January the Spanish Council of State had decided to have nothing more to do with Ireland. In March Leveson's early appearance was anticipated, and in Lisbon, as usual, the inhabitants were timidly leaving the city.¹² In June, Sir Richard Hawkyns wrote from Valladolid, where he was still a prisoner, that, notwithstanding any talk, they could do nothing this year for want of ships, money, and men, and that

¹⁰ The Paragon was at Plymouth on 15th August (Appendix of Letters, No. 4).

¹¹ As a specimen of the information of this kind sent to Cecyll, a letter of the 19th May may be instanced, which informed him that there were 300 ships and 30,000 men at Coruña intended for Ireland (*State Papers*, cclxxxiv. 15).

¹² Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*.

next year they would have enough to do to defend themselves. As the result of his observation he drew the conclusion that the King and ministers were inclined to peace, and that the people longed for it, but that 'a foolish pride' deterred them.¹³ It is true that troops were being collected in Spain, but their concentration had a much closer connexion with the hostile relations existing with France, where war was expected—although Henry probably never intended to allow it actually to occur—and with the condition of things in the Low Countries, than with another Quixotic excursion to Ireland. The Archduke was neutralized as an offensive factor by his entanglement in the siege of Ostend,¹⁴ and by another mutiny, the most dangerous and best organized that had yet occurred among the Spanish troops, that eventually withdrew a force of 5,000 men from his army, who set up as a predatory republic and opened friendly communications with Prince Maurice. In such circumstances the Spanish ministers were occupied with more pressing needs than the idea of renewing a distant enterprise already condemned by experience, especially as they were unable to send a ship to sea to defend their own coasts. Nor could their anxieties have been lessened by the knowledge that Dutch fleets were now sailing in East Indian waters and playing havoc with Portuguese pretensions among the native rulers. The Council of State, however, dallied with the subject of Ireland in their deliberations, but repeated that a small force was of no use, and never seriously considered any larger undertaking.

Monson's first Instructions are dated 9th July,¹⁵ and differ from Leveson's former ones chiefly in a direct prohibition to divide his fleet on any pretence whatsoever. He was to destroy any of the enemy's ships he could get at and examine the ports, then to join the Dutch, and, with them, wait off Cape Roca until Leveson arrived with the rest of the force and took supreme command, unless anything of urgent importance called him away, in which case a vessel was to be left there to communicate with Leveson. Nothing was said of any 'matter of profit' in the shape of the carracks or West India ships; so far from that, he was strictly ordered not to engage in anything 'which may divert or hinder you in this business,' that is to say, the harassment or destruction of any Spanish military force. The Government could not have considered Leveson's departure a matter of

¹³ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxiv. 28, 29. He was released in December of this year and knighted by James I. in July 1603.

¹⁴ It lasted from July 1601 until September 1604, cost the contending Powers upwards of 100,000 lives, and was valueless to the conqueror.

¹⁵ Printed in Appendix D.

urgency, because on 29th July the carrack commissioners at Plymouth wrote that they had discharged the cargo into three merchantmen, and into the Repulse, Garland, and Nonpareil of Leveson's division to be brought round to the Thames. Monson tells us that he was delayed by contrary winds for six weeks, which would date his readiness for sea in the third week of July; but his letters of 10th and 16th August¹⁶ imply that he was only then ready to sail. His statement that the loss of time caused him the forfeiture of his chance of meeting the homeward West India ships and carracks refers to cargo ships, but so far as the treasure galleons were concerned, none arrived between those of April and the fleet towards the end of the year.¹⁷ He seems to have had much trouble from desertion in his fleet, and the wind remained obstinately adverse until his detention led to changes that minimized the importance of his voyage. It will be observed that in the pay lists¹⁸ he ranks as Vice-Admiral until 26th August, and then as Admiral, and this nearly synchronizes with the new Instructions sent to him, and is possibly connected with the somewhat enigmatic note which says that Leveson assigned his commission to him.¹⁹ That Leveson's personal assignment of a royal commission would have been of any force is quite out of the question, and if it was by order of the Government it hardly needed such an emphatic note. The fresh Instructions were dated 29th August,²⁰ and stated that such intelligence had been received as to the unlikelihood of any Spanish descent upon Ireland, that if matters had not been so far advanced the voyage would probably have been countermanded. However, in view of the expense already incurred, Monson was to sail, and, after assuring himself of the truth of the news, was to use his own discretion as to whether he would send any ships back and where he would look for prizes. Leveson, with the Merhonour and some other ships, was to join Mansell in the Narrow Seas, as he was weak, but a reference to the pay lists²¹ shows that, with the exception perhaps of the Warspite for a fortnight, none of them did serve on that station. Monson could not have received these last Instructions before departing, for he hauled out into Plymouth

¹⁶ Appendix of Letters, Nos. 4 and 5.

¹⁷ Cabrera de Cordoba. Information from Spain told of the arrival of twenty-four merchantmen from the West Indies on ^{30th July} 1st August. On ^{9th August} 1st August two carracks came into the Tagus which, the writer thought, would have proved an easy prey (*Carew MSS.* 1st August, 1602). See also Appendix of Letters, No. 6.

¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 168, 183.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 182.

²⁰ Printed in Appendix D. This paper, not being dated as to the year, has been calendared in error under 1600.

²¹ *Ante*, p. 167.

Sound on the evening of 30th August, the next day, and sailed 'very early' on the morning of the 31st.²²

[3] Monson was off Coruña on Tuesday, 7th September, where he remained two and a half days, and soon came to the conclusion that the Spaniards had no form of invasion in view. His subsequent proceedings are related in more detail than in the text of the 'Tracts' in his despatch of 4th October,²³ from which the former seems to be condensed. It must be carelessness that leads him to say in the text that he could get no news of the Dutch, for in the despatch he shows that he knew before 26th September that they had left the coast. In fact, there is every reason to suppose that he knew it before he sailed, for Cecyll writes of them to Carew on 30th August as home or nearly home, and the absence of all reference to Opdam in the Instructions of 29th August implies that the writers thought it unnecessary to allude to a matter already known to the recipients of the despatch. Meteren says that the Dutch returned on account of want of provisions; Cecyll ascribes it to their having taken prizes to the value of 40,000*l.* or 50,000*l.*, but the need to intercept Spinola's galleys if possible may have had as much to do with their action as either of the other reasons. What the real strength of the Spanish coast defence force may have been is very uncertain. The writer of the letter of 23rd August (N.S.) spoke contemptuously of a 'fearful Armada' of seven sail, which had left under Brochero a fortnight previously, manned with a 'great quantity of freshwater soldiers and good store of fugitives of all nations'; Zubiaur was then at Coruña with nine ships. In October Cabrera de Cordoba wrote that 'not a ship passes but they take it, as we have no guard of ships on the coast to prevent them,' but the Spaniard evidently drew no distinction between Monson's squadron and the privateers normally working in those waters, which by this time might almost be considered an English preserve. But Monson's rather mixed metaphor that Frenchmen swarmed 'like bees in the sea,' engrossing the Spanish carrying trade, shows how quickly the Spaniards had appreciated the fact that Elizabeth dared not treat the French flag as cavalierly as she treated the Hansa, and how promptly Frenchmen took their opportunity.

The Spanish fleet with which Monson became entangled was under Don Diego de Brochero; there are further accounts in his letters and in Book V.²⁴

[4] Monson's next despatch is of 19th October,²⁵ and is the

²² Appendix of Letters, No. 6; *Cecil MSS.* 31st August, 1602.

²³ Appendix of Letters, No. 8.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, and section *Stratagems at Sea*.

²⁵ Appendix of Letters, No. 9.

last we have of his relating to this voyage. In the 'Tracts' he gives sufficient reasons for his return but does not observe that he had been directed to come home long before. The Privy Council may have come to the conclusion that his presence on the coast was now unnecessary to check Spain, or that he was not earning his expenses; more probably he was wanted to strengthen Mansell in the effort to intercept Spinola, for not being imperatively required in Spanish waters, it was cheaper to bring him back than to commission fresh ships. On 13th September, Stallenge, at Plymouth, acknowledges the receipt of a letter of the 6th from the Council, enclosing a packet for Monson, which, he says, shall be sent on the first opportunity. It was not, however, sent until the 20th, and the contents may be inferred from a letter of Sir Francis Godolphin's of 8th October, in which he says that none of Monson's ships has called at the Scillies since his departure, but that if one does, the Admiral shall be informed of 'her Majesty's pleasure for their speedy return.'²⁶ There is no obvious reason for intentional silence on his part, but that he should omit to notice it shows what little reliance can be placed on the historical portion of the 'Tracts' even in non-controversial matters connected with his own proceedings.

This was Monson's solitary independent command in time of war, and it leaves us still uncertain about his true position as an admiral. It is evident that prize-money was much more in his mind than fleet actions; but a leader's conduct must be judged by its suitability to the circumstances in which he is placed, and we must remember that, as ever, he was given a squadron only strong enough for a reconnaissance, yet told to fight if the occasion offered. The situation and the orders were incompatible, and he seems to have decided, rightly, to avoid action; therefore when he had, he thought, satisfied himself that there was no danger of a Spanish expedition he felt himself free to cruise for plunder. In permitting the separation of his ships he exposed himself to the most severe test to which the individuality of a commander could be subjected, and he appears to have lacked that force of character or personal magnetism which compels or attracts obedience from subordinates severed from the flag. When, on a momentary recrudescence of alarm about Zubiaur, he had determined to collect his squadron and go to Coruña again, he permitted himself to be tempted by what he thought was a merchant fleet, and was seemingly quite ready to sacrifice his principal object to the secondary one of making prizes. If he thought that a fleet of twenty-four Spanish ships was looking for him he had every reason to concentrate his force; but even in this case he had lost the *Mary Rose* and the *Dreadnought*.

²⁶ *Cecil MSS.*, 13th, 27th September, 8th October, 1602.

for three days, which points to the neglect of a rendezvous or sailing directions, and in the subsequent period of the cruise he seems to have been the plaything of chance, and his proceedings a chapter of accidents. How little he had to fear in reality from any Spanish fleet was shown by the incident with the *Lion's Whelp*, but he professed to find the station untenable on account of the number of Spanish ships at sea, in which case he had no right deliberately to divide his force as he admits doing in October.²⁷ If Spain had ever been dangerous at sea the time was now long past, and it mattered little what an English admiral did or did not do, but Monson seems to have been more apt at advising good measures than at putting them into practice, and he would have been the first to condemn another seaman who confessed that one of the reasons for being driven off his station was inability to keep in touch with his own ships.

The *Mary Rose*, which Monson intended to send home as nearly useless, proved to be the Cinderella of the fleet and made the only valuable captures. Trevor took four vessels with contraband of war on board, valued at 4,500*l.*, and Elizabeth promised him 500*l.* in reward. This was not paid when she died, and in 1605 was reduced to 300*l.* given out of the receipts from the *St. Valentine*.²⁸ Monson must have altered his opinion about the *Mary Rose*, or have been glad to remain in nominal employment, for she was his flagship during December, when his squadron, except the *Quittance* and the two merchantmen, remained in commission, presumably in the Channel.

In the parliamentary debates of 1601 concerning the damage done by privateers, much was said about Dunkirk, but nothing about Spinola, thus verifying Cecyll's expectation in 1599 that any injury they could cause would be within a small radius, and would not affect English commerce. The twelve galleys proposed in England when Spinola reached Sluys had sunk to four actually built, and either no occasion was found for their services or they were recognized as useless toys only proper for pageants. The Italian had, however, done considerable mischief to the Dutch coasting trade, and succeeded sometimes in hampering the maritime transport working in support of Prince Maurice's field force during the Nieuport campaign, and for the relief of Ostend. He was so far satisfied with his success hitherto that he was desirous of extending his operations, and went to Spain in the beginning of the year to negotiate with the Government.

²⁷ Appendix of Letters, No. 9.

²⁸ Appendix C (*State Papers Dom. Jas. I.* xiii. 77). If Chamberlain be correct in saying that the prizes were made in the Narrow Seas, it must have occurred during the extended commission in December (*Chamberlain's Letters*, Camd. Soc., p. 172).

Some very large schemes for the invasion of England were talked of, but the Council of State had the good sense not to consider them worth discussion, and he was eventually permitted to equip eight galleys at his own expense, with liberty to retain all prizes. He was bringing up these galleys from Seville when he was ordered from Lisbon to Cezimbra Bay to assist in the defence of the St. Valentine; there he lost two, and the injury done to the others delayed him for some time, and probably Opdam's presence on the coast was a further hindrance. He left Lisbon on 9th August (N.S.),²⁹ from which we may probably conclude that Opdam had then quitted the station, but the Dutch Admiral, expecting him to follow, dropped a division, when he passed up Channel, to co-operate with Mansell.³⁰ After looking in at one or more of the Spanish ports for supplies, oarsmen, and soldiers, Spinola was at Blavet in the second week of September, and the news of his whereabouts being at once sent to Cecyll³¹ gave plenty of time for preparation in the Channel. Winwood at once protested against the use made of Blavet as contrary to the treaties and the affection Henry and Elizabeth were supposed to feel for each other. The Secretary of State, the Duc de Villeroy, said that Spinola could not be prevented lying in any open bay, but that if he attempted to enter any port he would be fired upon.³² The relations between France and Spain were not so sympathetic as to induce Spinola to put himself under the command of French guns, or to remain on the French coast longer than he could help; moreover, every day of delay decreased his chance of getting through, both by reason of the lateness of the season and the time given to prepare for his coming. In reality, unless favoured by the most extraordinary good fortune, he had no chance. Neither English nor Dutch had repeated the mistakes of 1599; instead of wasting anxiety on the western Channel, the cruising force was concentrated in the Straits of Dover, the neck of the bottle he had to get through, and this time the Dutch had not left the earths unstopped, for the sea before Sluys and Dunkirk was alive with their cruisers.

The ships of the Channel Guard in commission during September were the Hope, Antelope, Advantage, Charles,

²⁹ *Carew MSS.* 23rd August; Winwood, *Memorials*, i. p. 433.

³⁰ The Moon, Vice-Admiral Cant; Samson, Captain Sael de Horn; Lion, Captain Henry Hartman; and the Hope, Captain Gerbrandt Jansen (Meteren, *Hist. des Pays-Bas*, ed. 1618, p. 509).

³¹ Winwood, i. p. 435; Raleigh to Cecyll, 15th September, enclosing information from Jersey (*State Papers Dom* cclxxxv. 5).

³² The first report put the galleys at Belle Isle. They may have moved up under the lee of Grouais Island, opposite Blavet, which would afford good shelter and anchorage.

Answer, and Crane.³³ Some of these, Mansell tells us, were employed on special services,³⁴ so that when on 24th September Spinola was sighted from the tops of the Hope, he and Jones, in the Advantage, were lying in the Straits with two Dutch vessels, the Lion and Hope, somewhat north-west of him, while the Answer and the other two Dutchmen, the Samson and Moon, were in the Downs. The Dutch claim that they were keeping the better look-out and were the first to sight the galleys, and afterwards much ink was expended by writers of the two countries in the endeavour to prove that the success was due solely to that nation to which the historian belonged. The truth seems to be that the galleys feared the English ships, but would have evaded them and got through safely had not the Dutch taken up the work, and it is to Mansell's credit that as soon as Spinola was seen he had the forethought to send off at once to warn the blockaders before Sluys and Dunkirk. It would be a sorry thing to deprive Mansell of any praise due to him here, for his conduct in this affair is almost the solitary act of his whole career, afloat or ashore, which does him any credit. When Spinola saw the Hope closing down upon him he altered his tactics and worked to windward until night fell, outweathering the sailing ships, until he thought he had got an offing which would enable him to run in close along the English shore. It was exactly what Mansell wanted him to do, and so run into the jaws of the three ships in the Downs, and he therefore stood away towards the French coast 'to confirm the secure passage they thought to find.' This course he continued until firing in the Downs showed that his scheme had succeeded, when he shifted for the south end of the Goodwins to cut off their escape. In the meantime Spinola was running in along the coast, and passed so close to the South Foreland that some of his slaves jumped overboard and swam ashore at St. Margaret's Bay. Then, to his surprise, he came under the guns of the three ships in the Downs, but the wind dying away gave him a respite which he utilized in escaping in the direction Mansell expected, where the Hope was waiting for him. One galley ran nearly aboard the flagship in the dark, and after receiving her broadside fell away with 'most pitiful outcries,' shattered and sinking. But so far as Mansell and Cant were concerned, Spinola had now got clear, and if it had not been for the blockading squadrons would have won his port. They now came on the scene and finished the task very efficiently; two galleys were rammed and sunk, two were driven ashore and went to pieces, one was wrecked at Calais, and the only one which

³³ *Ante*, p. 169.

³⁴ *A True Report of the Service done upon certain Galleys*, Lond. 1602. Mansell's own account of the affair.

SIR WILLIAM MONSON, 1602 193

escaped was Spinola's own, which managed to get into Dunkirk. The Italian had the purse of a great banking family to draw upon, but he had now leisure to reflect upon the progress of the naval art, and the uselessness of money when employed on obsolete instruments acting under unpropitious conditions. But he was not yet convinced, and in May 1603, having replaced his lost vessels, challenged a contest with four Dutch sailing ships and a galley, under Joost de Moor, who was watching Sluys. Spinola had eight galleys and four tenders, there was no wind, and he was in shoal water, so that the circumstances were in every way favourable for the galleys. He was killed, and his vessels driven off, rent, helpless, and filled with dead and wounded. The Dutch lost forty-six killed and thirty-four wounded ; the loss on board the galleys was said to be more than a thousand.

Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William
Monson into the Narrow Seas, A.D.
1603. [I]

| Ships. | Commanders. |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| The Repulse . . . | Sir Richard Leveson. |
| The Merhonour . . . | Sir William Monson. |
| The Defiance . . . | Captain Gore. |
| The Warspite . . . | Captain Somers. |
| The Rainbow . . . | Captain Trevor. |
| The Dreadnought . . . | Captain Reynolds. |
| The Quittance . . . | Captain Howard. |
| The Lion's Whelp . . . | Captain Polwhele. |

SIR WILLIAM MONSON returning with his fleet in November, there was a resolution to furnish another against March, which should be recruited with fresh ships, men, and victuals in June. Sir Richard Leveson was to command the first fleet, and Sir William Monson the latter ; for the Queen held it a course both secure and profitable to keep a continual force upon the Spanish coast from February to November, that being the time of the greatest peril to her Majesty, and she was the rather encouraged thereto by the safety she found the last summer, and the wealth she enjoyed of her enemies. The complaint of the ill furnishing-out of her ships in other voyages made it more carefully to be looked unto now, and there was better choice of victuals and men than usually had been, but in the meantime it pleased God to visit her Majesty with sickness, which caused a lingering, though no absolute stay or dissolving of the fleet. But as her danger was perceived to increase the ships were hastened

out to sea, holding it a point of policy of State to keep our seas guarded for fear of any foreign attempt till his Majesty should be peaceably settled in England.

This fleet departed from Queenborough the 22nd of March, and arrived in the Downs the 25th of the same, being the day after her Majesty's death. The news whereof, and commandment to proclaim King James VI. of Scotland our lawful King and the rightful inheritor to the crown, arrived both together, which put us into two contrary passions, the one of grief, the other of joy; grief for the loss of so good and gracious a Queen, joy for accepting of so religious and virtuous a King in that peaceable manner, against expectation, that it made happiness to all men, either at home or abroad.

As the part and office of this fleet was to guard and defend our own coasts from any incursion that might be made out of France or the Low Countries, so the commanders were vigilant to appear on those coasts once in two days, to dishearten them in case they had any such thought. But it was far from their abilities, whatever was in their hearts, to impugn his Majesty, coming in as he did not only with the love and liking, but with the great and excessive rejoicing of all his subjects.* And because the Archduke would make it more apparent to the world that he intended no enmity against the King, he called in his letters of reprisal against the English, and published an edict for a free and lawful traffic into Flanders, so that now our merchants might again trade peaceably into those parts from which they had been debarred the space of eighteen years. The King, finding that France neither impeached his right nor gave any jealousy by the raising of an

* The words 'coming in . . . his subjects' occur only in Sl. 1 as an interlineation.

army, and that the Archduke made a demonstration of his desire of peace, his Majesty did the like, acknowledging the league he had with those princes with whom the late Queen had wars, for wars betwixt countries are not hereditary, but commonly end with the death of their kings. Wherefore he commanded his ships to give over their southern employment and to repair to Chatham, giving manifest testimonies how desirous he was that his subjects should gain wealth by peace whatsoever they had either got or lost by war. [2]

[1] The fleet 'intended foreign' was :—¹

| Ships. | Captains and Period of Commission. |
|----------------|--|
| Repulse . | Sir Rich. Leveson, 'captain and admiral,' ² 11th March–6th May. |
| Merhonour . | Sir Wm. Monson, 'captain and vice-admiral,' 1st March–7th May. |
| Warspite . | Geo. Somers, 1st March–6th May. |
| Defiance . | Walter Gore, 1st March–5th May. |
| Rainbow . | Sackville Trevor, 1st March–23rd June. ³ |
| Dreadnought . | Humph. Reynolds, 1st March–5th May. |
| Quittance . | Francis Howard, 13th March–17th September. ³ |
| Lion's Whelp . | Wm. Polwhele, 1st March–7th May. |

[2] The bugbear of Ireland still loomed large in some minds, but not in Cecyll's, who remarked in January that 'there will be no army come into Ireland, if at all, before August.' There had, however, been no hesitation about the preparation of the fleet for 1603, and it appears to have been already in hand when Monson returned or shortly afterwards.⁴ It could hardly have been intended to go to sea before March, and in that month it is noticed as ready and designed to act with another fleet of ten Dutch ships and to be strengthened with five merchantmen.⁵ Leveson's Instructions are undated, but as he does not appear to have taken the command until 11th March, they can scarcely be

¹ *Pipe Office Declared Accounts*, 2241.

² 1*l.* 10*s.* a day.

³ Transferred to Channel Guard.

⁴ Chamberlain to Carleton, 4th December, 1602; *Autobiography of Ph. Pett*.

⁵ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxvii. 50.

much earlier.⁶ They followed the usual form in directing him to cruise between Finisterre and St. Vincent and attack any fleet destined for England or Ireland, the latter being the more probable: 'it is not unknown to you that the King of Spain can neither make any fleet for one or other of our kingdoms without the help of other nations,' and he was therefore to search all neutrals but not to interfere with French ships without 'pregnant cause.' Henry's royal word was not now of so much value as when the Admiral went to sea in the preceding year.⁷ The Flotas and the carracks were to be looked for, and his Vice-Admiral and captains consulted in all matters of importance. The final clause seems to have had especially in view Monson's system, or mistakes, of the previous autumn, for the order to keep his fleet together, as the scattering permitted hitherto had exposed the English to much risk and lost many good chances, was repeated with particular emphasis. Any captain leaving the flag without orders was to be deprived of his command, a step towards the construction of a formal naval code.

The destruction of Spinola's squadron had not affected the previous question of the activity of the Archduke's privateers, and in November 1602, three of those from Dunkirk had set upon the Crane, a Queen's ship of some force, and, although they did not take her, had 'put her to her shifts,' killing the captain and several of her men. If their ambition soared to 20-gun men-of-war the ordinary merchantman must have had a bad time, and, although we do not know what the scale of losses may have been, things were evidently serious enough to compel some remedy. There are indications that measures were under consideration after the parliamentary debates of 1601,⁸ but they were abandoned for the time and not renewed until 1603. The demand for more protection must have grown; the Channel Guard was weak and

⁶ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.* cclxxxi. 95. Calendared erroneously under September 1601. It appears that on account of the Queen's illness his commission was unsigned, and on 13th March he asked for a warrant from the Privy Council authorizing him to take charge (*ibid.* cclxxxvii. 54). The dates of the commissions leave it to be inferred that when the ships were brought forward for sea, it was with no view of a foreign cruise, but to protect the succession of James I. Indeed, if Monson is to be trusted in his later account (Book V., *Stratagems at Sea*), the fact of his being Vice-Admiral here, when it had not been intended that he should go with Leveson but be kept back to command the second fleet, proves the alteration of purpose.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 172.

⁸ *State Papers Dom. Eliz.*, Add., xxxiv. 47. This is a note of the requirements of shipowners, probably of Newcastle, if furnishing vessels for convoys. They desired various privileges, including all profits of prizes, but the most noticeable stipulation was one 'that no gentleman or ordinary captain be put in them, but mariners only.'

not particularly efficient,⁹ nor in sailing power was any man-of-war equal to a Dunkirker. Moreover the navy was weak in numbers and could not supply sufficient vessels for convoy duty without clogging its offensive capacity ; therefore it seems to have been understood that the new scheme was to be carried out at the expense of the country, although strictly the duty of the Crown. On 5th February a circular letter was issued to the lords lieutenants and justices of counties asking for voluntary contributions to maintain a convoy, 'the burden of our own fleet constantly increasing.' Ten or twelve ships were to be employed, the Government would supply all munitions of war, and the Queen would waive her right to customs on prize goods. Any suspicions the subscribers might feel were met by the announcement that all the money received would be held by a committee appointed by themselves, and in every way there was an endeavour to represent the proposal as something the Government was organizing as a favour to the commercial community. Their real feeling was probably not one of gratification, but of the impatience indicated by Chamberlain at 'seeing her ships serve to so little purpose against the Dunkirkers,' for in no war have shipowners ever been able to understand that the greater the success of the navy in large objects, the greater are likely to be their losses by privateers. The scheme, however, was a retrogression in principle and practice, bearing, as it did, a strong resemblance to that proposed by the merchants in 1405 when the Crown was unable to fulfil its duties. As a retrogression at a time when the rights and duties of the Crown were being more critically canvassed than they had ever been before, it presented no possibility beyond a temporary adoption promising constitutional troubles and the opening up of large questions. But the death of Elizabeth caused the project to be dropped, as nothing more is heard of it.

The war ceased as indeterminately as it had begun, and the fleet had done nothing very positive or striking that had had an evident effect in bringing it to an end. The navy had done good service in preventing a Power which was weaker by sea bringing its superior military strength to bear by invasion, but it had not inflicted any crushing blow in its turn. That was not the fault of the seamen but of the Sovereign, deaf to their advice or following it only half-heartedly ; enamoured of her diplomacy, but insensible of the truth that diplomacy is only effective as based upon arms. Fortunately Spain, in the wider sphere of national policy, had committed more and huger mistakes than England, and had

⁹ From the victualling accounts I should imagine that under ordinary circumstances quite half of the Channel division was comfortably in port doing nothing on any date that might be selected for examination. See also *ante*, p. 44.

practically executed the happy despatch on itself, irrespective of the relatively smaller errors the English monarch might make in handling the forces under her direction. We have seen that the war did not cause the creation of a navy, for it was already in existence ; it did not originate English confidence in the navy, because it existed before, although it no doubt augmented that faith, as the successful use of all weapons will do. The war did not teach the principles of naval strategy, for those principles were known and acted upon earlier, and the English Admirals only put them into practice upon an extended scale ; but, here again, their exercise at a distance instead of hitherto as in the Narrow Seas, was at once a proof of their truth and of the soundness of the prevailing belief in the efficacy of sea-power as the national arm. Perhaps, so far as the navy was concerned, the effects of the war were more subjective than objective, to be found more in the lasting influence it had upon the growth of homogeneity and cohesion in the Service, a permanent sub-consciousness in the human factor, than in its actual military results. The Spanish navy, such as it was, had fallen to pieces under the strain ; that of England, a healthier organism, had responded to the stimulus, closed up instead of disintegrating, and grown in knowledge, self-reliance, and all the qualities that made for future greatness. It had found itself.

To the Spanish war we may trace the beginning—although the Civil War and the first and second Dutch wars saw its great development—of that tradition of clean, decisive, clear-cut action now prescriptive in the Service, of which the conception soon expressed itself in the popular mind in the high standard which the admirals, even in the seventeenth century, were expected to attain. In the Spanish war, too, we may see the beginning of the parting of the ways in the relative proficiency and intelligence expected from naval and military officers respectively, resulting, in regard to the army, in the application of a very lenient measure of condemnation to failure, or a surprised enthusiasm of reward for success ; and, in regard to the navy, in the application of a stern and rigorous criterion, merciless to the incompetent and the mediocre, but to which British naval officers of all ranks have seldom failed to answer. If they had been generals, Byng would probably have obtained at least an honour instead of a firing party, and Calder a peerage in place of a court-martial. Of course no invariable rule can be formulated, and naval history can produce its own evil illustrations, if few in number absolutely and relatively, of indiscipline and inefficiency. But the substantial point to be noticed is the uniform public expectation that the admirals should reach the standard that the navy had made for itself in the past, and the correspondent clamour and disap-

pointment when they failed, where similar shortcomings in the generals were, unless shamefully conspicuous, usually passed over, or eventually condoned, as in the nature of things.¹⁰ The human material of the barrack-room and the mess-deck is the same; the difference in efficiency has been between the ward-room and the mess-room. Seamen have always necessarily formed a caste, but from the close of the sixteenth century commenced the era of the professional, as distinguished from the occasional, naval officer who, to a greater or less extent, lived amid his work and his men, and was compelled, as a condition of survival, to learn how to fight his natural and human enemies. At sea he was never quit of their threats. The complaints towards the close of Elizabeth's reign of the intrusion of the 'gentleman captain' are evidence of the extent to which the navy was already officered by men who made the sea their occupation, for the expression did not refer to the captains of good family, whose names recur year after year as commanding men-of-war, but was only a synonym for amateurs. Before the Spanish war the captains and higher officers of the royal ships were usually soldiers and courtiers, who took but a temporary and incidental interest in the sea service; by the time it ended they were becoming an organized body, linked by comradeship, and with regulations, customs, and precedents.

¹⁰ In 1760 Lord George Sackville was cashiered for misconduct at Minden. In 1765 he was made a Vice-Treasurer for Ireland and restored to the Privy Council, from the list of which George II. had himself struck off Sackville's name. In 1775 he was appointed President of the Board of Trade, and, in 1776, Secretary of State for the Colonies, with the management of the American war. The one thing George III. dared not do was to reinstate him in his army rank, but the flagrant defiance of public opinion shown in his political employment and promotion would have been impossible in an equivalent case in the navy. It was of this man that it was said that he was as bloodthirsty at the Council table as he was meek on the battlefield.

General Wentworth, Vernon's incubus in 1741 and 1742, affords another instructive example. Wentworth, after failing at Cartagena, invading Cuba in such a way that the Spaniards regarded him as a tourist, and refusing to advance on Panama (after he had occupied Puerto Bello without firing a shot) because he doubted the promise of the weather, was selected, in 1747, to act as military *attaché* with the Imperial army in North Italy. Vernon was first insulted by being passed over for promotion because he wrote some plain truths about the navy, actually in reply to the Admiralty's own request for his opinion, and subsequently dismissed because he did not treat his political superiors with that respect they supposed to be due to them. Wentworth's conduct, being merely military incapacity, was soon condoned; Vernon's, although his offence was only one of errors of tact or expression, found no mercy. On the whole it has been well for the navy and bad for the army that they should have been judged by such different standards.

Professionalism and consolidation increased during the seventeenth century because the principal wars were naval, active service throughout the year was becoming continuous for at least a part of the navy, and prolonged companionship and segregation from general influences produced its effect in marking off a class. In the army the officer had remained an amateur who, at most, campaigned during the summer, solacing himself for his fatigues by the relaxations of the court and town for nine months of the year. He had nothing of the ceaseless permeation with his work which made the seaman; nothing of the tireless watch on, and combat with, the elements which trains natural powers to their highest range. Thus the army became associated with fashion and the graces of society; the navy with the harder virtues of the constant fighter. For the naval officer the sea was becoming, and has continued, the business of his life; for the soldier the army was still, and has remained, a recreation. The army officer, usually wealthy or with wealthy connexions, and exercised but little in his work, most often took small interest in anything but a battle, and was content with little or no technical knowledge; for the naval officer technical knowledge was the indispensable condition of success in his struggle with nature, and his daily life kept him expert even in spite of himself. A natural selection increased the divergence, for unless influence can promote him rapidly there is no room in the navy for a blunderer or a shirker, and it was soon recognized that, though suitable for younger sons, it was no place for the fool of the family. Towards the end of the seventeenth century another agency—the loss of court interest—came into play, for William III. was distinctly unsympathetic in his relation to the navy, Anne ignorant, and the Hanoverian kings ignorant and military in their inclinations. Discouraging as this may have been to the individual, it was of advantage to the navy as a whole, for, thrown back on itself, taught to rely on its merits, and looking to duty rather than favour as the road to worldly success or personal content, it grew into a virility it could never have reached under the noxious shadow of the court. When the great victories of the Republican and Napoleonic wars made the Service comparatively the mode for the time, and an instrument of political patronage, there was an influx, although to no great extent, of officers of more wealth and higher social position, and the results were soon seen in the complaints similar to those raised against the Elizabethan and Jacobean gentlemen captains, and in the relative degeneration of the executive in the early part of the nineteenth century.

Peace was made when the military and financial strain was slackening, when Spain was daily becoming more helpless, and when all, and more, that had been fought for during eighteen

years was seen to be within reach. Yet James I. was satisfied with a treaty which accorded nothing commensurate with the position now occupied by the two nations, and, to outward seeming, Spain negotiated as haughtily as though another Armada were about to sail, although the profuse bribery extended to any Englishman who was thought able to influence events towards peace was a measure of the fears of the Spanish Government lest the negotiations should break down. If the English Ministers were not well informed of the condition of Spain it was no fault of Sir Charles Cornwallis, who was sent as ambassador, and who, as soon as he set foot in the country, began observing and reporting to his Government. When he had been in Spain a month he had already decided that,

If this peace had not been concluded, in mine own understanding I see not how it had been possible for him long to have borne out the infinite weight of charges and business laid upon him. His debts are great; out of his dominions he draweth little, the profits not surmounting his yearly charge.¹¹ . . . This kingdom consisteth only of nobility, merchants, and labourers; the latter estate is very poor, the second with war almost utterly exhausted, and the nobility all in a manner exceedingly indebted and their land engaged. . . . I hold this state to be one of the most confused and disordered in Christendom. This peace will give them breath and leisure to re-order it.¹²

A few days later, Cornwallis wrote again:

This peace came opportunely for this kingdom, and is admired¹³ of all Europe, yea, of this kingdom itself, how it was possible with so advantageous conditions to them and so little profitable to our realm it could be effected. . . . I find that England never lost such an opportunity of winning honour and wealth as by relinquishing the war with Spain. The King and kingdom were reduced to such state as they could not, in all likelihood, have endured the space of two years more. His own treasure was exhausted; his rents and customs for the most part assigned for the payment of money borrowed; his nobility poor and much indebted; his merchants wasted; his people of the country in all extremity of necessity; his devices of gaining by the increase of the valuation of money, and other such of that nature, all played over; his credit in borrowing, by means of the uncertainty of his estate during the war with England, much decayed; the subjects of his many distracted dominions held in obedience by force and fear; . . . his strength at sea not able to secure his ports at home, much less his Indies.

¹¹ Meaning that most of the provinces did not yield enough to meet the cost of government. Simon Contarini, the Venetian ambassador, says, in his *Relation* of 1605, that Naples cost 400,000 and Milan 200,000 ducats more than they yielded in revenue. (Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*, p. 580.) See also *ante*, i. p. 320, ii. pp. 15, 94.

¹² Winwood, *Memorials*, ii. p. 72.

¹³ Wondered at.

Cornwallis quotes a Spanish nobleman, who attributed the success of his Government to the lavish bribery employed, and who remarked that James and the Privy Council 'had not their senses' when they accepted the Spanish terms. If the ambassador was ignorant of the bribery when he wrote, he did not long remain uninformed, but he did not know that Cecyll himself was bought and, later, he innocently dilated on his information and suspicions to the Secretary. Cornwallis, like many others, perceived that the decay of Spain and the growing strength of France threatened the balance of European power, and promised future dangers ; but neither he nor anyone else saw, in 1605, that it was too late to save Spain, whose decadence was the outward sign far less of a temporary defeat in war than of more permanent and deep-seated evils.

The Voyage of the Earl of Cumberland to the
Island of Puerto Rico, and the Reasons
why it is inserted at the End of this First
Book.*

I SHALL exceed my first design by adding this voyage to Puerto Rico to the rest of her Majesty's actions, or those where her ships were employed at the charge of others. Yet because this was the greatest undertaking by subjects without the help or assistance of the Queen, both in number of ships and land forces, being furnished as well for land as sea service, as also because so great a person as the Earl of Cumberland took upon him the command of it, having by several voyages before attained to a perfect knowledge in sea affairs—for these reasons I have inserted this action to Puerto Rico among the rest of the Queen's aforesaid.

The earl being naturally addicted to the sea from his youth, as may appear by his undertakings, the first show whereof was in a voyage he undertook at his great charge and expense in 1586, intending his ships should pass to the South Sea by the Straits of Magellan, but unadvisedly they failed. After this he made sundry adventures in his own person, as in the former discourse is declared; and he often obtained the favour of her Majesty to assist him with some of her ships, which she was the more willing to grant to encourage him

* This voyage of the Earl of Cumberland is not found in any of the MSS. examined, and is, therefore, it is to be presumed, a very late addition.

in his enterprises, and to cherish the forward spirit of so great a person.

But at last my Lord began discreetly to consider the obligation he had to the Queen for the loan of her ships from time to time, and withal weighed what fear and danger he brought himself into if unluckily any of those ships should miscarry, for he valued the reputation of the least of them at the rate of his life. Upon these considerations, no persuasions being of force to divert him from his resolution of attempting some great action on the sea, where he had spent much time and money, and thinking thereby as well to enrich himself as to show his forwardness to do his prince and country service, he resolved to build a ship from the stocks that should equal the middle rank of her Majesty's, an act so noble and so rare, it being a thing never undertaken before by a subject, that it deserved immortal fame.

This ship, which he named the *Malice Scourge* (for by that name it seems he tasted the envy of some that repined at his honourable achievement), was eight hundred tons burthen, proportioned in all degrees to equal any of her Majesty's ships of that rank, and no way inferior to them in sailing or other property or condition of ships. When built she had several employments to sea, whilst my Lord was owner of her, and proved, as all other ships and men usually do, sometimes fortunate and sometimes otherwise, for there is nothing that a man can account firm or stable in this world, especially where the sea hath the most predominant power. And for her last farewell to sea my Lord performed this voyage to Puerto Rico in her, where he had trial of her goodness and wholesomeness in the sea by the violent storms he endured better than most part of his fleet.

It was not the ceasing of warlike actions by the King's coming to his crown, who brought peace with him, that made this ship cease from doing the part for which she was built, but another while she was employed by the merchants of the East Indies, who bought her for that trade, and whither she resorted and made two happy returns. In her third, what by foul play and treachery, she became a prey to the Hollanders, where she ended her days in fire, being worthy of a far better funeral. [1]

My Lord being aboard this ship (the *Malice Scourge*), and having divers others of burthen and strength under his command, he set sail from Plymouth the 6th of March, 1597.* Besides his general design to take, to destroy, or any way else to impoverish and impeach the King of Spain or his subjects, he grounded his voyage upon two hopes, the first more probable than the second in my opinion, who undertake, as I have said before, to observe the errors committed in such voyages.

From Plymouth he directed his course to the mouth of the river Tagus, upon which river the city of Lisbon is seated that sends forth yearly a number of ships to the East Indies called carracks, and that in the month of April. There was no question to be made of the certainty of their departure, because if they stay beyond that month they meet with much bad weather, and cannot weather the capes south of the line in their voyage to the Indies, but particularly that of Good Hope.

My Lord's principal end in this voyage was to intercept those carracks, which for burthen exceed all other ships in Europe, and go full freighted with commodities for the East Indies, besides the abundance of money transported in them, which would have enriched my Lord abundantly and the rest of

* 1597-8.

the adventurers. Against the time they should depart out of harbour my Lord appeared with his fleet before it, which did so much dishearten and dismay the Portuguese that, rather than they would put themselves in hazard of him and his fleet, they chose to give over their voyage and lose the excessive charge they had been put unto in furnishing their ships, by means whereof their carracks lay at home without employment the whole year after.

Besides the profit my Lord proposed to himself by this project thus frustrated, it tended to a matter of greater consequence to the state of England if it had proved successful. For you must understand that in the East Indies they are prohibited planting of vines, and want many other things for their sustenance with which they are supplied yearly out of Portugal, so that the Indies may not subsist without Portugal. Then let us consider what hindrance and losses both Portugal and the Indies received by hindering their ships from going to the Indies that year. And if one year proved so prejudicial to them, what would three or four years have done, if they had been so served and prevented? It would have reduced them to great want, and forced them to accept of a friendly traffic with us. Or, in time, we might have divided the Indies from Portugal, especially if we had carried a younger son of Don Antonio, whom no doubt they might have been forced to accept as King.

The error committed in the prosecution of this voyage must be imputed to my Lord himself, in not forecasting how to prevent the hazard and fears that might be impediments to his design; therefore he worthily deserved blame, to present himself and fleet in the eye of Lisbon to be there discovered, knowing that the secret carriage thereof gave life and

for my Lord by experience well knew, having been himself at the taking of some towns, that they afforded little wealth to the taker because riches of value will be either buried or secretly conveyed away. And for merchandizes of great bulk, which that poor island yielded, it was only some few hides, black sugar, and ginger, which would not amount to any great matter to countervail the charge of so costly a journey. Commonly that island sends out two or three ships of a reasonable burthen to transport the yearly commodities it yieldeth, for though it have the name of being in the Indies yet it is a place remote and unfrequented with traffic, either from the Indies or any other place. Or, though the island should be surprised at such a season of the year as their commodities were ripe and ready for transportation, yet the value is not to be esteemed where so many people that adventured with my Lord were to look for a dividend according to their adventure.

And yet I will not deny but by accident this island was made worthy an attempt upon it, by example of Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins, who, as you have heard, sailed thither on their own account, A.D. 1595. And their defeat made it the more admired, and purchased my Lord's greater honour, in that he carried it with a smaller number of men, and less loss, than Drake was repulsed.

But because time and opportunity alter the circumstances of things, therefore, to satisfy these common and vulgar people who judge according to event, and not according to reason, you shall understand the difference, and the cause that made the difference, betwixt Sir Francis Drake in the year 1595 and the Earl of Cumberland in 1598. Sir Francis Drake was commanded thither by direc-

hope to the action. By a familiar example of a man that being safely seated in a house, and in danger of an arrest, knows that catchpoles lie to attack him, and yet notwithstanding would venture abroad, and not seek to avoid them. So fared it with the carracks at that time, who rather chose to keep themselves in harbour than venture upon an unavoidable danger.

If my Lord had done well and providently his fleet should have been furnished without rumour, noise, or notice, in several harbours in England ; the men that went in them not to know or imagine the design of their voyage, or that they should meet to compose a main fleet, till they were come to the height the carracks were to sail in. And after that each captain to have opened their directions, with a special caution not to appear within sight of the shore for fear of discovery. This way, and no other there was, to lull the Portuguese into security, or to avoid mistrust till they had fallen into their hands.

My Lord's other hope, if this should fail, was to give an attempt with his land forces, either upon some island or town that would yield him wealth and riches, being the chief end of his undertaking. And after many propositions made at council, his resolution was to make an attempt upon the island of Puerto Rico, in which island there is a town of convenient bigness and strength, which my Lord not long after took and possessed, with little loss of men on either side because they came to composition.

Herein lies my part to except against this design of my Lord's, as I promised in my former relations. For whereas all men's actions have a reasonable show of likelihood of good to redound to them in their intended enterprises, yet cannot I conceive how a land attempt upon towns could yield my Lord any profit, or the merchants that adventured with him ;

for my Lord by experience well knew, having been himself at the taking of some towns, that they afforded little wealth to the taker because riches of value will be either buried or secretly conveyed away. And for merchandizes of great bulk, which that poor island yielded, it was only some few hides, black sugar, and ginger, which would not amount to any great matter to countervail the charge of so costly a journey. Commonly that island sends out two or three ships of a reasonable burthen to transport the yearly commodities it yieldeth, for though it have the name of being in the Indies yet it is a place remote and unfrequented with traffic, either from the Indies or any other place. Or, though the island should be surprised at such a season of the year as their commodities were ripe and ready for transportation, yet the value is not to be esteemed where so many people that adventured with my Lord were to look for a dividend according to their adventure.

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tions from the Queen. Not that she expected profit or benefit from the island, which she well knew, of itself, was unworthy any enterprise, but what she did was upon intelligence she received of a galleon of plate which, with the loss of her mast, was forced into that island, as I gave an account when I treated before of that voyage of 1595.

In the meantime five frigates were preparing in Spain to bring home that treasure, and in them to the number of eight or nine hundred soldiers, who, in their course to Puerto Rico surprised a pinnace of Sir Francis Drake's fleet that gave intelligence of his design, as well against that place as Nombre de Dios, whither he was bound. By which accident his designs were prevented, and the enemy had leisure to fortify, strengthen, and man the town with the soldiers brought in by the frigates, which made Sir Francis Drake suddenly and dishonourably retire with the loss of divers gentlemen and others of good quality. This misfortune was supposed to hasten the death of Sir John Hawkyns, who then died, after he had seen himself thus repulsed.

My Lord might as well have considered that no use could be made of the situation of that island, as of other islands of less value and riches there might be. As, for instance, Terceira, which, though the soil yields not that plenty and profit Puerto Rico does, yet by our inhabiting it the Spaniards and Portuguese would find great annoyance in their returns from the Indies, Brazil, and Guinea, in which seas our ships would continually lie, and endeavour cutting them off: as, on the contrary, Puerto Rico is seated so lonesome that they have scarce the sight of a ship in the whole year, except those few of their own I have formerly spoke of.

And thus much for my exception against my Lord's voyage to Puerto Rico. Now will I collect

some brief proceedings in that voyage, taken out of the printed copy published by Dr. Layfield, chaplain to my Lord in that expedition. [2]

| Ships. | | Commanders. | |
|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------|--|
| The Malice Scourge . . . | | The Earl of Cumberland. | |
| The Merchant Royal . . . | | Sir John Berkeley. | |
| The Ascension. | | Captain Flicke. | |
| The Samson | | Captain Clifford. | |
| The Alcedo | | Captain Catch. | |
| The Consent | | Captain Slingsby. | |
| The Prosperous | | Captain Langton. | |
| The Centurion | | Captain Palmer. | |
| The galleon Constance . . . | | Captain Foljambe. | |
| The Affection | | Captain Flemyng. | |
| The Guiana | | Captain Colthurst. | |
| The Scout | | Captain Jolliffe. | |
| The Anthony | | Captain Careless. | |
| The Pegasus | | Captain Goodwyn. | |
| The Royal Defence | | Captain Bromley. | |
| The Margaret and John . . . | | Captain Dixon. | |
| The Berkeley Boy | | Captain Leye. | |
| The Old Frigate. | | Captain Harper. [3] | |

My Lord, with the ships aforesaid, being furnished with all things necessary for such a fleet, set sail from Plymouth the 6th of March, 1597, and directed his course for Cape Finisterre, the northernmost Cape of Spain.

But before he could reach that coast he found a defect in his main mast, which was almost perished, and he forced to favour it with a slack sail until he arrived at the island of the Burlings, over against Peniche in Portugal, where he anchored, and commanded his fleet to keep a good distance off at sea to avoid being discovered from the shore, knowing that the hopes of his voyage consisted in secrecy.

He was not many days fitting his mast, having carpenters and materials enough for disasters, but notwithstanding his directions to his ships to stand

off to sea it could not keep the enemy from knowledge of them at Lisbon, where the carracks lay ready to depart. And thus the expectation of my Lord's voyage was frustrated, for the carracks being fallen down as low as the bay ready to sail they were instantly commanded to give over their voyage and return to Lisbon.

My Lord, finding it bootless to expect any good of the carracks upon which the grounds of his voyage depended, directed his course to the Canaries, rather to refresh his men ashore, who were raw soldiers and wearied at sea, than out of expectation of gain or any way to annoy the enemy. He landed without resistance at the poor island of Lanzarote, and the rather because he was made believe a marquis lived there, who, being taken prisoner, would yield ten thousand pounds ransom; but the projector knew as little of the truth thereof as he did of the place when he came to land. This miserable island afforded nothing but earth to walk on and some little store of wine, not worth the speaking of, and yet, as small a quantity as it was, it put his company into a mutinous disorder of drunkenness, that, to pacify them, my Lord was forced to use threats and the rigour of his commission, and to admonish them how to carry themselves ever after, upon danger and peril of their lives.

The 21st of April he set sail from thence, and being off at sea he called a council in which he proposed to his captains whether, in their opinions, it was better to direct his course for Pernambuco in Brazil, or Dominica in the West Indies, and there to take a new consultation. After long discussing this point, every man having the liberty to use his best argument, it was at last resolved for Dominica, whither he hastened, and landed there on the

23rd of May. Having watered (for the island afforded nothing else), he stood for the Island of Virgins, a place unpeopled, where he landed and mustered his soldiers and found the greatest part of them both rude and raw. [4]

At this island he was not far from Puerto Rico, whither his former resolution led him. My Lord himself went in his boat to view a convenient landing-place, and found a sandy bay fit for his purpose, whereupon he instantly put his men ashore on the 6th of June where he found no resistance. And because there needs no long account of the assault he gave to the outworks before his approach to the town, I shall say no more, to avoid prolixity, but that in two days he took both town, fort, and what else were impediments to his enterprise.

Having brought the enemy to his mercy, he carried himself both nobly and with pity; and whereas in such tumults disorders cannot be avoided, yet if they appeared, or were made known to him, he punished the actors with great severity, and in sight of the Spaniards who beheld the justice of his carriage. We have one instance of it in a valiant soldier, who otherwise had deserved well, and whom, for having committed violence upon the wife of a Spaniard, my Lord, without hearkening to mediation or mercy, hanged in the public market-place. A sailor had been so served for defacing the church, but by the importunity of other sailors (for at that time there was occasion to please them above soldiers) my Lord forbore his execution after he was brought to the gibbet. As the fleet lay in harbour upon St. Peter's Day,* there was a ship came bearing in amongst them from Angola in Africa, laden with blacks, a commodity that country does

* 29th June.

chiefly deal in, and was there secured. Another had been so served, but that seeing so many ships in the harbour she suspected they could not be Spaniards, and so escaped. There was another which came from Trinidad, but of so small value that she is not worth mentioning.

After all things were thus quieted and settled in the town there was a consultation whether it should be kept or quitted; but in the end one reason prevailed against all objections, which was a sudden sickness among the soldiers which in a few days swept away four hundred of them.

There was nothing more to do now but to embark ordnance and goods as the town afforded, which consisted of hides, ginger, and coarse sugar, things of small value to countervail so great an expense as that of this voyage; in fine he returned into England. It is needless to set down accidents at sea, but he arrived safely in the month of October following. [5]

And thus much concerning the voyages, successes, designs, and commanders from the year 1585 to 1603, that the wars ceased. Wherein it plainly appears how conquering and victorious our nation has been in their latter actions at sea. And to add the more to their honour you must observe the exploits they have performed by land in the land-voyages, in taking and spoiling of towns, ports, fortresses, and other places of moment, which for a time they have enjoyed and possessed in the several dominions of the Kings of Spain, as namely, in the Indies, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, the Islands; and farther than all these, in the South Sea, which at that time no nations sailed to but the Spaniards themselves, till the voyages of Sir Francis Drake and Mr. Cavendish.

[1] The surveyors employed by the newly constituted East India Company rated the *Malice Scourge* at 600 tons, and the committee of trade at first decided that she was too large for their purpose. Eventually they resolved to offer the earl 3,000*l.* for her, while he required 4,000*l.* After some bargaining he accepted 3,700*l.*, payable by 1,700*l.* in cash, a 1,500*l.* share in the voyage for himself, and a 500*l.* share for a Mr. Cordell.¹ This purchase was made in 1600, and, in December, her name was changed to *Red Dragon*. At the date of sale her armament consisted of three demi-cannon, sixteen culverins, twelve demi-culverins, and eight sakers, and in weight (63 tons) is greater than that of some larger ships of the Royal Navy in 1602, although it differs somewhat in the character of the guns.² She sailed successfully in this voyage, and in a second and third, after which her name disappears from the records of the East India Company; but I know of no authority for her fate as described in the text, which besides is not true of her third voyage.

[2] Although there is no MS. authority for this section the style is certainly Monson's, and if the criticisms are not particularly valuable they throw a good deal of light upon the man. It must be remembered that the writer had quarrelled with Cumberland, and was manifestly eager to condemn his proceedings even if manipulation of truth was necessary to that end. The first remarks as to the good results to be expected by preventing the Portuguese East India voyages, though purporting to be original, are a mere paraphrase of the arguments of Dr. Layfield, Cumberland's chaplain, who wrote the story of the voyage.³ There is a most patent *suggestio falsi* in the assumption that the object of the expedition was simply to plunder Puerto Rico, for not only was it decided before sailing that the island should be held, but Essex knew of the intention,⁴ and if Essex knew it is probable that Monson,

¹ Stevens, *Dawn of Trade to the East Indies*, Lond. 1886, pp. 32, 34, 43, 45, 96. There is what purports to be a drawing of the *Malice Scourge* reproduced in the *Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to Bantam* (Hak. Soc. 1853), but as it shows only a few guns in one tier it is evidently only conventional.

² *Repulse*, 777 tons and 54 tons of ordnance; *Ark Royal* and *Victory*, 692 and 694 tons, and each 50 tons of ordnance; *Elizabeth*, 855 tons, 61 tons of ordnance.

³ *Sloane MSS.* 3289, abridged in Purchas (*Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1,149, *et seq.*), where there is also an account of the first part of the voyage by the earl himself.

⁴ *Sloane MSS.* 3289, f. 46. Elsewhere, as well, Layfield implies that it was due to Essex's persuasions: 'I know by whose friendly, noble reasons in England he was settled and confirmed in his own choice to fasten rather on Puerto Rico than San Domingo' (f. 42). Also Cumberland told Layfield 'it was never my purpose to go to

then very friendly with him and one of his favourite captains, also was aware of it. But if Monson was ignorant at the time he was not ignorant when he wrote these passages, for not only was the voyage then ancient history but sufficient of Layfield had been printed by Purchas to show him the truth. There were valid enough arguments against the attempt to retain the island, those which applied to Drake's voyage of 1585-6; but if, under the now marked conditions of English maritime supremacy, a West Indian station was to be held, Puerto Rico presented several advantages over San Domingo or the Havana. Being a small and thinly populated island it would be easier to hold than a port in Cuba or Española occupied by a numerous and long settled population, whom it would have been impossible to reduce to subjection by such strength as England could place in the field at such a distance. It offered a secure and easily defensible port, so situated that it was to windward of, and flanked, the Spanish intercolonial lines of communication, so that the presence of a strong fleet in San Juan would have completely paralysed the movements of the galleons until it had been destroyed or driven off. Whether England could have kept a fleet there any more than in 1586 may be doubted.

Monson must have known that it was not easy to equip a fleet 'without rumour, noise, or notice,' in truth no more easy than it would be to mobilize a fleet to-day without attracting attention. What Cumberland could do in that direction he did, and we are told that in England the general belief was that the destination was Pernambuco, and Layfield says that it was so far believed in Spain that Philip strengthened the garrison there. But the Spaniards did not require to be inspired to be aware that like all English fleets, royal or private, this one would also have an eye to such profit as could be made by falling in with the carracks or the treasure fleets. In any case no one on board except perhaps Berkeley, and no one in England except a few chosen confidants, and no doubt the Queen, knew that the principal object of the expedition was to seize and garrison Puerto Rico; therefore, as a fact, the real secret was very well kept.

[3] The list as given in Purchas⁵ is :—

any place which, having taken and spoiled, I would run away from, but I meant to inhabit there and dispossess the Spaniards.' Layfield again: 'I am out of doubt that when he left England he was full of Puerto Rico, and not only to take it but to keep it. . . . I speak not this at random, but upon very pregnant evidence.' See also *post*, p. 220.

⁵ *Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1,149. The tonnage is from the Exchequer Warrants for the payment of the five shillings a ton bounty on new ships.

EARL OF CUMBERLAND, 1598 217

| Ships. | Tons. | Captains. |
|-----------------------------|-------|--|
| Malice-Scourge . | 600 | Earl of Cumberland, General ; John Watts, captain (outwards) ; Jas. Langton (homewards). |
| Merchant Royal | 400 | Sir John Berkeley, Vice-Admiral. |
| Ascension . . | 400 | Robert Flicke, Rear-Admiral. |
| Samson . . . | 300 | Hen. Clifford (outwards) ; Chris. Colthurst (homewards). |
| Alcedo . . . | 400 | J. Leye ⁶ (outwards) ; Thos. Catch (homewards). |
| Consent . . . | 350 | Francis Slingsby. |
| Prosperous . . | 400 | Jas. Langton (outwards) ; John Watts (homewards). |
| Centurion . . | 300 | Hen. Palmer ; Wm. Palmer. ⁷ |
| Galleon Con- stance | — | Hercules Foljambe. |
| Affection . . | 120 | Thos. Flemyng. |
| Guiana . . . | 210 | Chris. Colthurst (outwards) ; Gerard Middleton (homewards). |
| Scout . . . | — | Hen. Jolliffe. |
| Anthony . . . | 120 | Robt. Careless (outwards) ; Andrew Andrewes (homewards). |
| Pegasus . . . | — | Edward Goodwyn. |
| Royal Defence . | 190 | Hen. Bromley. |
| Margaret and John | 200 | J. Dixon. |
| Berkeley Boy ⁸ . | — | J. Leye. |
| Discovery frigate | — | Wm. Harper. |

Sir John Berkeley was colonel-general of the soldiers, and other officers were named to places on the staff in the usual way. In one place Layfield speaks of the fleet as consisting of twenty-six sail, but two or three prizes had then been added to it, and there may have been some pinnaces not included in the foregoing list.

[4] On 19th July, 1597, the day that Essex put back into Falmouth after his first attempt to get down to Ferrol, Cecyll wrote to him that 'my lord of Cumberland is a suitor to go a royal journey in October ; the plot is very secret between her Majesty and him.' Any enterprise intended so late as October must have had some place in the tropics for its objective, and the inference is that the earl had already formed the plan he put into execution

⁶ Or Lee, until 4th May.

⁷ After his father's death.

⁸ Or Blackley frigate. She belonged to Leye (Layfield).

later, although Pernambuco may have been intended in July. His commission, dated 17th October,⁹ empowered him to fit out the Malice-Scourge and not more than six other ships, and gave him power to press men and stores, and of life and death for the maintenance of discipline. All profits from prizes might be divided among the adventurers without account to the Queen except for customs. The ill-starred attempt of the Adelantado to reach Falmouth in October no doubt caused postponement, but in January 1598 he was authorized to go forward with his plans. On 8th February he was at Portsmouth, and was again delayed by being ordered to sea eastwards when the news came of the reinforcements Philip had succeeded in running up Channel to Calais.¹⁰ When at last he sailed his proceedings were not unknown in Spain, and it had been expected that he would have tried to intercept the treasure fleet, but as that arrived on 11 February he would not have been in time had he sailed in that month as he intended. The expedition left Plymouth on 9th March, and on the 14th was off Finisterre; here Berkeley with the mass of the fleet was ordered on to the Burlings, while the Malice-Scourge and two other ships stood in to the land in the hope of taking some fishermen from whom information might be obtained. A gale came on in which the flagship sprung her mainmast, and Cumberland ran down to join the main body at the Burlings to fish it there, but in the meantime he took a Hamburg ship with munitions of war on board. Although he kept out of sight of land the Spaniards were fully informed of his arrival by means of some of their countrymen who had left Plymouth for Lisbon at the time of his departure, but at first the news was not considered of much importance as it was thought he was running down the coast on his way to Pernambuco, and the carracks even dropped down to St. Julian to be ready to take a fair wind. However, he was seen often enough to prove that he was watching Lisbon, and then Philip was asked for orders. From prisoners and escaped Frenchmen the earl ascertained that the five carracks were not likely to sail while he was there, and, as he could not stay for an indefinite time, on 2nd April he sailed boldly up the south channel of the Tagus to reconnoitre their position, in the hope that it might be possible to attack them at their anchorage. The Malice-Scourge came nearly under St. Julian, and within a league of the carracks, but although their mouths watered—'for an hour or two we filled our eyes with this sight'—the conclusion was that an attempt on them was impracticable. Coming away they picked up some Frenchmen who had escaped from Setubal, from whom they learnt that the carracks

⁹ *Sloane MSS.* 33; *Egerton Papers* (Camd. Soc.), p. 263

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 93, note 20.

were not coming out until the coast was clear, even if that meant losing the season and not coming out at all. Cumberland now stood for Cape St. Vincent, and during the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April the rest of the fleet rejoined, having taken two or three prizes on the way. The next stage out was the Canaries, but some days were spent off St. Vincent looking for a fleet, supposed to be the Flota, which had been sighted and chased but dropped in the night. The Canaries were made on 13th April, but the terror of his presence on the Portuguese coast remained long after he had departed. The Venetian ambassador reported that the whole coast was blockaded, and that 'in Lisbon the cries of the people rise to heaven at the sight of their trade hampered and their city, so to speak, blockaded'; and, subsequently, that although the English only numbered thirty-five sail they stopped all commerce, and that the carracks had been ordered not to sail this year.¹¹ The English Government heard direct from Lisbon that the carracks were discharged of their cargo, and that ships intended for the West Indies were being drawn from their proper purpose to form part of a fleet intended to search for Cumberland; 'thus the small forces of an English earl can shut in both the East and West India fleets.'

The operations at the Canaries were of little importance, and only undertaken because the islands were on their route and offered a good occasion to land and drill the troops, who took the opportunity to get very drunk on the country wine. On 16th April Cumberland's captains dined with him, when he gave them sealed orders, only to be opened in the event of separation, naming Margarita and Puerto Rico as the destinations. He afterwards gave Layfield a cumbrous explanation of his reasons for putting in Margarita, which was, he said, only for the purpose of deception. He was now at Lanzarote, and Berkeley was detached to Teneriffe, but their reunion was delayed by calms. In the interval the Royal Defence, which had left England after them and sailed direct, came in and brought with her some English prisoners who had escaped from Lisbon in a fishing boat that she had picked up at sea. One of these men was named Haward or Howard, a servant of Raleigh's, taken prisoner at St. Michael in 1597, and he told the earl that he had heard that the carracks were to sail after all. The news was of course untrue, but it appeared positive enough to decide the General to wait for a few days, spreading his ships east and west and arranging a code of signals. He did not, however, allow the possibility to interfere with his plans, and on 25th April a council was held at which he at length unfolded his real purpose. The earl and Sir John Berkeley were alone seated; the captains stood respectfully

¹¹ *State Papers Ven.* 14 April, 17 June, ^{26th June} 6th July.

1

2

Layfield says that Cumberland was a man who always thought before he spoke, and always let the deed follow his word; the good conduct and discipline held through the remainder of the voyage showed that he knew how to make himself be taken seriously when the moment came for plain speaking.

[5] The fleet left the Virgin Islands on 5th June, the earl resisting the temptation to go out by the way followed by Drake, as urged by men who were there in 1595,¹² and taking the older and safer channel. Two pinnaces were sent forward under Knotsford to explore for a landing-place but he was unsuccessful, and on the morning of the 6th the earl himself found 'a goodly sandy bay,' where he decided to land, contrary to the advice of all those who had been with Drake, who, pluming themselves on their experience, insisted on all sorts of drawbacks. As usual he made a speech to the objectors, but, also as usual, he ended with 'Let me have no more speaking but get your men all into your boats and follow in order as I have directed you.' Layfield says, 'I never saw my Lord so resolutely set as at this time,' and that his great anxiety was to obtain an unopposed landing, after which he felt no misgiving as to results. By eight o'clock in the morning the 1,000 men available were all safely landed on the northern shore of the island some four or five leagues eastward of the town, from which they were separated by a narrow arm of the sea, El Boqueron, defended by two forts—Matadiabolo at the entrance, which was only some sixty yards wide, shallow, and blocked with stakes, and San Antonio, at the south end of El Boqueron, which commanded the causeway and drawbridge over which passed the road from the larger island to the small one on which the town of San Juan is situated. After a toilsome march, during which they fell in with a negro who was impressed as a guide, they came to the fort Matadiabolo and did not see how they were to attack it; 'we were at a flat bay, even at our wits' end,' says the chaplain. From various references it appears that the fleet or some of the ships had accompanied the troops in the march along the coast, and the earl had expected to be able to use the boats to cross, but was disappointed in that hope when he saw that the entrance of El Boqueron was blocked by stakes and covered by the fire from the fort, besides being protected by the surf on the bar, characteristic of all river mouths on the northern side of Puerto Rico. No one knew anything of the local topography, but, some Spanish horsemen having been seen reconnoitring them from the town, Cumberland felt certain that there must be a high road somewhere, and at last made the negro understand what he

¹² Captain Knotsford, who had been pilot to Hawkyns, was with him, no doubt especially retained for his knowledge of the seas about Puerto Rico.

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wanted. They set off round the lagoon, but it was now getting late in the day and many of the men were dropping with fatigue. At one moment it was decided to halt for that day, when they came upon some horses which were forthwith taken for the relief of those who most needed rest. By sunset they had come to fort San Antonio, and found a causeway wide enough for three persons abreast, but with the drawbridge on the San Juan side raised, and secured by a barricade and the fire from the fort. However, from another negro they learnt that the passage was fordable at low tide by the side of the causeway, but no one knew when that would be, and a watch was set while officers and men took a welcome rest. Two hours before daylight the time came and the assault began, the Spaniards being quite ready for them. After two hours' fighting, during which the English reached the fort and came to push of pike through the ports and loopholes but could effect no entrance, the assault failed, and the men were drawn off with a loss of fifty killed and wounded, for the tide was making again, and daylight would enable the Spaniards to use the seven heavy guns in the fort with more effect. Cumberland had been thrown down and nearly drowned in the wading, and was still so sick that when the men were marched back to the sea-shore after the repulse he had to be taken on board his ship. He had intended to rest that day, but if he was ailing bodily his mind was working vigorously, and in a few hours he was ashore again with another scheme and determined to succeed, saying that 'the service was to be done at whatsoever cost.' The new plan, and it seems to have been Cumberland's own, was to land 200 men between Matadiabolo and the town of San Juan to take the former in rear, while one of the small vessels stood close in, regardless of wreck, to engage it, and his musketeers plied the garrison from the opposite shore. When the attack developed the Spanish defence at once broke down and the garrison evacuated the fort, allowing Langton in command of the boats from the fleet to enter El Boqueron at his leisure. The transport across of the troops was not completed until the early hours of the 8th, but the previous evening the General and the Vice-Admiral reconnoitring San Antonio again found that also evacuated. The brilliant little operation had been done at a cost of only one man killed and three wounded, and the loss, as was expected, of the vessel that had stood close in to engage Matadiabolo. The march on the town was taken up in the moonlight, and not only was no resistance experienced, but San Juan was found to be abandoned, the governor and those capable of fighting having retired into the castle, El Morro, and most of the non-combatants having fled.

The earl desired to take El Morro without injuring it and with little loss of life in view of his intention to leave a garrison,

and therefore determined to reduce it by starvation. A breaching battery was, however, prepared in case supplies held out too long, and this opened on 19th June, when the defences were found to be much weaker than had been anticipated and easily breached, so that on the 20th the Spaniards asked for terms. They tried to make conditions, but Cumberland curtly offered them their lives and a passage from the island, and it is curious to notice that he anticipated Prince Bismarck in 1871 by refusing to communicate with the enemy except in his own language.¹³ On the 20th the fleet came into the harbour and preparations were made to send companies of troops through the main island, but the 400 prisoners from El Morro were not sent away to Cartagena until 17th July, convoyed by the Prosperous and Affection, which were to go on to England, and by that time it was recognized that the place could not be held. A garrison of less than 500 men could not be left, but the capture had been made in the most unhealthy season of the year and dysentery was wasting the force, so that even early in July there were 200 dead and twice as many sick, and matters grew worse every day.¹⁴ Cumberland's possession of the place was known at the Havana by the end of June, and the immediate result was that the sailing of the treasure fleet was stopped. It was not known in Spain until September, and as Philip II. died that month the prevalent gossip of a large expedition under Brochero to recover the island may be taken for what it was worth. There seemed, indeed, no probability that the Spanish Government would be able, at any rate for some time, to eject the intruder, and the Venetian ambassador, seeing this, commented that if he could stay at Puerto Rico 'the danger will be immense.' That was seen also on the English side,¹⁵ and so far Cumberland's strategic idea had been justified by events, although it was to fail from causes he could not control. But, besides showing how easily Spanish settlements could be taken,¹⁶ he had shown capacity for command of a very high order both in governing his force and in handling it. He stands out as a resolute, reticent man, knowing his own mind, able to make himself obeyed, when the moment came, without discussion, and capable of inspiring his men with confidence in his leadership. We do not know that discipline was so well maintained in any other Elizabethan expedition as in this, yet only one warning was necessary, and only one man hanged to enforce it. As a commander

¹³ 'His lordship peremptorily refused to seek their language, but would have them to find out his.'

¹⁴ Layfield notices the effect of fatigue as a predisposing cause.

¹⁵ 'I have heard wise men, and that without passion, say that the Spaniards have not in our age received a greater blow than the loss of Puerto Rico' (Layfield).

¹⁶ And, also, how difficult they were to hold.

he had made an enormous advance since 1589—so great that the probable explanation is that his true field of action was the land and not the sea, and that this was his first opportunity of showing it. The Spaniards had notice before he came and had fortified the harbour,¹⁷ expecting a repetition of Drake's mistake of 1595, but the earl had clearly thought out his plan beforehand, made straight for the chosen point of action, and carried it through regardless of difficulties. His first repulse did not affect his resolution, but only stimulated him to a brilliant tactical development which at once gave him his victory. Altogether we may say with Mr. Corbett, 'The whole conduct of the enterprise, indeed, marks him as a man who, if the Government had only been disposed to a vigorous renewal of the war, might well have supplied the place of Essex.'¹⁸

When it was seen that the evacuation of the town would be necessary Cumberland made up his mind to accept the situation and professed to think that there was still a chance of intercepting the homeward Flota, although, if we may trust his subsequent remarks to Layfield, he was not deceived by the intelligence he had of its immediate sailing but regarded the possibility as a forlorn hope from the first. He may also have had in mind that by good luck he might fall in with a delayed homeward-bound carrack, although they were due at Lisbon in August. Negotiations were opened for the ransom of the town, insincere on both sides, for the Spaniards only wanted to prolong them until the invaders were too weak to resist, and the earl only carried them on to obtain time to leave in peace. Eighty guns, ammunition, and all the portable merchandize in the shape of hides, sugar, and ginger were stowed in the ships' holds. Sir John Berkeley was ill, but if the Flota was going to sea it was important to leave at once, therefore the earl sailed on 13th August with the *Malice-Scourge*, *Samson*, *Royal Defence*, *Scout*, *Guiana*, and two or three pinaces, leaving Berkeley to bring on the rest. By this time there were 400 dead and as many more so ill that they had to be carried on board, but these were probably left for Berkeley's division. The earl was off Flores late in September,¹⁹ having experienced a variety of weather, including a gale, 'the remembrance whereof yet maketh me quake,' says Layfield; his ships had been scattered, but most of them soon rejoined at the

¹⁷ *Sloane MSS.* 3289, f. 36. Some remains of the *Nuestra Señora de Begoña*, the treasure galleon that had drawn Drake and Hawkyns to San Juan, were still to be seen. 'Some of the ribs of this great beast we found here, but the marrow and sweetness of her was gone' (*ibid.* f. 58).

¹⁸ *Successors of Drake*, p. 249.

¹⁹ The dates given by Layfield towards the end of the voyage are incompatible with each other.

rendezvous, and some of Berkeley's division, which had not been far behind him, put in an appearance. The inhabitants of Flores were very polite and friendly, and regretted their inability to provision the English because a Spanish fleet had been there, leaving only a few days before, and had taken all they had to spare and more. The fleet, they said, had been sent to convoy the homeward-bound carracks, but they had already passed, and now they did not know what the Spaniards were doing or where they had gone. Their information was quite true, and the Spanish fleet included the five carracks that had been blockaded in Lisbon in April, now hastily converted into fighting ships. Naturally Cumberland desired if possible to ascertain something more, and Slingsby was sent ashore to make inquiries; he brought off the governor of a town, 'a poor governor, God knows, scarce as good as an English constable,' but he confirmed what they had already heard, and added that no Flota was expected and that the Spanish fleet had been recalled by an advice boat. Faith was placed in his assurances, quite justly, and a council was called to discuss the position, at which the general feeling was shown to be for return home. There was really nothing more to stop for, though the earl seems to have had an idea of visiting the different islands, but the weather settled that matter by blowing him clean away from the Azores.

As Layfield says, it would be a mistake to call the voyage profitless. The Portuguese coast had been terrorized, the East and West India trade stopped, and the degradation of helplessness under attack had been again branded into the Spanish soul. The dulness and inefficiency of the Spanish Government had once more been advertised to the world, and it could be seen of all men that if the West Indian possessions were not ravaged their safety was not due to any protection that the mother country could afford them. The plunder was only estimated at 15,000*l.* or 16,000*l.*, not half the cost of the expedition, but although unfortunate for the subscribers, it need not be pointed out that that was not the measure of its value to England. In Lisbon they saw things in their right proportion, and in December a spy wrote from there, 'The course that Cumberland took to have a fleet lie three months before this river would spoil all this country and intercept the only maintenance of these wars.'

The Taking of these Places following is to be justified by the Lawfulness of a War begun 1585, betwixt England and Spain.*

SIR FRANCIS DRAKE, 1585, took these places following, being the first fleet the Queen set forth.

Praya, } in Cape Verde.
Santiago, }
San Domingo in Española.
Cartagena in Tierra-firme.

San Antonio in Florida.
St. Helena and the fort of
St. John in Florida likewise.†

Sir Francis Drake in the West Indies, 1595 where he died.

Rio de la Hacha.
Tapia.
Rancheria.

Santa Marta.
Nombre de Dios.
Puerto Bello.

Captain Preston in the West Indies, 1595.

Puerto Santo.
Coche.
Coro.

Santiago de Leon.
Cumana.

* B and R are the only MSS. which contain this list. In both the heading reads: 'The names of such towns, fortresses, and places as were taken from the Spaniards in the time of war in Europe, the Indies, Brazil, and the South Sea.'

† Drake did not take St. Helena, fearing to trust his ships in the shoal water in front of the place.

Captain Parker in the West Indies, 1601-2.

| | |
|----------------------------|------------|
| St. Vincent in Cape Verde. | Triana.* |
| Puerto Bello once more. | Campeachy. |
| The fort of Santiago. | |

The Earl of Cumberland, 1598.

| | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| The island of Lanzarote, one of the Canaries. | The isle and town of Puerto Rico. |
|--|--------------------------------------|

Captain Newport in the West Indies, 1592.†

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| Yaguana, } in Española. | Truxillo. |
| Ocoa, | |

Sir John Burgh took a town in the island of Trinidad in the West Indies, and Sir Walter Raleigh another after.

Mr. Cavendish's first voyage about the world 1586.

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| A fort and ordnance in the Straits of Magellan. | Payta. |
| Santa Maria. | The isle of Puna. |
| Morro Moreno. | Aguatulco in New Spain. |
| Arica. | The port of Natividad. |
| Pisco. | The bay of Santiago. |
| Paraca. | The bay of Compostella. |
| Chinche. | The isle of St. Andrew. |
| | The bay of Mazatlan. |

All in the South Sea.

* The fort of Santiago and Triana were both at Puerto Bello. Parker sailed with the *Prudence* of 100 tons and 130 men, the *Pearl* of 60 tons and 60 men, and a pinnace of 20 tons and 18 men, the last being lost in a gale off Cape St. Vincent with fifteen of her crew. Although on a small scale, Parker's cruise was in many respects one of the finest of the Elizabethan privateering exploits, especially in the ability shown by the commander.

† Newport took nineteen rich prizes. Captain William King, who sailed for the Gulf of Mexico about the same time, was hardly less successful. In the Gulf, King fell in with four ships set out by Lord Thomas Howard and a whole 'fleet' belonging to

Mr. Cavendish's second voyage to Brazil, 1591.

Santos.

St. Vincent.

Pernambuco * taken and quitted, and the carracks and goods brought from thence by Captain Lancaster and others.

Captain Langton in the West Indies, 1593, burnt and ransomed several farms and plantations in Margarita, Española, and Jamaica.†

Drake to the Bay of Cadiz, 1587, took two or three forts upon Cape St. Vincent and Cape Sagres.

He and Sir John Norreys took, in the voyage to Portugal, Peniche, Torres Vedras, and several villages; in Sir John Norreys's march to Lisbon he took the suburbs of Lisbon, and Drake took Cascaes.

1589. The Earl of Cumberland took the island of Fayal, and made Graciosa, the island of Flores, and Corvo give him relief.

1596. The Earl of Essex and the Lord Admiral took the city of Cadiz, the bridge of Suazo, and the town of Faro in Portugal (a bishop's seat of Osorius, whose goodly library was brought away).

1597. The Earl of Essex took the island and town of Fayal, made other islands give him relief, and took Villa Franca in the island of St. Michael.

I omit divers other places taken by private men in Spain and in the King of Spain's dominions.

Alderman John Wattes. It will be remembered that Newport, returning with two of his ships, the *Dragon* and the *Prudence*, met Burgh at the Azores and shared in the capture of the *Madre de Dios* (*ante*, i. p. 287).

* Fernando Buco in the Churchill text, Farnawbark in B, and Farnanbrick in R.

† This was the Earl of Cumberland's cruise of 1593.

The names of such private persons as went to the West Indies in the time of war in Elizabeth's day, with such prizes as they took.*

1587. Sir George Carey set out three ships ; two of which took nothing, and the third took a prize, and brought her into Bristol, worth 2,000*l*.

1589. Captain Michelson, in the Dog, took three ships, but of no value, none of which he brought for England.†

1591. A small ship of Sir George Carey's took nothing ; but had like to be taken herself.‡

In the same year Captain Newport returned with the like success.§

1592. These ships following were set forth :

Captain Lane with three ships of Mr. Wattes's.
Captain Roberts in a ship of Bristol.

* The Churchill text runs on, 'by which may appear how little hurt we have done or can do to the Spaniards in the West Indies in comparison of other places we have annoyed them in, as I have more largely proved in my second book.'

† On the contrary it was a very successful cruise (Hakluyt, *Voyages*, xv. p. 256).

‡ Off Cape Corrientes, on 13th June, 1591. The ship in question, the Content, carried only one minion, one saker, one falcon, and two portpieces by way of ordnance. She was in action, part of the time becalmed, from seven o'clock in the morning until sunset with three Spaniards of 600 and 700 tons, one of 100 tons, and two galleys, but they could not take her. 'The sides, hull, and masts of the Content were sowed thick with musket bullets.'

§ In 1592. See *ante*, p. 228

to Burgin was in the West Indies in 1592. Nothing is known of
Burgin after 1592. Burgin was in Maryland in the same year that Cape de
Aguirre sailed and that Hawkins was at San Juan
de los Rios. But Aguirre was in Maryland in 1592 and Hawkins at
San Juan in 1590. It seems probable that Burgin was in the
West Indies at some time but that Raleigh's memory played him
false as to particulars. Monson certainly must be wrong in the
date, and Raleigh's statement is not compatible with the notice of
Burgin in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

PRIVATE ADVENTURERS, 1585-1603 231

1601. Captain Cleive,* with a ship and a pinnace, took a prize of hides, which he restored at his return, the peace being concluded between the two kingdoms in the time of his absence.

†These private voyages being compared with the rest of the Queen's that went before, a man may plainly perceive that they produced greater loss, spoil and damage to the Spaniards than profit or advantage to the English. For computing the expense of our public actions and private adventures with the gain that arose out of them, we shall find they were much more chargeable than gainful to us; though I confess, in that case we are not to value the expense and loss in our disbursements, for it was repaid with the honour we gained, which will immortalize our nation.

* Qy. Edward Cliffe.

† This paragraph and the succeeding section upon *The Advantages of keeping a Fleet on the Coast of Spain in Time of War* are not in any of the MSS. collated for this edition.

Captain Benjamin Wood
 Lord Thomas.
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*The Advantages of keeping a Fleet on the
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*I over in this first book to insert a treatise I was
 required by Sir Robert Cecyll, then Principal Secre-
 tary of State, * to write, concerning the abuses and
 corruptions at sea, which then began to creep in,
 not only in ships, men, and victuals, but in the
 designs: with a remedy how to amend and redress
 them. But because it is more proper for my third
 book, where I treat of projects, a reformation of the
 abuses of the navy, as also how to make an offensive
 and defensive war upon our neighbouring countries
 that oppose us on the seas, I refer you to that book,
 and have gathered by this that follows, that, whilst
 the Spaniards were employed at home by our
 yearly fleets, they never had opportunity nor leisure
 either to make an attempt upon us, or to divert the*

* The style, 'Principal Secretary of State,' will strike some
 readers as an eighteenth century editorial emendation. However,
 Cecyll is so described in 1601 (Thomas, *Hist. of the Public
 Departments*, p. 27). In the commission for the trial of Mary
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which the next year after they attempted, in 1588,
because not molested as the year before.

Our action in Portugal, following so quick upon
the overthrow in 1588, made the King of Spain so
far unable to offend, that, if the undertaking had
been prosecuted with judgment, he had been in
ill-circumstances to defend it or his other king-
doms.

From that year to the year 1591 he grew great
by sea because he was not busied by us as before,
which appeared by the fleet that took the Revenge ;
which armada of his, it is very likely, had been
employed against England had it not been diverted
that year by my Lord Thomas Howard.

And for four years together after this the King
employed his ships to the Islands, to guard his
merchants from the Indies, which made him have
no leisure to think of England.

The voyage to Cadiz in 1596 did not only
frustrate his intended action against England, but
we destroyed many of his ships and provisions that
should have been employed in that service.

He designed the second revenge upon England,
but was prevented by my Lord of Essex to the
Islands; which action of his, if it had been well car-
ried, and that my Lord would have believed good
advice, it had utterly ruined the King of Spain.

The Advantages of keeping a Fleet on the
Coast of Spain in the Time of War.

I OMIT in this first book to insert a treatise I was required by Sir Robert Cecyll, then Principal Secretary of State,* to write, concerning the abuses and corruptions at sea, which then began to creep in, not only in ships, men, and victuals, but in the designs; with a remedy how to amend and redress them. But because it is more proper for my third book, where I treat of projects, a reformation of the abuses of the navy, as also how to make an offensive and defensive war upon our neighbouring countries that oppose us on the seas, I refer you to that book, and have gathered by this that follows, that, whilst the Spaniards were employed at home by our yearly fleets, they never had opportunity nor leisure either to make an attempt upon us, or to divert the

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wars from themselves. By which means we were secured from any attempt of theirs, as will appear by what follows.

The Spaniards stood so much in awe of her Majesty's ships that when a few of them appeared on the coast they commonly diverted their enterprises ; as namely in the year 1587, when Sir Francis Drake with twenty-five ships prevented an expedition that summer out of Cadiz road for England, which the next year after they attempted, in 1588, because not molested as the year before.

Our action in Portugal, following so quick upon the overthrow in 1588, made the King of Spain so far unable to offend, that, if the undertaking had been prosecuted with judgment, he had been in ill-circumstances to defend it or his other kingdoms.

From that year to the year 1591 he grew great by sea because he was not busied by us as before, which appeared by the fleet that took the Revenge ; which armada of his, it is very likely, had been employed against England had it not been diverted that year by my Lord Thomas Howard.

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He designed the second revenge upon England, but was prevented by my Lord of Essex to the Islands ; which action of his, if it had been well carried, and that my Lord would have believed good advice, it had utterly ruined the King of Spain.

The next year that gave cause of fear to the Queen was 1599, the King of Spain having a whole year, by our sufferance, to make his provisions, and bring his ships and army down to Coruña. Which put the Queen to a more chargeable defensive war than the value our offensive fleet would have been maintained with upon his coast.

This great expedition was diverted by the fleet of Holland, which the Adelantado pursued to the Islands.

The following years, 1600 and 1601, there was hope of peace, and nothing was attempted on either side till the latter end of 1601, that he invaded Ireland; but with ill success, as you have heard.

The last summer, 1602, he was braved by her Majesty's ships in the mouth of his harbour, with the loss of a carrack, and rendered unable to prosecute his designs against Ireland. For no sooner was Sir Richard Leveson returned, but Sir William Monson was sent back again upon that coast, as you have heard, who kept the King's forces so employed that he betook himself only to the guard of his shores.

It is not the meanest mischief we shall do the King of Spain, if we war thus upon him, to force him to keep his shores still armed and guarded to the infinite vexation, charge, and discontent of his subjects. For no time or place can secure them so long as they see or know us to be upon the coast.

The sequel of all these actions being duly considered, we may be confident that, whilst we busy the Spaniards at home, they dare not think of invading England or Ireland. For by their absence their fleet from the Indies may be endangered, and in their attempts they have as little hope of prevailing.

*The Names of such Ships as her Majesty left at her Death.**

| Names of Ships. | Tonnage. | Men in Harbour. | Men at Sea, whereof | Mariners. | Gunners. | Sailors. |
|-----------------------|----------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| Elizabeth Jonas . . . | 900 | 30 | 500 | 340 | 40 | 120 |
| Triumph . . . | 1,000 | 30 | 500 | 340 | 40 | 120 |
| White Bear . . . | 900 | 30 | 500 | 340 | 40 | 120 |
| Victory . . . | 800 | 17 | 400 | 268 | 32 | 100 |
| Merhonour . . . | 800 | 30 | 400 | 268 | 32 | 100 |
| Ark Royal . . . | 800 | 17 | 400 | 268 | 32 | 100 |
| Saint Matthew . . . | 1,000 | 30 | 500 | 340 | 40 | 120 |
| Saint Andrew . . . | 900 | 17 | 400 | 268 | 32 | 100 |
| Due Repulse . . . | 700 | 16 | 350 | 230 | 30 | 90 |
| Garland . . . | 700 | 16 | 300 | 190 | 30 | 80 |
| Warspite . . . | 600 | 12 | 300 | 190 | 30 | 80 |
| Mary Rose . . . | 600 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| The Hope . . . | 600 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| Bonaventure . . . | 600 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| The Lion . . . | 500 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| Nonpareil . . . | 500 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| Defiance . . . | 500 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| Rainbow . . . | 500 | 12 | 250 | 150 | 30 | 70 |
| Dreadnought . . . | 400 | 10 | 200 | 130 | 20 | 50 |
| Antelope . . . | 350 | 10 | 160 | 114 | 16 | 30 |
| Swiftsure . . . | 400 | 10 | 200 | 130 | 20 | 50 |
| Swallow . . . | 330 | 10 | 160 | 114 | 16 | 30 |
| Foresight . . . | 300 | 10 | 160 | 114 | 16 | 30 |
| The Tide † . . . | 250 | 7 | 120 | 88 | 12 | 20 |
| The Crane . . . | 200 | 7 | 100 | 76 | 12 | 20 |
| Adventure . . . | 250 | 7 | 120 | 88 | 12 | 20 |
| Quittance . . . | 200 | 7 | 100 | 76 | 12 | 20 |
| Answer . . . | 200 | 7 | 100 | 76 | 12 | 20 |

* The Tiger, Scout, and Achates had been cut down into lighters before 1603. There are omitted from this list the Vanguard, 500 tons; the Mercury, a galliot; four galleys proper, the Advantagia, the Superlativa, the Volatillia, and the Gallarita; and several small pinnaces and sloops. It will be noticed that Monson divides the seamen into mariners and sailors. Sir Richard Hawkyns also notices the distinction, but seems to speak doubtfully as though not of his own experience and as if the discrimination between the two classes was dying out in his time. He says that 'some ancient seamen' defined a mariner as a man 'who is able to build his ship, to fit and provide her with all things necessary, and after to carry her about the world; the residue to be but sailors' (*Hawkyns' Voyages*, p. 273, Hakluyt Soc.).

† There was no such name in the Royal Navy.

| Names of Ships. | Tonnage. | Men in Harbour. | Men at Sea, whereof | Mariners. | Gunners. | Sailors. |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| Advantage . . . | 200 | 7 | 100 | 70 | 12 | 20 |
| Tiger . . . | 200 | 7 | 100 | 70 | 12 | 20 |
| Tramona . . . | — | 6 | 70 | 52 | 8 | 10 |
| The Scout . . . | 120 | 6 | 66 | 48 | 8 | 10 |
| The Achates . . . | 100 | 5 | 60 | 42 | 8 | 10 |
| The Charles . . . | 70 | 5 | 45 | 32 | 6 | 7 |
| The Moon . . . | 60 | 5 | 40 | 30 | 5 | 5 |
| The Advice . . . | 50 | 5 | 40 | 30 | 5 | 5 |
| The Spy . . . | 50 | 5 | 40 | 30 | 5 | 5 |
| Merlin . . . | 45 | 5 | 35 | 26 | 5 | 4 |
| The Sun . . . | 40 | 5 | 30 | 24 | 4 | 2 |
| Cygnat . . . | 20 | 2 | | | | |
| George hoy . . . | 100 | 10 | | | | |
| Primrose hoy . . . | 80 | 8 | | | | |

Her Majesty left these ships aforenamed at her death in a perfect and flourishing estate. And whilst she lived they made her and her realms worthily renowned by the exploits and victories they and her subjects achieved; and she left in every one of those ships officers serving in their several places whilst they lay in harbour.

But as abuses by continuance of time are crept in for want of care and overlooking, like chimneys that gather soot by continual fires, that may endanger the house if it be not prevented by sweeping, so fared it with our navy at the latter end of the Queen's reign, which Sir Robert Cecyll, the Principal Secretary, carefully foresaw, and caused me to write the ensuing discourse how the then abuses might be taken away and a course settled for a reformation, that the like might not hereafter happen; which I directed to him as follows: *

* This paragraph does not exist in MS. The statement about the ships is followed by the letter addressed to Cecyll, which is only found in B and R.

To the Right Honourable Sir Robert Cecyll,
Principal Secretary to her Majesty.

I have by your honour's command, and my own experience and observation, briefly collected the abuses of our seamen, and the corruptions that are tolerated, and show the injuries offered in furnishing, victualling, and manning her Majesty's ships; and, lastly, how such wrongs may be reformed; all which I humbly represent to your honour.*

Concerning the Abuses of our Seamen.

Nothing breeds disorders in our sailors, but liberty and over-much clemency. The one they have in their ordinary ships of war, where no discipline is used, nor authority obeyed; the other in escaping punishment when they justly deserve it, which hath brought her Majesty's service to be of no more account and reckoning than the actions of private men. It is strange what misery such men will choose to endure in small ships of reprisal, though they be hopeless of gain, rather than serve her Majesty, where their pay is certain, their diet plentiful, and their labour not so great. Nothing breeds this but the liberty they find in the one, and the punishment they fear in the other.

* B and R read: '... reformed. Then I proceed to the Spaniard's providence and subtilty to circumvent us nowadays, and conclude with a project how to war upon them more to the profit and security of her Majesty and State than our former actions have yielded; all which,' &c. The Project is in Book V.

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| The Charles . . . | 70 | 5 | 45 | 32 | 6 | 7 |
| The Moon . . . | 60 | 5 | 40 | 30 | 5 | 5 |
| The Advice . . . | 50 | 5 | 40 | 30 | 5 | 5 |
| The Spy . . . | 50 | 5 | 40 | 30 | 5 | 5 |
| Merlin . . . | 45 | 5 | 35 | 26 | 5 | 4 |
| The Sun . . . | 40 | 5 | 30 | 24 | 4 | 2 |
| Cygnat . . . | 20 | 2 | | | | |
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| Primrose hoy . . . | 80 | 8 | | | | |

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The ships these men covet to go in are neither of service nor strength to the State, or annoyance to the enemy. Their owners are men of as base condition as themselves, making no more reckoning what outrages their ships commit at sea than the men themselves that commit them. They are so much emboldened upon the lenity used toward them that they as ordinarily detain men after they are pressed as if there were no law to prohibit it. Nor are they contented with a competent number of men in their ships, but commonly carry twice as many as their ships and victuals can sustain; and the first carvel or fisherman they take they put their superfluity of men into, who many times sink in the sea, famish for want of victuals, or are forced ashore into Spain, where they must either be compelled to serve against their country or die in misery. And thus have more seamen been consumed than in all other actions or enterprises against Spain. And no man dares reprove it, because the Lord Admiral is interested in all such prizes as these unprofitable ships take.

It is time to foresee and prevent these inconveniences; for it is apparent this neglect of the Queen's service lost her Majesty the Indian fleet Sir Richard Leveson met withal, being forced to leave Sir William Monson with half the ships * at Plymouth for want of sailors to man them, when at the very same time more men were suffered to go in private ships of reprisal than would have manned her Majesty's ships.

And yet this is not all the mischief that ensues upon it; for these men being thus suffered to go, her Majesty's ships are supplied with fishermen at the season of their voyage to Newfoundland, so

* But see *ante*, p. 173.

that not only the sailors, but the countries about them that are supported by that trade are half undone. The men themselves are so unserviceable, and of so weak a spirit, that I look upon it as a principal cause of sickness in her Majesty's ships. These abuses are well known to the Spaniards, which made Zubiaur, their General at sea, covet nothing more than to board one of her Majesty's ships, showing how ill they are manned in comparison of ships of reprisal.

Besides many private voyages have proved prejudicial to her Majesty's designs; for oftentimes they that go in such ships are taken prisoners and give light and knowledge of our designs. Their attempts to the Indies and other places have been warnings to the enemy, they not having force to annoy them. As for example, the two voyages of Sir Francis Drake and Mr. Cavendish about the world, which though honourable to themselves, yet it had been much better for the Queen that they had not been undertaken but with greater forces, for we have now discovered to the Spaniards our finding the way through the Straits of Magellan, which they thought to conceal from us; we have passed by the coast of Chile and Peru up to Panama, crossed over to the Philippine and Molucca Islands, and the East Indies. Thus have we warned, without annoying them, to strengthen themselves in those parts. So that such places as at that time had no defence are now made able both to defend and offend, as appeared by the taking of Mr. Hawkyns in the South Sea, 1594.

And since that time it is apparent by three several voyages made by the Hollanders, the one in 1597, with five ships; the second in 1614, with as many; but, lastly, and especially in the fleet called by the name of the Nassau Fleet in 1623, all which

fleets passed the Straits of Magellan,* attempted landing in divers parts of Peru and New Spain with a force of three thousand soldiers, and were repulsed in those places which Mr. Cavendish had taken and enjoyed, Anno 1587, but with thirty shot.

How to Redress these Disorders.

If it be true, as it is held to be, an easier thing to cure than to discover a disease, then may there be hopes of amendment of these enormities and abuses. But the first thing that must be obtained is, the consent and countenance of the Lord Admiral; for I have showed that these abuses are crept in by his permission, or at least his officers. The second, is not to admit of all men to become owners and captains that are able to buy or victual a ship, but to examine their condition, their estate, and qualities, and to cause them to put in security not to connive at the abuses here expressed. Thirdly, to restrain all private actions whilst her Majesty's are on

* Three Dutch ships sailed in 1595 for the East Indies, and returned in August 1597. In 1598 several squadrons were despatched, by private adventurers, to the Moluccas by the Straits of Magellan. The 1614 fleet, referred to by Monson, was one of six vessels under George Spilbergen, who returned in 1617 after having circumnavigated the world and done much to establish the prestige of the Dutch in the East Indies. The fleet of 1623 was a military expedition of thirty-two men-of-war, carrying 1,700 troops, intended to make a settlement in Brazil and equipped by the Dutch West India Company. It did not approach, and was not intended to approach, the Straits of Magellan. The Dutch historians, who should be better authorities than Monson, say that between 1623 and 1636 the West India Company made 90,000,000 livres in prizes (Accarias de Serione, *La Richesse de la Hollande*, Lond. 1778, i. p. 62; Janiçon, *État Présent . . . des Provinces Unies*, La Haye, 1729, i. p. 394).

foot; but if they will adventure, to let it be done in the company of her ships, where they shall have a share proportionable to their adventure, which I think will prove more beneficial than now they find it. Or, if they will adventure thus alone, give them liberty so to do four months in the year, namely at such a time that it is not fit to have her Majesty's ships abroad, but with this caution likewise, that they be enjoined to return at such a time as the Queen's ships shall have use of them and that the vice-admiral of every county do foresee and provide that no ships carry more men than may be well accommodated, nor less victuals than to sustain them, lest they should run into the mischiefs aforesaid.

This will be the means to redress all abuses, to make men obedient to discipline and command, to avoid sickness in her Majesty's ships, to employ none but such as are serviceable, not to molest the poor labouring fishermen, to give the merchants satisfaction, and to preserve the life and liberty of sailors.

Now follow the Abuses in her Majesty's Ships.

There are so many, and several, abuses in her Majesty's ships that the reforming of one is to little purpose, unless there be a reformation in the whole. And I will first begin with victuals, in which consist the lives of men: in this there is such great abuse in every voyage that there is no man but has cause to complain.

The gunners, into whose charge is committed the strength of the ship, are preferred to their places rather for money than merit. And to descend

to the ships themselves, there are so many impediments in them in our southern voyages that we cannot say anything is strong or serviceable about them. And though their wants be made known before their going from home the Officers of the Navy, either out of frugality, or following precedents of former ages, not considering there was no such employment for the Queen's ships heretofore, have not that care which is expedient. And lastly, the men that serve in them are so evil entreated that they allege it for their only backwardness to serve the Queen.

The Manner how to Reform these Abuses.

The way to redress every abuse is to execute severe justice upon the chief men in office : as, first, the Victualler, if he fail either in goodness or quantity of her Majesty's allowance, let his life answer it, for no subject's estate is able to countervail the damage her Majesty may sustain by such defect. And to take away all excuses of his part, and to provide there may be no failing of the service, it were convenient to have a surplus of victuals transported in other ships, to be exchanged, if upon view the other prove to be ill-conditioned.

Secondly, for the gunners : their deceits in powder and shot, and other things under their charge, are intolerable ; and they have been the more emboldened by the baseness of some captains, who have consented to their theft.

For reformation hereof it were good to have a deputy appointed in every ship from the Officers of the Ordnance, to take charge of powder, shot, and all other things, and to deliver them to such men as

shall be accountable for them at the end of the voyage. For it is no reason so great a charge should be committed to the gunners, who make no conscience to steal, and may steal without controlment when it is in their possession.

Another thing a captain must have orders to forbid, and look precisely it be obeyed, which is the lavish use of shooting for pleasure at the meeting of ships, passing by castles, and banqueting aboard, for indeed there is more powder wastefully spent in this sort than against an enemy.

For the third, which is the disability of ships to the southward, it is occasioned by the great weight of ordnance, which makes them laboursome and causes their weakness. And, considering how few gunners are allowed to every ship, it were better to leave some of these pieces at home than to pester the ships with them. Indeed all her Majesty's ships are far undermanned; for when people come to be divided into three parts, the one-third to tackle the ship, the other to ply their small shot, and the third to use their ordnance, all the three services fail for want of men to execute them.

Neither do I see that more men can be contained in the Queen's ships to the southward, for want of stowage for victuals and room to lodge in. No ship that returns from the southward should go to sea again under half a year's respite in harbour, in which time she will be well aired, and her ballast must be changed.

There should be a general workman appointed in harbour carefully to overlook the ships that shall be employed. This man should go the voyage, and have the like charge at sea. Nothing that is necessary for ships but should be carried in a great abundance by a deputy from the Officers of the Navy, as I have formerly said in the like case of the

Officers of the Ordnance. All precedents of former times of furnishing the Queen's ships to be abolished if they be not beneficial now, and that this officer give an account of the surpluses remaining that what is not spent may be restored ; which will nothing increase the charge in carrying them to sea, and yet the ships shall be so provided as no casualty that can happen at sea will bring them into distress. Besides they shall supply the want of such prizes as they take, who by reason of their long voyages have consumed their sails, ropes, and tackling, as in the like case we did to the carrack, which we could not have brought for England if we had not supplied her want out of the Queen's ships.

And lastly, for the men, for without them ships are not available, their usage has been so ill that it is no marvel they show their unwillingness to serve the Queen. For if they arrive sick from any voyage such is the charity of the people ashore that they shall sooner die than find pity, unless they bring money with them.

And seeing her Majesty must and does pay all men that serve her, it were better for them, and much more profit and honour to the Queen, to discharge them upon their first landing than to continue them longer unpaid. For whether they are sick, or lie idle in harbour, their entertainment runneth on till they be discharged, to the great consumption of victuals and wages, which falls upon the Queen.

Wherefore it is necessary that an under-treasurer be appointed in every fleet, who should carry money for all necessary disbursements. I have borrowed some part of these reformatations, and annexed them to my fifth book, which I presented to the King's view, showing the abuses of this time that are used to his ships and employments.[1]

[I] The position of seamen, in pay and social consideration, was steadily deteriorating during the reign of Elizabeth, but the decadence was not then felt in consequence of the demand for their services in men-of-war and in privateers, which gave them a pseudo-independence. The terrible mortality from disease which occurred in nearly every voyage induced much of the recklessness and insubordination frequently apparent, for only the hope of plunder could persuade men to face the dangers of a West Indian voyage. We talk romantically of the 'youthful expansion' of the race, of 'Elizabethan heroes,' and of 'the spacious times of great Elizabeth,' but it is nearer the truth to admit that it was the first opportunity since the Norman Conquest for piracy on a national scale, and all classes, from Queen to ship's boy, hastened to avail themselves of it, and, for the moment, the ship's boy had the best of it. Private interest and the interest of human liberty in Western Europe may have coincided, but the latter was not the one inspiring the multitude, and it is pure hypocrisy to pretend that the masses—like the masses in all ages and of all social conditions—were moved by anything but the idea of personal or political profit. A few fanatics may have hated the Scarlet Woman, but most Englishmen loved Spanish silver. Raleigh, always a cool and cynical observer, did not believe that those who crowded to fight the Spaniards combated for an idea: 'We find it in daily experience that all discourse of magnanimity of national virtue, of religion, of liberty, and whatsoever else hath been wont to move and encourage virtuous men, hath no force at all with the common soldier in comparison of spoil and riches; the rich ships are boarded upon all disadvantages, the rich towns are furiously assaulted, and the plentiful countries willingly invaded. Our English nations have attempted many places in the Indies and run upon the Spanish headlong in hopes of their reals of plate and pistolets, which, had they been put to it on the like disadvantages in Ireland or in any poor country, they would have turned their pieces and pikes against their commanders.'¹ Naturally the men desired to sail in privateers rather than in the Queen's ships, both by reason of the slacker discipline and the greater chance of prize-money, and Monson's complaints about the injurious competition the private ships exercised against men-of-war in attracting crews were only those that were echoed by admirals for centuries after him, and were no doubt also made centuries before he was born. On the whole, however, there was much less difficulty in manning the royal fleets than in the next century, nor should Monson's repeated statements that privateering was usually a source of loss to the adventurers be accepted unquestioningly. He maintained it in

¹ *Hist. of the World*, Bk. iv. cap. 2, sect. 4.

order to support his argument, but there is various evidence—the tenths paid to the Lord Admiral, the steady increase in the number of ships employed in privateering, the fact that the same owners are found engaged in it year after year, and the ruinous effects on Spanish commerce—to show that when carried on in a business fashion it was profitable enough. Of course the great expeditions, the Queen's and Cumberland's, were failures, but the small men made it pay. If it be true that during the war there were 'never less than 200 sail of voluntaries and others on their coasts,'² or even half that number, the fact sufficiently refutes Monson's persuasion, for owners were not likely to keep their ships out yachting. The impression that privateering was not profitable may have been in part due to the usual circumstance that money lightly got was lightly spent. Bishop Goodman notices that 'the Lord Admiral's office in those times was worth 40,000*l.* a year, and yet no nobleman poorer than the Lord Admiral. Captain Jones, who took many prizes, and sometimes had eight or nine men in livery after him, and lived at an excessive rate, yet died in a beggarly condition. I did once hear a rich Londoner boast and brag what great penny-worths he and others bought of the sea captains; truly those goods did not prosper.'³

The work done by the navy and by seamen was appreciated by experts, but does not appear to have struck the popular imagination, since there are comparatively few references⁴ to either made by the Elizabethan dramatists and poets. There was little romance and less comfort about the sea; it was a business, and most of those who went on it seem, like Raleigh, to have been

² Hagthorpe, *England's Exchequer, or a Discourse of the Sea and Navigation*, Lond. 1625, p. 45.

³ *Court of King James*, i. p. 61. Raleigh might have been added as another example of a successful privateer owner and of extravagance.

⁴ In folklore there is one Kentish rhyme, of the Elizabethan period, relating to 'pilfering seamen.' Such references of the Elizabethan writers as exist are mostly personal in character, that is to say, eulogistic of individuals (*e.g.* Drake, Norreys, Essex), and seem to be motivated rather by the social position of the person spoken of than by what may be called the naval instinct. There is no recognition of the work done by the minor captains and the sailors nor any appreciation of the superior seamanship and vigour shown, all the English success being flatteringly attributed to the prowess of the few chosen heroes. Still less is there any prophetic intuition among the poets of the vision of expansion and sovereignty opening out as the consequence of maritime supremacy. Probably it was not until the naval degradation of the reigns of James I. and Charles I. brought the comparison home to them that the English people as a whole realized the relative excellence of the Elizabethan navy and its connexion with the material prosperity enjoyed under Elizabeth.

glad to get off it as soon as possible. But at the time it was a paying business, and as the handicraftsmen who understood it were limited in number and their services in demand, they could to a certain extent make their own terms, irrespective of character or of penalties for misconduct or breach of contract. Even the sovereign, who had the press system to fall back upon, was compelled to raise wages, although not in proportion to the rise in prices; private individuals had not only to raise wages but to submit to any insubordination, extortion, and want of skill. These conditions did not make for elevation of character. We have seen that the Crown commissioners thought it an insult to heaven to take sailors' evidence on oath,⁵ and from others who were brought into contact with them we obtain similar testimony. Sir Richard Hawkyns is very eloquent on the subject: ⁶ 'Mariners are like to a stiff-necked horse which, taking the bridle betwixt his teeth, forceth his rider to what him list, maugre his will, so they having once concluded and resolved are with great difficulty brought to the reign of reason.' In preparing for his voyage in 1593 he relates his troubles in getting his men together at Plymouth: 'For some would be ever taking their leave and never depart; some drink themselves so drunk that except they were carried aboard they of themselves were not able to go one step; others, knowing the necessity of the time, feigned themselves sick; others to be indebted to their hosts and forced me to ransom them—one his chest, another his sword, another his shirts, another his card and instruments for sea; and others, to benefit themselves of the imprest given, absented themselves, making a lewd living in deceiving all those whose money they could lay hold of, which is a scandal too rife among our seamen.' Hawkyns tells us that he was obliged to engage one-third more men than he needed in order to make up his crews, and mentions Cumberland and others as also victims. Besides the classical illustration of the *Golden Lion* in 1587 there are other instances mentioned in the preceding pages which show how readily the English sailor flew to mutiny when discontented. Hawkyns ascribes many of the mutinies to thefts and frauds committed on the men in detaining wages and prize-money, but that will hardly explain outbursts at sea, and we observe that the sailor expected to have a voice in the conduct of the voyage, and, if he was not listened to, became, to say the least, very unaccommodating.⁷ Discipline was not yet instinctive, and the turbulent independence that was the complement of a vigorous maritime vitality was unchecked by professional pride or an excess in the supply of seamen. In Cavendish's last voyage it was his 'insolent mutinous

⁵ *Ante*, i. p. 293.

⁶ *Hawkyns' Voyages* (Hakluyt Soc.).

⁷ *Ante*, i. p. 267.

company' that determined his return, and Anthony Knevet, who wrote an account of the expedition, paints a vivid picture of the men refusing to come on deck and Cavendish's appearance among them with a rope's end.⁸ Towards the end of the war, when the Spanish flag was driven off the seas, the men became almost frankly pirates, and would obey no one who would not consent to seize neutrals or allies. One captain, who came back from the coast of Portugal in June 1603, told Cecyll that he had not met a single Spanish merchantman, and that in consequence the privateersmen were plundering French ships. When, after examining a Frenchman, he released it, 'my company grew into such a mutiny, by reason I would not rob them, that they would have stowed me under hatches.'

Monson's comments on the victualling, gunners' and boat-swains' frauds, and the other matters, are not at all exaggerated. As regards the victualling the faults were due, during Elizabeth's reign, not so much to dishonesty as to ignorance of what was suitable food and how to preserve it. The English seaman insisted on his gallon of beer a day in the tropics; even if it had been good it would have meant dysentery and liver mischief, but as it was necessarily bad after weeks or months at sea, as beer was then brewed, it spelled pestilence. Salt beef, salt fish, and cheese were the staple articles of solid food, and were cooked in salt water, therefore scurvy was endemic. Sir Richard Hawkyns calls it 'the plague of the sea and the spoil of mariners,' and thought that 10,000 men had died of it in twenty years. The ships themselves were badly ventilated, their holds nearly choked with gravel ballast soaked with bilge water and cask drainings, and the cooking galley, a structure of bricks and mortar, erected in the hold, where the heat from it helped to spoil the provisions and, in voyages to the southward, to debilitate the men. If we add to the scorbutic tendency the effects of malaria and excesses in local wines, the fatal results of the fevers which swept through the fleets can be explained.

No doubt theft, fraud, and embezzlement always existed in the navy as they exist in all human institutions, but they first become notable during this reign because documentary evidence becomes so much more plentiful and a long war afforded greater opportunities. Sir John Hawkyns may or may not have been a conscientious Navy Treasurer, but if he was dishonest he intended that no one but himself should be so, and his official career was a fairly successful struggle with the knavery going on around him.

* The rope's end was meant to be used, for Knevet was knocked senseless instead of the man Cavendish struck at. Knevet also relates a curious story of healing by suggestion, performed by one of the surgeons (Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, iv. p. 1201).

After his death the administration rapidly deteriorated. Sir Fulke Greville, the next Treasurer, was a silken courtier, the Surveyor, Comptroller, and Clerk of the Navy were of doubtful ability or repute, and it is to this period that Monson's criticisms refer. The orgy of plunder which then commenced lasted well into the nineteenth century, but the time of unrestrained enjoyment granted to the ships' officers was but short. In the seventeenth century checks were applied which compelled them to be comparatively honest, and the booty was shared chiefly among the higher placed Admiralty, Navy Board, and dockyard officials, and their immediate subordinates. A sharp distinction, however, should be drawn between the clerical and administrative members of the Admiralty and Navy Board and those belonging to what may be called the professional and scientific branches. The former can only be described in language which would savour of exaggeration unless supported by innumerable quotations from contemporary documents; the latter were sometimes, although not as often as is supposed, dishonest, and frequently wasteful and extravagant, but invariably gave the nation some value, and not rarely very good value, for the money which disappeared. The former were civilians saturated, from 1688, with political corruption and sordid individual interests, slaves of custom and routine, of mediocre ability, at the best unable to realize any higher conception of their duties than industrious letter-writing, and more often ready to sacrifice the welfare of the navy and of the country to their jealousy of the seamen. The professional members of the two Boards were either sailors who came from a fresher and healthier moral atmosphere, whose experience had taught them the needs and possibilities of the navy, but whose outlook was too often cramped by the narrowness and conservatism born of isolation and restricted intellectual associations; or scientific men, so far as shipbuilding and engineering could then be scientific, whose training and work, practical and experimental, inspired wider vision and more liberal views. Previous to 1688 the navy was always under the control of a seaman or of one under the influence of seamen. After the Revolution the growth of the civilian bureaucracy and the maleficent influence of Parliament and politics did much to injure its efficiency.⁹

⁹ Of course there is no diagrammatic dividing line: the political taint may be traced as early as the second Dutch war, but it did not infect and corrupt until after 1688. An immediate consequence of political contamination was the political admiral, and a surviving one is the Parliamentary First Lord. The question, as usually stated, whether the head of the navy should be a professional or a civilian, an expert or an ignoramus, commonly begs the issue, for it assumes that the civilian must necessarily be a politician. In reality there are three terms to consider—expert, civilian, or politician. Hitherto the

The lavishness in saluting, noticed by Monson, seems to have commenced about now, and was very marked during the whole of the seventeenth century. Although frequently prohibited it was not really checked until after the Restoration, when the Duke of

field has been mainly occupied by the last, and to trace the results of the sacrifice of the navy to party needs, nepotism, jobbery, waste, and, worst of all, the feeling natural to a placeman who has succeeded by debating power that as an excuse for place the navy and the Local Government Board are of equal importance, would fill many pages. The professional head has been liable to the personal sins of favouritism and jealousy, but he has been saved by his practical experience in peace and war, and broader intellectual perception of national needs, born of appreciation of the import of the navy in its imperial sense, and it is indubitable that, with hardly an exception, the Service has never been so efficient as when a seaman has been First Lord. That a person should be chosen to fill an office requiring familiarity with highly technical matters and an expert understanding of the theory and practice of a very specialized form of warfare because he has been successful in parliamentary sophistry, jibing his political opponents, fondling the electoral mob, or is an advocate of some shibboleth, an opponent of some shibboleth, a peer, or the relative of a minister, is a subject for laughter or tears according to the temperament of the observer. Only the vitality of the Service, the expression of a living national instinct, could have withstood such an incubus. Had the House of Hanover liked the sea as well as did the Stewarts, or equally understood its potentialities, the navy would, no doubt, like the army, have had to bear the burden of royal rulership; on the other hand, if it has escaped the evil influence of commanders-in-chief by birth, it has suffered from the deadly blight of the bureaucracy and has been insulted by having been placed under the government of politicians of a peculiarly debased type. On official and state occasions an Earl of Sandwich spoke for Hawke and Rodney; and a Melville was the official representative of Nelson.

We are so accustomed in speech and writing to associate the Admiralty with the navy that, historically and morally, it is necessary to differentiate the former markedly from the combatant branch it controls. The latter has not been perfect, ethically or otherwise, but it requires no other defence than the pages of history it has made; and what it has done has been usually in spite of the Admiralty, which illuminates itself, literally and metaphorically, with the credit of its deeds. In the article on the Admiralty in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the writer, the late Mr. F. W. Rowsell, after touching upon some of the many attempts at reform to which it has been subjected, describes it as 'a tree which in some shape or other has not ceased to bring forth evil fruit.' Mr. Rowsell belonged to the department himself, and it would have been well had the written and spoken deliverances of others of his class, from First Lords downwards, attained the same frankness. Much naval history has been written by officials and persons connected with, or dependent upon, the Admiralty, but such productions have not tended towards enlightenment.

York drew up a table of the number of guns to be fired on various occasions. At first the duke's regulations were more often ignored than obeyed, but constant repetition won some obedience. During the early seventeenth century the excuses for firing salutes were extraordinary—when visitors, including the captain's or an officer's wife came on board or left; when healths were drunk; and when passengers came to or quitted the ship. Mansell, in 1603, put into Calais, where 'I neither spared your shot nor powder.' When the King of Denmark left, after visiting James I., 'at every health there were from the ships of Denmark and the forts some three or four score great shot discharged, and of these thundering volleys there were between forty and fifty.'¹⁰ Very often, too, the expenditure of powder and shot—for the guns were shotted¹¹—in salutes was only a cover for stores embezzled.

In 1863 a French historian wrote of it that as an instrument of administration it was one of the most unintelligent existing in any country, 'one of the most extraordinary institutions in this world, and the most inevitably compelled to consume immense resources in order to obtain comparatively poor results.' That was after half a century of political First Lords. M. Raymond, of course, knew nothing of our War Office, and the Admiralty has always possessed the supreme advantage of that comparison which has preserved it from selection as the standard illustration of ineptitude. And it must be admitted that at its worst it has never descended to the depths of the War Office and Horseguards, for, during the eighteenth century at least, the political members of the Board were, if not single-minded, fortunately more often knaves than fools, and therefore the less harmful of the two. A recent Secretary of State for War once said: 'I do not suppose anyone has ever contended that it is the business of the War department to be prepared with a large scale and elaborate map of every country in which his Majesty's forces are called upon to serve' (Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Lords), 21st May, 1901). No First Lord has yet plaintively asked whether the Admiralty could be expected to supply men-of-war with charts of the coasts on which they might be called upon to serve, and this particularly fatuous utterance is significant of the distance yet existing between the two departments.

¹⁰ Goodman, *Court of King James*, ii. p. 140.

¹¹ This habit frequently caused accidents. In Francis Delaval's voyage to the East Indies in 1601, they met a Dutch merchant fleet, and, in saluting, a Dutch gunner sent a shot into a French ship. His admiral sent him to the French admiral to be punished at discretion, but the latter returned him with a request that he should be pardoned: 'How the Dutch treated him afterwards I know not, though I do not much doubt that they hanged him up immediately at the yardarm, for the Dutch observe an exact discipline in their ships, and suffer no crime to pass with impunity; from thence it comes to pass that their navigations are more successful than the French' (Harris, *Nav. atque Itin. Bib.* Lond. 1705, i. p. 256).

Ralegh also notices the paucity of gunners and the effect of the excessive weight of ordnance in straining the ship ; it was the correlative of the heavy armament introduced by Henry VIII., as shipbuilding was hardly advanced enough yet to meet the structural requirements of the guns. Coming home in 1597 many of them had to be struck into the holds of the ships, nor, we are led to suppose, was the occasion exceptional. Theoretically, men-of-war were allowed three men to every five tons of gross tonnage,¹² one-third of the total number being soldiers, one-seventh of the remainder gunners, and the rest seamen. In practice, however, the proportion of gunners and soldiers was not so large, at any rate towards the end of the reign, when the seamen were better trained to serve the great guns. Ships like the *Ark Royal* and *Warspite*, with thirty-eight and thirty-two heavy guns, were allowed thirty-two and thirty gunners respectively. There was no doubt some rule governing the distribution, but it is not easy to define it from the figures, and it is clear that the number would only permit one gunner to each piece, and that the gun crew must have been composed of seamen.

There is no authority but Monson's for the station list he gives, the division into thirds for heavy guns, small arms, and handling the ship, but it will be noticed that this disposition corresponds to the foregoing proportions if one-third were soldiers. A paper of the reign of James I.,¹³ however, tells us that after 1588 soldiers were not employed to the same extent, being replaced by seamen or their room not filled up, and if so this symmetrical arrangement can no longer have existed. His other suggestions did not take effect until long after. Sick and wounded seamen were first provided with hospitals and quarters on shore in 1653 during the first Dutch war, and the deputy treasurer with the fleets was a late seventeenth century innovation, and then was not instituted for the benefit of the men.

¹² The Spaniards allowed one seaman to every five tons of net tonnage. See *post*, p. 327.

¹³ *State Papers Dom.* cix. 139, i.

When all these Things are reformed and well ordered and Ships ready furnished to Sea, the next important thing in a General, is to provide how to get Intelligence of his Enemy, and to keep the Enemy from having intelligence of him ; which in our late Wars with Spain we compassed by the following means.*

WHAT I have said touching an offensive and defensive war with Spain needs no other repetition than what is contained in the fifth book. As I have often said in the precedent discourses, the life of an action by sea is to get intelligence of an enemy, and to keep the enemy from intelligence ; for in that case a man is armed and guarded to encounter an enemy naked and unprovided, as I have instanced in many examples before. For he that gains a victory by fortune rather than by providence cannot challenge the victory as his own, but must allow fortune a share with him ; for success is the tutor of fools, as true prevention proceeds from judgment.

And because in our succeeding actions and wars with Spain, if ever there should happen a new breach, we may not be ignorant how to proceed against that nation by our former precedents, I have annexed these following precepts as a light and

* Instead of this heading, B and R (the only two MSS. containing these concluding sections) have, 'A Project how to have Intelligence of the affairs of Spain by Sea, if we become their enemies, by precedent of former times.' Nor is the first sentence, 'What I have said . . . fifth book' to be found in the MSS.

guide how to get intelligence at our arrival upon that coast, by which we shall be able the better to direct ourselves in the whole voyage. For I have always found that example is of greater force than precept, and that it is an easier thing to follow a lesson well taught us than to compass it by our own practice or study.

The first means we used to get intelligence of the affairs of Spain upon our arrival was to hail into the height of the Burlings, a small desert island, whither every night the carvels of Peniche, opposite to it, resorted to take fish which served the whole country. About the time the carvels were to draw near the island, in the night time, we used to leave some ships' pinnaces, well-manned, near the shore, where there could be no suspicion of them, and, at the day approaching, the shallops suddenly boarded and seized one of the said carvels at least, of which we made good use in two kinds. Besides the advertisement we received from the people in her of the state of that coast, and especially Lisbon, where the greatest fleets and trades are, we made good use likewise of the carvel itself, for they are boats of singular choice sail to fetch up a chase that we could not suddenly do with our own pinnaces, and at the end of the voyage the poor men themselves went not away unrewarded by us. If from thence we stand to the island of St. Michael as the nearest and most frequented by English ships, of all the rest of the Terceiras, who use to trade under the name and colour of Scots, this direction following shall suffice for you to imitate, that I gave a ship of London who was to be either there or at Graciosa before my coming. I gave this instruction to the ship aforesaid upon advertisement the Queen had of the arrival of the Indies fleet at Terceira, and commanded me to hasten after Sir Richard, who was

gone to sea some few days before, and encountered the same fleet between the Islands and Seville, and before my coming to him, as is to be seen in the present voyage in this book.

The Means to get Intelligence at the Terceira Islands.

The instructions following I have formerly used to be informed of affairs in those parts, and employed Captain Whiskynges in a small carvel to the effect following : *

Imprimis. You are to keep company with the *Primrose* of London, which is bound for *Graciosa*, till you come short of that island, and then to leave her on her course to *Graciosa* and yourself to ply into the road of *Villa Franca* and *St. Michael*, where you shall use your best endeavour to speak with the ships, there riding, that trade under the name and colour of Scots but are properly English. And to avoid suspicion and danger that may after arise to the said Englishmen you shall speak with them in the night.

Item. The chief things you shall covet to know are these, viz., of the state of the *West India* fleet ; and whether they be at the *Terceira Islands* or no ; whether they will depart thence, for what port

* Instead of this paragraph B and R, have 'Instructions for Captain Whiskynges, sent in company of the *Primrose*, of London, to the islands aforesaid.'¹

¹ John Whiskynges commanded the *Cygnets* and *Makeshift* in 1586, the *Merlin* in 1587, was master of the *Swiftsure* in the *Cadiz* voyage in 1596, and was captain of the *Richard* of *Plymouth*, the 'small carvel,' in 1602. He was also master of a ship in 1592, when the *Madre de Dios* was taken, and was reported to have secured 'half a peck,' of pearls for himself.

they will go—Seville or Lisbon ; whether there be treasure aboard, how far they ride from the shore ; whether they have intelligence of the Queen's ships being at sea or no, and what else you can learn touching the point of the carracks coming home.

Item. That if you think such intelligence you receive there be not sufficient to satisfy you, that from thence you go to the island of Terceira and view the road of Angra, to see in what state the ships there ride, and what the possibility there is to fetch them out of the said road.

Item. That this being done, you repair to Graciosa, where you shall find the Primrose aforesaid, who against your coming thither shall inquire sufficiently of every particular point contained in the second article.

Item. If you find the fleet of treasure to be gone to Spain, you shall do your best endeavour to find the Admiral or me ten or twelve leagues west from the Rock.

Item. If you be truly advertised that the fleet of the Indies is in any of the roads about the Islands, not adventuring to put forth, that you endeavour to speak with some Englishman of war,* and there to deliver him this letter you receive from me, the contents whereof you are already acquainted with, and desiring God to guide you I commit you to his protection.

From aboard the Garland in Plymouth Sound,
March 27, 1602.

* Privateer.

A Copy of the said Letter sent by Captain Whiskynges to all such Englishmen of war as Captain Whiskynges shall chance to meet with at Sea.

After my very hearty commendations ; Whereas the Queen's most excellent Majesty is advertised of the late arrival of the Plate fleet in the road of Angra, at the island of Terceira, in their course from the West Indies towards Spain. And forasmuch as her Majesty hath sent divers of her ships to sea, whereof Sir Richard Leveson is Admiral, and myself Vice-Admiral, to intercept the fleet and treasure aforesaid, and to annoy the King of Spain otherways, I have thought good in the absence of Sir Richard Leveson, who is put to sea some few days before me, to employ this bearer, Captain Whiskynges, with such instructions for the accomplishment of the service as is thought most convenient for the effecting it ; which instructions I have given him order to acquaint you with. And for the better effecting of the business he hath in charge I will request all you English captains and masters of ships that shall receive this letter of mine from his hands to confer with him how and in what way you may do her Majesty the best service, and that you especially observe this course following, viz., if you shall understand that the silver fleet intendeth to venture home without waftage * from Spain that you presently thereupon use the best means to give notice to Sir Richard, or me, when you shall know by Captain Whiskynges where to find us ; or else that you lay off or on before the road of Angra, and send Captain

* Convoy.

Whiskynges himself upon this service, the managing whereof I refer to your own discretion. But whichever of you shall attend the fleet as aforesaid must observe this direction of mine following :

Upon the Spanish fleet's putting to sea, both of you to pursue them astern till you bring them to the height they mean to hale in. And that done, then one of you to lose company of them in the night, and to ply with all possible speed to the place aforesaid to meet Sir Richard or me.

And that the other bark do still attend the fleet, that if they should alter their height she may in like manner leave them in the night and follow the directions aforesaid, as the other bark is directed ; but with this caution, that you keep a strict account of the shifting of the winds, from the time you left them until your meeting with us, for knowing their height, and observing the winds shifting, there will be little doubt of our meeting. The service you will do to the Queen and state by this, and the good that will redound to yourself needs no repetition, for your own wisdom and discretion is able to tell you ; and therefore not doubting of your willingness and care herein, I bid you farewell.

From on board the *Garland* under sail in Plymouth Sound,
March 26, 1602.

*I have known our state use this policy in time of war, when they desired to be informed of the state of the King of Spain's ships, the places of their abiding, furnishing and building ; they have sent a spy, disguised like a pilgrim, to travel through all the ports of Biscay and Galicia, in his way to Saint Jago de Compostella, pretending his going to be in devotion. By which means he has seen and dis-

* The MSS. examined do not contain this paragraph.

covered all those things he had in charge, and returned with a true relation how things then stood.

The Means how we obtained Intelligence of the South part of Spain by a Method of my own.

In the voyage of Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson to the coast of Spain, you will find an intelligence I received, from certain Scotch and French ships, of five galleons riding at San Lucar watching an opportunity of wind and spring tides to pass the bar of San Lucar, being ready bound for the West Indies. And because I would be particularly resolved of all the circumstances thereof, I employed Captain William Love to the ports of Salee and Mamora in Barbary, with the following instructions.*

Imprimis. That you first repair to Salee ; and if you cannot be fully informed of such things as you desire to know, to depart thence to Mamora, seven leagues eastward of Salee.

Item. You are to have special care to manage your business with secrecy, as well from the English that go with you in the bark, as from the Spaniards and Moors resident in the country. And, because you shall have the better pretence of coming into their harbour, I will deliver you certain commodities to sell that are vendible in that country.

* Instead of the preceding paragraph the MSS. B and R read 'Directions I gave another time to Captain William Love, who I employed in Barbary to know the state of that part of Spain over against it, and especially of the fleet ready to go to the West Indies.'

Item. You are to inquire and seek for the chief and principalest Englishman in either of the two places, and to deliver him a letter with a superscription, 'To my faithful countryman.' And finding no Englishman there, if you break your mind to any other stranger let it be to a Hollander, that either lieth there as agent to merchants, or who cometh out of Holland purposely to trade, to whom you shall have another letter, 'To my dear friend and neighbour.'

Item. If you find neither English nor Hollander, you, having the language, may insinuate yourself into the company of some Portuguese or Spaniard, of whom you may learn by familiar and cunning talk, not as a thing purposely expounded, so much as you covet to know, and finding his intelligence to concur with that I received from the French and Scotch you may the more boldly give credit to him.

Item. The things you are principally to enquire after, are these following: the number and quality of all ships at Cadiz and San Lucar. Secondly, whether the galleons you are employed to hearken after be gone to the Indies, or no; or whether they came over the bar the last spring tide; whether they ride at Cadiz or over the bar of San Lucar; or if they be not gone, to demand the cause of their stay, or when they will depart. To enquire whether there be any ships appointed to waft them to the Canaries, and how many, and their names, because I have already a catalogue of all the King of Spain's ships and their burdens, and knowing their names I may estimate their strength. To learn whether they alter their ordinary course of sailing because of the fear they conceive of her Majesty's ships which they know to be upon their coast. Speak nothing of their wealth, lest it should give some cause of mistrust. I will not write thus particularly, either to the Englishman or the Hollander; but they having my

letter to credit anything you shall say, and showing my hand to these instructions, it will be sufficient for you to know each other's minds.

Item. That you suffer not any of the bark's company to go ashore, nor, as near as you can, any of the Moors to come aboard; but if either happen you must give the Englishmen charge upon their lives not to discover the place and height where I lie. If any talk of the Queen's ships should happen you must seem to hear newly of their being at sea and of the directions they have to lie in the mouth of Lisbon. Do not confess that you have been in England these four months, and lest they should suspect otherwise by the cleanness of your ship you may say you trimmed her at Mogador or some other place you may name.

Item. That finding yourselves fully informed as to these things you desire, or what else you think convenient to know, then speedily to repair to me in the same height you left me; and missing me there, to direct your course to Puerto Santo, where I mean to remain the space of five or six days to repair my ships after the fight if I chance to meet the galleons.

Given on board the Garland, 17th April, 1602.

This bark, on her way to Barbary, met the said galleons, with whom she kept company a while, and leaving them went to look for me. But it happened that the Spaniards passed ten leagues to windward of me before the bark could meet me and so escaped.

*The Spaniards in all their actions against Eng-

* This and the following sections down to *The Queen's Death and the Advantages of the Peace that ensued* are not in any of the MSS. collated for this edition.

land by sea could never set foot on shore, but in the year 1595, when with four galleys they passed from Blavet in Brittany, which they had taken from the French King, into Penzance in Cornwall. These four galleys took, spoiled, and rifled that poor town of Penzance, made no long stay there, but speedily returned again for Brittany.

The plotter of this stratagem was one Captain Burleigh, an Englishman, who was afterwards well requited for his treachery ; for, to be even with him for so foul a fact, Sir Robert Cecyll, the Principal Secretary, writ a letter to him residing in Lisbon, pretending that he was employed as a spy, and gave him thanks for some particular service he named he had done, when indeed there was no such cause, for the man was ever too honest to that side.

Sir Robert Cecyll so ordered it, that this letter fell into the hands of some ministers of the King of Spain, whereupon Burleigh was apprehended, close imprisoned, and cruelly tortured, when he deserved no such severe usage. I speak this, because I would have the world judge how justly he deserved it, and how prettily the Spaniards were imposed upon by it.*

* An Englishman, one Elliot, piloted Spinola's galleys up Channel in 1599. Like most English seamen who deserted to Spain, Elliot was a proclaimed pirate, and as soon as he got into the Netherlands opened communications with a view to pardon. He dangled the bait of a plan to seize the Havana before Elizabeth, but it is more likely that the knowledge that he was deep in Spinola's confidence induced her to authorize Cecyll to offer him a safe conduct to and from England, the pardon being conditional on the value of his information.

Another Englishman, John Lambert (*post*, p. 319), angled for his pardon with a scheme to take Gibraltar, but that was not one likely to attract Elizabeth.

Some Observations of my own.

Whether we shall impute it to the work of God, who disposes of all things, or to the Queen's good fortune which attended throughout the greatest part of her reign, or to the wise conduct of those she reposed trust in, or to the care and skill of the captains, masters, and mariners that took charge of her ships—I know not which to judge of them—but it is very certain, we must acknowledge it for a great and admirable work of God, that in her Majesty's eighteen years' war with Spain by sea, her fleets, which were continually employed on the Spanish coast, in the Indies, and other places, continually abiding and enduring the fury of all winds and weather, never out of motion and working in troublesome water, never for the space of three, four, five, or six months so much as putting into harbour, or anchoring, or having any other refreshment from shore, but still tossing on the waves of mountainous seas that never break, in comparison of ours that seem but little hills to them, the difference in times and tides much altering the case, for upon our coasts and narrow seas, where our greatest wars have been, no disaster to our ships but might be easily remedied and amended, for commonly we were never further from home than we might repair to some of our ports in twenty-four hours.

The marvel I speak of is, that notwithstanding the apparent dangers and casualties of the sea aforesaid, yet not one of her Majesty's ships ever miscarried, but only the *Revenge*, which I said, in her voyage in 1591, was taken by the Spaniards by the unadvised negligence and wilful obstinacy of the captain, Sir Richard Greynville.

And we may partly judge by that ship the *Revenge's* precedent misfortunes, that she was designed, from the hour she was built, to receive some fatal blow ; for to her, above all other her Majesty's ships, there happened these unfortunate accidents. In 1582,* in her return out of Ireland, where she was admiral, she struck upon a sand, and escaped by miracle. Anno 1586, at Portsmouth, being bound upon a southern expedition, coming out of the harbour she run aground, and against the expectation of all men was saved, but was not able to proceed upon her voyage.† The third disaster was in 1589, as she was safely moored in Chatham, where all the Queen's ships lay, and as safe one would think as the Queen's chamber ; and yet, by the extremity of a storm, she was unluckily put ashore, and there overset, a danger never thought on before, or much less happened. And to make this misfortune the more strange and remarkable, the same night, being twelfthnight, it was my chance to be at Cork in Ireland, and passed down from thence in a boat to Cross Haven in the greatest calm I have seen.

If we compare these fortunes of the Queen's with those of her father's, who next to her had the greatest employment for his ships at sea, you will find great difference betwixt them, although we cannot properly call them voyages in King Henry VIII.'s time. For his ships were never so far from home but they might return again with a good wind in twenty-four hours' sail ; as the others never expected to see the English shore, under four, five, or six months, and many times more.

* The *Revenge* was upon the Irish station in 1580.

† The crew were paid sea wages between 1st August and 8th November, therefore it is to be presumed that she did proceed upon her voyage under Hawkyns (*ante*, i. p. 135).

The Disasters of some of King Henry VIII.'s Ships, and the Lord Admiral.

Upon the coast of Brittany, in a fight betwixt the English and the French, the Regent, otherwise called the Sovereign of England, encountered with a carrack of Brest, and being grappled together, were both burnt,* with the captain, Sir Thomas Knyvet, and seven hundred men in her; and the captain of the carrack was Sir Pierce Morgan,† with nine hundred men that perished with him.

The Mary Rose, next to the Regent in bigness and goodness, after this was cast away betwixt Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight, the very same day King Henry boarded her, and dined in her. Part of the ribs of this ship I have seen with my own eyes; there perished in her four hundred persons.‡

* On 10th August, 1512. The statement that the Regent was sometimes called the Sovereign of England is copied from Stow, and is unfounded if intended as a distinctive name.

† Hervé de Porzmoguer. The carrack of Brest was the *Cordelière*.

‡ Seven hundred men, according to a contemporary, John Vowell, alias Hooker, of Exeter, author of the *Life of Sir Peter Carew* (Lond. 1857). The captain of the Mary Rose, Sir George Carew, who was drowned in her, was a cousin of this Sir Peter. The accident occurred on 20th July, 1545, and Raleigh ascribed it to the lowness of the port sills, which, he says, were only sixteen inches from the water-line, and took in water as she heeled in tacking. For various reasons this explanation may be rejected. Hooker, who, if not an eye-witness, had the particulars from those who saw the disaster, attributes it to a general confusion. When the ship was seen to be heeling dangerously Sir George Carew was hailed, and answered 'that he had a sort of knaves he could not rule. . . . It chanced unto this gentleman as the common proverb is—the more cooks the worse pottage. He had in his ship a hundred mariners, the worst of them being able to be master in the best ship within the realm, and these so maligned and dis-

The next disaster that befell the King at sea was the Lord Admiral himself, Sir Edward Howard, who, offering to land in his boat at Bertheaume Bay, near Brest in Brittany, was there slain and drowned together.*

When the Lady Mary, sister to King Henry, was transported into France with fourteen ships of his Majesty's, to marry Louis XII., King of France, three of his ships were cast away, and the admiral, wherein the lady went, being the best and the greatest of the rest, called the Lubeck, was one of them that perished; but by good hap, and industry and pains of men, the lady escaped, but four hundred and odd persons were drowned.†

Within two days after the casting away of the Mary Rose aforesaid, a pinnace of the King's, called the Hedgehog, riding before Westminster Bridge, by a misfortune of shooting off a gun a barrel of powder took fire, and blew her up.

daigned one the other that, refusing to do that which they should do, were careless to do that which was most needful and necessary, and so contending in envy perished in frowardness.'

* On 25th April, 1513, Sir Edward Howard attempted to cut out Prigent de Bidoux's galleys in Blanc Sablon Bay, and was repulsed and killed.

† On 30th September, 1514, the Great Elizabeth, a four-masted Hansa ship of 900 tons, bought into the navy by Henry VIII., was wrecked at Sandgate, near Calais. The Princess Mary was not on board, but waited at Dover for a change of weather, and left on 2nd October. The Great Elizabeth was the only ship lost.—Grafton, *Chronicle*, ii. p. 282, ed. 1809; *Chronicle of Calais* (Camd. Soc.), p. 16.

As I have set down in this first book the state of the War with Spain by Sea from 1585, when it began, till 1602, when it ended ; for the Conclusion of the Affairs of that Time, I will annex the advice and resolution of our State, and the Council of War, for making a defensive war against Spain, when we feared an Invasion in 1588.

If the following discourse seem more tedious to the reader than is fitting, let it not be imputed a fault in me ; for I neither add nor diminish one word from the original copy resolved on by the Council of War, whose names here follow :

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| The Lord Grey. | Sir John Norreys. |
| Sir Francis Knollys, Treasurer of the Household. | Sir Francis Drake. |
| Sir Thomas Leighton. | Sir Richard Bingham. |
| Sir Walter Raleigh. | Sir Roger Williams. |
| | Ralph Lane, Esq. |

The 27th of November, 1587.*

PROPOSITIONS.

Such means as are considered to be fittest to put the forces of the realm in order to withstand an invasion, and the places most to be suspected that the Spaniards intend to land in :

| | |
|-----------|--------------------|
| Milford. | Torbay. |
| Helford. | Portland. |
| Falmouth. | Portsmouth. |
| Plymouth. | The Isle of Wight. |

* *State Papers Dom. Elis.* ccix. 49, 50. The Churchill text adds Sir Richard Greynvile and omits Sir Francis Drake.

These are aptest for the army of Spain to land in.

| | |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| Ness, in Sussex. | Harwich. |
| The Downs. | Yarmouth. |
| Margate, in Kent. | Hull and Scotland. |
| The river of Thames. | |

These are aptest for the army of Flanders.
Places fittest to be put in defence to hinder their landing :

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| Milford for Wales. | The Isle of Wight. |
| Plymouth for the west. | Portsmouth. |
| Portland for the middle of the west parts. | The River of Thames. |

MILFORD.

Although we do suppose the barrenness of the country to be such as it is not likely to be invaded, yet touching Milford Haven, in respect of the goodness of the same haven, we think it convenient that there should be a trained number of two thousand footmen and five hundred horse, to be levied and had in readiness. And for the increase of horsemen, if any lack be, then the gentlemen with their serving men may be commanded to supply the default to the number aforesaid.

PLYMOUTH.

(The most likely place.)

The reason why Plymouth is thought to be the most likely place, is, for that it is unlikely that the King of Spain will engage his fleet too far within the Sleeve before he has mastered some one good harbour ; of which Plymouth is the nearest to Spain, easily to be won, speedily to be by him fortified, and conveniently situated to send succour to either out of Spain or France.

PORTLAND.

(A likely place.)

The reason why Portland is also an apt place to land in, is for that there is a great harbour for all his ships to ride in, and good landing for men. The isle being won is a strong place for retreat, the country adjoining champaign, where, with great commodity, he may march with his whole army.

The reason why the Downs, Margate, and the river of Thames are thought fit landing-places, is in respect of the commodity of landing, and nearness to the Prince of Parma, in whose forces the King of Spain resteth much and reposeth special trust.

How in those places order may be taken to hinder their landing, whether by fortification or assembly of the people, or both.

For Plymouth, both by fortification and assembly of people.

In Devon and Cornwall there are of trained men in the counties and Stannary six thousand men, which are to be assembled for the defence of Plymouth, standing equally to both counties. Of which we are of opinion that in place of muster days, which is very chargeable, and in effect to no purpose, that two thousand of those should be assembled together at Plymouth, under such a General as shall be ordained to govern that western army, to the intent that they may know their leaders, be acquainted with watch and ward, and be thoroughly instructed

to all purposes, that on suddaines * there may be no amaze, nor any confusion. This shall be done the one half at the charge of her Majesty the other at the charge of the country, if the country's charge does not surmount the ordinary trainings.

For Portland, by assembling of men and fortifying.

In Dorset and Wiltshire there are of trained men two thousand seven hundred, which are to be assembled for the defence of that place, and that two thousand of the said number should be assembled and exercised, as before is said, at Plymouth, or in some place of Wiltshire appointed.† For the Isle of Wight to take Somersetshire, in which there are two thousand footmen.

At Sandwich, and the Downs, by the assembling of men.

In Kent and Sussex there are of trained men four thousand five hundred, which are to be assembled in those places for defence thereof; and two thousand of the said number to be assembled at Sandwich, to be governed and exercised, as before is said, for Plymouth.

So likewise for Norfolk and Suffolk, like order to be observed.

Our further meaning is, that these garrisons shall remain but for twenty days, to be thoroughly trained and acquainted with encamping. And then

* Alarms or emergencies.

† *I.e.* That the levies of Dorsetshire and Wiltshire should be concentrated at some place in Wiltshire, as those of Devon and Cornwall at Plymouth.

every such two thousand men in garrison, being so acquainted with this discipline, shall give example to a great army of raw men, whereby there shall be no manner of confusion on all suddaines.

Further, we are of opinion that to these two thousand men there shall be twenty captains appointed, which twenty captains having each of them a hundred trained men, shall receive under their charge, when the army shall assemble, a hundred more; so as in effect there shall be four thousand men in order, and under martial discipline. The choice of which captains we think, for the one half, to be left to the choice of the General of the army, and the other ten to be of the principal gentlemen of the country, under whom there may be soldiers appointed for their lieutenants.

The like order to be observed in every of the other places of garrison.

What order must be taken to fight with the enemy, if by force he be landed.

For the manner how to fight with the enemy, it must be left to the discretion of the General; only we give this advice, that at his landing he may be impeached, if conveniently it may be done; and if he march forward, that the country be driven so as no victuals remain to them but such as they shall carry on their backs, which will be small. Also that he be kept waking with perpetual alarms; but in no case that any battle be adventured till such time as divers lieutenants be assembled to make a gross army, as we have before specified, except upon a special advantage.

Farther, it is thought necessary that in these two provinces of Devon and Cornwall, and in all

others where many lieutenants be, there should one be appointed to be chief to lead the army (that among many lieutenants there be no straining of courtesy), lest by such delay and confusion great inconveniences do grow to the country and advantages to the enemy. And therefore every lieutenant coming out of any country with his force, his authority only to extend to govern his company as colonel of that regiment, and so to be commanded by the General-lieutenant: as, for example, in Devon and Cornwall there are ten lieutenants, whereby it may be known who shall command in either, as need shall require.

What proportion of men must be prepared for armies to serve to that end.

Whensoever the enemy shall land, as if at Plymouth for example, then by the computation of six thousand men armed and furnished in Devon and Cornwall, we do conceive that the assistance of Wiltshire, Dorset, and Somerset, adjoining to the six thousand of the west, will make a sufficient army, being strengthened by the gentlemen and serving-men and other of the country that shall be adjoined, though not so thoroughly armed as the rest. And if it happen, either by resistance or contrary weather, that the enemy pass over Plymouth and land at Portland, then the armed men and trained soldiers of the west shall repair to them. And farther, if the invasion be in Kent, or anywhere to the west of the river of Thames, then those middle shires directed to assist the west may turn to the east along the coast.

If the army of Flanders shall land to the east of the river of Thames, then the same order is

to be taken for assistance with the shires adjoining as is aforesaid, namely, Suffolk, Norfolk, Essex, and the City of London.

And because there is a special regard to be had to the safeguard of her Majesty's person, we think it most necessary that an army should be provided to that end, to be compounded of such counties as are appointed and reserved for that purpose, and to join with the forces of the City of London, and such other as may be armed out of her Majesty's store.

Farthermore, generally for the increase of footmen lacking armour, we think it fit that there be of the able men unarmed, (whereof choice may be made) to join with the trained men armed, one fourth part more ; of the which fourth part of unarmed men, eighty may be pikes, and twenty bills. For the providing of which pikes and bills, there must be speedy provision made, being weapons that the realm does furnish.

Also for the increase of armed pikemen in this time of scarcity of armour we do think it good that all the armed billmen may be converted to be made armed pikemen ; and that all able billmen unarmed should be levied, and chosen in their places, because the ranks of billmen in order of battle are always environed and encompassed about with pikemen ; for the billmen serve especially for execution if the enemy in battle shall be overthrown. But here is to be noted, that there must be reserved a few armed billmen and halberdiers to guard the ranks, wherein the ensigns and drums &c., are placed in the order of battle.*

Also, forasmuch as upon any sudden invasion it would be too late to provide these things, which

* This paragraph is not in either of the two *State Paper* copies of this document.

shall be necessary for defence, it is thought necessary that beforehand twenty pieces * of ordnance and munition be provided, as also powder, spades, and all other furniture whatsoever; and the same to be left in these forenamed places, in which these garrisons shall remain.

It is also to be provided that, at those general assemblies for training, as well the horsemen as the footmen may be exercised. And to that end that at Plymouth, Portland, Sandwich, and any other places that shall be fit to have the like training, the horsemen of the next adjoining counties be brought together: as namely, at Plymouth, those of Devon, Cornwall, and Somerset; at Portland those of Dorset and Wiltshire, Hampshire and Berkshire; at Sandwich those of Kent, Sussex, Surrey, and so forth. But because it may fall out, that in those places appointed for training of footmen there may want forage or place fit for horsemen, it may be left to the discretion of the lieutenants to choose the fittest for the cavalry, as near the footmen as conveniently may be.

SCOTLAND.

Farther, as touching Scotland, which landing we cannot resist, we think it meet that a stronger proportion be considered of for that part, namely six thousand footmen, and two thousand horsemen, whereof to be a thousand lances, arms of far more defence and may be furnished as good and cheap, as the jack, and to be taken out of the Presidency.†

If therefore the army of Flanders should happen to land in Scotland, whereby their forces and

* One copy of this paper says 'a store of ordnance.'

† The Presidency of the North, the northern counties.

strength shall be so great as the army aforesaid shall not be able to encounter them, then we think fit that a good part of the army prepared to guard her Majesty's person shall march to support the army of the north against that enemy, and join with the trained men of that country, and the army of the west be brought to supply that charge.

It is also most carefully to be considered, that the King of Spain is not hopeless of some party of papists and malcontents. All which, if these small regiments before spoken of be not in readiness, it will be too late to assemble for resistance of any foreign enemy, and to withstand them at home both in one day. For every man shall stand in fear of firing of his own house, and destruction of his family; therefore, if any stir should happen, in this case some severe proceedings and execution towards such offenders would be speedily used by martial law.

And to conclude, when it shall be bruited in Spain that there are at Plymouth and other places such a number of armed soldiers under ensigns and leaders, the number will be reported to be double or treble; so as the King of Spain, upon good probability, may conceive that these soldiers, and such as are in other places upon the coast in like readiness, are determined to land in Portugal or the Indies, the same opinion being fortified by the preparations of so many ships as are given in charge to be made ready in those parts by Sir Francis Drake.

We think it also very necessary that, throughout all the countries of the realm, this proportion, as well amongst the armed and trained, as the unarmed pikes and bills, may be observed, that is to say, that of every hundred there be eighty pikes and twenty bills. We think it necessary also that some

order and provision be taken by their lordships, that her Majesty's ships being at Rochester be not entrapped.*

Thus far is the Direction and Resolution of the Honourable Commissioners aforesaid, concluded on November 27th, 1587.

Now follows an Exception to some Points of the Resolution abovesaid.

If I had been of that age and experience as now I am, and worthy to have been called upon for my opinion by so many noble and able personages to the propositions aforesaid, I should have dissented in some things from them, under correction be it spoken, as shall appear by these ensuing reasons.

Our safety upon an invasion depends on three defences : the one, on the good success of our ships at sea ; the second, on our repulsing an enemy in offering to land ; and the third, on our forces within the kingdom, if they chance to land. All which are at large handled, in the precedent discourse, by the prime and most experienced soldiers of our time.

MILFORD HAVEN.

The first direction of propositions by them is Milford Haven, as a place of danger, and wish it may be guarded with two thousand foot, and five hundred horse, with some supplies of gentlemen and their servants, which they think sufficient in respect of the barrenness of the country of Wales.

* The portion 'And to conclude . . . be not entrapped' is not found in the two copies in the *State Papers*.

The ANSWER to Milford Haven.

I conceive, as Milford Haven has the advantage of all havens in England, or almost in Europe, for the largeness and goodness of the port, so there are a multitude of landing-places ; for it is said of Milford Haven, that a thousand ships may ride in it, and not one see another, whereby an enemy may land to his advantage, when he list, without resistance. And in that case, where two thousand five hundred soldiers are designed to withstand the enemy's landing, there is no possibility for them to do service unless the shore should be as well fortified ; which would be a thing impossible.

I would therefore advise, if it were not too great a presumption in me, not to hazard any part of the two thousand five hundred men in seeking to defend their landing, but to draw them to a head, and seek to take advantage of them after their landing ; as, namely, in cutting off the rear and stragglers in their marches, and wearying them with often alarms to prevent the foraging of the country of victuals. And in the meantime to draw and convey the cattle of all kinds into the mountains, that an enemy can neither possess, nor know where to find them ; and for other kind of victuals, as corn, &c., that cannot be conveniently transported, to set them on fire, that the enemy may meet with hunger and famine instead of food.

And if the invaders intend to march from Milford Haven to the inward part of the land (for that is the end of all conquerors) it will easily appear what imminent dangers they will run themselves into.

Their victuals in that part of Wales will not sustain them, and it will be the less, being before destroyed. Secondly, their march will be wearisome and tedious, where they must pass mighty

mountains and find themselves destitute of all succour; in which passages the two thousand foot and five hundred horse aforesaid, knowing the country so perfectly well, as the others do not, they may take great advantage of them. Thirdly, the further they march they will be the greater distance from their ships, and consequently from succour and assistance. And, in the meantime, whilst they are upon their troublesome and dangerous march the Queen will have time enough to draw her forces from the furthest part of England.

PLYMOUTH.

The next that is alleged is Plymouth, as the likeliest place, in respect it is the nearest port to Spain, to give succour; and that they will not in reason adventure their fleet further into the Channel before they are masters of some good harbour.

ANSWER.

I approve these reasons, as a chief ground for an enemy to settle upon; for whosoever invades by sea, above all things must seek to obtain a port for his fleet. Only I disapprove the election of Plymouth before Falmouth; for Falmouth lies more convenient for Spain, fourteen or fifteen leagues nearer to it, a better harbour and outlet, and at that time of less defence than Plymouth, and being possessed by the Spaniards, it will be made stronger by the situation. Moreover Falmouth is in Cornwall, a small shire and narrow betwixt sea and sea, and has no country neighbour to it westward to give us assistance, as Devonshire hath Cornwall to the west, and Somersetshire to the east. But the one and the other I hold as fit to be fortified, as any two harbours of England.

PORTLAND.

Portland is alleged to be an apt place for the Spaniards to arrive in, for that it is a great harbour for all their ships to ride in, and a good landing for their men ; that the island being won it is a strong place for retreat, the country adjoining to it champaign, where with great conveniency they may march with their whole army.

In Dorset and Wiltshire there are of trained men two thousand five hundred, which are to be assembled for defence of that place ; and the honourable commissioners do advise that two thousand of the same number should be assembled and exercised, as before is said of Plymouth. And that some place be appointed in Wiltshire for the succour of the Isle of Wight, and to take the help of Somersetshire, which are two thousand foot.

ANSWER.

The honourable commissioners are misinformed in the state of Portland ; for it is neither an island, nor has, as they conceive, a harbour for ships to lie in safely from all weather. It hath only an open bay, where with an easterly wind ships ride in danger. And if the fleet of Spain should arrive there I should sooner look to have them wrecked upon the shore than to return safe again to sea.

Portland is a road some leagues over from shore to shore, and within it lieth a small bar, and dry haven, called Weymouth, of no defence against an enemy's landing nor fit for great ships, as is all that shore, except only a small port of no importance upon the road. This place is in the state of Milford Haven, that hath an infinite number of places to land in and no possibility to impeach an enemy's landing. And this will serve as well for an answer

to the Isle of Wight, and other places of that sort where there are several landings.

The road of Portland gives us an advantage over the Spaniards, if they should anchor there, by reason of the breadth of the road, which is such that no fortifications from the shore can impeach our attempts upon them. For suppose we should not be able to cope with them in ships, yet, keeping ourselves to windward of them during the time of the whole flood, we shall be able to put in execution stratagems in firing them with vessels we may drive among them. Or, if we fail one flood, we shall be able to attempt them as often as we list, and the flood shall run without danger to ourselves, for during the flood they cannot come to us, and with the first of the ebb we shall be able to ply out without endangering ourselves any manner of way.

I confess it is necessary that the men be mustered and trained in every shire to make them able soldiers, but, in my opinion, it is not safe to design so many men to so many several places, without there be works and trenches made to defend them and to enable them to repulse an enemy's landing. For, if those men should be defeated, the loss of their arms would equal the loss of so many men, and dishearten others that have not been acquainted and accustomed to the accidents and chances of war.

Something I have said to this part of keeping an enemy from landing in my fifth book, where I treat of stratagems, by example of the Downs, and other places where the shoreside is full of small stones and shingles cast up by sea.

HOW TO FIGHT.

The next that follows is the order to be taken to fight the enemy if he be landed, which must be

left to the discretion of the General. What ensues more, by the advice of the honourable commissioners, I refer to their former directions which you have read, and for brevity sake will deliver my opinion for the world to consider.

ANSWER.

There must be great consideration, not only how to fight, but a place must be chosen within the land to make their rendezvous for all their forces to meet together with most conveniency. For, the enemy being landed, we must lay aside all other propositions or stratagems more than to think how to force them in a main battle as we shall hear they direct their course, either by dividing their army, or marching in a whole body.

And for the effecting hereof we must resolve to gather and draw so many men into a body as will make two main battles, the one to attend the south and west coast, the other to be ready to attend the Prince of Parma and his army in the east.

If our ships fail of intercepting the Spaniards landing they will become masters of all our ports, and there is no coast where they shall arrive in England but will yield them store of landing places without resistance, as before I have expressed. And therefore our chief defence must consist in our land army, if we must not employ so many men as is designed to withstand their landing as aforesaid.

For the place of rendezvous for our western army I hold Salisbury the most convenient seat. It lieth half-way betwixt London and Plymouth, which will make the easier march for them both; not forty miles from Portland and that southern coast; not above eighteen from Southampton, nor thirty to the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth. So that we shall in

a manner be upon the enemy before they can be provided or prepared for their march.

All the soldiers that are designed to oppose their landing in Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Dorset, and Hampshire, being joined with the rest that shall be drawn out of the inland shires, will make an army able to encounter more men than three such fleets can either contain or bring.

When it comes to this extremity the countries must have care to drive away their cattle, and live things of all sorts, and to convey their corn and other victuals in carts, and one cart to take it of another, that the first may return back for another load. And if they have not time enough then to burn the rest, and carts also, that the enemy may be disappointed of carriages as well as victuals and for forage for their horses; they coming by sea, their number cannot be great.*

The place to drive their cattle to be near the army, which will surely guard them. This being done, the General is to advise whether to march and meet the enemy before their further entrance into the land, or to suffer him to march into the inward country to have the greater advantage of them, being far from their ships, and by consequence from all relief and help that they can afford them. But I am utterly against the adventuring of our people by handfuls before they come to a main battle.

The place of our rendezvous for our eastern army was well and advisedly chosen in 1588, when her Majesty repaired to her army. First, in respect of the small distance from London, from whence they were to receive supplies; secondly, by the provision made of building a bridge of boats to pass over the river to the succour of Kent, or Kent of

* *I.e.* they cannot have many horses.

them ; and thirdly, for appointing their rendezvous on the Essex shore rather than in Kent. For if an enemy land in Kent he is kept by the river of Thames from coming to London, unless it be by the bridge of London, or of Kingston, which may be prevented by breaking them down : whereas if an enemy land on Essex side, he may march directly to London without let, impeachment, or other impediment, but by the encounter of an army, that may be drawn out of Essex, Kent, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, Huntingdon, Northampton, Lincoln, Norfolk, Suffolk, Middlesex and London. And for Berkshire, Bedfordshire, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, and the shires thereabout, they lie indifferently to give assistance as well to the western as eastern armies.

The honourable commissioners did conceive that this great preparation of ours would so much terrify the Spaniards that it would divert them from their intended invasion upon England, but I believe it proceeded rather out of a hope, or an imagination, than out of any ground or reason, for so great an expedition as this of the Spaniards, is not to be scared away like birds with wisps from a cherry-tree. But if you do it as a policy to amaze them, I fear they are not so unprovided of intelligence from England but to know that the preparation of ships, the quantity of victuals, and the raising of soldiers, does intend no great matter from home.

Besides, if we should fright them with a voyage to the Indies, there are many things required in such a voyage that cannot be suddenly provided, as namely, the sheathing our ships, provisions of all kinds, iron hoops for casks, and many other things needless to express. But suppose we should actually undertake such a voyage from home, I know

not how we can give a greater advantage to the Spaniards, they having so great an army and navy in readiness to assault us wheresoever we arrive ; and in such a place where they shall be continually supplied from home, whereas we shall find nothing but what we carry with us.

PROPOSITION.

Whereas the council of war do advise that in the army that shall be raised there be an increase made of pikes and bills, as weapons that the country affords, and shows the necessity of their being put into such men's hands as have not been taught other arms.

I will be bold, without derogating from those noble persons, to deliver my conceit to this point, and to commend to them a weapon that, though it be known to us, yet has never been used in war, or against public enemies ; and yet in my opinion it may be made useful in the field, where there is neither castle, fort, nor town of strength.

The weapon is a pikestaff, such as keepers and warreners use for the guard of the game, and that every wood affords us without cost. This staff to have an extraordinary long pike, and three small ones to be screwed in at the sides of the staff, and so light that a man may easily command him ; every man in a town to be enjoined to have one. And to give the more credit and reputation to this weapon, and to encourage men to the use of it as an exercise of value, credit, and pleasure, as football, hurling, and wrestling have been anciently used when there was more society and friendliness among men than nowadays, I would advise that all people thus armed with staves, may, every holiday, have a place and time

appointed for meeting and conversation to use these commendable exercises and sports, and amongst them to have men of skill appointed to instruct them, as masters of defence do their scholars till they be made perfect.

At this meeting they may also use wrestling and other laudable sports which would put life and agility of body into them. It will make them courageous to encounter an enemy, and skilful to take an advantage upon him. They need take no care but to wield their staffs with such advantage as shall be taught them ; as a musketeer, with whom they are to encounter, has his musket, his rest, shot; powder, and match to look to, one whereof failing he may cast away his piece for any other service he can do.

Let the musketeer in this case be sure to kill him he levels at, or else the pike will be within him before he can load again and have the advantage of his weapon upon him. And the pikeman, being taught to wrestle, will suddenly kick up the other's heels, and, if he carry ever a dagger or knife in his pocket, he will be the death of his opposite if his staff fails him.

The bill in this case is improper, under correction to the commissioners, whose use is, if an army be routed, to fall upon them pell-mell with blows only. A bill is short, and not so nimble in a man's hand as a staff : it will be commanded by the horse, and a great trouble to him that carries it after the pursuit of an enemy. A staff has no impediment, but may easily overtake a musketeer that is laden with his piece and furniture, that he shall be either forced to yield, or cast away his arms to escape by flight. It will also be an advantage to a man if he be put to leap a ford or ditch, and many other uses may be made of it.

This meeting for recreation will make good

conversation and love amongst men. It will make them abandon alehouses, and think on nothing but on holidays to spend their time in sports, which for many years they have been debarred of. And for the better governing it, and to avoid any hurt that may arise by it, it is wished, that at the time of practice the pikes be taken out of their screws ; and at every such meeting the constable and his deputy be appointed to govern them and punish abuses.

Thus shall all men in the kingdom be made to serve their prince and country without murmuring, exception, or offence offered by one or other. They are drawn to no expense or charge by it, or time lost or spent in vain to hinder their other affairs or labours ; the holiday yields them free liberty for their delights and sports, which have been of later times worse spent.

And thus much of a gentle private opinion, to be compared with that of the honourable commissioners.

The Queen's Death, and the Advantages of
the Peace that ensued above the War in
her Time.

HAVING run over as briefly as I could such accidents as the eighteen years' war did produce betwixt Spain and us, now happened, as you have heard, the Queen's death, which, as was ever likely, produced alterations in Europe, though not much in England. For commonly every State changes with time, and sometimes with advantage to themselves and subjects, for leagues of princes are uncertain, and they are often friends to-day and enemies to-morrow.

When God called her Majesty to His mercy, it had been long looked for and desired by her foes, and feared by her friends. Some laughed, some lamented; Spain and its adherents rejoiced, having tasted the bitterness of eighteen years of war with her. Holland feared, and did begin to foresee their good days begin to wane, because his Majesty needed not to support factions abroad to defend his just and lawful title.

These two nations, that were opposite one to another, had their particular ends; but the people that heartily and inwardly mourned were the English, to see themselves deprived of a sovereign so good and gracious, so virtuous and victorious, whose reign had continued so long, as few of them ever knew other princes in England, which made them suspect that both heaven and earth had con-

spired against them. But this fear was suddenly turned into joy: for when his Majesty appeared and approached near London they recovered a new life and spirit, and received him with that alacrity that they had soon forgot their grief, and fixed their hearts as faithful to serve the King as they had willingly obeyed the Queen.

But before I end with the Queen's death I will show you and the world, by comparison, the difference betwixt peace and war in the Queen's time, if she had been so happy as to enjoy it. For though her actions were of great reputation to her and her subjects, through the success she had against so mighty and potent an enemy as the King of Spain, yet I must confess, the actions of our two succeeding kings (King James and King Charles) settled a firm and quiet league and peace in this kingdom, that has produced greater happiness and benefit if we will lay aside passion and partiality.*

Peace has eased us of needless taxes, which in war princes are forced to lay upon their subjects: peace takes away all fear of enemies, so that every man may live quietly under his olive-tree. Our peace has trebled our number of ships to that of former times; mariners are abundantly increased,

* Instead of this paragraph B and R read, 'Though the Queen be now dead yet before I draw to an end of her reign, or before I treat of any passage at sea in the King's time, I will handle two things necessary to be annexed to this former discourse, the one a design intended against Spain if the war had continued, which was approved by Sir Robert Cecyll, then Secretary of State, at whose instance it was written. The other is an instruction to a General or Admiral at sea showing what is requisite in such a commander by example of the precedent voyages, to which I have added some things which, for brevity sake, I refer to the catalogue of the first book.'

The MSS. then give the 'farewell to the gentlemen,' &c., and the first book ends. The intervening matter has not been found in MS.

and wealth plentifully augmented ; so that we are better enabled and provided to resist the fury of war, either by land or sea, if there should be occasion.

And if eighteen years of peace have produced so great an alteration and change to this kingdom, in comparison of the eighteen years of war past, how happy had we been if the eighteen years aforesaid had been converted into the same number of peace. All blessings had been poured upon this land, which by war was hindered ; for who sees not that eighteen years of trade doubly increased those riches that time consumed ? These errors of ours will serve for a warning to us in future times ; for it is an old saying, ' That example is of greater force than precept ' ; and, ' That custom teacheth nations, reason men, and nature beasts.'

Spain is more punished by the King's peace than by the Queen's war. For, by our peace, England is enlarged by several plantations in America, all neighbours to Spain in their habitations of the West Indies, in case they become insolent, or offer injuries, which plantations in eighteen years are brought to afford plenty of food without the help of England. Which is no small benefit to us, considering the increase of Scotch and French that are ready to devour us : and besides this abundance of victuals, the soil of that country will produce whatever we shall plant or graft there, so that England need spare nothing out of it that will bring a want to it, for their chiefest want is of tools, materials, and other instruments.

The air is delightful, and the climate wholesome, and lies most convenient for other nations to take off their commodities. Then judge, if Queen Elizabeth had not been diverted by war, what honour, what wealth, and all other blessings had she left as

a legacy to her subjects, which was afterwards increased by our two Kings aforesaid.

And besides these seven western plantations, begun and continued by subjects, without expense to the Kings, and not molested by the terror of the enemies, I will sail to the East Indies, three times further distant than the other from England, and where the equinoctial line must be twice cut. There we found a trade to the island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the nearest part of that continent to us. And, keeping the shore of that African coast, we landed at the island of Ormuz, and other places within the gulf of Persia, where we assisted the King of Persia to take that island from the King of Portugal.

But I confess, this was not so commendable as many other noble acts of ours, for here we defiled our hands with stealth ; and what is worse, we did it to aid and benefit a Mahomedan. But mark what the end of that voyage proved to the English, which brought God's anger and revenge upon them, for the Persians treacherously broke their word with our men, and upon a slight occasion seized all the goods they had taken. And besides, an English ship lighting upon greater wealth than the rest was there cast away and perished ; not to speak of many other disasters that befell them.*

We stopped not here, but in the same easterly course repaired to Surat, in the kingdom of Cambaya, under the government of the Great Mogul, to try what trade and riches that King and country would yield us. The long distance betwixt the sea-coast and the Court of the Mogul did not obstruct our visiting him, but thither we sent at times several

* In January 1622 an English squadron from Surat, under the command of Captains Blithe and Weddell, co-operated with Shah Abbas in the siege and capture of Ormuz.

ambassadors, who found civil entertainment, which has afforded us a peaceable trade, with divers immunities.

But before we leagued, or had correspondence with this King, we had settled and continued, and to this day do enjoy a greater trade and further from home than Surat, as namely, at Java, Sùmatra, Jacatra,* the Molucca Islands, and others. We have seen and tried what China and the island of Japan afford, though we are not much encouraged to persevere in those trades, for they do not answer the great expectation we had conceived of them. I dare boldly aver, if the custom-books of that trade to the Indies were viewed, it has yielded the Crown of England many a hundred thousand pounds, all which we must attribute to our peace; for though in the Queen's days, and in the year 1591, Captain Raymond gave a warlike attempt if he and his ships had not miscarried in his going to the East Indies, yet that voyage produced nothing but misery, as you will understand hereafter.

But I know the well-wishers to war, and favourers of the Queen's time, will except against me and all I can allege in commendation of peace as placing it before war. But in answer to them, I say, I was as great an actor in those days of war as any other that shall question what I say, and have as good reason to judge of the difference of times as they, if partiality and faction do not transport them.

And because I insist so much upon peace, and go about to prove the good it produced above the Queen's war, I expect to be hit in the teeth with his Majesty's late war with Spain in 1625, and with France in 1627. But before I come to that time, I

* The native name of Batavia.

must tell them that King James, who reigned twice as long as his son, reckoning to the year 1635, could not be said to have been molested or his countries infested by enemies. And the accident that fell out in the days of King Charles might rather be termed an act of unkindness with the King of Spain than of malice, and therefore deserved not the name of war, for it was begun and ended before either side could think to frame themselves to hostility. And who knows not that some evil and passionate counsellors drew our King to a sudden and sharp revenge upon France, which was as quickly ended as words could give satisfaction.

But I would ask these captious persons whether either of these two unkindnesses or occasions were so violent, or of so long continuance, as to hinder his Majesty's designs to enrich his kingdoms, or whether the plantations failed by any misfortunes we found by war.

Another objection will be made against what I say of our plantations, which is, that they were known to us long before, and that English ships visited the East Indies in the Queen's time. And perhaps they will press me with the first discovery of Sebastian Cabot, Anno 1497, from fifty-eight to thirty-six degrees of latitude; which I thus answer: *

No relation of Cabot's ever mentioned his possession, or setting his foot ashore to inhabit any of the lands betwixt the degrees aforesaid; and therefore we can challenge no right of inheritance, wanting proof of possession, which is the law acknowledged for right of discovery. And by this argument the Spaniards may as well encroach on us

* The degrees of latitude quoted, which are given differently by various historians, show that Monson was following Lopez de Gomara's *Historia General de las Indias*.

upon as colourable title, because they were the first that sailed into America.

The second objection is, the proof of our inhabiting Norambega,* a part of the main continent of America, and betwixt the degrees aforesaid, in 1584; and so we say Captain Raymond, before spoken of, was in the East Indies in 1591.

I confess here was a possession in 1584, and a patent granted Sir Walter Raleigh, who placed there a colony; but so ill seconded, that all the planters were there consumed, and no memory left of them, though our late planters endeavoured to find what became of them. Whereby we may say our possession was lost, as in the case of inheritance that for want of heirs a man forfeits his estate.

And to answer the objection of the East Indies, there is no mention of possession by Drake, who was there the first of any Englishmen, when he sailed round the world, and before the reign of King James. And moreover, in the forty-third year of the Queen, and the year before she died,† she granted a patent to certain merchants for fifteen years' trade to the East Indies, which was prolonged in the ninth year of King James‡ to continue for ever; but the Queen lived not to see the return of that first voyage which Captain Lancaster went. And, moreover, his employment was as well to take by violence as to trade by sufferance, and unworthy the name of an honest design. For the hands of

* The name Norambega (and its variants) appears to be of French origin, and to have been established by the Breton and Norman seamen. It was sometimes applied to the whole eastern coast of North America from Cape Breton to Florida, and sometimes to a cape, river, or village. (H. HARRISSE, *Découverte et Évolution Cartographique de Terre-Neuve*. . . . Paris, 1900.)

† The charter was dated 31st December, 1599.

‡ 31st May, 1609.

merchants should not be stained or polluted with theft ; for in such case all people would have liberty to do the like upon them.*

But indeed, the most memorable thing we can challenge by that trade is that we have lately agreed with the Portuguese, who were the first discoverers, and to this day enjoy the benefit of it, have settled their government and language, built rich and curious cities, churches, and monasteries, and all things else that belong to a civil nation, in as large and ample a manner as in their own country of Portugal : and more than this, they have the command of many civilized countries adjacent to them. They have ships sufficient to uphold the trade betwixt Portugal and the Indies ; and yet they are willing to make us sharers in their commerce, and to incorporate us as freely as themselves, with promise to employ and freight our ships for our better satisfaction.

But give me leave freely to deliver my opinion concerning this voluntary offer made by the Portuguese, who hitherto could be brought upon no account to grant us trade. We must conclude they are drawn to it rather through necessity than love or other respects, for they find the intrusion and good success of the Hollanders to be such as in time may hazard their ruin and subversion in the Indies without the help of England, who is best able to right them. Therefore let us consider the

* Lancaster's proceedings were not altogether peaceful, but he was constrained by circumstances rather than by his instructions. An unsympathetic critic might inquire what distinction Monson drew between plundering the Portuguese in the East Indies and in Cezimbra Bay in time of war. The master of an Elizabethan merchantman who had failed to attack an enemy, if the circumstances were favourable, would have been held guilty of a gross neglect of duty to his crew, his owners, and his country.

time and the occasion of this overture and embrace it as friendship grounded upon interest ; for though leagues betwixt States be to support one another yet every one has his particular advantage. I will say no more to this point but advise you to safety and security, and to beware you be not deluded with golden pills wherein is hidden most deadly poison.

A Farewell to the Gentlemen to whom I
dedicated this Book.

GENTLEMEN,—I make you the Alpha and Omega of my discourse ; for at the beginning of this book I commended it to your view, and now, at the end, I take my leave with a loving farewell, adding this admonition by way of caution—that you beware of adventuring yourselves and estates upon sea journeys. You may perceive, by my observations, what peril they bring without profit, and what pains without preferment ; for there are few, if you will enter into particulars, whose employment has gained them advantage. As to the contrary many are brought to want and misery by them.

Our private actions of reprisal have been as fatal to the adventurers as Sejanus's horse to the riders, or the spoil of Toulouse to Scipio's soldiers ; for to this day there remains a proverb in France that he who is unfortunate, ' has some of the spoil of Toulouse in his house.' And so fares it with our undertakers of reprisals, for wealth so gained brings a curse with it, and not only wastes itself but consumes goods well-gotten if mixed with it.

Take notice of these few persons following, instead of a multitude I could recite, that have been brought into the estate of Sejanus's riders, or the destroyers of Toulouse ; and it will appear that God was displeased with their actions and punished their designs.

I will begin with the Earl of Cumberland, whose voluntary undertakings brought a cross upon

him in his first two journeys, bereaving him of two hopeful sons whom this kingdom could not match. And in the prosecution of such actions he so greatly impaired his estate, that his heirs, and their posterity, have just cause to bewail his proceedings.

The three eminent men of that time by sea were Drake, Hawkyins, and Frobiser, none of which left any legitimate child to enjoy his labours. And if two of them were now alive, they knew not where to find the estates they left behind them.*

The miserable gentlemen that undertook such enterprises for gain, to recover their spent and consumed estates, were Cavendish, Chidley, Manby, Cocke, with many others I could name, whose funerals were all made in the bottomless sea, and their lands consumed and turned into the element of water.

And if we descend to the towns, which for a time flourished by the goods so gotten, and examine the conditions of them and their inhabitants, we shall find not only the people but the places impoverished after the same manner they were enriched (that is to say), by rapine, spoil, and piracy. And I may further say that there are not three men in this kingdom who can boast they have succeeded their fathers in any quantity of goods so gotten.

What I warn you of is not so much out of persuasion as precedents and example, which is the north star for men to sail by. But if your wilfulness will not admit of advice, and hereafter you feel the

* This seems a taunt deliberately directed at Sir Richard Hawkyins, whose legitimacy has not been questioned by anyone else. Frobiser died a wealthy man, Sir John Hawkyins certainly left property, and as there was a law-suit between Drake's widow and his executor the inference is that there was something to fight for. See also *ante*, p. 246, on this subject.

smart of it, remember that counsel is always full of perturbation to such as are embracers of their own wills.

And remember the saying of a grave and wise councillor, ' That as youth warneth thee to prevent the worst, so age bids thee provide for the best ' ; for it is a sickness of most men to be guided by opinion and not by judgment. But wise men do otherwise, for if they run into an error they seek quickly to amend it.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

APPENDIX A.

PEDRO ESTRADE'S LETTER.

Calthorpe MSS. Hist. Man. Com.

[Appendix to Second Report.]

(This letter, written by a Spanish soldier who made the luckless Armada voyage, no doubt came officially into the possession of Lord Calthorpe's ancestor, Robert Beale, a Clerk of the Privy Council in 1589. The writer was among the 'entrettenidos,' or additional officers detached to serve in the Spanish fleet with a view to replace the waste to be anticipated from the fleet actions and, later, in Parma's army. The translation is obviously a very bad one; not only is it baldly literal—that form of literalness which consists in giving the exact dictionary translation of a word without regard to its real meaning—but in several places the translator found himself unequal to his task, with the result that probably some passages have been omitted and certainly some others entirely misrepresent the original Spanish.

In considering to which ship Estrade was attached the salient clue given us is the reference to the death of Don Philip de Cordova while 'trimming our foresail.' He was a son of Don Diego de Cordova, Master of the Horse to Philip II., and therefore a person of some importance. His death, in the manner described by Estrade, is noticed by several writers whose accounts are printed by Don C. Fernandez Duro (*La Armada Invencible*, i. p. 125; ii. pp. 261, 272, 287, 410). Some of these narrations also say that he was on board the San Marcos, a galleon of the division of Portugal which included the chief fighting ships of the Armada and was under Medina Sidonia's immediate command

(Fernandez Duro, i. p. 125 ; ii. pp. 67, 261 ; *Col. de Doc. Inéditos para la Hist. de España*, lxxxi. p. 216). Estrade's ship came back to Spain, so that if the San Marcos was wrecked the identification fails ; but of all the writers quoted only one, Don Luis de Bavia, the author of a Pontifical History, says that she was lost. Don C. Fernandez Duro himself does not include her in his lists of those that are known to have returned or of those known to have been lost. Of course the stories printed in the *Armada Invencible* are (assuming in all cases the good faith of the writers) of unequal value in weight of authority, some being by those who were both eye-witnesses and seamen, some by eye-witnesses or seamen, others by those who were neither. Don Luis de Bavia belonged to the last class, and it seems unlikely that he alone should have been in possession of information unknown to others better placed to obtain such knowledge, and who seem to have given all the details they knew. Therefore the probability is that he was mistaken in his reference, little more than casual, to the fate of the San Marcos. A minor point tending to the identification of Estrade's ship with the San Marcos is to be found in the fact that the latter is known to have been in the thick of the fights in which the former was closely engaged.

I have not found Estrade's name mentioned in any Spanish document other than the list of 'entreténidos,' but from the fact that this letter is addressed to a brother 'in the Indies,' it may be surmised that he was a member of the well-known colonial family of Estrada, settled in Mexico since the Conquest. Alonso de Estrada, a natural son of Ferdinand the Catholic, was the first Treasurer, under Cortes, of the newly-conquered country.)

The translation of a letter written in Spanish by one that was in the Duke of Medina's fleet to his brother in the Indies, intercepted by one of the venturers by letter of reprisal, 1589.

We went forth with the fleet out of Lisbon towards England the year 1588, whereof was General the Duke Medina Sidonia and John Martinez de Recalde was his Vice-Admiral. Saturday, the 14 May, part of the fleet went from Lisbon, and on Sunday the 29, all the rest of

the fleet went forth and came to an anchor in Cascaes.¹ Monday, the 30 May, the Vice-Admiral went forth and another galleon that remained within, and this day we set sail and our course towards the Groyne, whereas we were with foul till² Tuesday, the 14 June, that we saw Cape Finisterre, whereas we were turning up and down till Sunday the 19 of the same. Then entered the Vice-Admiral St. Martin³ and other some of our ships into the Groyne, and the rest kept along the coast. We remained in the Groyne till we were all joined together, and Friday, the 22 July, we went forth of the Groyne and came to an anchor east and west with Ferrol. And Saturday the 23 of the same we set forth with the wind at south, bearing towards the north to seek the coast of England.

And Friday the 29 of the same at four of the clock in the afternoon we sounded at sixty-five fathoms, and presently the same day we saw the land which was the cape of the Lizard.

Saturday, the 30 of July, we were becalmed six leagues from the land; and in the afternoon,⁴ nigh unto —, ⁵ we discovered about 76 sail and knew them to be the English fleet. They did bear towards the east, the wind being at south-west. Then we remained⁶ until it was day and ran under our foresails, which was a great oversight.⁷

Sunday, the 31 of the same, at the break of the day there was betwixt us and the shore 7 sail of the enemy, and to the S.S.W. 69 sail. Then did we put ourselves in

¹ 'Cast Cales' in MS. The dates are all New Style.

² *I.e.* 'when we experienced foul weather till' &c.

³ It is not clear why the San Martin, Medina Sidonia's flagship, should be called the Vice-Admiral, but the same expression occurs again towards the end of the letter. In the Spanish the San Martin would be the Capitana; perhaps the explanation lies with the translator.

⁴ About three o'clock.

⁵ Blank in MS.

⁶ From the Spanish *amainar*, to strike sail.

⁷ Apparently the result of the council of war, in which Medina Sidonia had refused to follow the advice of the leading seamen and attack in Plymouth harbour, was known through the fleet, and doubtless Estrade's view represents the general feeling. Both the duke and his critics overlooked the fact that Howard was not likely to wait for him.

order and the 7 sail joined with the 69, as they were that day in all 76 sail.⁸ Our Vice-Admiral did put himself to the N.N.W. of us.⁹ And they began to shoot off their artillery very well and shot two bullets into the foremast¹⁰ and came bearing up, the wind being at south-west. And the English did prolong,¹¹ lying close by the wind of us. And we paid them very well with shot, although the English had the vantage by reason of good powder, store of shot, and good ships of sail and by a wind. Don Pedro de Valdes did put himself with his Vice-Admiral to the south-west of the army, and did what he could with very good artillery which the Rat¹² had, and some other ships that put themselves forward did what they could. The Vice-Admiral of the galleasses¹³ went putting himself into our

⁸ Several accounts say that the English came up 'en ala' while the Spaniards were formed into three divisions. For a discussion of the meaning of 'en ala'—whether 'line abreast' or 'line ahead'—see Mr. Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, i. pp. 45, 46, ii. pp. 207, 208, 2nd ed.

⁹ Martinez de Recalde on the left flank, the rearguard.

¹⁰ Unless something is omitted here the text implies that the foremast of Estrade's ship was struck; but the phrase probably relates to the Vice-Admiral's ship of the preceding sentence. Martinez de Recalde was at this time on board the San Juan, his own ship, the Santa Ana, the flagship of the Biscay division, having got away from the Armada towards the French coast, where she was subsequently wrecked at Havre. One writer (Fernandez Duro, ii. p. 248) says that the English 'shot two cannon balls into the foremast of our almiranta San Juan'; two others (*ibid.* ii. pp. 266, 378) refer to the injured mast of the Vice-Admiral's ship without mentioning her name. It will be remembered that Martinez de Recalde, besides being in command of the Biscay division, was acting as Vice-Admiral of the whole fleet in the San Juan, of the Portugal division, the Almiranta-General.

¹¹ A literal translation of *prolongar*, to lengthen or to stretch out, and, nautically, to go alongside. As a military officer Estrade would be unlikely to intend the word to be understood in its naval sense. He may mean that the English were straggling, or that they opened out intentionally.

¹² The Nuestra Señora del Rosario was the flagship of Valdes, and the San Francisco his Vice-Admiral. The Rata Encoronada was one of the Levant squadron under Don Alonso de Leyva, who this day commanded the vanguard or starboard division of the fleet.

¹³ The Zuñiga.

horn of Don Pedro Valdes ; and the English when they saw the galleasses to renter,¹⁴ they retired and went away all that they could. And the artillery ceased and we did apart ourselves. The artillery endured this day from nine o'clock in the morning till four in the afternoon,¹⁵ and we bare east and by north to the cape of Torbay. And about five of the clock in the evening Don Pedro Valdes did leave the ship of Santonne de Nuigochea, the Katherine ; and the Gallega had her foremast or bowsprit broken.¹⁶ And forthwith she shot off three pieces, but not one of the whole army did come to her. And within a little while after her foremast fell down upon her mainmast ; then again she shot off four pieces, but there were none that came to succour her, for that the wind did blow much, the sea was grown, and the English did follow us. At prayer-time we left her for that the Duke of Medina did shoot off a piece with a bullet by which we proceeded on our way. After we understood that she was boarded with five galleons, who did much harm unto Don Pedro and slew all his people, and apprehended him and is now prisoner by the Queen of England's order. The same day there kindled a fire in the Vice-Admiral Oquendo which shot off their pieces and blew up their orlops, and there were slain and burnt 300 men. And the next day, in the evening, we left her and the English went into her, shot off a piece and went aboard.

Monday, the 1 August, north and south with Plymouth, the enemy was in the wind being calm at west.

Tuesday, the 2 August, at break of the day, the wind being at north-east, we gave chase to the enemy, the galleasses with some other ships wearing unto them, playing with their ordnance, turning in the wind from the south-west to the south-east, fighting with us, and there was great

¹⁴ *Sic* in MS. Perhaps 'recounter.'

¹⁵ A Spaniard on board the San Martin estimated that the English fired more than 2,000, and the Spaniards 720, round shot during this action.

¹⁶ The MS. is obviously corrupt here. The N. S. del Rosario fell foul of the Santa Catalina, the former losing bowsprit and then foretopmast. 'Gallega' must refer to the N. S. del Rosario as a Galician-built ship. Geronimo de la Torre (Fernandez Duro, ii. p. 400) calls her 'una nao Gallega.'

store of cannon shot.¹⁷ The Vice-Admiral of John Martinez de Recalde¹⁸ came entering in from the south-east, and with him and John Gomez de Medina¹⁹ and other ships we came so nigh unto the Vice-Admiral that with one piece of cast-iron we shot two bullets into the Vice-Admiral of the English, and there was great shot of ordnance. And the galleon St. Martin did bear room²⁰ with us, and played with her cannon almost with all the whole army in such sort that in²¹ more than one hour we could not see her for smoke. The shot of artillery endured this day from seven of the clock in the morning till five in the afternoon at the cape of Torbay.²² If this day we had had galleys we had overcome them, for that we did break and separate the army in many parts. And forthwith we cast about to the east and by north to find the Isle of Wight, with the wind fresh at south-west, all our ships in very good order.

Wednesday the 3 of the same at break of day, being north and south with the Isle of Wight, afore wind, they came shooting at us, and at the end of two hours they left us for that the galleasses did evil entreat them and hurt one of their best galleons, for that she did amain²³ and all the rest remained with her, and we went forward to the east and by north, being calm all night.

Thursday, the 4 August, at the break of the day, the

¹⁷ The change of wind having put the English to leeward, the Spaniards engaged the *Triumph* and five merchantmen for an hour and a half, when the wind veered from S.E. to S.S.W.

¹⁸ The Vice-Admiral (Almiranta) of Recalde's division was the *Gran Grin*, but he was now on board the *San Juan*, the Almiranta-General (Laughton, *Armada Papers*, ii. p. 384).

¹⁹ In the *Gran Grifon*, the flagship of the squadron of urcas or hulks.

²⁰ Bore down; this is probably the translator's rendering of *arribar*, to bear down—to 'bear room' being its English equivalent.

²¹ Oy. 'for more' &c.

²² Off Portland. Possibly Estrade, who cannot have known much of the nomenclature of the south coast, was told that it was the Start; or possibly in writing this letter afterwards from notes or memory he mixed up the information given him.

²³ Two authoritative Spanish texts (Fernandez Duro, ii. pp. 236, 423) say the same; the English accounts do not mention the incident.

hulk of P^o Meras ²⁴ was so nigh unto the enemy that more than twenty came shooting at her very strongly, but none of them did lay her aboard, although they were very nigh them, and there went to succour her the galleasses and a frigate of Portugal. This day they did very well, and on the one part and on the other part there was much shot artillery till it was eleven of the clock and the English stood close by the wind. There were this day some ships that were wended about by five flat bottomed boats ²⁵ for that it was calm and fair weather, till the wind came to the south-west as we went forward on our way, and they followed after us.

Friday the 5 of the same at Cape Deursaga ²⁶ it was calm all day. This day we sent out a pinnace ²⁷ unto the Prince of Parma, and in the evening the wind came to the south-west and we bare to the north-east and by east.

Saturday the 6 of the same we saw the land of Cape Dearmes ²⁸ and in the evening we came to an anchor upon the coast of Calais at fifteen fathoms. This day there joined with the enemy other thirty sail that came out from Dover

²⁴ Pedro Meras was owner of the hulk Duquesa Santa Ana (Fernandez Duro, i. p. 391) of the Andalusian squadron. It has usually been held that it was Recalde's flagship Santa Ana whose lagging brought on the action off the Isle of Wight. There were four ships named Santa Ana in the Armada.

²⁵ The Lion and Ark Royal were towed into action by their boats; the Triumph's towed her to windward of the Spaniards.

²⁶ We have to consider not only what Estrade wrote, but the translator's rendering of Estrade. There is little doubt that Deursaga is the Ferlaga—Fairlight Down—of the Spanish hydrographers. Fairlight, rising 599 feet above the sea-level, is still a landmark, and was a more important one in Elizabethan navigation than now.

²⁷ Domingo Ochoa was sent to ask for round shot, and for some of the light vessels Parma had at Dunkirk (*Col. de Doc. Inéditos*, lxxxi. p. 214). This confirms Medina Sidonia's *Diary*, which, however, says 'flyboats.' Flyboats were large, heavy-sailing, cargo vessels, which would have been quite as incapable of closing with the English as were the galleons. 'Navichuelos'—little barks—is the more appropriate description of another writer.

²⁸ This must be the Cabo de Arnes of the Spaniards which corresponds, in position, to Gris Nez. But the *Diary* says that 'the coast of France being that near to Boulogne' was made at 10 A.M. on Saturday.

and came to an anchor south-west of us. So this day with such ships as came unto them along the coast there were above 150 sail, yet in that which I did see and others likewise there were but 18 good galleons, or 20, of 300 tons, and the rest small, which did amaze me. The English did well accomplish their business (but with the secrets of God).²⁹

Sunday the 7 of the same we were still at an anchor on the said coast, till it was the break of day that they did awake us with fire. This day there came a frigate from the Prince of Parma, and said that he was not ready, which was evil news, and straightways the frigate returned.³⁰

Monday the 8 of the same at two of the clock in the night we saw coming all afire eight ships of the English in very good order towards us, with the flood, which came very swift, the which caused us to let slip our cables to the end, and we were marvellously separated bearing from the banks of Flanders. We could not veer our sheets by reason of the flats. And it was miraculous that some of our ships did not light on them; if it had not been for those flats we had veered and so fled, but we could do no less but fly.³¹ The galleass of Captain Varo broke her rudder upon Calais sands, and she was beset with more than forty small ships. All the men fled away swimming, and the general of her was slain with stabs, for he remained there all alone.³² And we went shooting of our cannon

²⁹ *Sic.* Perhaps the Spanish form was 'for reasons which are the secret of God.'

³⁰ Don Rodrigo Tello gave his own impression that Parma was not ready. The same day Medina Sidonia received information, but not from Parma, that the latter would not be ready for a fortnight.

³¹ It is possible that the original Spanish said something about not being able to let fly the sheets. Neither officers nor men were yet ready to run away.

³² As Estrade can have known the fate of the San Lorenzo only by report, his inaccuracy here seems to support his general truthfulness when he was himself present. The galleass's rudder was disabled through fouling a cable, and she drifted ashore, but Don Hugo de Moncada was shot and not stabbed. The ensign of the galleass fell into the possession of Wm. Wackelin of Dover, and he was ordered to send it up to London (*Acts of the Privy Council*, 17th August, 1588).

very strongly, and the galleon St. Philip remained all alone, tarrying³³ that they might lay her aboard, and did not shoot off any piece till such time as they did very evil entreat her, for that all that passed did shoot at her. The galleon St. Matthew remained in her succour, who likewise passed much evil. We left them this day, being very evil entreated and with great leaks. St. Philip went for Calais and St. Matthew for Flushing and fought with the fort till such time as they sunk her.³⁴ St. John of Sicily and the ship of Ochoa degoyaga,³⁵ and one hulk,³⁶ remained this day among more than twenty galleons and ships ; but they were not boarded but with bullets, and so they cleared themselves. St. John of Sicily and the hulk cast about towards us but very evil entreated ; yet the English would not board our ships in any wise, although we did amain and tarried for them and suffering all their shot of good artillery. And the ship of Ochoa degoyaga remained much spoilt and we left her, for we had not time to take in all the people.³⁷ So we bare out of the north and north-east with great disorder investing one with another and separated ;³⁸ and the English in the wind of us discharging their cannons marvellously well, and discharged not one piece but it was well employed by reason we were one so nigh another and they a good space asunder the one from the other. The Vice-Admiral St. Martin went before, shooting her artillery. This day was slain Don Philip de Cordova, with a bullet that struck off his head and struck with his brains the greatest friend that he had there, and 24 men that were with us trimming our foresail. And whereas I and other four were, there came a bullet and from one struck away

³³ 'Taryg' in MS.

³⁴ The San Felipe and the San Mateo were both taken by the Dutch. The banner from one of them was placed in the Great Church at Leyden ; only a fragment of it now remains.

³⁵ Qy. Pedro de Ugarte.

³⁶ Probably the San Salvador (Major Hume).

³⁷ Probably the Maria Juan of the Biscay squadron (Fernandez Duro, ii. p. 284).

³⁸ Some close together, some separated. The 'investing' of the text is evidently the Spanish *embestir*, which in the sixteenth century meant to fall alongside or to board. The remainder of the sentence suggests that the Spanish ships were falling foul of each other.

his shoe without doing any other harm, for they came and plied so very well with shot. And in the afternoon as I was below discharging my artillery there was a mariner that had his leg struck all in pieces and died presently. Many disgraces³⁹ have happened, I cannot recount them all; yet for the English I believe they also have had their part, for I do believe that it hath not been seen a fleet to endure their artillery so many days, for the time was long. This last day of our discomfort or spoil from 2 of the clock in the morning till it was 3 in the afternoon we bore to the north-north-west with great disorder, they following us.

Friday the 12 of the same they left us and went towards the shore, and we followed our voyage with evil and contrary winds until we came in 61 degrees, leaving every day behind us ships that were spoiled. And Wednesday the 20 of the same we remained all alone with the galleon of the Duke, for that our mainsails and topsails were all too torn by reason they were old. The 22 of the same⁴⁰ we saw the land above Sella,⁴¹ and Sunday the 25 September we entered into Sancta Andiva,⁴² with our ship all well and with only the loss of twenty men that were slain; and there we found the duke, who was gone ashore all alone. And his galleon was departed for Alaredo for that it was great and could abide the sea. Now we remain all only 20 ships, and that of Oquendo is here also, and we all well. We know not what will be ordained. God let me see you.

Your brother,
PEDRO ESTRADA.

³⁹ Apparently the translator's version of *desgracias*—misfortunes.

⁴⁰ *Sic*, but Sept. 22. The San Marcos and thirteen other vessels parted company on August 22nd (Relation of Pedro Coco Calderon).

⁴¹ Ribadesella, somewhat more than one degree west of their purposed port—Santander.

⁴² Santander.

APPENDIX B.

THE SPANISH TREASURE FLEETS OF
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

IN the history of the Elizabethan war the West Indian treasure, or Plate, fleets occupy so large a place as the objective of State expeditions and private enterprise, that a brief sketch of their organization and of the system governing trade between Spain and its transatlantic possessions will interest many readers. By the end of the sixteenth century the fleets were, in the words of a Spanish historian, 'the objects of universal cupidity, able alone to influence politics and overstrain the morality of the governments of the age.' That was the light in which they were viewed abroad; in Spain, as has been pointed out, the bullion they brought formed the foundation on which all Philip's political schemes were built, and on its safe arrival depended the solvency not only of the commercial classes but of the Government. The West Indian was practically the only trade left to Spain, and residents in the country frequently have occasion to notice the strained anxiety with which the arrival of the fleets was awaited.¹ The effects of their non-arrival were felt equally

¹ 'The Flota has arrived; had it delayed much longer, they say every one of the Seville merchants would have failed' (*State Papers Venetian*, 15th Nov. 1586). 'If the fleet falls into Drake's hands or even does not sail it will mean the ruin of half Spain' (*ibid.* 3rd June, 1587). 'If the Plate fleet is taken, Spain will be ruined' (*ibid.* 16th Nov. 1589). 'The Genoese have let it be known that unless that fleet comes safe to hand, they will not be able to negotiate any loan with his Majesty' (*ibid.* 4th Jan. 1592). 'The news that the Flota will not come home this year has greatly disturbed' Spain (*ibid.* 11th Oct. 1594). In 1600 delay in its arrival 'causes everyone great anxiety' (Cabrera de Cordoba, *Relaciones*).

in the hut of the Spanish peasant, payment for whose wool was to be made from their lading, in the offices of German and Italian financiers, in the warehouses of the Swedish or Dantzic merchants who supplied naval stores, in the camps of Flanders, and in the cities of France where civil war was bought with the silver of Potosi.

The first result of the discoveries of Columbus was to cause the Spaniards to forget their dislike to the sea and to rush to adventure in the new world. Men were wanted in the West Indies; there they required many necessities, and the products of the tropics were wanted at home. Therefore for the first few years commerce was much more free than at any later period, and the Spanish monarchs, by a decree of 6th May, 1497, declared all goods to and from the West Indies absolutely free of customs and taxes.² The chief object of Ferdinand and Isabella was the royal fifth of bullion, and the more Europeans who emigrated the more rapid the opening up of the country, but even the desire for gold yielded to the exclusive policy of the age. At first emigration was as free as commerce, but an edict of 1501 forbade any but natives of Castile, Leon, and Aragon to sail for, or land in, the American possessions, and legislation on this point became more restrictive as years passed on. For some time the Government oscillated between licences subsequent to inquiry and simple registration of intending passengers to whom there was no obvious objection, but by 1518 emigration was no longer free even for Spanish subjects, as it was determined to keep the new possessions innocent of religious and political contamination. By that year the

² R. Autunez y Acevedo, *Memorias Históricas sobre la Legislación y Gobierno del Comercio de los Españoles con sus Colonias*. Madrid, 1797, p. 210. But there seems to have been some taxation in the West Indian ports, and Columbus had rights under his patent. See also Irving's *Columbus* for the edicts of 1495 and 1497. The chief authorities for this Appendix, besides R. Autunez y Acevedo and other writers individually referred to, are the collections of *Ordenanzas Reales para la Casa de Contratación*, and *Ordenanzas del Consejo Real de las Indias* in the British Museum Library (SPAIN—*Laws*, 707 b 23, and SPAIN—*Departments of State*, 501 g 7), and the *Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Indias*. The *Norte de la Contratación de las Indias* of J. Veitia de Linage is not very trustworthy for the early sixteenth century.

excluded classes comprised Moors and Jews and their children, if new converts, as also the children and grandchildren of the reconciled, and, *a fortiori*, of those burnt or condemned as heretics. The punishment for any attempt at evasion was loss of property, the whip, and the galleys, equally for the unlicensed passenger and the shipmaster who conveyed him. In 1550 further regulations prohibited the passage of unmarried women, negroes,³ and gipsies; merchants going with their goods had to produce the written consent of their wives and to give 1,000 ducats security to return within three years. No government official was allowed to sail without his wife, and no member of a religious order without a special licence. These orders remained in force during the period under consideration, but some relaxation in them commenced towards the end of the sixteenth century, since in 1594 the penalty was reduced to the galleys for four years for the vulgar, and banishment to Oran for ten years for gentlemen. The work of approving and licensing passengers was one of the duties appertaining to the officials of the Casa de Contratacion, or India House, at Seville, but it is not surprising to read that 'multitudes of unlicensed persons go over.' The preparation of forged certificates became a profession at Seville, personation and other devices were practised, and the severity of the punishment risked

³ The depopulation of the Indies had compelled the Spanish Government to permit the sale of slaves from a very early period. At first they were from Spain, therefore Christian, but cargoes were frequently 'run' from the African coast. In 1506 there was an order to expel all such contraband slaves from Española. Licences to carry over a certain number were continually given to private individuals, and in 1517 Laurence de Gomenot, a Savoyard, obtained the first regular contract (J. Antonio Saco, *Hist. de la Esclavitud de la Raza Africana* . . . Barcelona 1879). With short intervals the contract system thereafter became permanent, but the supply was never equal to the demand in the Indies, which explains why Hawkyns and others found it so profitable to take over cargoes of slaves from Africa, and why the Spanish settlers were unable to resist the temptation of buying them, notwithstanding the stringent laws against trading with foreigners. A Cedula of 6th June, 1556, fixed a tariff for negroes; the price was not to exceed 100 ducats a head in the Islands, 120 in Mexico, in Peru, and 180 in Chile.

served only to raise the prices of the necessary papers and develop the ingenuity of sellers and buyers.

Spanish colonial commerce and legislation pivoted on the treasure traffic, and this was the reason the American trade was restricted to one port. When America was discovered it was supposed at first that gold was to be obtained by the load, requiring only collection, and in the eyes of Ferdinand and Isabella it was much more important to prevent the Crown being defrauded of its dues on the gold and silver obtained than to permit the natural development of trade by those towns best fitted to acquire it. As the result the Galician and Asturian ports, inhabited by the best seamen and strongest races, mentally and physically, of Spain were sacrificed to Seville. Looking at the social, religious, and political conditions under which they would have had to struggle, the result doubtless would have been the same, but we may be certain that the hardier northerners would have made a better bid for success than was natural to Andalusians.⁴

The Casa de Contratacion of Seville, the members of which may be best described as Commissioners for the Indian trade, dates from 1503. At first it was on a very modest scale, consisting of three officials 'to take charge of the said trade,' but occupation soon outgrew capacity, and an ordinance of June 1510, necessary in consequence of the increasing traffic, formulated their duties on a larger plan.⁵ They were to meet at least twice a day for an hour each time, except on holidays. They were to keep books, inform the King of everything necessary to his service, and 'diligently inquire into the natural history and products of the West Indies.' All non-political communications from the governors in the West Indies were to be addressed to them, and civil causes arising from the West Indian trade were to be decided by them with the aid of a legal assessor. In 1511 similar jurisdiction in criminal causes was given to them with control of a

⁴ Comparative freedom of trade from most of the Spanish ports was not granted until 1778. At the expiration of ten years from that date the exports from Spain to the American colonies had quadrupled, while the imports from the colonies to the mother country had increased elevenfold.

⁵ M. Fernandez de Navarrete, *Coleccion de Viages*, ii. p. 337.

separate prison, and, as might be expected, there was much friction with the established courts. But their most important duties were in connexion with passengers, cargoes, and ships. We have seen that they had to examine and choose suitable passengers; they had also to select and charter ships, examine their seaworthiness, register their lading outwards, and strictly visit and search those arriving home. It may be said that all cargoes were consigned to them, for the most valuable portion of the ship's lading was transferred to the Casa, and the owners could not obtain possession until the 'Visitors' had satisfied themselves that no prohibited goods or passengers had been carried, and that all dues and taxes had been paid.

If constant supervision could have made Spanish ships seaworthy there should have been few lost. No vessel could sail for the West Indies without the licence of the Casa, and each one approved was inspected three times; the first time empty, a second time laden, and finally immediately before departure. After the second visit any increase in the cargo involved a penalty of 10,000 maravedis a ton and confiscation of the goods taken on board; moreover, the masters had to give 10,000 ducats security that the register disclosed everything, anything unregistered being *ipso facto* forfeited. No deck cargo was allowed, but it was permitted to stow water, provisions, and passengers' luggage on deck, and light things—wool, straw, or small casks of water—in the huge channels of those days.⁶ The boat carried on deck was to have only light articles stowed in it, and great care was to be taken that the ship was not overloaded.⁷ Cargo once in the hold was not to be moved until the ship arrived at her destination; there it was compared with the copy of the register

⁶ In the case of the *Madre de Dios* Hugh Merritt, captain of the *Prudence* of London, deposed 'that there was about 200 or 150 tons of goods of divers sorts in the chains of the carrack without side' (*Lansd. MSS.* 70, f. 163). The Portuguese carracks were much larger than the Spanish galleons, but these figures suggest a clerical error, or one of estimation.

⁷ By a *Cedula* of 16 June, 1618, the Visitors were directed to put a 'Plimsoll mark' on the ship, at their first survey, down to which she might be loaded. The Genoese statutes ordered this safeguard as early as 1330.

sent out in duplicate by another ship, and any discrepancy was corrected by confiscation. Everything was registered; passengers, cargo, crew, ship, armament and fittings; and the master who, either at the colonial port or on his return, found himself out of correspondence on any point with his register had to face a veritable commination service. Precautions homeward were even more strict because the treasure was then on board. Neither outward nor homeward were the fleets to touch anywhere unless compelled, and to avoid the necessity the homeward fleets were directed to take eighty days' provisions on board;⁸ if a captain put into any port unnecessarily, or if, being forced into one, he permitted any communication with the shore he suffered loss of property and the galleys. After sighting St. Vincent and running along the coast of Portugal, to drop a boat and communicate with the shore meant 200 lashes and ten years of the galleys for every person in the boat, even though it had been lowered by order of the General in command of the fleet.⁹ Upon arrival at San Lucar no one was to land, and nothing was to be taken out of the ships until they had been visited by the officials of the Casa, which visit was to be made within one day of arrival. For delivering letters before the royal despatches had been sent off, and a general permission given, the punishment was a fine of 100,000 maravedis or one hundred lashes. The inspecting officer compared the passengers with the register, and made inquiry of everyone as to any defaults that had been found in officers and crew, or among the passengers themselves, on subjects ranging from concealed treasure and jewels down to blasphemy. Delation was encouraged by a proportionate reward to the accuser.

⁸ We see that in nearly every voyage the Flotas called at the Azores; the General was directed to send in to Angra for orders, and if he found none to continue his voyage without stopping. But frequently the presence of the English on the coast of the Peninsula, or at the Azores, forced the whole fleet into Angra; and if there were no English there was the normal unseaworthiness of Spanish ships which the ordinances did not take into account.

⁹ The Spanish system gave as little authority or power of initiative as possible to the Generals. The chief purpose of their appointment was to see that regulations, which were supposed to cover all likely contingencies, were carried out.

The particular privileges of Seville, chosen at first because the Indies were considered for a few years the exclusive appanage, in which Leon and Aragon had no share, of the crown of Castile, were not retained without protest from the other maritime cities. It was by no means a suitable port, the fact that only ships of less than 200 tons were able to cross the bar of San Lucar necessitating transshipment from vessels of the size that were afterwards engaged in the trade. In the early years this disability was not thought important because small vessels—caravels and coasters—were sufficiently large for the traffic. Later, the circumstance that official organization was firmly seated at Seville, acting with the vested interests of the classes desirous of maintaining it as the Indian port, was powerful enough to bear down opposition. But the other cities frequently attempted, and sometimes with temporary success, to obtain a share of the lucrative American trade. During the first quarter of the sixteenth century, and towards its close, ships were allowed from Cadiz under the supervision of a representative of the Casa, and, for a short time, homeward bound vessels too big to cross the bar of San Lucar were also permitted to go there. In 1524 Coruña petitioned that it might have a Casa established, pointing out the deficiencies of Seville, and adding that foreign vessels were sometimes unable to double St. Vincent for months, and also that ships could be built in the north at half the price they cost in Andalusia.¹⁰ For a few years from 1529 the privilege of the trade was extended to nine other ports, but the extension was made practically worthless by the proviso that the homeward ships were to unload at no other port than Seville. So strict was this order that if a vessel was forced through unseaworthiness to seek the shelter of a nearer harbour the cargo was to be transhipped to Seville without being put ashore.¹¹ It was an age of monopolies

¹⁰ M. Fernandez de Navarrete, *Col. de Viages*, v. p. 193.

¹¹ The question whether this rule was relaxed in 1702 for 'the galleons of Vigo' is of more than antiquarian interest. Diving and dredging operations have been undertaken on the supposition that the permission applied for to land the gold and silver had not arrived from the Council of the Indies, that the French Admiral, Châteaurenault, did not take the matter into his own

and exclusive trading companies, but this was protection run mad when not only all the ports but one, but the greater number of the subjects of the empire, were debarred from trade with the colonies. The result of the exceptional favours granted to Seville was that it obtained wealth out of all proportion to the other cities of the kingdom, and, in a sense, at their expense. This is not the place to examine the consequences of Spanish economic policy, yet even in Seville the Spaniards themselves were but agents for foreigners who traded under cover of Spanish names, and the city a distributing centre not for the manufactures of Spain, but for those of the commercial countries of Europe. But contemporary Spaniards regarded with pride the conditions they observed, outwardly flourishing enough before the troubles with England and Flanders became acute. The author of a commercial treatise writes of Seville :—¹²

Commerce as it is seen to-day, particularly in this province, certainly causes me an astonishment that common and vulgar things do not arouse in me. Trade is so great and universal that judgment and high intelligence are necessary to exercise it and even to examine it. In the days of our ancestors only persons of little consideration occupied themselves with commerce, but now it has increased to such a degree that it is necessary to become like them to succeed in it. To-day merchants have a commerce extending into all parts of Christianity and even into Heathendom . . . to insure their cargoes, which are worth millions, they are obliged to insure in Lisbon, Burgos, Lyons, and Flanders, for the cargoes are so great that neither the insurers of Seville, nor of twenty Seviles, could suffice. The merchants of Burgos have their agents at Seville . . . the merchants of Italy find it equally necessary to have agents here so that our principal merchants traffic to-day in all parts of the world and have correspondents everywhere.¹³

hands and insist that it should be landed, and that treasure to the value of millions sterling still lies buried in the sands of the harbour. See also the conflicting evidence about the St. Valentine, *ante*, pp. 156, 175, and *post*, pp. 369, 370.

¹² Tomas de Mercado, *Summa de Tratos y Contratos*, Sevilla, 1569.

¹³ With this may be compared the *Breve Discurso* of Alonso de Cianca, Madrid, 1620. 'Many persons zealous for the public good have thought over the injury that for years past the commerce of the city of Seville, and the fleets of New Spain and

In view of the rich cargoes carried in the Flotas the choice of suitable ships was a principal duty of the officers of the Casa, and there are very many regulations dealing with this matter. As early as 1494 the Spanish monarchs proclaimed a bounty on native built ships of a certain size, and as a corollary shipowners were forbidden to sell their vessels abroad, and merchants to freight foreign ships when Spanish ones could be obtained.¹⁴ Necessity compelled the relaxation of this navigation act towards the end of the sixteenth century, and the Cédulas of 1571 and 1572 permitting the hire of Easterlings if Spanish ships were not available were a sign of the progressing maritime decadence.¹⁵ We have seen in the preceding pages that in the last quarter of the century the Flotas were made up of French, Dutch, Italian, and Hansa ships embargoed or hired; few but the treasure galleons were Spanish built and owned. There was an order in 1593 that no vessels built at Cadiz, Seville, and in the districts of Niebla, Gibraltar, and Ayamonte, should be taken up for the Flotas because, being built of

Tierra-firme despatched from it, have suffered and still suffer, considering that twenty and thirty years ago when the population of the Indies was much less than now, and the demand for merchandize also less, sixty or seventy ships of from 500 to 800 tons went in the fleet of New Spain, and in that of Tierra-firme forty of the same burden all loaded with merchandise. And now although the population is greater, and therefore as a necessary consequence the trade should be greater, it is so much the reverse that only fourteen or sixteen ships go in the New Spain fleet, twenty being thought a large number; and only eight in that of Tierra-firme, and those not all fully laden, and trade has so diminished that it appears likely to entirely cease.'

¹⁴ Venice and Genoa had adopted, if not originated, a bounty system a generation earlier, and one or the other was no doubt the model for the legislation of the Catholic Kings, just as the tentative progression of Henry VII. of England on the same road was probably due to his knowledge of what Ferdinand and Isabella were doing.

¹⁵ Bernardino de Mendoza, writing to Philip (*Simancas Papers*, 1st October, 1581), refers mournfully to the conditions he remembered about 1560, 'the large number of Spanish ships then to be met with, which is not now the case as trade is reduced to English, French and Flemings.' In other despatches he dwells on the fact that trade between England and Spain was carried on only with English ships.

pine and green wood, they were nearly all lost at sea. Yet many years before efforts had been directed to enforce the use of oak and iron bolts in building.

A Cedula of May 1557 dealt with the deceits of owners, although it may be assumed that had the officials of the Casa honestly carried out the close inspection ordered such schemes would have been hopeless. This Cedula describes the methods of some owners in using their ships in the Levant trade, and, when worn, sending them to Seville to be sold for use in the Flotas. The purchasers rebuilt them a third larger on the old keels so that the increased weight and tophammer caused excessive straining in a seaway; to prevent this, no ship more than two years old was to be registered. The same Cedula raised the limit of size to 400 toneladas, preceding edicts having restricted traffic to vessels of from 100 to 300 toneladas.¹⁶ Roguery, however, was not restricted to owners. The regulations of 1534 show that the shipmasters frequently hired guns, anchors, cables, and stores to make up the required equipment, and men to fill up the muster-sheets, when the Visitors came on board to make their official inspection, getting rid of stores and men immediately afterwards; it is significant that as early as 1522 the officials of the Casa were forbidden to let out, hire, or meddle with the hire of ships directly or indirectly under penalty of forfeiture of property. In 1552 a royal order was necessary on account of the 'many frauds' in insurance. As some persons secretly insured their property two or three times over, it was enacted that in future no insurance would be valid that was not publicly announced, and that owners were not to recover more than two-thirds of the value of their ships. The causes of the unseaworthiness of Spanish ships were mainly the very short keel carrying a relatively long hull with huge superstructures, and the scientific ignorance which attempted to gain strength by very massive scantlings without knowing how to knit and balance a forest of timber. Such vessels were probably of light draught and broad floors; they were certainly crank and leewardly. Sides were thick enough to resist shell, but seams opened, butts started,

¹⁶ The tonelada was 53·44 cubic feet; the English ton was 60 cubic feet.

and bolts drew ;¹⁷ masts and spars were heavy enough for ships half as big again as those to which they were fitted, but standing rigging was weak and badly adjusted. The solidity and weight of the mass became its weakness. Unless a fleet was caught in a hurricane or a Norther, the homeward run from the West Indies by the Bermudas and Azores was the only foul weather passage to which Spanish maritime trade was exposed ; it was in this that the terrible losses by wreck occurred. The Newfoundland fishery from the Biscayan ports was carried on by small vessels of the seaworthy class used before 1492, and with no especial disasters ; the evil lay in that Spanish shipwrights were called upon to construct much bigger ocean-going ships, and that no builder arose of sufficient talent to work on new lines or to vary from a type.¹⁸

¹⁷ Spanish ships were iron spiked and bolted which made weaker ships than when wooden treenails were used, as the vessels soon became 'iron-sick.' France followed Spain in this respect, to the disgust of the English Navy Board in later centuries, when French prizes, after being hardly fought for, were found to be scarcely worth repairing for the navy.

¹⁸ There are many references in Elizabethan and Spanish papers of the time of Philip II. to ships being built for that King on the English model. A William or John Lambert, of Liverpool or Chichester (*S. P. Dom. Eliz.* cclii. 58, and cclxviii. 69), was in Philip's employment for years, and certainly designed some vessels for him. But the desire for ships on English lines was only sporadic, and took no real hold on the Government, nor did it reach the merchant owners at all. The allusions in Spanish MSS. and books to ships 'of the new invention' refer firstly to the great galleons introduced by Don Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa Cruz ('los grandes galeones de que fue inventor'), for the sole construction of which he received a patent for ten years from 1550, and which were at once put into the Flotas ; and secondly to the type designed by Pedro Menendez de Avilés in 1573, long, low-lying, flush-decked ships without forecastle or poop, and intended to use sweeps as well as sails. These latter were not cargo but treasure carriers, were the model for Alonso de Bazan's (Alvaro's brother) improved galleyzabras, and were probably the original from which we eventually obtained, via Dunkirk, our early frigates, although Alvaro Christobal de Barros, Philip's chief naval organizer in the first half of his reign, is said to have been the inventor of frigates. (C. Fernandez Duro, *Disq. Náuticas*, Lib. v. p. 24.) In these vessels of Pedro Menendez,

At first, any ship having a licence was permitted to sail alone and at any season of the year ; this system continued

the length on the upper deck was nearly four times the beam ; this was considered a tremendous leap forwards, as indeed it was, but the increased speed obtained was held to have justified the innovation. The legend of the enormous size of Spanish vessels doubtless grew from Bazan's galleons, and flourished by popular story confusing them with the great Portuguese carracks. Before 1550 Spanish ships were small, judged even by a sixteenth century standard, and afterwards a galleon of 800 tons was a very big one. However, the galleon was not peculiar to Spain. In the thirteenth century the galleon, or *galeonus*, was common to the Mediterranean, and was a small and especially fast galley. How or why, whether suddenly or by a slow process, the name was transferred to a modification combining the high freeboard and top structures of the round, or cargo ship, with the comparative length and narrowness of the galley is not now known, but the type became general among the Mediterranean Powers. It is also uncertain whether Bazan's 'new invention' was one which converted the oared Italian *galeone* into a pure sailing ship, or merely an adaptation of minor details in an already existing ocean-going sailing ship to Spanish requirements. The whole question is very obscure because two- and three-decked sailing ships, some of them belonging to Barcelona, and capable of carrying hundreds of people, existed in the thirteenth century (Capmany, *Memorias Históricas sobre la Marina . . . de Barcelona*).

Beyond the general fact known to us that the Spaniards built their ships short and high, an Elizabethan seaman could have marked for us in half a dozen sentences the distinctive characteristics of a Spaniard of his day. As it is we have painfully to note *obiter dicta* here and there which may help us to form a picture. Fournier (*Hydrographie*, Paris, 1643) tells us that Spanish ships of his date—and they could scarcely have altered much from the time of Philip II.—were wall sided, the bowsprit steeved high, and the portlids hinged at the sides instead of at the upper edge. On the first point I have no other information, the second is probably correct judging from drawings of Spanish vessels on maps and elsewhere, but the third seems contradicted by a quotation from R. Autunéz y Acevedo (*op. cit.* p. 71), which speaks of portlids 'with hinges and rings to raise them.' I have found, however, no reference to ports and their fittings in any of the collections of Ordinances. In the official account by Essex (*Harl. MSS.* 36) of the Islands Voyage of 1597, he says that the Spanish ships which ran into Angra 'by shewing of their white bellies so

until the wars between Charles V. and Francis I., and the success of Norman and Breton privateers, enforced some method of protection. From about 1520 the game of hunting the Flotas, which for more than two centuries proved so fascinating an occupation for English, French, and Dutch seamen, may be said to commence, but it was the French and not the English who led the way, and who even in those early years stretching over to the West Indies, showed at once the inherent weakness of Spanish maritime pretensions in pretending to hold a maritime empire without a marine.¹⁹ In 1521 ships were fitted out to protect the coasts, and the next year, a squadron was sent to cruise at the Azores. This being found insufficient the merchantmen were ordered, in 1526, to sail together for mutual protection, and therefore this year marks the commencement of the Flotas. Coincident with the supply of an armed guard, which in the middle of the century usually consisted of only the flagship and the second in command—the Capitana and Almiranta—is the collection of the 'Averia,' or convoy money to pay for it. The date of its first levy is given differently by nearly every authority, due probably to the fact that during the first half of the century the sailing in company was not

much above water were known to be unladen,' so that we may infer that the under water portion of the hull was usually painted white or graved with white stuff. Sir Richard Hawkyns, in 1593, recognized a Spanish frigate because it 'was long and snug and spread a large clew.' On another occasion an English seaman 'suspected them to be Spanish by their being painted with ochre on the stern, by their newness, and by the disposition of their sails.'

¹⁹ About 1524 Giovanni da Verrazano, the famous Italian seaman in the service of France, sailed along the eastern coast of North America planting the French flag on the seaboard, and thus seizing a continent for Francis I. He was taken by the Spaniards in 1527 and hanged at Cadiz as a pirate (Harrisse, *Discovery of North America*, Lond. 1892, p. 219; Murphy, *Voyage of Verrazano*, New York, 1875). In 1522 Jean Florin, a corsair of La Rochelle, took two out of three ships bringing home the royal fifth of the plunder of Mexico. Some of the jewels, of priceless value, were sent to Francis I., and the riches indicated made him consider sadly what chance France had against a Power with the apparently inexhaustible wealth of the New World to draw upon. Later, the Spaniards caught Florin and gladly hanged him.

strictly enforced, nor the armed guard regularly supplied, but that both precautions were only used during war time. But the *Averia* was certainly charged as early as 1525, when it was 1 per cent.; it varied in different years, being usually 5 per cent., but was sometimes much more,²⁰ and was levied on all kinds of cargo, the most fruitful contribution being obtained from the treasure, the King paying his *Averia* like everyone else. During the Elizabethan war the *Averia* seldom covered the cost of extra armaments, to say nothing of indirect sources of expense. Between 1592 and 1603 the extra cost on the outward fleets alone was reckoned at upwards of 300,000*l.*, and the further extraordinary expenses between 1592 and 1601, due to the wintering of the *Flotas* and *Armadas* in the West Indies from fear of the English fleets, at upwards of 750,000*l.*²¹ The system of sailing in fleets only became continuous from 1561, when one sailed in January and another in August, dividing at Dominica, one part for New Spain or Mexico, the other for *Tierra-firme* or South America. Of course the usual penalties of confiscation and the galleys were incurred by ships and men sailing at other dates. In 1564, instead of the two divisions of the *Flota* sailing together, the New Spain fleet was ordered to sail in April and that for *Tierra-firme* in August. It is needless to follow in detail the minor alterations continually made in the sailings of the *Flotas*. The times of sailing were moved backwards and forwards, the homeward fleets were sometimes ordered to come together and sometimes separately; it is only necessary to notice that the distinction, afterwards sharply defined, between the *Flota*, or fleet for New Spain, and the *Armada*, or treasure galleons from *Tierra-firme*, only begins with the working of Potosi, and was the consequence of the rich yield from that mine after 1557 which made an especial fleet advisable for *Nombre de Dios* and *Cartagena*. Another important inno-

²⁰ J. Veitia de Linage says that it was 14 per cent. in 1596.

²¹ *Col. de Doc. Inéd. para la Hist. de España*, lii. pp. 535, 563. These amounts must be multiplied by at least six to obtain the present values. Taking them at 6,000,000*l.* this seems to be about one-eighteenth of the value of the bullion brought over 1592-1600 (see *post*, p. 339), and these, it must be remembered, were extra charges, beyond the ordinary cost of sea carriage and other expenses.

vation that marked this period was the formation of the *tercio de galeones* or marine infantry. Each fleet made the return voyage the year following the departure from Spain, and the General in command was supposed to be able to look forward so far as to be able to send, within twenty days of his arrival at San Juan de Ulua, an advice boat saying when he would start on the voyage home, usually expected to be in February. The use of advice boats can be taken back to 1514 at least, and they were continually plying between Spain, the Azores, the Canaries, and the West Indies, scouting or carrying despatches. Although very small, usually about twenty-five tons, they seem to have traversed the Atlantic with much more success than attended the larger full-rigged ships.

The armament of the merchantmen was as much a matter of regulation as the other stores and fittings. Every passenger was compelled to arm himself and his servants sufficiently, and in 1582 there was an order that a *harquebus* was to be supplied to each sailor, while javelins and half pikes being found useless were no longer to be carried, a tardy recognition of the changing conditions of warfare. The first orders about ship armament seem to be of 1522, another note of the advent of the French privateer. Vessels of 100 tons, the highest given and therefore showing the moderate amount of trade, were to carry four heavy iron guns with chambers, sixteen *passovolantes* (eight a side) and eight *espingardas*.²² In 1552 the artillery for an Indiaman of the heaviest tonnage employed, 250 tons and upwards, was ordered to be, one *demi culverin* or one cannon, two *sakers*, one *falconet*, ten *lombards* and twenty-four *versos*.²³ Of these, only the *demi culverin*, the cannon,

²² *Col. de Doc. Inéd. de Indias* (serie segunda), ii. p. 143. The *espigarda* was a hand gun. The *passovolante* is defined by J. Arantegui y Sanz (*Apuntes Históricos sobre la Artillería Española en los Siglos XIV y XV*) as an eighteen pounder. It appears impossible that a 100 ton ship could have carried sixteen of them besides four other heavy guns of undefined weight. A sixteenth century Spanish writer on artillery places *passovolantes* in the hand-gun class, which is much more probable, perhaps on a pivot mounting.

²³ *Verso*, from the Latin *vertere*; swivel guns, the English 'murderer.'

and the two sakers can be considered guns of any power against a ship's works. Nettings,²⁴ waistcloths, and 'blindners' to turn arrow and musket fire were part of the equipment. It is particularly to be noticed that even at this early date thirty rounds were provided for the guns, except the falconet which had fifty, and the lombards which had twenty. As the century progressed, armament naturally became heavier. In 1563 the Cortes petitioned that Spanish ships should be gunned in proportion to their tonnage, as they were inferior in that respect to other nations. It was doubtless due to the hard tuition of experience that we find a marked improvement by 1587, although the Spaniards were still behind their principal antagonists. In a Flota of 1587 the Capitana and Almiranta carried fifty and forty brass guns respectively; the remaining thirteen averaged $19\frac{1}{8}$ brass and iron broadside guns apiece.²⁵ Monson remarks that the ship guns were mounted on ordinary field carriages and could not be traversed, an additional disability in action.

Much has been written on the inferiority of the Spanish gunnery, but if it was inferior it was not for want of care in training gunners. Some time in the sixteenth century a school for teaching and examination was attached to the Casa, and in 1576 a long list of rules for the guidance of teachers was issued for the purpose of ensuring competence in the gunners of the Flotas.²⁶ Theoretically, the Spaniard

²⁴ Nettings of metal, of a chain mail type, were used by the Spaniards, and similar nettings, probably adopted from them, were customary in English ships in the time of Henry VIII. In the reign of Elizabeth rope nettings, said to have been invented by Sir John Hawkyne, were employed. See *post*, John Young's 'Notes on Sea Service,' Appendix to Book III.

²⁵ *Disq. Náuticas*, v. p. 468. All these ships were in the Armada the following year. Concurrently with an increase in physical arms of offence went heedfulness of spiritual arms of defence; in 1582 there was an order that officers and men were to confess and communicate before sailing. The injunction that this regulation should be strictly observed became a standing clause in the Generals' instructions.

²⁶ M. Fernandez de Navarrete, *Bib. Marítima Española*, ii. p. 255. These orders of 1576 may have been only modifications of earlier ones, but I have not found any other reference to an artillery school attached to the Casa.

was as advanced, and wrote as well, as the Italian or German, but it can only be supposed that the national distaste for the sea showed most clearly in an art that most surely requires a genius for the sea in those who practise it on shipboard. In front of, or behind, a stone wall the Spaniard was as efficient as his opponent; on a slippery rolling deck he had only to await his fate with the courage of his race. If he professed to despise the gun and to long for handgrips, his preference masked fear rather than contempt, and concealed a confession of inferiority. We have one vivid description, by an eyewitness, of ordinary Portuguese gun practice which is worth quoting, seeing the probability that there was little difference between the Portuguese and Spaniards, and that, after 1580, Portuguese were numerous in the Spanish fighting fleets, although not in the Flotas. Linschoten was coming home from India in 1589 in the *Sta. Cruz*, a 1,600-ton carrack. Off Flores she was attacked by three English privateers, none of them of more than 60 tons. A running fight ensued, and on board the *Sta. Cruz* 'when we shot off a piece we had at least an hour's work to lade it in again, whereby we had so great a noise and cry in the ship as if we had all been cast away, whereat the Englishmen themselves began to mock at us, and with a thousand jesting words called unto us.' That is a picture which explains the issue of the war more tersely, and quite as successfully, as dissertations on the working of political and ethical forces, which may cause wars but do not decide them.²⁷

²⁷ Benzoni (*Hist. Novi Orbis*, lib. ii.) also throws some light on the rottenness of administration which was one cause of Spanish weakness in gunnery:

'The principal reason of the French getting so many of the ships belonging to the Spaniards was the avarice of the owners; for on quitting Spain such was their avidity to fill up with merchandize and passengers that they did not put the due number of guns on board . . . nor even the number commanded by the Council of the Indies. . . . The Council moreover appointed certain commissaries to take special care by going to San Lucar to visit the ships when they were about starting and ascertain whether they were provided according to the orders issued. But the captains of the ships, by putting a piece of gold into the hands of the commissaries, made them say that all was right; and with this arrangement they went away to Seville, waited on their superiors

Just as Spanish fleets were formed of vessels belonging to other powers, so the crews were made up of men of nearly every nationality. Raleigh wrote that their crews 'are either Almaynes, Flemings, or strangers, for the Spaniards are but indifferently practised in this art.' The momentary enthusiasm that had sent the Spaniards to the coast in crowds soon died out when it was recognized that the new world, whatever it gave the Crown, the adventurer, and the merchant, produced little wealth for the peaceful emigrant. The confession of a Spanish writer on navigation, himself a pilot, clearly explains the Spanish relation to the sea, but could never have been written of a maritime race:—

The sea is not so well conditioned that any man should adventure to enter the same of will, but of necessity; because that man which saileth except it be to the discharge of his conscience, or defence of his honour, or to support his living—I say and affirm that such a one is either unadvised, or detesteth his life, or else they hold him for a fool or as one distraught of his wits.²⁸

Philip's ambassador in England wrote of the inaptitude of his countrymen 'for a seafaring life, a sterile soil being generally the only reason why men overcome their dread of so dangerous a trade.'²⁹ Again, the Venetian ambassador at Madrid writes, 'everyone tries to avoid service by sea.'³⁰ Such quotations might be multiplied indefinitely, yet on paper the maritime strength of Spain was sufficient, if the men could have been made available. There are, in the British Museum, several MS. accounts of the ships, harbours, and seafaring population of Spain

at the Casa de Contratacion, and took God to witness that everything was in perfect order. . . . In this way three or four Spanish ships used to start, though the best of them carried only two or three iron guns, half eaten through with rust, and one keg of indifferent powder.'

Benzoni was writing of the middle third of the century, but that period did not, we may take it, abruptly differ from the years before or after it.

²⁸ A. Guevara, *Art of Navigation*, Lond. 1578 (Eng. translation). See also Introduction, *ante*, i. pp. 29, 30.

²⁹ *Simancas Papers*, Mendoza to Philip, 20th February 1580.

³⁰ *State Papers Venetian*, 11th April 1583.

towards the end of the sixteenth century ;³¹ they appear to be all copies or modifications of the same original, but whether the date should be 1571 or 1586 is doubtful. Two copies³² give a total of 34,400 sailors and fishermen, the third,³³ 39,200 ; taking the lowest figures, and assuming that they are only approximately correct, we have a number double that of the 15,000 English seamen mustered in 1582. If the military fleets were filled with foreign seamen, the same condition held still more persistently in the Flotas because, when foreign ships were hired or pressed, their crews necessarily went with them, yet even under such circumstances it was remarked in 1578 that many of the ships had to carry men who had never been to sea. In four ships under the command of the Adelantado Francisco de Orellana, the explorer, bound for South America in 1545, sixteen out of eighteen of the crew of one of them, itself a Breton ship, were foreigners. The squadron was so badly equipped as a whole that its departure was forbidden, but Orellana sailed in defiance of the prohibition.³⁴

During the reign of Philip II. the proportion of sailors on board the fighting ships was twenty to every 100 tons ; of these two-thirds were able seamen, the remainder ordinary seamen and boys. An Ordinance of 1552 fixes the crews of 100, 200, and 250 ton ships of the West Indian fleets at eighteen, twenty-eight, and thirty-five able, eight, twelve, and fifteen ordinary, seamen, two, four, and five boys, and two, four, and six gunners respectively. The proportion was probably raised later as the ships in use became bigger, since in 1582 it was ordered that the Capitana and Almiranta should carry 100 seamen each ; no cargo beyond that necessary for ballast was to be laden in these ships, which were expected to bear the brunt of any fighting. Every captain had to undertake to bring back his crew, that is to say, to permit no desertion.³⁵ Each man was

³¹ *Harl. MSS.* 295, f. 89 ; *Add. MSS.* 1026 ; *Cott. MSS.* (*Vesp. C.* vj, f. 219).

³² *Add. MSS.* 1026, and *Vesp. C.* vj.

³³ *Harl. MSS.* 295.

³⁴ *Col. de Doc. Ind. de Indias*, xlii. p. 268.

³⁵ Ridiculous as this regulation may appear it was improved upon by the English Government during the war with France of

entitled to a pound and a half of bread, three quartillos³⁶ of water (one being for cooking) and two quartillos of wine a day; the ordinances do not mention meat, fish, &c., although from other sources we know that they were supplied, but perhaps by way of private arrangement. In the King's ships the pay of an able seaman was fixed in 1554 at from 9s. 3d. to 11s. 9d. a month, ordinary seamen from 4s. 3d. to 5s. 9d., and boys from 3s. to 4s. This was nearly double the pay of English seamen at the same date, but the effect of the influx of the precious metals had not then been felt pointedly in England. In 1588 able seamen were being paid 14s. 8d., and the others in proportion; there are no figures available bearing on the pay of the merchant seamen, but probably it was not much less.

Perhaps the most interesting branch of this inquiry is that relating to the navigation and courses of the Flotas. Many have written in scorn of Spanish seamanship, but there were no more unsparing critics, even in the sixteenth century, than the Spaniards themselves. Yet few matters connected with the Indian trade received closer or more constant attention than the training of competent pilots and masters for the fleets and the preparation of trustworthy charts for their use. But even in 1545, after half a century of experience, a Spanish cosmographer³⁷ could write of the pilots:—

How few of those who navigate know the essentials of navigation! The cause is that they have neither masters to teach nor books to read notwithstanding that the art is so old . . . each one is guided by his own empiricism, and so it frequently happens that when a ship has two or three pilots each of them reasons from a different standpoint, which proceeds from lack of scientific knowledge of their art; from this ignorance results many disasters—losses of lives, ships and goods.

Thirty years after the foregoing was written another Spaniard described even more contemptuously the varying results obtained by the pilots of his ship. And, coming to the end of the century, Sir Richard Hawkyns remarks 'others the reign of William III., when not the captain but the owner was compelled to enter into an obligation to bring back the full crew from the West Indies and the Plantations.

³⁶ The quartillo was nearly nine-tenths of a pint.

³⁷ Pedro de Medina, *Arte de Navegar*.

have recounted unto me that coming from the Indies and looking out for the Islands of Azores they have had sight of Spain, and some have looked out for Spain and have discovered the Islands.' ³⁸ About 1525-30 thirty-five pilots gave their estimate of the distance separating Ferro from Deseada. The highest calculation was 900 leagues, the lowest 700, eleven certify for 800, and the others chose various intermediate figures.³⁹ Yet knowing, as professional readers will, how easily errors of navigation are made, how they happen to-day to careful navigators supplied with the latest scientific appliances, educated by the blunders of generations of predecessors, and traversing seas become commonplace by long acquaintance, we should rather admire than despise these men when we consider their success in ranging such a nearly uncharted sea as the Caribbean, and such an ocean as the Pacific, ignorant of currents, reefs, winds, and shoals, with primitive instruments, incorrect latitudes, and no longitude. Most of the Spanish losses were caused by storms in the open sea, and due to bad seamanship and the unseaworthiness of the ships: relatively few to careless or, so far as their knowledge extended, ignorant navigation, although landfalls might be faulty and positions entirely wrong. Writers like Pedro de Medina and Martin Cortes, who poured contempt on the pilots and masters, were authors of text books and inventors of instruments that they desired to have forced into use by royal order, and to that end they disparaged

³⁸ *Hawkins' Voyages* (Hak. Soc.), p. 136. But in his voyage of 1593 Sir Richard himself came in sight of the coast of Guinea when he thought he was sixty or seventy leagues from it (*ibid.* p. 134).

³⁹ *Col. de Doc. Intd. de Indias*, xlii. p. 541. Deseada is distant from Ferro, on the rhumb line, 2,488 nautical miles. The exact value of the Spanish marine league during the first half of the sixteenth century is not determined beyond question, but, according to the calculations of M. D'Avezac (*Les Voyages d'Americ Vespuce et les Mesures Itinéraires employés par les Marins Espagnols et Portugais*. . . . Paris, 1858), it was slightly more than three and a fifth ($3\frac{2}{5}$) English nautical miles. Therefore 800 leagues would be $2,561\frac{1}{5}$ of such miles. The most recent investigation into the value of the Spanish league is that by Mr. HARRISSE (*The Diplomatic History of America*, London, 1897), who has worked out the subject very fully.

existing conditions. That the pilots were ignorant is true enough—their knowledge was only that of their generation—but it may be doubted whether their ignorance was more dangerous than that of their would-be teachers. These teachers were not content to wait the accumulation of facts to reason from ; they theorized without them.

However, in this as in other matters Spaniards were merciless in criticism among themselves. The continued outcry about the ignorance of the pilots—complaints which really meant that in some fifteen years these men had not acquired by inspiration the results of nearly four centuries of experience—led to the foundation of a school of hydrography and navigation, a foundation, it is well to notice, new in the history of the nations, and the beginning of the scientific departments now a part of every Admiralty. The earliest Spanish chart of the new discoveries that has come down to us is that of 1500, by Juan de la Cosa, but there must have been many others drawn by transatlantic voyagers for their own use, and each creating and propagating its own especial errors. Therefore, in 1508, Amerigo Vespucci was nominated Pilot Major of Spain to control and teach navigation, and, at the same time, as untrustworthy charts were commonly drawn and sold, a standard one—called the *Padron Real*—was to be formed by him and his coadjutors and kept as the official model. That the latest discoveries and corrections might be entered on it, it was ordered 'that whoever shall find new lands, islands, bays, ports, or whatsoever else is worthy of being noted on the said *Padron Real* shall, on his return, give a relation of the same to the Pilot Major.' Navigators were to use copies of this *Padron Real* only, and they were to be sold at prices fixed by the Casa, which also had its own staff of cosmographers.⁴⁰

The curse of Spanish administration, in every depart-

⁴⁰ Mr. HARRISSE (*Discovery of North America*) says 'the cosmographers engaged in Spain were almost of every nation.' Mr. HARRISSE has failed to obtain the date of the first appointment of cosmographers to the Casa de Contratacion and to the Council of the Indies. Amerigo Vespucci did not go to sea until he was nearly fifty years of age, and, whatever his theoretical, can have possessed but little practical knowledge. The appointment was characteristically Spanish.

ment of the State, was that when good regulations were made they were ignored or failed of their purpose, while bad ones seemed at once to work automatically at full power. Such was the case in this minor example of good intentions directed to the improvement of navigation. Whether because the official prices were too high, or by reason of the natural love of humanity for the illicit, the manufacture and sale of private and incorrect charts was not checked, and, after many years of experience of the disasters caused by them, Charles V. ordered, in 1526, a new official chart to be prepared, which, however, was not completed until 1535, under the name of the *Padron General*. This was to be corrected regularly every year unless some new fact of great importance came to light, when such fact or correction was to be entered at once. Notwithstanding the fault found with the *Padron Real*, no one who compares Juan de la Cosa's chart of the Caribbean Sea with that drawn in 1529 by Diego Ribero can fail to be struck by the enormous advance shown in the latter, although progress would needs be slow in an age when it must have taken a year to ascertain and report a fact and another year or two to verify it. Many ordinances were issued during the remainder of the century dealing with the manufacture of unlicensed and dangerously inaccurate charts, but without much success in suppressing them, although by 1552 a fine of 50,000 maravedis (36*l.* 15*s.*) was incurred by their makers.⁴¹

Side by side with the attempts to improve the maps were endeavours to perfect theoretical and practical navigation. The first treatise on navigation was the *Suma de Geografia* of Martin Fernandez Enciso, printed in 1519, the

⁴¹ Raleigh appears to have got hold of one of this class—'I remember a pretty jest of Don Pedro de Sarmiento, a worthy Spanish gentleman who had been employed by his King in planting a colony upon the Straits of Magellan; for when I asked him, being my prisoner, some question about an island in those Straits which methought might have done either benefit or displeasure to his enterprise, he told me merrily it was to be called the Painter's Wife's Island, saying that whilst the fellow drew that map, his wife sitting by desired him to put in one country for her that she in imagination might have an island of her own.' *Hist. of the World*, Bk. II, cap. 23, sect. 4.

forerunner of many to follow within a few years. The two best known subsequently were the *Arte de Navegar* of Pedro de Medina, which became the favourite text book in France, and the *Breve Compendio* of Martin Cortes, which was adopted in England. Cortes first propounded the magnetic pole, but thought it extra terrestrial. Many students devoted themselves to the task of finding a reliable method to obtain longitude; Pedro Apiano invented instruments for the purpose, Alonso de Santa Cruz tried to deduce it from the variation of the needle, others prepared clocks or time measurers of sand, water or mercury. Improvements were also made in the instruments used in taking observations.

When Amerigo Vespucci was made Pilot Major in 1508, with the duty of preparing an official chart, a code of regulations was also drawn up for the licensing and registration of pilots for him to enforce. Every pilot was to pass an examination before him and his assessors, but the same spirit that rendered fruitless the enactments about the charts also worked injury here. Besides laxness in examination, direct charges of dishonesty were brought against the Pilot Major. Amerigo Vespucci died in 1512, but his successors were not considered any more trustworthy, and there is meaning in a prohibition, in plain words, against receiving bribes directly or indirectly, and a threat of a fine of 100,000 maravedis for any failure to carry out the rules laid down for examinations. The Pilot Major was permitted to sell maps of his own construction outside Seville, but not in the city, nor to candidates for his certificate, a restriction which obviously only tempted to collusion. Fernando Columbus, in a MS. assigned to 1527, writes :—⁴³

As the Pilot Major, besides being the colleague of the cosmographer, is his great friend, if any other person has constructed the map or instrument the Pilot Major seeing that it is not the work of his companion declares the same at once unfit for use, and refuses his certificate on the plea that these instruments must be examined again thoroughly. He then keeps the maps and instruments at his house for a long time, and finally gives neither

⁴³ Muñoz MSS. quoted by H. Harrisse, *Discovery of North America*, p. 265.

his approbation nor leave to use them, however good they may be. The reason is that he does not want any other than his companion to construct naval objects.⁴³

In 1552 a school for the education of pilots was opened in the Casa de Contratacion, and anyone desiring to become a master or pilot was compelled to study there for one year. Pupils were taught navigation and cosmography, the use of the spheres, charts, nautical instruments, and how to take observations. At the end of his term the candidate had to face an examination which the Government, at least, meant to be searching. He was examined by the Pilot Major in the presence of the cosmographer and six pilots, who were all sworn to give an honest vote. Besides his year of tuition he must have had six years' experience of West Indian navigation, and produce certificates from two pilots; he was to be not less than twenty-four years of age, sober, healthy, no gambler, and a native of Spain.⁴⁴ The Pilot Major and cosmographer were permitted to ask as many questions as they pleased, but the other pilots only three each. The vote was a secret one by ballot, the decision being that of the majority; a rejected candidate had to make another voyage to the West Indies before admission to further examination, and there was no restriction as to the number of times such a one might come before the examiners. At a later date the term of tuition was shortened to three, and then to two, months.

If Columbus had taken the Azores instead of the Canaries as the starting point of his first voyage the re-discovery of America would probably have been deferred for many years. As it was his men murmured that the ceaseless trend of the Trade would prevent their return, but murmurs

⁴³ The regulation this criticism referred to ran as follows:— 'Because to carry instruments of navigation inaccurate or untrustworthy has caused and may cause great inconvenience or loss, it is ordered that a mark be put on all charts and instruments made for sale by private individuals. This mark shall be placed by the pilot and cosmographer of the Casa after examination and comparison with the standard patterns there preserved.'—*Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias*, Ley 8, Tit. xxiii, lib. 10.

⁴⁴ An order of 1515 forbade the entry of any Portuguese as a pilot, 'however learned and skilful he may be.'

would have become open mutiny after weeks of struggle with the prevailing westerly winds of higher latitudes. Just as the Trade winds rendered the voyage of Columbus physically easy, so they encouraged the new born commerce between Spain and the West. Nature had marked out the western route—the Ladies' Sea—for the Spaniards; it was long before they learnt the best eastern one. The Gulf Stream was not noticed, and the Florida Channel not entered until 1519,⁴⁵ and it was not until some years after that date that the return voyage by the Florida Channel and with the prevailing westerly winds became the usual one. In some instructions for navigation undated but probably about 1525–30,⁴⁶ it is remarked that formerly ships returned on nearly the same course that they followed going out, and took three or four months, but that now pilots were more skilful and went to the north. The passage gives the impression that the alteration was recent, but doubtless there was no sudden change, and while the more enterprising tried the new route, others still followed the old one. In 1525 four vessels sailed from the Island of San Domingo to San Lucar in twenty-five days; this was long remembered as a record passage, and shows that by that year certainly some pilots were taking the northern course.

The experience gained every year steadily added improvements in practical navigation as the intricacies of the Caribbean Sea became charted and described, but although it would be interesting to trace its development it would be far too long a study for this place. We must, therefore, proceed to the end of the sixteenth century, and briefly notice the sailing directions then used by the Spaniards and their Elizabethan contemporaries, for which there are two important authorities available. There is a manuscript in the British Museum Library, probably of about 1597, derived from Spanish sources and corrected by English seamen, which may be taken as representing the latest science of the day, from which we may learn the courses, landfalls, and other details connected with the navigation to and from the West Indies. The other

⁴⁵ HARRISSE, *Discovery of North America*, p. 189.

⁴⁶ *Col. de Doc. Ind. de Indias*, xlii. p. 541.

A detailed map of the West Indies and Spanish Main, showing islands, seas, and major cities. The map includes latitude and longitude markings from 70°W to 60°W and 10°N to 30°N. Key features include:

- Islands and Archipelagos:**
 - Bahamas Islands:** Labeled as "Bahama I.", "New Providence I.", "San Salvador I.", "Long I.", "Cuba I.", "Haiti or San Domingo", "Santo Domingo", "Alto Velo", "Santa Cruz", "Cristobal", "Mona", "Puerto Rico", "Virgin Is.", "St. John", "St. Thomas", "St. Christopher", "Montserrat", "Gallions Channel", "Desada", "Marie-Galante", "Dominica", "Marinique", "St. Lucia", "St. Vincent", "Barbados", "Grenadines", "Carriacou", "Grenada", "St. Tobago", "Trinidad", "R. ORINOCO", "S. Thome".
 - Antilles or Caribbean Islands:** Labeled as "ANTILLES OR CARIBBEE ISLANDS".
 - Haiti or San Domingo:** Labeled as "HAITI OR SAN DOMINGO".
 - Cuba:** Labeled as "CUBA".
 - Puerto Rico:** Labeled as "PUERTO RICO".
 - St. John:** Labeled as "ST. JOHN".
 - St. Thomas:** Labeled as "ST. THOMAS".
 - St. Christopher:** Labeled as "ST. CHRISTOPHER".
 - Montserrat:** Labeled as "MONTSERRAT".
 - Gallions Channel:** Labeled as "GALLIONS CHANNEL".
 - Desada:** Labeled as "DESADA".
 - Maria-Galante:** Labeled as "MARIE-GALANTE".
 - Dominica:** Labeled as "DOMINICA".
 - Marinique:** Labeled as "MARINIQUE".
 - St. Lucia:** Labeled as "ST. LUCIA".
 - St. Vincent:** Labeled as "ST. VINCENT".
 - Barbados:** Labeled as "BARBADOS".
 - Grenadines:** Labeled as "GRENADES".
 - Carriacou:** Labeled as "CARRICOU".
 - Grenada:** Labeled as "GRENADE".
 - St. Tobago:** Labeled as "ST. TOBAGO".
 - Trinidad:** Labeled as "TRINIDAD".
 - R. ORINOCO:** Labeled as "R. ORINOCO".
 - S. Thome:** Labeled as "S. THOME".
- Seas and Passages:**
 - INDIAN OR CARIBBEAN SEA:** Labeled as "INDIAN OR CARIBBEAN SEA".
 - Nova Passage:** Labeled as "NOVA PASSAGE".
 - St. George's Bay:** Labeled as "ST. GEORGE'S BAY".
 - St. Peter's Bay:** Labeled as "ST. PETER'S BAY".
 - St. John's Bay:** Labeled as "ST. JOHN'S BAY".
 - St. Thomas Bay:** Labeled as "ST. THOMAS BAY".
 - St. Christopher Bay:** Labeled as "ST. CHRISTOPHER BAY".
 - St. Lucia Bay:** Labeled as "ST. LUCIA BAY".
 - St. Vincent Bay:** Labeled as "ST. VINCENT BAY".
 - St. Barthelemy Bay:** Labeled as "ST. BARTHELEMY BAY".
 - St. Kitts Bay:** Labeled as "ST. KITTS BAY".
 - St. Eustace Bay:** Labeled as "ST. EUSTACE BAY".
 - St. Andrew Bay:** Labeled as "ST. ANDREW BAY".
 - St. George Bay:** Labeled as "ST. GEORGE BAY".
 - St. Peter Bay:** Labeled as "ST. PETER BAY".
 - St. John Bay:** Labeled as "ST. JOHN BAY".
 - St. Thomas Bay:** Labeled as "ST. THOMAS BAY".
 - St. Christopher Bay:** Labeled as "ST. CHRISTOPHER BAY".
 - St. Lucia Bay:** Labeled as "ST. LUCIA BAY".
 - St. Vincent Bay:** Labeled as "ST. VINCENT BAY".
 - St. Barthelemy Bay:** Labeled as "ST. BARTHELEMY BAY".
 - St. Kitts Bay:** Labeled as "ST. KITTS BAY".
 - St. Eustace Bay:** Labeled as "ST. EUSTACE BAY".
 - St. Andrew Bay:** Labeled as "ST. ANDREW BAY".
- Other Labels:**
 - Toronto:** Labeled as "TORONTO".
 - Alto Velo:** Labeled as "ALTO VELO".
 - Santa Cruz:** Labeled as "SANTA CRUZ".
 - Cristobal:** Labeled as "CRISTOBAL".
 - Mona:** Labeled as "MONA".
 - Puerto Rico:** Labeled as "PUERTO RICO".
 - Virgin Is.:** Labeled as "VIRGIN IS.".
 - St. John:** Labeled as "ST. JOHN".
 - St. Thomas:** Labeled as "ST. THOMAS".
 - St. Christopher:** Labeled as "ST. CHRISTOPHER".
 - Montserrat:** Labeled as "MONTSERRAT".
 - Gallions Channel:** Labeled as "GALLIONS CHANNEL".
 - Desada:** Labeled as "DESADA".
 - Maria-Galante:** Labeled as "MARIE-GALANTE".
 - Dominica:** Labeled as "DOMINICA".
 - Marinique:** Labeled as "MARINIQUE".
 - St. Lucia:** Labeled as "ST. LUCIA".
 - St. Vincent:** Labeled as "ST. VINCENT".
 - Barbados:** Labeled as "BARBADOS".
 - Grenadines:** Labeled as "GRENADES".
 - Carriacou:** Labeled as "CARRICOU".
 - Grenada:** Labeled as "GRENADE".
 - St. Tobago:** Labeled as "ST. TOBAGO".
 - Trinidad:** Labeled as "TRINIDAD".
 - R. ORINOCO:** Labeled as "R. ORINOCO".
 - S. Thome:** Labeled as "S. THOME".

authority is purely Spanish, also undated and probably not later than 1585.⁴⁷

As a rule the New Spain, or Mexican, fleet sailed in early summer to escape the hurricane season and the Northerners of the Gulf of Mexico; that for Tierra-firme, or the Spanish Main, somewhat later in order to be at Nombre de Dios or Puerto Bello⁴⁸ at the least unhealthy season of the year, but it not infrequently happened that the two fleets sailed in company. Leaving San Lucar in summer a S.W. course was laid for the point of Naga, I. of Teneriffe, but if in winter S.W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. for Cape Cantin on the African coast 'to reach more quickly less cold and stormy winds and seas.' From Cape Cantin S.W. $\frac{1}{4}$ W. for Naga; then for Gomera or Grand Canary for provisions, as stores for fifteen days only were taken on board at San Lucar, it

⁴⁷ The Museum MS. is *Sloane 2292*. At the end of the MS. there is a note:—'This whole rutter hath been examined with a copy of John Douglas which was written out of one Sir W. Raleigh had of Captain Parker. Those notes that are written on the blank pages are such readings as are in that copy, and when lines are stroked without notes of diverse readings they are words of my copy more than his. My copy was had of E. M. 1590, and this was examined 1595, and the last part from p. 35 was more than was in my copy. T. H.' Douglas was master of Raleigh's ship in his Guiana voyage of 1595; Parker was the fine seaman who sacked Puerto Bello in 1602; E. M. was probably Edmond Manwaring who commanded men-of-war more than once, or Edmond Musgrave, Master of the Charles in the Cadiz voyage. The identity of T. H. is doubtful; the slope, fineness of stroke, and character of the two letters strongly resemble the writing of Lord Thos. Howard, but I can find no example of his signature by initials, and in signing his full name he invariably combines the T and H into one letter. In any case this paper comes to us with the highest credentials. It is printed, but imperfectly, probably from another source, and quite unedited, in Hakluyt's *Voyages* (xv. p. 357; ed. 1888).

The original of the Spanish paper, anonymous and undated, is in the archives of the Department of Hydrography at Madrid. It is printed in the *Anuario de la Direccion de Hidrografia* for 1867, p. 343. There is another Spanish MS. 'rutter' in the British Museum (*Add. MSS.* 28189), but of no especial value.

⁴⁸ Nombre de Dios before 1584, Puerto Bello after that year. See *ante*, i. p. 333 for the mule transit across the Isthmus from Panama.

being considered a run of eight days to the Canaries. From these islands the course was thirty leagues S. to escape the calms 'which stretch fifteen leagues to the west of Hierro.'⁴⁹ Great circle sailing was of course unknown, and the navigators of the sixteenth century thought that in 'running along a parallel' they were following the shortest distance between two points, instead of, as is actually the case, traversing the arc of a circle in preference to its chord. Therefore to reach Deseada, in the West Indies, from Ferro, the *Anuario* goes on :—

Two courses may be taken. The oldest is W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S.W. until latitude $15^{\circ} 30'$ is reached, that being the latitude of Deseada;⁵⁰ a course due west is then steered. The newer route, being free of the calms of Hierro, is to steer W.S.W. to 20° , and then go W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S.W. until the said latitude of Deseada is reached. The time of this voyage, with favourable winds, should be 28 to 30 days because the longest runs will not be more than thirty leagues a day, as night sailing is done with little sail, the larger ones being taken in.⁵¹

If the two fleets were together they separated at Deseada, and here also were detached single ships for various ports, but of course the landfall was more often Martinique or Dominica than the desired island. The New Spain fleet, parting company, then made the South side of the I. of Sta. Cruz within two leagues, then Cape Roxo on the west side of Puerto Rico at a distance of four leagues. Mona and Saona at the eastern end of Española were sighted in turn, and the coast was followed to Ocoa, and close by, in the Gulf of Neyba, the fleet watered and refreshed. The city of San Domingo had been passed in consideration of the eternal trade regulations and fear of smuggling. Putting to sea and passing one league outside Beata and Alta Vela a W.N.W. course was taken 'giving at night a deviation to the west to keep clear of the coast.' Cape Tiburon being made, the course was north of Navasa to Cape de Cruz, then W.N.W. to the I. de Pinos in 20° .⁵² If the pilot took his departure from

⁴⁹ Ferro. The *Sloane MS.* says 'twenty-four hours south.'

⁵⁰ The latitude is really $16^{\circ} 20'$.

⁵¹ *Sloane MS.* adopts the 'newer route' and gives the latitude of Deseada as 15° .

⁵² Actually $21^{\circ} 40'$.

Cape de Cruz at night he was directed to run twenty-five leagues to the westward to get well clear of Los Jardines shoals. The next landfall was Cape Corrientes and then Cape San Antonio in 22° .⁵³ In view of the character of the navigation from Deseada onwards it was fortunate for the Spaniards that the prevailing easterly winds usually put their cumbrous and unhandy craft to leeward of the coast line.

From Cape San Antonio to San Juan de Ulua (Vera Cruz) there was an outside, or winter, and an inside, or summer, track through the Bay of Campeachy. By the former the fleet ran fifty leagues W.N.W. from Cape San Antonio to clear the Alacranes, 'which are in 22° east and west with Cape San Antonio, not going nearer to them than thirty fathoms. From this depth run N.W. fifty leagues until you come to 24° in order to pass Los Negrillos, which are in $23^{\circ} 30'$ '.⁵⁴ Thence the course lay W. and S.W. to the coast, making it fifteen leagues to the north and to windward of San Juan de Ulua, running down and entering the port by the north channel. The summer (May to September) route was to run along the Yucatan peninsula in soundings, and pass between the Arenas and the Triangles, or south of the latter and Las Arcas, making the coast of Mexico at the Sierras de San Martin, and working up the coast until San Juan was entered by the south-east channel. A glance at the chart will show the perilous and intricate nature of this summer passage. Nor is our wonder at their usual success lessened by finding that the Arenas Key is given by the Spaniard as in 22° , instead of the true $24^{\circ} 8'$, and Las Arcas in 20° instead of $19^{\circ} 30'$, and that there is not a word of the dangerous and uncertain currents.

When the Tierra-firme fleet came direct from Spain it entered the Caribbean Sea by the channel between Tobago and Trinidad, afterwards named Galleons Passage; thence there was an open run to Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. When joined with the fleet for New Spain, and leaving it at Deseada, the course laid for Cape de la Vela with a leading Trade wind was equally favourable. From Cape de la Vela care was taken to keep outside the 'white

⁵³ $21^{\circ} 51'$.

⁵⁴ Alacranes shoals $22^{\circ} 28'$. The latitude given of Los Negrillos is practically correct ($23^{\circ} 27'$).

water,' or 40-fathom line, and the navigation should have been easy until the anchors dropped in Nombre de Dios bay.⁵⁵ It was rendered difficult by the want of longitude forcing the pilots continually to sight the land by day, and lie to or anchor at night; these precautions indicate that experience had taught them that the currents rendered dead reckoning only an additional source of error.

Whether the two fleets came out together or separately they had to meet for the homeward journey at the Havana, thence to disembogue by the Florida Channel. In view of the prevalent winds of the Caribbean Sea, east or from some quarter of east, both fleets, at San Juan de Ulua and Nombre de Dios, were dead to leeward of their port.⁵⁶ In addition to this the ships from Nombre de Dios had to clear the nests of cays, reefs, and shoals extending far out to sea from the coast of Nicaragua. Therefore their first course was from Nombre de Dios back to Barú, near Cartagena, employing the eastward coast eddy, avoiding the main western current, and getting well to windward of the dangers of the Mosquito coast before starting for the passage through the Yucatan channel. From San Juan de Ulua the object of the Spaniards was to use the northerly winds which occur during February and March. The pilots were directed to get into 25° and then make their easting; they were warned not to go higher than 26° or they would be embayed in the Gulf of San Carlos, or Florida, and find it difficult to come out.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ The *Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias* (Lib. iii. Tit. vii. Ley 14) gives a series of formalities and salutes, too long to abstract here, governing the arrival and entrance of fleets or single ships. One rule was that a ship entering any West Indian port by night was liable to be fired upon and sunk by the land batteries without inquiry.

⁵⁶ In naval history it is well to remember that the Leeward Islands of the English were the Windward of the Spanish, French, and Dutch. Their Leeward Islands were those lying along the coast of Venezuela.

⁵⁷ The Spaniards became less cautious in time. In Herman Moll's charts of 1720, on which the Flota track is marked, the curve reaches as high at one point as 28° 10', and no doubt the course was then a long established practice; presumably they had found by experience that north and north-westerly winds are more frequent the farther the Gulf of Mexico is entered.

From the Havana both fleets sailed through the Florida Channel,⁵⁸ and if in summer went to the westward, and then north of the Bermudas to 39°, when the easting to Corvo was run down. In winter—leaving the Florida Channel—‘steer nearly E. $\frac{1}{4}$ N.E. to the Bermudas in 33°, leaving them to the north, prudently working up your latitude to 37° to find the I. of Santa Maria. This course is shorter but slower than that of the summer, a proof that the currents run to the north-west.’ From the Azores to St. Vincent and then to San Lucar finished the voyage.

A Spanish writer has said that sufficient treasure from the New World has passed through Seville to pave the city with tiles of gold and silver, and the statement is probably no exaggeration. It would be both interesting and historically important if we could put into reliable figures the sum the Spanish Crown had at command from this source between 1585 and 1603, for although only a fifth of the bullion brought over belonged to the King, it must be remembered that that belonging to private individuals was not infrequently seized as a forced loan. Calculations have been made, and are quoted here for what they may be worth, but the data are scanty and uncertain. One writer⁵⁹ estimates the import of gold, during the eighteen years, at 10,500,000*l.*, and of silver at 48,900,000*l.*; another⁶⁰ thinks that the total imports of gold and silver amounted together to 44,000,000*l.* There happens to be a contemporary test, although a rough one, that can be applied to these figures. The Venetian ambassadors at the court of Spain kept the Seignory informed, among other things, of the arrival and value of the treasure fleets. Between August 1587 and November 1600 they report a series giving the ‘millions of gold’ brought in them for all except one fleet.⁶¹

⁵⁸ For this, as in the previous navigation, the *Sloane MS.* gives directions in much more detail than the *Anuario*, noting landmarks and inculcating caution when and where to lie to or anchor.

⁵⁹ A. Del Mar, *Hist. of the Precious Metals*, Lond. 1880, p. 175.

⁶⁰ W. Jacob, *Historical Inquiry into the Production and Consumption of the Precious Metals*, Lond. 1831, i. p. 62.

⁶¹ Mr. H. F. Brown, the editor of the *Calendar of Venetian State Papers*, informs me that a Venetian ambassador would use the coinage of the country to which he was accredited. In that

Taking an average of ten millions for the omitted one the total is 108,240,000 ducats, or 29,766,000*l.*, a curiously close approximation to Jacob's estimate of 29,400,000*l.* for the corresponding fourteen years. But of course we can feel no certainty that the Venetian ambassadors announced the arrival of all the fleets, or that all their despatches are in existence.

case, 'millions of gold' means millions of ducats, each ducat worth 5*s.* 6*d.* according to the usual valuation. Gerard de Malynes (*Lex Mercatoria*, Lond. 1622, p. 266) reckons 'a million of gold' as 300,000*l.*, and the ducat therefore at 6*s.*, but Mr. Brown quotes a passage from a Venetian despatch which makes the 'million' only 150,000*l.* (*Calendar of Venetian Papers*, x. pp. 534, 5, and Mr. Brown's note there on the subject).

APPENDIX C.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE ST. VALENTINE.

INVENTORY OF GOODS ON THE CARRACK.

State Papers Dom. Elizabeth, cclxxxv. 12.

[Fair copy, unsigned.]

Endorsed :—An inventory of the Carrack goods taken by estimate of the commissioners.

An inventory of the goods of the Carrack St. Valentine taken at Leadenhall the 20th of September, 1602.

| | |
|---|--------|
| Calico books, ¹ special fine | 2,407 |
| Calico books, fine | 12,119 |
| Calico books, ordinary | 9,926 |
| Calico books, unpapered | 969 |
| Calico books, washed | 1,093 |
| Calico books, long | 404 |
| Calico books, double | 4 |
| Calico books, stained | 520 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 27,442 |
| Calico lawns of divers sorts | 6,088½ |
| Calicoes diaper | 140 |
| Calicoes, starched | 2,897 |
| Pack calicoes ell ² broad | 3,656 |
| Pack calicoes, yard broad | 442 |
| Calicoes of 3 to 2, tasselled and untasselled | 5,017 |
| Callequins ³ | 2,397 |

¹ Probably similar in meaning to book-muslin—packages in the shape of books.

² 'Elne.'

³ Or 'Cannequins, a low-priced kind of cloth' (Linschoten, *Hakluyt Soc.* ed., p. 60).

| | |
|--|--------|
| Ketches ⁴ of 3 to 1, all uncheded | 15,313 |
| Brown calicoes | 246 |
| Brown canaquins | 315 |
| Calicoes, russet and grizelled ⁵ (whereof one muff) | 93 |
| Striped and coloured calicoes | 263½ |
| Calicoes, crisped | 4 |
| Calico canopies and testers— | |
| White (whereof 2 wrought with yellow) | 11 |
| Ash colour | 1 |
| Striped | 12 |
| Painted | 2 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 26 |
| Calico quilts and quilting pieces— | |
| Quilts, white | 93 |
| White pieces quilting | 5 |
| Striped quilts (whereof one large) | 43 |
| Stitched and embroidered quilts | 35 |
| Painted quilts | 29 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 205 |
| Calico mantles | 3 |
| Calico cupboard cloths or carpets of divers colours | 106 |
| Pynthadoes ⁶ (whereof 10 painted) | 742 |
| Barbers' aprons or striped calicoes | 590 |
| Calico buckrams | 2,476 |
| Calico girtweb (rolls) | 13 |
| Cotton yarn bundles | 9 |
| Crewle ⁷ red and blue (bundles) | 16 |
| Calicoes, rotten and unserviceable— | |
| Books, folded (per esteem) | 200 |
| Books, unfolded | 167 |
| Lawns | 233 |
| Starched calicoes (per esteem). | 400 |
| Pack calicoes | 140 |
| Pieces of 3 to 2 | 337 |
| Ketches, 3 to 1 (per esteem) | 100 |
| Barbers' aprons | 7 |
| Persian carpets (whereof long 9 ; rotten one) | 44 |

⁴ *Corges*, parcels of twenty pieces.⁵ Grey.⁶ Painted or stained.⁷ Fine worsted (*Halliwell*).

APPENDIX C

343

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Turkey carpets (rotten 5) | 10 |
| Leather carpets (whereof coverings for stools 4) | 37 |
| Divers curled papers (whereof half-papers 5) | 363 |
| Paper fans A chest half full | |
| Raw silks, bundles | 160 |
| Sleeved silks, papers | 1,589 |
| Stuffs of silk (rolls, whereof damask 8) | 36 |
| Canopies and testers of silks, wrought, 6 whereof— | |
| Velvet, red and green | 1 |
| Velvet embroidered with gold, and silk curtains fringed with gold and silk | 2 |
| Damask | 2 |
| Other silk | 1 |
| A canopy of white taffety, painted | 1 |
| Cushions suitable | 11 |
| Quilts and coverings of silk and quilting pieces, wrought— | |
| Damask | 4 |
| with 7 small pieces of damask | |
| Crimson velvet | 1 |
| Satin | 2 |
| Purple silk and damask | 2 |
| with 4 long cushions suitable | |
| White taffety | 1 |
| with 6 pieces of white taffety | |
| Other silk, quilts, and coverlets | 6 |
| | <hr/> |
| | Quilts 16 |
| | <hr/> |
| | Pieces 17 |
| Quilts and coverlets, painted (whereof 1 taffety) . | 13 |
| Mantles of white silk, embroidered | 1 |
| Cloth of gold and silver counterfeit pieces | 2 |
| Seed pearl (small bags) | 14 |
| Garnets (bag) | 1 |

SPICES.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| Pepper— | |
| Butts and pipes | 165 |
| Puncheons and hogsheads | 765 |
| | <hr/> |
| Hogsheads | 1,095 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----|
| Cinnamon— | | | | | | | |
| Pipes | . | . | . | . | . | . | 80 |
| Hogsheads | . | . | . | . | . | . | 19 |
| Barrels | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 |
| Canisters | . | . | . | . | . | . | 216 |
| Chests emptied | . | . | . | . | . | . | — |
| Ginger— | | | | | | | |
| Pipes | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 |
| Hogsheads | . | . | . | . | . | . | 16½ |
| Barrels | . | . | . | . | . | . | 3 |
| Bags | . | . | . | . | . | . | 43 |
| Green ginger and other conserves— | | | | | | | |
| Barrels | . | . | . | . | . | . | 41 |
| Cloves— | | | | | | | |
| Chests full | . | . | . | . | . | . | 12 |
| Hogshead | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Barrels | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 |
| Firkin | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Cases | . | . | . | . | . | . | 82 |
| Cloves, fusses ⁸ (case) | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Maces— | | | | | | | |
| Chest | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Canisters | . | . | . | . | . | . | 9 |
| Rice— | | | | | | | |
| Hogsheads | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 |
| Barrels | . | . | . | . | . | . | 34 |
| Cases or chubs | . | . | . | . | . | . | 16 |
| Meece or cusko ⁹ — | | | | | | | |
| Hogshead | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Cases or chubs | . | . | . | . | . | . | 4 |
| Barrels | . | . | . | . | . | . | 13 |

DRUGS.

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cubebs— | | | | | | | |
| Pipes | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 |
| Puncheons | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Cardamoms, hogsheads | . | . | . | . | . | . | 5 |
| Tamarinds, rundlet | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |
| Cocoa nuts (barrel) | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 |

⁸ Bruised.⁹ *Cuscus, kuskos* (Persian and Urdu *khas khas*), the aromatic root of the Indian *Andropogon muricatus* (*New Eng. Dict.*).

| | |
|---|----|
| China roots ¹⁰ and gallingall ¹¹ .— | |
| Hogsheads | 2 |
| Barrel | 1 |
| Bag | 1 |
| Benjamin ¹² .— | |
| Hogshead | 1 |
| Cases | 29 |
| Olibanum— | |
| Hogsheads | 3 |
| Barrels | 3 |
| Firkin | 1 |
| Pipe | 1 |
| Cases or serons ¹³ | 5 |
| Incense— | |
| Hogsheads | 3 |
| Pipes | 2 |
| Barrels | 2 |
| Resin (hogshead) | 1 |
| White wax— | |
| Pipes | 13 |
| Hogshead, half full | 1 |
| Firkin | 1 |
| Sal ammoniac (firkin) | 1 |
| Camphor, refined— | |
| Hogshead | 1 |
| Barrels | 4 |
| Sanguis draconis ¹⁴ (barrel) | 1 |
| Indigo— | |
| Hogsheads | 3 |
| Barrel | 1 |
| Rundlets | 2 |
| Chubs great | 10 |

¹⁰ The *Smilax China*, a sarsaparilla. 'It cured Charles V. of the sciatica' (Phillips, *New World of Words*). Modern patients are seldom so fortunate.

¹¹ 'The aromatical root of the rush called Cypress' (Minsheu, *Guide to Tongues*).

¹² Benzoin.

¹³ On the West Coast of Africa the seron was 185·53 grains English. At Malaga it stood for a special weight of $3\frac{1}{2}$ arrobas or 87½ lbs.

¹⁴ The resin from several palms of the genus *Calamus*.

| | |
|---|-------|
| Burrace, ¹⁵ refined (barrel) | 1 |
| Tincall ¹⁶ — | |
| Barrels | 7 |
| Jars | 9 |
| Rundlets | 13 |
| Gumlacre ¹⁷ — | |
| Pipes | 6 |
| Hogsheads | 25 |
| Barrels | 4 |
| Cases | 87 |
| Bloodstones— | |
| Firkins | 12 |
| Chubs | 5 |
| White wood, ends or pieces | 68½ |
| Ybony, ¹⁸ ends or pieces | 1,260 |

ACCOUNT OF GOODS.

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 136.

[Fair copy, signed.]

GOODS and merchandize taken in a Carrack, called the St. Valentine of Lisbon, by Sir Richard Leveson, knight, and sold and delivered from Leadenhall in London by the commissioners, from the 3rd of January, 1603,¹⁹ until the 1st of September, 1604, during which time Sir William Ryder, knight, was treasurer of the monies proceeding upon those sales.

Goods sold to Mr. Cranefeild,²⁰ Mr. Masham and others the 9th of March, 1603 ; ²¹ payable some part in hand, and the rest at divers days. As followeth, viz. :

¹⁵ Borax.¹⁶ Native borax.¹⁷ Gumlacquer.¹⁸ Ebony.¹⁹ 3rd January, 1603-4.²⁰ Lionel Cranfield, afterwards Earl of Middlesex and Lord Treasurer.²¹ 1603-4.

| | | | |
|---|-------|-----------|-----------|
| Indigo, 2,072 pounds net weight, tare and tret deducted, sold at 5 <i>s.</i> the pound . | £ | <i>s.</i> | <i>d.</i> |
| | 518 | 0 | 0 |
| Indigo, wet and ill-conditioned, 175 pounds weight, sold at 2 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> the pound . | 21 | 17 | 6 |
| Rice, net weight 62 cwt. 3 qrs. 24 lbs., ²² sold at 13 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> the cwt. | 41 | 19 | 6 |
| Tyncall, ²³ net weight 4,915 pounds, sold at 1 <i>s.</i> 10 <i>d.</i> the pound | 450 | 10 | 10 |
| Cinnamon, net weight 19,360 pounds and a half at 1 <i>s.</i> 3 <i>d.</i> the pound | 1,210 | 0 | 7 |
| Gum-lacre, net weight 140 cwt. 1 qr. 26 lbs., ²⁴ at 5 <i>d.</i> the cwt. | 702 | 8 | 2 |
| Ginger, net weight 51 cwt. 3 qrs. 22 lbs., ²⁵ at 3 <i>d.</i> the cwt., cometh to 155 <i>l.</i> 16 <i>s.</i> 9 <i>d.</i> , but this ginger, with all the several commodities above mentioned, being sold to be paid one-third part in hand, and the rest at three months and nine months, with order, given by the Lord Treasurer to abate, after 10 per cent, for as much ready money as would be paid for any of the said goods sold, there was abated after 10 per cent. for this parcel, whereby the same cometh to but | 149 | 16 | 9 |
| Wet pepper, 36,969 pounds net weight, sold at 8 <i>d.</i> the pound | 1,232 | 6 | 2 |
| Light pepper dry, net weight 4,012 pounds, sold at 6 <i>d.</i> the pound | 100 | 6 | 0 |
| Light pepper wet, net weight 1,360 pounds, sold at 3 <i>d.</i> the pound | 17 | 0 | 0 |
| Dust of dry pepper, net weight 7,040 pounds, sold at 0 <i>b.</i> ²⁶ the pound | 14 | 13 | 4 |

²² A side-note runs, 'vj^m €C iij qrt^m xxiiij lbs.'—that is, 6,000 lbs. 2 cwt. 3 quarters and 24 lbs. This form of entry was the usual one at an earlier period (cf. *Naval Accounts and Inventories* (Navy Records Soc.), *passim*, and especially p. 244). It will be noticed that the cwt. here is of 100 lbs.

²³ See note 16, p. 346.

²⁴ Here the cwt. is 112 lbs., but in the next entry it is 100 lbs. again.

²⁵ Side-note runs, 'v^m € iij qrt^m xxij lbs.'—i.e. 5,000 lbs. 1 cwt. 3 quarters and 22 lbs.

²⁶ Halfpenny.

| | | | |
|--|----|----|----|
| Dust of wet pepper, net weight 13,304 pounds, sold at q ^t ²⁷ the pound . . . | £ | s. | d. |
| | 13 | 17 | 2 |
| Dry stony pepper, net weight 2,569 pounds, sold at 6d. the pound . . . | 64 | 4 | 6 |
| Wet stony pepper, net weight 2,125 pounds, sold at 3d. the pound . . . | 26 | 11 | 3 |

All which several parcels of wet pepper, light pepper, dry and wet dust of pepper, were sold, to be paid a third part ready money, another third part at six months, *vide licet* the 9th of September, 1604, and the other third part at six months following, viz. the 9th of March, 1604.²⁸

| | | | |
|--|-------|----|---|
| Caskus, ²⁹ net weight 14 cwt., sold at 2s. the cwt. ³⁰ . . . | 1 | 15 | 0 |
| Sum total of all the goods sold to Mr. Cranefeld, Mr. Masham and others do amount unto . . . | 4,565 | 6 | 9 |

Goods sold to Sir Thomas Bennett and other merchants to be paid for in ready money, at the rates and prices following :—

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Calico books, superfine | 373 |
| Tasselled calico books | 926 |
| Ordinary books of the third sort | 2,508 |
| Ordinary books of the second sort | 2,045 |
| Ordinary books of the first sort | 5,171 |
| Unpapered and unstarched books | 438 |
| Long calico books | 562 |
| Calico lawns of the first sort | 242 |
| Calico lawns of the second sort | 2,387 |
| Calico lawns of the third sort | 1,771 |
| Calico lawns of the fourth sort | 340 |
| Calico lawns of the fifth sort | 45 |
| Starched calicoes | 2,352 |
| | <hr/> 19,160 |

Sold one with another at the rate of 8s. the piece, 7,664l.

²⁷ Farthing.

²⁹ See note 9, p. 344.

²⁸ *I.e.* 1604-5.

³⁰ 'Cth draught' in MS.

| | |
|--|-------|
| Washed calicoes | 1,570 |
| Stained calicoes | 1,497 |
| Stained lawns of the first sort | 43 |
| Stained lawns of the second sort | 251 |
| Stained lawns of the third sort | 135 |
| Stained lawns of the fourth sort | 10 |
| Canekeenes, ³¹ white | 1,994 |
| Canekeenes, brown | 252 |

5,752

Sold one with another at 3s. 4d. the piece, 958l 13s. 4d.

| | | | |
|--|-----|----|------------------|
| Raw silk, 6 cwt. 0 qrs. 5 lbs., reduced to the pound subtle ³² and sold at 24 ounces the great pound, bringeth forth 451 lbs. 5 oz. and $\frac{1}{3}$ of an ounce, sold at 21s. 6d. the pound | £ | s. | d. |
| Sleeved ³³ and twisted silk, 1,076 double papers weighing 6 cwt. 0 qrs. 18 lbs. the tare deducted, being 80 lbs. 11 ozs., the weight reduced to the pound subtle weigheth 609 lbs. 5 oz. at 16 ounces the pound and sold at 16s. the pound, cometh to | 485 | 3 | 8 |
| Cypres, ³⁴ 133 double papers, sold at 16s. the piece | 487 | 9 | 0 |
| Cypres, 89 single papers, sold at 7s. 8d. the piece | 106 | 8 | 0 |
| Buckrams, 255 papers, sold at 1s. 4d. the paper | 34 | 2 | 4 |
| Camphor, ³⁵ 7 cwt. 2 qrs. 7 lbs., sold at 25l. the cwt. | 17 | 0 | 0 |
| Olibanum, 22 cwt. 2 qrs. 19 lbs., sold at 33s. 4d. the cwt. | 192 | 16 | 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Cubebs, 9 cwt. 2 qrs. 23 lbs., sold at 25s. the cwt. | 37 | 14 | 2 |
| Benjamin coarse, 2 cwt. 1 qr. 14 lbs., sold at 8l. 10s. the cwt. | 12 | 2 | 7 |
| | 20 | 3 | 9 |

³¹ See note 3, p. 341.³² Net weight. Compare with the next entry.³³ Soft floss or unspun silk (*Encyclopaedic Dictionary*).³⁴ A fine gauze-like crape (*Hallivell*).³⁵ 'Campheire'

| | | | |
|---|--------|-----------------|-----|
| Incense, 9 cwt. 3 qrs. 14 lbs., sold at 9s. | £ | s. | d. |
| the cwt. | 4 | 8 | 10½ |
| Sal ammoniac, 21 pound sold at 10l. 10s. | | | |
| the cwt. | 1 | 19 | 4½ |
| Sanguis draconis, 56 pound at 6l. 10s. the | | | |
| cwt. | 3 | 5 | 0 |
| China roots, 2 cwt. 2 qrs. at 12l. the cwt. | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| Tamerines, ³⁶ 49 pounds at 5l. 10s. the cwt. | 2 | 8 | 1½ |
| Sum total of the goods sold to Sir | | | |
| Thomas Bennet and others for | 15 | 1 ³⁷ | |
| ready money amounteth to | 10,057 | 12 | 9 |

Goods sold to the commissioners and divers of the merchants which bought jointly the other goods, and bought these goods for their private use and particular accounts.

| | |
|------------------------|-----|
| Superfine calico books | 100 |
| Tasselled calico books | 97 |
| Book calicos, ordinary | 33 |
| Long books | 10 |
| Calico lawns | 122 |
| | 362 |

Sold at 8s. the piece, one with another, 144l. 16s.

| | |
|---|--------|
| Striped calico books, 40 sold at 15s. the piece, 30l. | |
| Washed books | 204 |
| Stained books | 1,080 |
| Stained calico lawns | 266 |
| Brown calicoes stained | 6½ |
| | 1,556½ |

Sold at 3s. 4d. the piece, 259l. 8s. 4d.

| | | | |
|---|----|----|----|
| | £ | s. | d. |
| Sleeved and twisted silk, 26 lbs. 6½ oz. at | | | |
| 16s. the pound | 21 | 2 | 6 |
| One bag of pepper, weighing net 234 pound | | | |
| sold to Sir Thomas Gorges at 1s. 4d. the | | | |
| pound | 15 | 12 | 0 |
| Cypres, 25 double pieces, sold to divers | | | |
| persons at 16s. the piece | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| Cypres, 19 single pieces at 7s. 8d. the piece | 7 | 5 | 8 |

³⁶ Tamarinds.

³⁷ Sic.

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| Pinthadoes, stained and broken, 9 at 2s. the piece | £ s. d. 18 0 |
| Grisseld calicoes, 91 at 3s. 4d. the piece . | 15 3 4 |
| Buckrams, 19 papers at 1s. 4d. the paper | 1 5 4 |
| Canekenes, 4 at 3s. 4d. the piece | 13 4 |
| Canekenes, stained, 20 at 1s. the piece . | 1 0 0 |
| White calico quilts, stained, 27 at 1l. the piece | 27 0 0 |
| Quilting pieces, stained, 2 at 5s. the piece | 10 0 |
| White quilts of calico stitched with yellow bark, one small quilt sold at | 2 0 0 |
| A calico surplus sold at | 5 0 |
| Cannepes ³⁸ of white calico, 9 sold at 1l. the piece | 9 0 0 |
| Silk quilts, 2 small, sold at 4l. the piece . | 8 0 0 |
| Silk painted quilts, 3 at 2l. 10s. the piece | 7 10 0 |
| Small pieces of silk quilting for a waist- coat | 10 0 |
| Dimidies, 5 short pieces, ³⁹ at 5s. the piece | 1 5 0 |
| Brown calicoes, 90 at 6s. the piece | 27 0 0 |
| Testernes ⁴⁰ of calico, 3 at 6s. 8d. the piece | 1 0 0 |
| Tikes ⁴¹ of narrow calico, 3 at 3s. 4d. the piece | 10 0 |
| Cypres, curled, single pieces, 3 at 7s. 8d. the piece | 1 3 0 |
| Curled cypres, double pieces, 3 at 15s. the piece | 2 5 0 |
| Skin cypres, single pieces, 10 at 5s. the piece | 2 10 0 |
| Skin cypres, double pieces, 2 at 10s. the piece | 1 0 0 |
| Cotton yarn, rotten, 424 pounds at 4d. the pound | 7 1 4 |
| Cinnamon, coarse, 290 pounds at 1s. 3d. the pound | 18 2 6 |
| Ginger, dry, 75 pounds at 6d. the pound . | 1 17 6 |

³⁸ Canopies, probably bed-curtains here.

³⁹ Halves or short pieces.

⁴⁰ Bed furniture.

⁴¹ *Tike, Tigue*, a pillow-case (Godefroy *Dict. de l'ancienne langue Française*).

| | |
|---|----------|
| Short cinnamon, the sweepings, 186 pounds, sold at 7 <i>d.</i> the pound . . . | £ s. d. |
| Benjamin, coarse, 146 pounds at 1 <i>s.</i> 3 <i>d.</i> the pound . . . | 5 8 6 |
| Sum total of all the goods sold to the commissioners and merchants to their private use . . . | 9 2 6 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 650 4 10 |

Pearl, called ounce pearl of several sorts, sold and otherwise delivered out by order of the Lord Treasurer, as followeth, *videlicet* :—

| | |
|--|---------|
| Pearl, called ounce pearl, unbored, of the smallest sort, 445 ounces, sold at 3 <i>s.</i> the ounce . . . | 66 15 0 |
| Pearl, called ounce pearl, unbored, of the second sort, 119½ ounces, sold at 9 <i>s.</i> the ounce . . . | 53 15 6 |
| Pearl, called ounce pearl, unbored, of the third and greatest sort, 4 ounces, sold at 18 <i>s.</i> the ounce . . . | 3 12 0 |
| | <hr/> |

Sum total of the pearls sold is . . . 124 2 6

| | |
|--|---------|
| Pearl, called ounce pearl, of the second sort, delivered to Edmond Palmer, embroiderer, ⁴² for the service of the young prince, by the Lord Treasurer's warrant, 139½ ounces, valued at 9 <i>s.</i> the ounce . . . | 62 13 4 |
| Pearl, called ounce pearl, of the third or greatest sort, delivered to the same embroiderer by the said warrant, ⁴³ 60½ ounces, valued at 18 <i>s.</i> the ounce . . . | 54 13 6 |
| | <hr/> |

Sum total of the pearls delivered to the embroiderer . . . 117 6 9

Pepper sold to Mr. William Garwaye and other merchants at the rate of 1*s.* 4*d.* the pound, being touched and somewhat impaired by salt water, upon the taking of the Carrack. And whereof some pepper was parcel of Sir Robert Manxfeilde's⁴⁴ prize, and brought from the

⁴² 'Embrotherer.'

⁴³ 'To make a footcloth and other apparel' (*Pipe Office Accounts*, 2,507).

⁴⁴ Sir Robert Mansell. 'Sir Robert Mansfield and Sir

Customhouse to Leadenhall, both which sorts of pepper were sold at one rate—viz. at 1*s.* 4*d.* the pound, to be paid at three six months,⁴⁵ *videlicet*, the 1st of March 1604, the 1st of September 1604, and the 1st of March 1605.

| | |
|---|------------------------------|
| Sold unto the said merchants, 629 bags of the Carrack pepper weighing one hundred and forty thousand seven hundred four score and fifteen pounds $\frac{3}{4}$ of pepper, tare and tret deducted, at 1 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> the pound, cometh to . . . | £ s. d. 9,386 7 8 |
|---|------------------------------|

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| Sold unto the said merchants of the pepper brought from the Customhouse, being parcel of Sir Robert Manxfeilde's prize, 51 bags of pepper weighing eleven thousand forty and six pound of pepper, tare and tret deducted, at 1 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> the pound, cometh to . . . | 736 8 0 |
| Sum total of the pepper amounteth to . . . | 10,122 15 8 |

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| Coarse wax delivered to the officers of the green cloth for his Majesty's service, to be melted and refined, 13 pipes and one hogshead weighing, gross weight with the tare, 112 cwt. 1 qr. 16 lbs., ⁴⁶ which by estimation might weigh, net weight, 98 cwt., which being valued at 5 <i>l.</i> the cwt. cometh to . . . | 490 0 0 |
| Sum total of all the goods sold and delivered by the said commissioners amounteth to . . . | 26,127 11 7 |

Examined by me, R1 : WRIGHT, Registrar.⁴⁷

Amyas Preston have brought in six Easterlings into the river that came out of Spain laden with spices and some bullion that we pretend should belong to certain Portugalles' (Chamberlain to Carleton, 31st October 1601).

⁴⁵ That is, at three intervals of six months. The dates here are New Style.

⁴⁶ A side-note runs, 'ix^m viij €^{lb} w 5t. neat'—i.e. 9,000 lbs. 8 cwt., therefore the cwt. of wax was of 100 lbs.

⁴⁷ There is another account (*Pipe Office Accounts*, 2,505) which I have not thought it necessary to print, of goods sold between 28th

**WARRANT FOR PAYMENT OUT OF THE PRIZE
GOODS MONEY.**

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 141.

Dated February 20th, 1603-4.

[Signed, original.]

[Addressed :—To our very loving friend Sir Wm. Ryder, knight, treasurer of the moneys raised by the sale of the Carrack goods, be these.]

AFTER our hearty commendations. Whereas Mr. Symon Harvie doth serve his Majesty's house with grocery ware at a lower rate than the same are worth, for recompense whereof he is allowed a composition of sugars, spices, raisins, and such like fruit as are brought into the realm from beyond the seas, whose case is also recommended unto us by the officers of the Green Cloth, that he hath sustained in those provisions great loss by reason of the pepper and spice that was brought into the realm, of the Dutch spices taken by Sir Robert Mansell, knight, and after in the Carrack taken by Sir Richard Leveson, knight, out of which he hath had no composition because the same appertained to the late Queen, and now to his Majesty. And further he allegeth, which we know to be true, that by reason of a restraint that hath continued these nine months that no pepper should be brought into the realm until that in his Majesty's possession might be vented, whereby he hath lost the benefit of that he should by the said imposition have recovered of such spices as

June, 1602, and 3rd January, 1604, amounting to 17,723*l.* 12*s.* 3*d.*, therefore the total gross receipts were nearly 44,000*l.* Elizabeth took a number of Persian and leather carpets for herself, and pepper to the value of 1,559*l.* was given to Leveson by way of reward; in July 1603 calicoes to 2,000*l.* value were delivered to Sir Jas. Sandilands as a gift. The total deductions for gifts, payment to commissioners, and general expenses connected with inventorying, labour, and sales in the first account came to nearly 7,000*l.* The expenses connected with the second account, the one above, were 5,112*l.* 2*s.* 10*d.* The commissioners for the first series of sales (1602-4) received 1,687*l.* for their superintendence, so that the carrack was relatively more profitable to them than to anyone else.

otherwise should have been brought into the realm,⁴⁸ by which occasion though he hath made a large demand of the loss he sustaineth, which although we do not allow according to his demand, yet we think it reason that recompense should be made unto him in some reasonable sort: And withal these are to will and require you to pay presently⁴⁹ unto Mr. Harvie in ready money 300*l*. And this together with his acquittance of the receipt thereof shall be your sufficient discharge in that behalf. This 20th of February, 1603.

Your loving friends,
T. DORSET. SUFFOLKE.
DEVONSHYRE. H. NORTHAMPTON.

*RECEIPT FOR 20*l*. FROM PRIZE GOODS MONEY.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 149.

[Undated. [October 1604.] Signed, original.]

RECEIVED on the day and year abovesaid, by me John Hawes, of Sir William Ryder, knight, treasurer of the moneys proceeding of the sale of the Carrack goods, the sum of 20*l*.—viz. 5*l*. thereof for my pains taken in and about the sorting, removing, weighing, and delivering of part of the said Carrack goods at Leadenhall by allowance made by the committees⁵⁰ as by their bill subscribed the 28th of August 1604 appeareth. And the other 15*l*. for marking and

⁴⁸ Harvey's claim to consideration is worded more clearly in another paper (*P. O. D. A.* 2,507): 'Simon Harvey, the King's grocer, in recompense for losses by him sustained in serving his Majesty's house with spices at a lower rate than they were worth, for recompense whereof he received and was to receive upon composition sugars and other spices brought into the realm from beyond the seas, in which spices by him received he likewise sustained great loss by reason of the great quantities of pepper and other spices brought into the realm in the prizes,' so that in consequence of the restraint on importation he either did not receive the spices intended or was unable to sell at a profit in competition with the prize goods.

⁴⁹ At once.

⁵⁰ 'Comityes' in MS.

numbering of bags and for the like pains and attendance given in that service, as by a bill subscribed under the hands of three of the committees appointed by the lords his Majesty's commissioners appointed for the sale of the said Carrack goods bearing date the 6th of September, 1604. I say received in the whole . . . 20*l*.
per me JOHN HAWYES.

*WARRANT FOR ALLOWANCE TO THE
CARRACK COMMISSIONERS.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 140.

Dated January 10th, 1605-6.
[Original, signed.]

AFTER our hearty commendations. Whereas by warrant of the Lords of the King's Majesty's Privy Council dated the 28th day of July, 1603, Sir William Ryder,⁵¹ knight, with others, was appointed one of the commissioners for the Carrack goods, wherein he continued from the 28th of July, 1603, until the 23rd of January following. And whereas by virtue of his Highness' commission under the great seal of England, dated the 23rd of January in the first year⁵² of his Majesty's reign, to us and others directed for the said Carrack goods the said Sir William Rider was appointed treasurer of the said Carrack goods, and we by our letters of the 25th of January, 1603,⁵³ did appoint the same Sir William Ryder, knight, John Wolstenholme, Arthur Ingram, and Richard Carmarthen,⁵⁴ officers of the

⁵¹ Lord Mayor in 1600.

⁵² January 23rd, 1604.

⁵³ 1603-4.

⁵⁴ Surveyor of Customs for the port of London. Carmarthen, or Carwarden, was frequently employed by Elizabeth in the valuation and sale of prize goods. Sir Robert Naunton (*Fragmenta Regalia*) relates how he gained the Queen's confidence when an underling by 'observing his time and presenting her with a paper showing how she was abused in the under-renting of her customs, and therewithal humbly desired her Majesty to conceal him, for that it did concern two or three of her great counsellors whom Customer Smith had bribed with 200*l*. a man, so to lose the Queen

Customs, and Mr. Richard Wright commissioners for the preserving, viewing, inventorying and sale of the said goods, wherein they have been jointly employed from the said 25th of January, 1603,⁵⁵ until the 1st of September following : Now forasmuch as the said Sir William Ryder, John Wolstenholme, Arthur Ingram, Richard Carmarthen and Richard Wright have been humble petitioners unto us for some allowance for the travail, pains and expenses of themselves and their clerks sustained in and about the said service during the several times before mentioned. And for that we are authorized by his Majesty's said commission to give such allowances to any persons employed about his service as to any three of us (whereof I, the Lord Treasurer of England, to be one) should be thought fit and convenient : We therefore, having consideration upon the view of former allowances in the same case, do think fit and so we do will and require you to allow unto the said Sir William Ryder, knight, for his travail and pains, not only as commissioner from the 28th of July, 1603, until the 1st of September, 1604, being ccciiii^{xix}⁵⁵ days, but also as treasurer from the 23rd of January, 1603, until the said 1st of September, and for the charges of his clerks attending the receipts and payments of the money arising by sale of the said goods, and for the forbearance of two

2,000*l. per annum*, which being made known to the Lords they gave strict order that Carwarden should not have access to the back stairs ; till at last her Majesty, smelling the craft and missing Carwarden, she sent for him back and encouraged him to stand to his information, which the poor man did so handsomely that within the space of ten years he brought Smith to double his rent, or to leave the Customs to new farmers So that we may take this also into observation, that there were of the Queen's Council that were not in the catalogue of Saints.' Camden calls Carwarden 'an understanding and subtle fellow,' and says that his opponents were Burghley, Leycester, and Walsyngham. That Leycester should have taken a bribe is in the highest degree probable, and Burghley and Walsyngham must suffer suspicion from the company they were in. The customer, Sir Thomas Smith, founder of the family of Smythe, Viscounts Strangford, was farming the Customs in 1586 for 26,000*l.* a year. In 1590, in consequence of Carwarden's information, the amount was raised to 50,000*l.*, and soon reached 127,000*l.* in 1604.

⁵⁵ 399 days.

thousand pounds which he paid upon the King's warrant and letter of me, the Lord Treasurer, to Sir William Howme, knight, six months before he received any money out of the sale of the said goods. In all the sum of 366*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* And that you further allow unto the said John Wolstenholme, Arthur Ingram and Richard Carmarthen to each of them three-score pounds, and to Mr. Richard Wright one hundred marks. All which several sums we require you to give allowance accordingly in the said Sir William Ryder's account as treasurer of the said Carrack goods now to be passed. For doing whereof these our letters shall be your warrant and discharge in that behalf : From Dorset house this 10th of January, 1605.⁵⁶

Your loving friends,

T. DORSET.

SUFFOLKE.

DORSET TO LAKE, WITH DRAFT OF WARRANT.

State Papers Dom. James I. xiii. 77.

[Endorsed :—Warrant to the Lord Treasurer and Lieutenant of Berwick to distribute 700*l.* out of the Carrack's goods to certain captains and others for service done at sea in the last year of the Queen's reign. 29 April, 1605.]

RIGHT trusty and right well beloved Cousin and Councillor and right trusty and well beloved Councillor, we greet you well : Whereas our beloved subjects Captain Gyles Thornteton, Captain Sebastian Pitfolde, Captain Henry Browne, John Randall, Philabeth Cogan and John Veyney, in the last year of the reign of our late dear sister of famous memory, Elizabeth, late Queen of England, did together at their proper costs and charges set forth to sea two several ships, the one called the Pearse of Plymouth, the other called the Recompense of Weymouth, who being upon their voyage at sea did discover a Spanish Carrack being in the road of Cezimbra, and presently⁵⁷ upon their discovery did by their earnest diligence and carefulness seek and find out our said sister's ships then being also at sea, to whom they did give speedy intelligence of the said

⁵⁶ January 10th, 1605-6.

⁵⁷ Immediately.

Carrack, and thereupon they the said Captain Thorneton, Captain Browne, and their company, were by special command from Sir Richard Leveson, knight, and others the then commanders and captains of the said Queen's ships charged to attend, and afterwards were employed in the taking and winning of the said Carrack, in which (as we are informed by the said Sir Richard Leveson and others, the then commanders of the said ships) they the said Thorneton, Browne, and the rest of their said company did special service, not only in yielding their help and strength in the taking of the said Carrack, but also in conducting and bringing in of the said Carrack into our haven and river of Plymouth, in which said service they were employed by the space of nine or ten weeks, during all which time they lived at their own charges and spent and consumed their powder, shot and victuals, which they had laid into their said ships for their voyage, and so by that means did utterly lose and overthrow their said intended voyage, to their great loss and hindrance. The benefit of which said Carrack (wherein there was pepper, calicoes and other things of great value) hath wholly redounded and come to our use. In regard whereof, as also for that humble suit hath been made unto us by the said Thorneton and Pitfolde in the behalf of themselves and their company, and by the said John Randall for himself, and the said Browne, Cogan, and Veyney, for some allowance to be made unto them for their said expenses and service so done as afore-said : We let you to wit that in consideration of the said service and expenses and in full recompense of the same, we are well pleased and of our especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion do give and grant unto the said Captain Thorneton, Captain Pitfolde, and Captain Browne, John Randall, Philabeth Cogan, and John Veyney the sum of 200*l.* of lawful English money, viz. one hundred pounds of the said 200*l.* to be delivered and paid to the said Captain Thorneton and Captain Pitfolde, and the other 100*l.* is to be delivered and paid to the said John Randall for himself and the said Captain Browne, Philabeth Cogan, and John Veyney. Wherefore our will and pleasure is and we do straitly charge and command you that you deliver and pay or cause to be delivered and paid unto the said Captain Gyles Thorneton and the said Captain Sebastian

Pitfolde one hundred pounds of lawful English money whereof you our Treasurer are to make division between them as you shall see just cause and according as you shall find their several merits;⁵⁸ and also unto the said John Randoll for himself and the said Captain Henry Browne, Philabeth Cogan and John Veyney one other 100*l.*, all which is to be paid unto them at and out of the next payment of such moneys as are to be paid by any merchants or others unto us for such goods as are already sold unto them out of the said Carrack by virtue of our commission to you and others in that behalf directed. And forsomuch as Jacob Jaques in the said last year of the reign of our said late sister having (as he hath informed us) set forth his ship at sea furnished with men and victuals, had the said ship stayed at sea by the command of Sir Wm. Mounson, knight, Vice-Admiral of our ship called the Garland, who did not only take the said Jaques and twenty-one of his men out of his said ship and employed them in the service of our said ship called the Garland, but also did put into the ship of the said Jaques 49 infected persons which then did lie dangerously sick in our said ship, and thereupon sent away the ship of the said Jaques together with the said sick and diseased persons into our river of Plymouth, and afterwards employed the said Jaques and his said company at sea in special service for the public good, by the space of two months, in whose behalf testimony hath been made unto us by the said Sir Richard Leveson, knight, and the said Sir William Mounson, knight, that the said Jaques himself did then many good and profitable services for the state, but especially in that which he performed in the taking of the said Carrack, as well in playing the gunner as in instructing them in the steerage and other offices belonging to the said Carrack, and likewise received a hurt in his body by the shot of a great piece of ordnance in that service and sustained other great losses, by reason whereof he is likewise become an humble suitor to us for some recompense to be given

⁵⁸ Dorset decided to give Thornton 90*l.*, as the Pearse of Plymouth was equipped entirely at his own expense; Pitfolde being in partnership with Randoll, out of whose 100*l.* he would get his share, obtained only the remaining ten of this 100*l.* (*Add. MSS.* 5,752, f. 153).

unto him for his services and charges so by him sustained and done as aforesaid : We therefore let you to wit that in consideration of his said services and charges and in full recompense of the same : We are well pleased and of our special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, we do give and grant to the said Jaques the sum of 100*l.* of lawful English money : Wherefore our will and pleasure is and we do straitly charge and command you that you deliver and pay or cause to be delivered and paid unto the said Jacob Jaques the said sum of 100*l.* of lawful English money, to be paid unto him at and out of the next payment of such moneys as are to be paid by any merchants or others unto us for such goods as are already sold unto them out of the said Carrack by virtue of our said commission to you and others in that behalf directed. And whereas also our beloved subjects Captain George Somers and Anthony Moone, being owners and victuallers of a ship called the Swallow, did in the last year of the reign of our said late sister at their own costs and charges set forth the said ship to sea and appointed one Captain Phillip Lea to be captain and master thereof, which said ship by the especial command of Sir Richard Leveson, then General of the fleet, was stayed and commanded to attend upon our said ships, in which (as we are informed by the testimony of the said Sir Richard Leveson and others the then commanders of the said fleet) there was especial service done and performed by the said Captain Lea, master of the said Swallow, and his company, especially in chasing, pursuing, and taking a Spanish ship coming from the West Indies laden with ginger, hides, and other commodities esteemed at the value of one thousand pounds at least, the benefit whereof hath come to our use, and did likewise then further service in the chasing, pursuing and taking of a flyboat⁵⁹ of good value which was brought into the haven of Plymouth, in performance of which services they spent and consumed their powder, shot and victuals and by that means utterly overthrew their intended voyage to their great loss and hindrance, whereupon they became humble suitors to our said late sister for some recompense to be given to them

⁵⁹ Dutch *Fluit*, corresponds to the Spanish *Urca*, hulk as a cargo ship.

for their said service, cost and charges as aforesaid, which by reason of her death which presently ensued was prevented, so as yet they have not received or had any gift or allowance for their said services and charges done as aforesaid. And thereupon they, the said Captain George Somers, Anthony Moone, and Phillip Lea, have been likewise humble suitors to us for some recompense and allowance to be made unto them for the same. We therefore let you to wit that in consideration of the said services and charges and in full recompense of the same, we are well pleased and of our special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion we do give and grant unto the said Captain Lea for himself and the rest of his company the sum of 100*l.* of lawful English money. Wherefore our will and pleasure is and we do straitly charge and command you that you deliver and pay or cause to be delivered and paid unto the said Captain Lea for himself and the rest of his said company the said sum of 100*l.* of lawful English money at and out of the next payment of such moneys as are to be paid by any merchants or others unto us for such goods as are already sold unto them out of the said Carrack goods, by virtue of our said commission to you and others in that behalf directed. And further whereas our beloved subject Sir Sackville Trevor, knight, in the said last year of the reign of our said late dear sister was then captain of one of our ships called the Mary Rose, and was also at that time Vice-Admiral of a fleet employed then upon the coast of Spain, and in that service did take 4 hulks which were proved lawful prizes at the costs and charges of the said Sir Sackville Trevor, and the profit and benefit thereof did redound and come to our Exchequer (as he hath informed us), and for that upon a reference of the cause from us to you our Treasurer and also to our Admiral of England we have been likewise certified that the said Sir Sackville Trevor did perform a very profitable service in taking of the said 4 ships and in proving them prizes, in which were found so much wheat, powder, musket shot, and cordage, as were estimated worth above 4,500*l.*, and that our said late sister was content in recompense of the said service to give unto the said Sir Sackville Trevor the sum of 500*l.*, which said gift by her death became utterly void, and although no part

thereof hath hitherto been paid yet you our Treasurer and our Admiral think it fit that the gift of 300*l.* should be bestowed upon the said Sir Sackville Trevor in full satisfaction and recompense of his charges and services done and performed as aforesaid. We therefore let you wit that in consideration of the said service and charges so by the said Sir Sackville Trevor done and sustained as aforesaid and in full recompense of the same, we are well pleased and of our special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, we do give and grant unto the said Sir Sackville Trevor the sum of 300*l.* of lawful money of England. Wherefore our will and pleasure is and we do straitly charge and command you that you deliver and pay or cause to be delivered and paid unto the said Sir Sackville Trevor the said sum of 300*l.* of lawful English money at and out of the next payment of such moneys as are to be paid by any merchants or others unto us for such Carrack goods as are already sold unto them by virtue of our said commission as aforesaid. And these our letters shall be your sufficient warrant and discharge in this behalf. Given under our signet, &c.

Sir Thomas Lake I pray you draw a privy seal accordingly or rather the King's warrant under his signet.
25 April 1605.⁶⁰

T. DORSET.

*WARRANT FOR PAYMENT OUT OF THE PRIZE
GOODS MONEY.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 155.

[Dated March 18th, 1605-6. Original, signed. Addressed to Mr. Auditor Gofton.]

AFTER our hearty commendations. Whereas the King's Majesty, by his warrant under the privy signet dated at Greenwich the 29th April in the third year of his Highness's reign, directed to me the Lord Treasurer of England and the Chancellor and under-treasurer of the Exchequer or to either of us, was pleased in consideration of service of

⁶⁰ Holograph.

sundry persons hereafter named about the taking of a Spanish Carrack in the last year of the late Queen's reign, and of some other prizes then also taken (the benefit whereof hath been or is to be answered to his Highness for the same) to allow unto them for their charges such sums of money as in the same warrant (amongst others) is mentioned and particularly expressed, viz. to Captain Gyles Thorneton and Sebastian Pitfolde, for their service about the taking and conducting into Plymouth of the said Carrack, one hundred pounds; to Jacob Jaques, who had his ship stayed by Sir William Mounson, knight, then Vice-Admiral of the fleet, and his fresh men taken out of her, and the sick and diseased men in the said Vice-Admiral's ship sent away in the said Jaques' ship to Plymouth, being therein and otherwise employed in service by the space of two months, one hundred pounds; to Captain George Somers and Anthony Moone, who set forth a ship called the Swallow at their own charges under the conduct of Phillip Lea, captain, which ship was stayed by Sir Richard Leveson, knight, Admiral of the said fleet, and by him used in the taking of the said Carrack, one hundred pounds; and to Sir Sackville Trevor, knight, Vice-Admiral of a fleet employed upon the coast of Spain,⁶¹ in which service he took four hulks which were proved good prizes laden with wheat, powder, musket shot and cordage, the benefit whereof hath been answered to his Majesty, the sum of three hundred pounds, as by the same his Highness's warrant remaining with me the Lord Treasurer may appear: And whereas also suit hath been made unto me the Lord High Treasurer of England by the servants of the five late commissioners for the Carrack business, who have by the space of thirteen months taken great pains and labour in removing and sorting the Carrack goods at such times as the commissioners would not trust the common labourers and porters: These are now to will and require you out of such moneys as are owing to the King's Majesty by William Garwaye and other merchants for pepper sold unto them, you give allowance in the account of Sir William Ryder, knight, late treasurer of the Carrack goods, not only of the several sums before mentioned amounting to six hundred pounds accord-

⁶¹ Trevor succeeded Monson as Vice-Admiral from 27th August, 1602.

ing to his Majesty's pleasure signified by his Highness's said warrant remaining with me the said Lord High Treasurer of England, but also that you likewise allow the sum of fifty pounds to Mr. Richard Carmarthen to be by him equally divided amongst the servants of the said commissioners for their travail⁶² and pains about the said Carrack goods. And lastly whereas by order and commandment of me the Lord Treasurer of England you are to new make and ingross the said Sir William Ryder's account for entering the several allowances aforesaid : We are content to allow unto you for the travail⁶² and pains of yourself and your clerks, to be paid by the said Mr. Garwaye and other merchants out of the said moneys owing by them for pepper, the sum of thirty pounds. For all which sums this our warrant, grounded upon the King's Majesty's commission under the great seal of England bearing date at Westminster the 23rd day of January in the first year of his Majesty's reign, shall be as well sufficient discharge to the said merchants for payment thereof, as to you to give allowance in the said account accordingly. And so we bid you heartily farewell. From Dorset house this 18th of March, 1605.

Your loving friends,

T. DORSET.

DEVONSHYRE.

H. NORTHAMPTON.

*WARRANT FOR PAYMENT OUT OF THE
PRIZE GOODS MONEY.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 151.

[Original, signed. Addressed to :—Contractors for the Carrack pepper.]

AFTER my hearty commendations. Whereas it hath pleased his Majesty by his letters under the signet bearing date the 29th of April last past to command me (amongst other things therein contained) that I should cause to be delivered and paid unto Sir Sackville Trevor, knight⁶³ (in

⁶² 'Travell' in MS.

⁶³ Fourth son of John Trevor of Trevallyn, Denbighshire. A brother, Sir John Trevor, became Surveyor of the Navy in 1598,

consideration of his service and charges done and performed in the last year of the late Queen's reign, about the taking of 4 hulks which were proved lawful prizes at his costs, and the profits thereof did redound and come to his Highness's Exchequer), the sum of three hundred pounds of lawful English money at and out of the next payment of such moneys as are to be paid by any merchants or others unto his Majesty for such Carrack goods as are already sold unto them by virtue of his Highness's commission to me and others in that behalf directed. These are therefore to will and require you to pay and deliver unto the said Sir Sackville Trevor or his assigns the said sum of three hundred pounds out of the next payment of such moneys as are to be paid by you to his Majesty's use for such Carrack pepper as hath been already sold unto you by virtue of the said commission according to his Majesty's good pleasure so signified as aforesaid: And in so doing this, together

having no qualification for the post but that of having been secretary to Nottingham. Sackville Trevor was knighted in 1604. His first man-of-war command was the *Sun*, in the Channel, from August to December 1595. In 1596 he commanded the *Charles* in the Cadiz voyage, and afterwards in the narrow seas continuously through 1597 and 1598 until 28th October, 1599. Throughout 1600 he was in the narrow seas in the *Tramontana*, and in 1601 on the Irish coast in the same ship until April 2nd, when he returned to the Channel in command of the *Advantage* from 17th April to 15th December. In 1602 he was captain of the *Adventure* on the Spanish coast under Leveson, and from 27th August became Vice-Admiral in the *Mary Rose*, when the hulks referred to in the text were taken (see *ante*, p. 190). It is unnecessary to follow Trevor's sea service further beyond noticing that he did not go to sea again without flag rank. His professional career is chiefly of interest as illustrating the rise of the class known as 'gentlemen captains,' who, in the seventeenth century, were the cause of so much ill-feeling and even mutiny in the navy, and who owed their appointments and rapid promotion to influential relationship. The seamen who broke Spain obtained only uncertain and temporary employment, and, in most cases, never rose above the rank of captain. Trevor and others who had seen but little active service (for being in sea pay did not necessarily mean being at sea), who had done nothing meriting especial reward, and whose experience was mainly confined to home waters and ports, found their flag appointments in a few years.

with Sir Sackville Trevor's acquittance testifying the receipt thereof, shall be your sufficient warrant and discharge. From Dorset house this 22nd of June, 1605.

Your loving friend,
T. DORSET.

*WARRANT FOR ALLOWANCE OUT OF PRIZE
GOODS MONEY.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 158.

[Original, signed.]

WHEREAS Sir Thomas Gorges, knight, employed lately as a commissioner about the Carrack goods, did receive to his own use one bag of pepper weighing 234 lbs. at 16^d. the pound, amounting to the sum of 15^l. 12^s. Now forasmuch as we find that the said Sir Thomas Gorges hath dealt justly in the said service, and that he doth not think himself altogether satisfied for his said service in that behalf: we have therefore at his request thought fit to allow him the said sum of 15^l. 12^s. due for the said pepper. These are therefore to require you, that you make allowance thereof upon the passing of the account of Sir William Rider, late treasurer, for the said Carrack goods as a thing to be borne by his Majesty. And this shall be your warrant in that behalf. Dorset house, this 28th day of November, 1605.

T. DORSET, NOTINGHAM

*CERTIFICATE OF RECEIPT OF WAX FROM THE
PRIZE GOODS.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 144.

[Undated. Unsigned.]

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Dorset, Lord High Treasurer of England, and to the Honourable Sir Thomas Fleming,⁶⁴ knight, Lord Chief Baron of his Majesty's Court

⁶⁴ Sir Thomas Fleming was Chief Baron 27th October, 1604, to 9th February, 1607.

of Exchequer, and to the rest of his Majesty's barons of the same Court, and to all other his Majesty's officers to whom it shall concern.

May it please your good Lordship and the rest to be advertised that there were brought by Mr. Parrye, chief clerk of the Spicery,⁶⁵ from Leadenhall, thirteen pipes and one barrel of the Carrack wax, the which being melted and tried in his Majesty's storehouse at Whitehall in the month of September, being in the second year of his Majesty's reign, made eight thousand three score and ten pounds of wax neat, and the same wax was charged in the office of the Spicery sine precio⁶⁶ and so spent in his Majesty's service.

*WARRANT FOR ALLOWANCE TO JOHN SOSAR
OUT OF PRIZE GOODS MONEY.*

Additional MSS. 5,752, fol. 146.

[Original, signed. Addressed :—To Sir William Ryder, knight.]

AFTER our hearty commendations. Whereas John Sosar was employed, upon the bringing hither of the Carrack to Plymouth that was taken by Sir Richard Leveson, in perusing all the Portingall letters, cargases,⁶⁷ bills of lading, accounts, and other writings concerning the goods in the said Carrack, for which he hath had as yet no allowance, though by the former commissioners for the ordering of those goods there was direction given the same should be paid. Forasmuch as the pains he took is certified by you, and that you can make him no allowance without warrant from us: These shall be to require you to give

⁶⁵ The Spicery was a department of the Household administered by a chief clerk, two under clerks, and a yeoman. One of the duties of the office was to provide the torches, waxlights, &c., for the palace service, hence the delivery of the Carrack's wax to Mr. Parry. It appears, from the regulations of July 1604, that much waste had occurred hitherto, and a clerk of the Spicery was ordered to attend every morning at the chandlery to receive back all remains of wax lights from gentlemen ushers, grooms of the chamber, and others to whom they had been issued.

⁶⁶ This wax was valued at 490*l*.

⁶⁷ From the Spanish *carga*, relating to lading.

such competent allowance unto him in regard of his pains and attendance about that service as you shall think convenient. Wherein this shall be your sufficient warrant. From Whitehall the 5th of August, 1604.

Your very loving friends,

| | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| T. ELLESMERE, Canc. | T. DORSET. | SUFFOLKE. |
| GILB. SHREWSBURY. | E. WORCESTER. | |
| DEVONSHYRE. | H. NORTHAMPTON. | |
| RO. CECYLL. | THO. BURGHLEY. | W. KNOLLYS. |

EXAMINATION OF FRANCIS COWPER AND OTHERS.

State Papers Dom. Elizabeth, cclxxxv. 4.

[Copy.]

[Endorsed :—The examination of 3 men which came lately out of Spain, 1602.]

1602, September 14.—The examination of Frances Cowper and Henry Parramore of Plymouth, who were prisoners in the galley called the *Leeuet*,⁶⁸ vice-admiral under the Marquis of Santa Cruz, at the time of the taking of the Carrack in Cezimbra road.

THE said examinares do say that the second of June, being the day before the Carrack was taken, divers poor carvels of Cezimbra, discerning her Majesty's ships to come about the point of Cape Espichel,⁶⁹ did depart out of the road of Cezimbra, for their own safety, whereupon the Marquis of Santa Cruz gave present⁷⁰ order unto his three galleys to fetch them in again. The weather growing calm, so as the Queen's ships could not come into the road, commandment was given unto the said carvels to lay the Carrack aboard and to take out some part of lading, which they did accordingly, being seven or eight in number, whereof some departed for St. Toves,⁷¹ some for Lisbon, and some delivered their lading at the town of Cezimbra.

⁶⁸ The *Leva*.

⁶⁹ 'Pitcher' in MS.

⁷⁰ Immediate.

⁷¹ Setubal or St. Ubes, a short distance east of Cezimbra.

These examimates do also report that the same day, divers boats of Cezimbra did go to and from the Carrack, carrying much goods with them; this is all that these examimates are able to say touching the Carrack, whereunto they have subscribed their names.

FRANCES COWPER.

HENRY + PARRAMORE'S mark.

Andrew Hearinge, prisoner in Lisbon, being examined, saith that the pilot of the Carrack was committed unto the same prison where he did remain, and the said pilot having his house searched by the King's officers, three bags of diamonds and stones, together with certain other jewels, were found, whereupon he was arraigned and condemned; he also saith that into the same prison, thirty-five or thirty-six gentlemen that were aboard the Carrack were then committed upon suspicion of stealth. And that the captain of the Carrack was likewise committed, for the like offence, but unto what prison he is not able to report.

ANDREW HERINGE.

State Papers Venetian.

[Original Despatch, Venetian Archives, 22nd June, 1602. Simon Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate.]

ONE of the ships of the Portuguese Indies, missing for two years, and bringing a cargo worth two millions of gold, has arrived. She wintered at Mozambique, and on the 11th instant, with only thirty men left of her crew, she reached the harbour of Almada, but could not make it for want of a pilot. The governor, in dread lest the ship should fall into the hands of the enemy, sent 300 soldiers aboard and the galleys of Spinola as an escort. But the eight Englishmen, whose deeds I reported in my last,⁷² fell on

⁷² 'On the coast of Portugal eight English ships recently disembarked 700 soldiers and sacked Figueira and Buarcos, two places of small importance. All the same they made some prizes.' (Despatch of 12th June.)

her with such determination that after a stiff fight she remained their prize. The Viceroy came down to the shore in person with all his troops : of the twelve galleys two were burnt, and the crew of one mutinied and went over to the English. Many of the Spanish troops are killed and the Marquis of Santa Cruz severely wounded. Valladolid, 22nd June, 1502.

APPENDIX D.

INSTRUCTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR WILLIAM MONSON

State Papers Dom. Elizabeth, cclxxxiv. 73.

[Fair copy, unsigned.]

[Endorsed :—Instructions for Sir William Monson, Vice-Admiral of her Majesty's fleet for the coast of Spain. 1602.]

9 July, 1602.—Instructions given to Sir Wm. Monson, Knight, Vice-Admiral of her Majesty's fleet for the coast of Spain.

YOU shall take charge of her Majesty's good ships the Mary Rose, Dreadnought, Swiftsure, Adventure, Answer, Quittance and Lion's Whelp, and of the Paragon of London. And God prospering you, as we heartily wish, shall take the first opportunity of wind and weather to carry your fleet safe and entire together in one body towards the coast of Spain.

You shall dispose and govern your whole voyage and all your counsels and enterprises principally and merely to prevent and impeach the preparations and gatherings together of the King of Spain's ships, galleys, and other sea forces ; and shall not divide your fleet, nor undertake any exploit or service which may divert or hinder you in this business which concerneth the safety and honour of your prince and country, either for adventure, purchase,¹ or other second,² and hope or desire whatsoever.

¹ From the time of Chaucer to late in the eighteenth century plunder was termed 'purchase,' not ironically but because the word is derived from the old French *pourchasser*, to pursue—that being the usual preliminary to pillage.

² In support or aid of others. Sir F. Vere, in his *Commentaries*, calls the supports of the fighting line 'the seconds.'

You shall direct your course as straight, and with as much expedition as God shall permit, towards the Cape Finisterre and Coruña, where you shall carefully and circumspectly view and discover the state of that coast and the ports adjoining. And if you find any preparations there or any rendezvous appointed for the enemy's ships or galleys, you shall, with good advice and courage, and with God's assistance, do your best to destroy or disperse those which shall be gathered, and to stop, take, or overthrow all such as shall attempt to go in and consort with the rest.

If you find those ports clear you shall ply up along the coast of Galicia and Portugal as near the shore as safely you can till you come to the height of the Rock. And all the way shall look into their ports and inform yourself of the intended preparations in every place, and shall apply yourself to hinder and prevent them in the best sort you can.

When you are gotten into the height of the Rock, if no other important occasion for the prevention and dispersing of the enemies' preparations carry you necessarily from thence, you shall ply it off and on there till your Admiral, with the residue of his fleet, do come up unto you ; and in such case of your necessary departure you shall leave some small ship or pinnace with perfect direction what course you hold, what is the purpose of your removing, and where you may be found or will attend for further direction.

You shall give advice to the Quittance and to the Hollanders of your coming as soon as possibly you can, and shall direct them where to find you and what course they shall hold. And shall assure them of the present return of your Admiral and the residue of our fleet. And what care and course her Majesty hath taken for their speedy supply with victuals and all necessary provisions, and shall confirm and encourage them the best you can to continue resolute and constant in the prosecution of this service, which so much importeth the common cause of religion and of both our countries.

Above all things you shall take heed to refrain yourself and all your companies from offering any wrong, violence, or interruption to any of her Majesty's friends and allies, and shall suffer no man to go aboard them for whose honest carriage yourself will not answer ; nor shall

without plain and manifest proofs of goods prohibited, or belonging directly to the King of Spain's subjects, take, seize, or stay any vessel or anything therein contained as you will answer it at your uttermost peril. If you meet any ship of her Majesty's allies laden with Spanish iron or anchors, you shall agree with them for the same in friendly manner and shall take order for the transporting thereof to her Majesty's storehouse at Deptford Strand, and shall give your bill for payment at reasonable day of such reasonable price as may not redound to the owner's loss, which shall accordingly be paid and discharged, by the Officers of her Majesty's navy, to any their assigns without delay or loss.

You shall advertise the Lords³ from time to time of all your proceedings and of such preparations as you shall discover, and of all things which, in your discretion and judgment, you shall think meet for their knowledge.

So soon as you have sight or notice of your Admiral's coming you shall repair unto him and follow such further directions as he shall think fit for the good of her Majesty's service and the loyal discharge of our duties and the zeal and renown of our religion and countries. For which all noble and true courages think it their chief honour to adventure their lives.

INSTRUCTIONS TO LEVESON AND MONSON.

State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclxxv. 54.

Original. Signed. 29th August [1602].

[Addressed :—To our very loving friends Sir Richard Leveson, knight, and Sir William Monson, Admirals of the fleet, employed to the southwards.]

AFTER our very hearty commendations, we have now received intelligence directly showing that there is no great likelihood of the Spaniards coming for Ireland, so as if the journey of you, Sir William Monson, were to begin again we would peradventure be advised before the Queen should be put to charge. But because we will not

³ Of the Privy Council.

move too suddenly upon this advertisement, though for my own part, I, the Secretary, hold it true, and because it may fall out that yet before winter he may transport some numbers thither, the rather when he shall find that the Queen hath no fleet at sea, adding also that a great part of her Majesty's charge is (? paid,⁴) her Majesty is contented the same shall go on if in any convenient time the wind shall serve. Wherein we have thought good to direct you thus far in your proceedings: That you, Sir William Monson, according to your former instructions, do repair to the coast and visit Coruña and Lisbon, where if you shall find that your own intelligences concur with this enclosed, and that there be no preparation for Ireland, then doth her Majesty commit it to your discretion in what height to lie, and how to govern yourself for intercepting of any such matter as may countervail her Majesty's charge. In which kind, because you shall upon the coast best gather knowledge, whether the fleets be come or not, her Majesty leaveth it to your discretion to send home or retain such and so many of the ships as you shall think fittest for all considerations of her Majesty's service, and so for this time we commit you to God's protection. From the Court at Oatlands, the 29th August.

Your very loving friends,

NOTINGHAM,
RO. CECYLL.

Sir Richard Leveson, we think it fit that in your return with the Merhonour and those ships that come about, you stay awhile in the Narrow Seas, because Sir Robert Mansell is but weak.

Sir Richard Leveson,
Sir William Monson.

⁴ This word is destroyed in the original.

APPENDIX E.

MONSON'S LETTERS, 1592-1602.

(1)

MONSON TO FROBISER.

Lansd. MSS. 70, f. 48.

July 12th [1592].

[Holograph.]

Addressed, 'To the Right Worshipful and his very loving friend Sir Martin Frobiser, Kt., give these with speed, speed, haste, post haste.'

[Endorsed (in Frobiser's hand): 'Received this letter the 13 of August, 1592, at the Burlings.']

SIR,—It is needless to recount of my troubles past in Spain, you being thoroughly persuaded the Spaniards' usage to be most vile and cruel towards our nation. For such matters as have passed, for your better intelligence I have sent you by this ship, the Green Dragon, as likewise what ships I shall meet at sea I will certify you because of your more assurance. I do much desire to see you myself, and were I assured to meet you by going into this ship I would have left my own where I am passenger. Saturday last, being the 8th July after our account, there came in one of the six carracks out of the Indies, which was scattered from the rest with a storm under the Line. The others are looked for hourly. The height they held in was 43°; therefore in any wise keep to the northward of the Burlings, or in the height thereof.

Since their departure from Goa, in the Indies, they never see St. Helena,⁵ the island of Terceira,⁶ nor any land till

⁵ 'Sainte Ilena.'

⁶ 'Terseirr.'

they fell with the coast, for so was their directions upon pain of death from the King; one of them was sunk in a storm at the Cape of Bona Esperanza, so that there be behind four.

If you chance not to meet them within twelve days after the writing hereof I make account they be at the Islands; then may you use your own discretion, but in any wise beware of keeping the sea when your ship goeth foul, for I left at an anchor at Cascaes eighteen great ships of the King's, besides pinnaces; twelve there were making ready in Lisbon; six there were looked for out of Biscay. They at Cascaes will put to sea within four days; the rest, in Lisbon, will not so soon be furnished. No man knoweth whither they are certainly bound; some think for the Islands, others think to Ferrol, where the King meaneth to make an armada next year. Others there be that saith that the rest of the carracks be discovered by carvels of advice in 43°, and that you likewise are discovered by the name of my lord of Cumberland, and that the carracks have orders, for fear of you, not to bear with this coast till the men-of-war meet them. Of all these reports I refer the likeliest unto your own opinion, whose experience and wisdom is known to be great to all the world.

On Sunday and Monday there came in two carvels from the mine⁷ with much gold.

There came a ship of advice not long since from the Havana, who brought news of so many English men-of-war as that no ships durst put forth, which maketh me imagine the fleet of the West Indies will hardly come home this year, or if they do it will be winter first.

I left an old follower of yours in prison, called Captain Lygett; if it be your hap to take any Spaniard you may do a deed of charity to keep him to ransom him; otherwise he is destitute of all friends.⁸ Thus briefly have I discoursed of such matters that I imagine will make for your voyage, and, beseeching God to send you all honour and fortune, I

⁷ 'Myne'—La Mina, on the Gold Coast.

⁸ Perhaps the Captain Legatt who was scouting under difficulties off Coruña on Christmas Day, 1596 (*ante*, p. 16). He does not appear to have ever commanded a Queen's ship.

take my leave of you in haste from the Jonas of Hamboro
this 12th of July, being Wednesday.

Yours most assured to use,

WILLIAM MONSON.

I have sent you a note of such goods as be in the
carracks departed out of Goa in the Indies 12th January,
1592, after the Spaniards' computation :—

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|--------|------------------------|----------|-----|
| Pepper | quintals ⁹ | 34,460 | Hardwax | quintals | 756 |
| Anell ¹⁰ | " | 2,324 | Linen cloth, as calico | | |
| Cloves | " | 3,763 | and such like packs | | 966 |
| Cinnamon | " | 1,589 | All kinds of silk | | |
| Nutmegs | " | 150 | cases | | 119 |
| Mace | " | 522 | Cases of silk | | 93 |
| Camphor | " | 76 | Cases of Indies | | |
| Benjamin | " | 206 | cloth | | 309 |

(2)

MONSON TO CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xc. 119.

March 19th,¹¹ 1602.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—Sir Wm. Mounson to my master, without
date. Sir Rych. Levison ¹² gone to sea (in another hand), 1601.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Being desirous to render account
to your honour of all things that shall happen in this in-
tended journey, I thought good to let your honour under-

⁹ 'Kintals.' The ordinary Lisbon quintal weighed 129·54
English pounds, and that of the India department 113·34 lbs.
But Linschoten tells us that the quintal, or pecul, of pepper
weighed 128 lbs.; therefore it seems as if it were bought by the
last measurement in the Spice Islands and sold at Lisbon by
that of the India House.

¹⁰ Indigo (Linschoten), from the Hindustani *nīl*.

¹¹ Postal endorsement 'From Plymouth this 20 of March past
4 in the morning.'

¹² *Sic*. His name was usually written Leveson, Lewson, or
Luson.

stand that Sir Richard Leveson set sail from the Sound of Plymouth with all her Majesty's ships, except the Garland and Defiance, the 19th of this present with the wind at north west ; he hath left directions with me to follow him into the height of the Rock twenty leagues west of the shore, which I hope to do upon Tuesday next at the furthest. The want of sailors have¹³ been the greatest impediments unto us, but by that time I dare be bold to promise your honour we shall be both fully victualled, and furnished with men. Sir Richard hath left a letter of directions with the mayor of Plymouth for the Dutch Admiral which he takes to be as effectual as though I had stayed his coming. And in hope your honour will be well satisfied with my departure before the arrival of the Hollanders, seeing it was by order of my Admiral, I humbly take my leave of your honour, and will ever rest your honour's during life to be commanded.

Your honour's ever to dispose of,

WILL. MONSON.

(3)

MONSON TO CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xciii. 31.

May 8th [1602].

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed by Cecyll : 'Capt. Monson to me.']

SINCE the sealing up your honour's other letters I have received advertisements by a Frenchman from the shore of the death of the Adelantado the 9th of this month after their account ; he died at St. Mary's port suddenly without speaking a word. It is thought he was poisoned, and not unlikely, for he was a great tyrant to all sorts of people, and generally hated amongst his own countrymen.

Their preparations in Lisbon are stayed, or else goeth forward very faintly, which makes me conjecture that either they are not able to make a head to encounter us

¹³ *Sic.*

or that they are careless of anything that is to come home this summer, now that their plate is safely arrived. If her Majesty would please to keep a continual fleet upon his coast, though he were willing yet he were not able either to guard home his Indies fleets or to annoy her by any invasion in England or Ireland. For thus stands the case with him: by reason of the barrenness of his countries he is not able to keep his navy continually in one port, and being divided, as they are now and every year else since I knew the sea, it is not possible for them to make a head, for some of them lying at Cadiz,¹⁴ others at Coruña,¹⁵ and the rest at Lisbon, before they shall come to their rendezvous we shall be able to intercept them. Once again I humbly take my leave of your honour from aboard the Garland this 8th of May, 1602.

Yours honour's in all service to be commanded,
WILL. MONSON.

(4)

MONSON TO NOTTINGHAM AND CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xciv. 128.

August 10th [1602].

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed: 'Sir Wm. Monson to my Lord Admiral and my master from Plymouth.']

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Here arrived the Swiftsure the fourth of this month, of the Answer and hoy I hear nothing as yet. Since her coming down I have stopped a leak she had, mended her beak head, which was ready to fall off, and taken in all her victuals, so that I am now ready to take the benefit of the first wind, with all the ships that are here except the Paragon, who I do leave to accompany the Answer and to bring the store of all the other ships. And because one hour's delay may be an overthrow to the voyage, the year being so far spent, I have furnished the

¹⁴ 'Cals.'

¹⁵ Monson, of course, always writes 'the Groyne' for Coruña.

ships of as much as the *Marchmar* could spare, which she is to be supplied withal out of the bay at her coming down.

Here is no news from Coruña nor any of that part of Spain since Mr. Greville's¹⁶ departure. From Saturday last here came in a *Brazilman*, and in her divers passengers which was taken by the Hollanders in the galleon they took at St. Helena.¹⁷ If they be not already arrived they do certainly expect two more galleons the latter end of this month in Lisbon. They left in Pernambuco,¹⁸ the port from whence they came, five great hulks and at least thirty carvels and other ships, all which they make account will be at home in the latter end of September. In my next letter I hope your honours shall hear of my departure, and until then I humbly take my leave of your honours, and will ever rest

Your honours' to dispose of,

WILL MONSON.

Plymouth, 8 in the morning, the 10th of August, being Tuesday.

¹⁶ Fulke Greville.

¹⁷ A Dutch trading squadron, under Wolfert Hermann, had been 'making hay' of Spanish pretensions in the East, and besides founding the settlement of Batavia had defeated and scattered a Portuguese fleet of much greater strength. During Hermann's voyage home two of his ships met and took at St. Helena the carrack, the *St. Jacob*, referred to in the text, called a galleon by Monson. The passengers and crew were landed in Brazil and thus came on in the *Brazilman* Monson mentions, while the carrack itself arrived in Holland in July, and a medal was struck in honour of the event, the obverse of which showed with a grim humour the lion of the Netherlands chasing the leaping horse of Charles V. with the motto *Quo saltas insequar*—'wherever you go I will follow you.' The Dutch East India Company was chartered on 20th April, 1602, showing that the promise was made in earnest. The cargo of the *St. Jacob* sold for 1,500,000 florins.

¹⁸ 'Fenanbuke.'

(5)

MONSON TO NOTTINGHAM AND CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xciv. 147.

August 16th, 1602.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—August 16, 1602. Sir William Mounson to my master, from Plymouth.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Since my writing to your honours I have received a letter from your honours not much different from the course I undertook of myself for the hastening of the voyage, but now being fully authorised by your honours' letters to take up such wants as is needful for the ships, which I forebore to do until now, in respect that I durst not put her Majesty to more charge than needs must, and especially having no commission, therefore upon the receipt of your honours' letters in one day I supplied all our wants, as well for sea store as otherwise, and this day being Monday, howsoever the wind is, having fair weather, am ready to put to sea.

Because it hath pleased your honours to make stay of the Answer by reason of some defects which I always suspected in her, it were meet in my opinion that her Majesty's ships should be attended with some pinnace to be employed upon any occasion that shall be offered, either to advertise your honours into England or to discover where greater ships dare not adventure. In respect the charge is small, and the necessity great in having such a one, I have presumed so much upon your honours' allowance therein, as I have dealt with Mr. Stalladge¹⁹ for the present fitting one and sending her after me. Here are in the port of Plymouth divers ships both French and Dutch, and in the town divers Spaniards and Portuguese, expecting a wind, and passage to go for Spain.²⁰ I have thought

¹⁹ Wm. Stallenge, Customs' officer at Plymouth.

²⁰ Apparently passengers on board neutral ships, or the prisoners taken by the Dutch at St. Helena referred to in the

good to make stay of all such ships and men twenty-one days after my departure ; if your honours shall think it convenient to discharge them sooner, or detain them longer, your honours may please to give directions, otherwise the Fort is resolved to perform my request. Notwithstanding the encouragement of men in taking the Carrack, which was some fortune to every man besides their ordinary pay, their minds are little reformed of their abuses towards her Majesty's service, but daily run away, making no more difference betwixt receiving her Majesty's press, than an ordinary private action in a man-of-war,²¹ for it is an incredible thing to inform your honours of the number of sailors that are run away since our coming home. But to prevent such disorders hereafter I have taken a course which if it be well executed I hope will somewhat further her Majesty's service ; I have written to the chief officers of the towns where any presses have been that if they find any prest men returned from her Majesty's ships without a discharge under my hand, that they shall apprehend him and cause him to be conveyed to the gaol ²² to receive his trial according to the statute.²³

I have likewise written to the judges of the assizes, that if any such offenders come before them humbly to entreat them to execute the law with great rigour against them, and that if they find any such worthy of death, to sentence them to receive it at Plymouth to terrify all seamen by their example. And thus humbly craving pardon of your honours with the remembrance of my service to your honours, I humbly take my leave Plymouth the 16th of August, 1602.

Your honours' ever to command,
WILL. MONSON.

preceding letter. Englishmen found ashore in a Spanish port would have had little mercy.

²¹ Privateer.

²² 'Goale' in MS.

²³ See *ante*, i. p. 139, note.

(6)

MONSON TO CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xcv. 26.

Not dated.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

1602.

[Endorsed :—30 August, without date.²⁴ Sir William Monson to my master. Her Majesty's ships all put to sea.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Here arrived yesterday, being Sunday, and the same day Sir Richard Leveson went from hence, a small prize from the coast of Spain and one Portuguese²⁵ in her which had been in Lisbon a month before, at which time Don Diego de Borachero²⁶ went with his fleet to the Islands to waft home the two carracks, which was wanting, and the Indies fleet. This Portuguese had occasion to stay four days after in Cascaes, and in that space there came in the two carracks; the first land they fell withal was the Burlings to windward of the Hollanders, and they to windward of the Spanish fleet, not one of them being seen by the other.

Since that time this Englishman met off the Islands of Bayona the six galleys of Spinola's in their way to Coruña and from thence to Santander; whether they shall there winter or come along for the Low Countries the Portuguese cannot report; he was supplied with slaves and oars out of the galleys of Lisbon.²⁷

Vasco Fernandes Ceser, the King's principal officer of his navy in Lisbon, with seven of the chief gentlemen that were in the Carrack, are imprisoned, and it is thought shall be executed for the loss of the Carrack.²⁸

²⁴ *Sic.*²⁵ 'Portingall.'²⁶ Don Diego Brochero de Paz de Anaya.²⁷ See *ant.*, ii. p. 191.

²⁸ The Saint Valentine. On 31st August, 1602, Wm. Stallenge writes from Plymouth to Sir R. Cecyll that when the prize left Lisbon, a month before, 'there were there imprisoned some men of great account—Vasco Fernandes Ceser, Proveedor of the

I do imagine your honour hath been informed of a report, which came from Rochelle, that the Portuguese hath surprised the Spaniards in the island of Terceira, and possessed themselves of the castle ; there is the like bruit in Portugal by this man's report. If it had been true it is like her Majesty should have heard from the Portuguese before now, having no other prince to rely upon.

After a long southerly wind and most extreme foul weather I thank God He has sent me this Monday night a fair north-east wind, which I was ready instantly to take, and I put to sea with all the ships as well manned as any that ever went out of England, and because my victuals should come out all together, and mistrusting my beer which proves not altogether so good, I revictualled myself for a week with beer only, so that, until the latter end of November, at which time it is fit to draw home with her Majesty's ships, I account myself royally²⁹ fitted, and I hope in that space to do some service to deserve your honour's favour, being the only thing I desire in this world. I am unwilling to lose a minute of time, having so fair a wind. I humbly take my leave of your honour, and will ever live

To be disposed by your honour,

WILL. MONSON.

King's Almacenes, and the Conde de Vidigueyra, late Viceroy of the East Indies, with others upon some occasions of the taking of the carrack' (*Cecil MSS.*). Dom Francisco da Gama, fourth Conde de Vidigueyra, a descendant of the great Vasco da Gama, had been Viceroy from 1597 to 1600. Fernandes Ceser was not an executive officer, as Monson seems to imply, but, as Proveedor, a paymaster and inspector of naval stores in the galley dockyards.

²⁹ In MS. 'vyeally.' The reading in the text is that adopted by the editor of the *Cecil MSS.*

(7)

MONSON TO CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xvii. 78.

*Not dated.*³⁰

[Holograph.]

[Endorsed :—Without date. 1602. Sir William Monson to my master from Plymouth. His justification concerning the conjuror, and being at Mass.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I received a message by Sir Richard Leveson from your honour, which he partly forgot, but in effect that I should not countenance a man in Plymouth suspected to be a conjuror. There was an accident happened which belike your honour was informed some part thereof, though perhaps not with the full proceedings, which I will deliver truly to your honour, and then your honour may judge how like I was to have been abused by the folly of the mayor if by mere fortune I had not prevented it. I had of late a youth that served me, which, through the extremity of a calenture, fell so extreme mad as he was forced continually to be watched and kept in a dark chamber, and one day, observing when all my servants was abroad, broke out of his chamber window and ran to one of his acquaintance in the town, and told him that the day before he came into a house at five o'clock in the afternoon and see this supposed conjuror with six more all disguised saying mass, and going into a chamber above it he found me all alone. The man to whom he told this, having as little wit as the mad body, informed the mayor thereof. The mayor hereupon sent to entreat me that my youth might come unto him. I presently sent him, and a man with him, to inform the mayor that he was mad, desiring him to pardon him if any complaint came against him for some disorder which he used to do when he could steal abroad. The house

³⁰ As the last paragraph refers to the subject of intelligence from Spain discussed in the 'other' letter of August 30th, and as he sailed early on the 31st, this must be of the same date.

where this was said to be done was searched, and the suspected man's lodging who lay in the same house; there was found in his chamber two books, and a piece of paper full of figures touching diseases, and one about the success of one of the Queen's ships with the name of one Stephen unto it, sailor, that was to go in the same ship. The man, hearing his chamber was searched, went unto the mayor, who committed him until he made proof where he had been all the day the mass was supposed to be said. And I, hearing by chance how my name was used to be in a house where a mass was, went immediately to the mayor, who showed me the boy's confession. I told him how unlike it was any such thing could be, for that the time of the day was against the use of masses to be said, and for my own purgation I protested I had never been in that house in my lifetime, that all the men in the fleet could witness I was aboard that day from one o'clock until eight at night, that the boy was mad could be proved by half the town, and that he was locked up all that day my servants and the folks of the house where I lay could testify. When the mayor heard these evident proofs [he] began to remember himself there was no such chamber in that house where the boy confessed I was. The mayor, seeing his error, was sorry that he had like to have injured me so much; and ashamed that he should credit a report of a mad man without examining further circumstances, he would have delivered me the boy and his confession, which I refused to take, but wished that the boy might be kept that night with a watch to observe his humour,³¹ whether he was mad or no, and that all persons suspected to favour a mass in the town might be examined; that the man which by name was reported by the boy to be there might have offered him his oath of supremacy, and enquiry made when he had been at church. All this was done, the boy was found by his keepers to be mad, and all to proceed out of an idle brain. Then the mayor asked my opinion what he should do touching the books and papers. I advised him if they touched either religion or state to bind him over to answer it before the high commissioners, and that if he could find no friends to be bound for him to keep his money in deposit, which the mayor told me was fifty

³¹ 'Ewmore' in MS.

pounds found in his chest. What the books imported I know not, but it is like no great matter, for of the fifty pounds he kept but twenty for the answering it; since that time I never heard what became of it. Thus your honour may see that my countenancing of him, as your honour was informed, was to clear myself, which through the indiscretion of the mayor might have brought my name in question to my utter discredit and overthrow.³³ For such intelligence as I received by a Portuguese lately taken, and the Englishman which brought home the said Portuguese, I refer your honour to my other letter and myself to your service, which I will everlastingly vow unfeignedly to perform.

Your honour's evermore to be commanded,
WILLM. MONSON.

(8)

MONSON TO CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xcv. 136.

Oct. 4th, 1602.

[Holograph.]

[Endorsed :—4th of October, 1602. Sir William Monson to my master, from the coast of Spain.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Presently, upon the dispatch of my letters to your honours from Plymouth, I put to sea with a scant wind and a likelihood of foul weather, which I choosed rather to do than to lie in harbour expecting a settled wind with expense of victuals. The same day se'nnight I set sail I fell with Coruña, where I spent two days and a half plying before the harbour, in which space I met with an Irishman that come from Rochelle bound in for Coruña, who had been at Coruña a month before. He did assure me that [in] the fleet which lay there, and threatened arriving in England, such as were taken perforce to serve were discharged, and the King's ships sent to Lisbon there to join with the fleet that was

³³ From here apparently added later.

preparing. He told me that Adonell,³³ who the Spaniards term the savage earl, seeing how much he was frustrated of his hopes when the action of Ireland was deserted, determined to travel up to the King to crave leave to return home into his country, there to make trial of his friends rather than to rely upon the hopes of Spain. Archer,³⁴ that arch-traitor, with some others escaping from Berehaven upon taking of the castle, put themselves to the fortune of the sea in a small French ship with one mariner, without compass, card, or glass, and being in this distress, he arrived at Coruña the 17th of July, where he spared not to speak liberally in the disgrace of Don John de Aguila. He went to the Court with a resolution to inveigh against him to the King, and, as far as his credit will give him leave, to animate the King upon a second expedition for Ireland. I do verily think that in the end both Adonell and he will transport themselves over into Ireland in some small vessel, there to try what head they can make, and to put the rebels in hope of supplies, rather than to attend themselves seeing how they are fed with promises and delays, and in my simple opinion it would seem an excellent course if all men-of-war³⁵ that go out of England were straitly commanded to spend a week in their going forth, either before Coruña or in the course betwixt Coruña and Ireland; besides the possibility in taking them, they will stop all intercourse betwixt Spain and the rebels.

When this intelligence of the division of the fleet was seconded by a Frenchman I spoke withal, and that there was no danger like to happen to Ireland, according to my directions I repaired to the Rock, and sent my carvel in with the shore to range along the coast to get me more intelligence. By the way I met some Frenchmen, which

³³ Hugh O'Donnell, Earl of Tyrconnell. He died soon afterwards. 'We hear out of Spain that O'Donnell, riding towards the court at Valladolid, died suddenly by the way, and, being opened, there was found in him a serpent (as some call it), or rather a worm with two heads of eight feet long' (*State Papers Dom.* 4th November, 1602).

³⁴ James Archer, a Jesuit, who had been assisting in Tyrone's rebellion.

³⁵ Privateers.

came from Lisbon. They told me of the arrival of the two carracks, the going to sea of the Spanish fleet, and of two galleons that were left in harbour for want of sailors to man them. I met off the Rock two gallant ships, Frenchmen of 300 tons apiece, going into Lisbon. They were laden with dry fish come from Newfoundland and had in them 250 men. I told them that their King had promised her Majesty that none of his subjects should carry either munition or victuals into Spain, and that if I should send them for England, and make prize of them, the King would be well pleased withal.³⁶ But, notwithstanding, because her Majesty hath a desire to show more friendship towards the King's subjects than any other Prince's, I would only forbid them any harbour of Spain and took a bond of them, which they willingly entered into, of 4,000*l*, which I have here sent unto your honours, and keep two of their men for pledges for the performance of what is contained in the said bond. In this I prevented the Spaniard of his three principal wants—ships, men, and victuals.

The day following I had the chase of a carvel, being the next ship unto her, and made sign to the rest of the fleet to keep their course. She recovered the road of Cezimbra before I could fetch her. I followed her under the castle, where I came to an anchor, and after some fight betwixt the castle and me I sent to the Governor that I might have the carvel delivered to me; if not, that I would not leave shooting till I had beaten their town and castle about his ears. He returned me answer, as in truth it was, that she had bulged herself, that she came from the Terceira, and was laden only with wheat. I then sent for one of the men of the carvel, to know the state of the Terceira. The Governor sent me a present of several fruits, and all the intelligence he knew of Lisbon, of the mutiny of the soldiers of Terceira, some of which were in that carvel and brought to be executed in Lisbon, and of the Indies fleet which six weeks before were come home and fell with Cezimbra. He likewise sent me a secret promise, that when either I, or any from me, should come hovering before the harbour with a white flag in the maintop, to send to speak with me, and to deliver what he knows

³⁶ Compare Monson's instructions, p. 374.

touching the Spaniards. I am the more tedious in this, because your honour may see what use may be made of this man hereafter when her Majesty shall have a fleet upon this coast.

At my return again to the Rock I met all the ships and my carvel except the Paragon, which I suspect is gone home. If it be so I cannot excuse the captain nor master. My carvel made report that in her ranging the coast she found Zubiaur³⁷ with 14 ships riding under the Islands of Bayona, which news made me fear he meant to return again to Coruña, and understanding all the soldiers to be aboard him that came from Ireland, not knowing how far Archer had prevailed at Court, and seeing there was no cause to detain him upon this coast, the Hollanders being gone and the Indies fleet and carracks arrived, I suspected lest the King would once more prosecute the Irish affairs, and was resolved after I had got some farther intelligence to repair to Coruña to attend that fleet; but the 26th of September, at night, being close aboard the Rock, I espied a light which I gave chase unto, hoping it had been either the St. Thomé or Brazil fleet. I bore within pistol shot of the Admiral, thinking to have boarded him suddenly before he was prepared, but when I see the hugeness of his ship and the number of the rest to answer the proportion of those my carvel made relation of, being thus engaged amongst them I had no way to avoid them without hurt, but counterfeited to be of the fleet, and caused a Spaniard I had aboard me to ask what strange ship it was that was come into the fleet that night. The Adventure, for only she and the Whelp was in my company—the Mary Rose and Dreadnought I had lost three nights before in a storm—bore up, thinking I had carried that light and that the other ships had been Flemings I had made strike. She was presently discovered to be an enemy; they shot at her and spoiled some of her men. Captain Norreys had stayed a small Frenchman the day before and put five Englishmen into her, which the day after was taken, for the Spaniards followed us that day, and most of them, especially two great ships, fetched exceedingly upon the Whelp. When I see that by sailing she could not avoid

³⁷ 'Sereago.'

THE SPANISH GALLEYS

The Spanish galleys were the most formidable vessels of the time, and were used by the Spaniards to attack the English ships. They were long and narrow, with a high prow and stern, and were propelled by oars. They were armed with cannon and muskets, and were manned by a large crew of oarsmen and soldiers. The Spanish galleys were used to attack the English ships in the Channel, and to capture them. They were also used to transport troops and supplies to the coast of Spain. The English ships were often attacked by the Spanish galleys, and many were captured. The Spanish galleys were a great threat to the English ships, and they were used to great effect by the Spaniards.

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Brochero, coming into Lisbon after the fight at Cezimbra, hanged three of his men which rose against the captain of one of his galleys, slew him, and would have yielded her into us. He went towards the Low Countries before my coming upon the coast. The galleys that were drawn together at San Lúcar and Cadiz are returned again into

⁴⁸ In the next letter he says that Brochero was the Spanish commander.

the Straits, and ride at this instant at Cartagena, where it is said the King will go to see them. Don Pedro de Toledo, who thought to have gone chief commander, is greatly discontented that Don John de Carbona has the place, and refuses to go at all.

In hope your honours will take this in good part until I have better opportunity to send home, I humbly take my leave of your honours, beseeching God long to bless and prosper your honours in all health and happiness. From the coast of Spain by a prize of Fowey, this 4th of October.

Your Honours' evermore to command,
WILL. MONSON.

(9)

MONSON TO CECYLL.

Cecil MSS. xv. 167.

October 19th [1602].

[Holograph.]

[Endorsed :—19 October, 1602. Sir William Monson to my master, from the coast of Spain. Received 25 November.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Ever since the writing of my last letter to your honour the wind hath continued easterly, which hath kept me from seizing the Rock, or the Brazilians from entering into Lisbon. It puts the Portuguese in such fear of their miscarrying, as they hold the whole city undone if they come not in safety this month, and hath daily processions and solemn prayers that they may escape the Englishmen.

Don Diego Brochero, after his long time spent at sea to little purpose, for that he hath not taken one English man-of-war, though at several times met with as many as are at sea, entered into Lisbon twelve days since, with some of his masts spent, most of his ships leaky, and one of them sunk in the sea. I hear he frets it was I that came so nigh him in the night, amongst the midst of his fleet and escaped in the manner I writ to your honour of.

them, I struck my topsails and stayed for them, which Zubiaur perceiving cast about and stood the other way, and made a sign for his fleet to do the like.³⁸ One of the great ships fetched upon the Adventure, who likewise struck her topsails, but the Spaniards left her in the like manner. Seeing I had thus escaped them I was glad to see Zubiaur drawn again to the southward, for now your honours may be bold to assure her Majesty for any attempt against Ireland, and I do very well perceive that this small force of mine, which is made far greater ashore, as I am informed, is the principal means to divert him from his attempts in Ireland, and therefore, if I return not that benefit that I desire, my hope is in your honours that her Majesty will accept of my service performing that I was principally employed in, though I do not despair of the other if God please to send me some fair weather, which at this time of the year this coast is little subject unto. So soon as I meet with the Mary Rose I mean to send her to England, for here she is of small service, being no better sailer and a great charge to her Majesty. The Whelp goes likewise ill, which I will send home with the first purchase.

The kingdom of Portugal was never in that penury and want of corn as at this instant. If her Majesty can stop the French relieving them, and prevent the Easterlings with a fleet at spring, they will be driven to a great calamity. I know not whether to impute to the contrariness of the winds or to the fear they conceive of her Majesty's continual fleet upon this coast, but certain it is the Easterlings' trade is not so great into Spain as in former times. Since my coming upon the coast I have not met one of them; Frenchmen swarm like bees in the sea and they going securely from Englishmen the Spaniards hath their only trade in their vessels.

Spinola, coming into Lisbon after the fight at Cezimbra, hanged three of his men which rose against the captain of one of his galleys, slew him, and would have yielded her unto us. He went towards the Low Countries before my coming upon the coast. The galleys that were drawn together at San Lucar and Cadiz are returned again into

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The 17th of this month I met a Frenchman, which came from San Lucar, by whom I understood of the arrival of two Indies-men, and of seven more daily expected which lost company of the other two 20 days before. Here-upon I hastened to the South Cape with the Whelp and my carvel in my company; the other ships I left to lie about the Rock, so that seeing both my hopes was at one instant and in several places I have divided myself, so that there is possibility at the least of one; and until I hear they be passed in, I am resolved to fare hardly rather than to return home. I fear the rest of the ships will be forced home sooner than their victuals end, it falls out so ill; the Whelp is in some want of drink which I will supply out of Frenchmen.

This present 19th of October and the same day I fell with the Cape,³⁹ I met an Italian which came out of Lisbon; there were Dutchmen in her which ran away to avoid serving in the King's ships; they desired to be taken into my ship, and I have them aboard me. Zubiaur, with eight of the least ships of the sixteen Don Diego had, put to sea in their company, but what his design is they know not; some saith to lie before Lisbon to attend the Brazil fleet, others that they have directions to fall with the Madeira and that those ships shall waft them from thence. The other eight great ships are unrigged. The King's want of mariners and all provisions to sea is such that your honour need neither fear Ireland nor any great fleet of his to be employed anywhere, for he was not able to furnish those eight ships without taking sails, cables and anchors from such Easterlings as were in the harbour. Sailors of all nations seek to avoid his service, and either run away in shipping or flies to hide themselves in the mountains. There are five galleys comed to Lisbon, which makes up the number eight. Parker of Plymouth hath a ship taken by a Dunkirk⁴⁰ and brought into Lisbon; the Dunkirk is of good force and carrieth 250 men, the captain of her had made an offer to the King and expects daily an answer, that if he may have the King's favour and all the goods he can take, the King to have the ships, ordnance and muni-

³⁹ *I.e.* he made St. Vincent on the date of this letter.

⁴⁰ A Dunkirk privateer.

tion, he will undertake every eight days to bring into Lisbon either an Englishman or Hollander.

There is no preparation either in Cadiz ⁴¹ or San Lucar, nor nothing else in this coast worth certifying your honour of, wherefore I humbly take my leave of your honour, and will ever live,

Your Honour's to be commanded,

WILL. MONSON.

The 19th of October.

⁴¹ Monson nearly always writes 'Cals' for Cadiz. In Elizabethan papers 'Cales' is the most frequent form, and Monson's very phonetic spelling probably gives us the common pronunciation.

THE END OF THE SECOND VOLUME

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